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ABSTRACT 
 
This is a thesis about legislative package deals in the European Union and their effects on 
EU policy outcomes. It analyzes inter-chamber legislative exchange between the Council 
of Ministers and the European Parliament. The key argument is that package deals increase 
the legislative influence of the European Parliament across legislative procedures and 
policy areas. Package deals allow Member States to establish control over the financial 
aspects of legislation and to ensure its adoption without delay. In exchange, the European 
Parliament gains further institutional powers and access to some of the EU‟s most salient 
policy areas. 
 Legislative bargaining between the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament is analyzed across all EU legislation, completed in the period 1 May 1999 - 30 
April 2007. The argument is tested empirically through the quantitative analysis of 1465 
co-decision and consultation proposals, 19 policy areas and 8 years. Five in-depth case 
studies complement the findings.   
 The results indicate that the use of package deals in the EU is conditional on the 
distributive nature of legislative proposals, and their urgency. In turn, package deals and 
urgency affect legislative outcomes. Package deals and delay increase the EP‟s legislative 
influence in the consultation procedure. Package deals and Council impatience increase the 
EP‟s legislative influence in the co-decision procedure. Overall, package deals extend the 
EP‟s legislative influence in distributive policy areas and increase its institutional powers.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
This thesis develops an argument about legislative package deals in the European Union. 
Package deals are agreements between the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament which link decisions on multiple issues and proposals. Issue linkages take place 
not only within proposals, but also across proposals and legislative procedures. Despite the 
importance of package lawmaking, this phenomenon has received little theoretical and 
empirical attention in EU legislative research. Procedural spatial modelling has been the 
most widely used analytical tool in the study of EU legislative politics. Standard models of 
EU lawmaking have focused heavily on the effects of agenda-setting, amendment and veto 
powers on EU policy outcomes. However, the thesis finds that around 25 per cent of EU 
legislation is decided through informal package agreements (p. 149). Package deals cover 
all the main areas of EU law-making and cut across the two main legislative procedures:  
co-decision and consultation. 
The purpose of the thesis, therefore, is to address this gap in the literature by 
providing answers to two questions:  
 
 Why are legislative package deals concluded regularly in the European Union? 
 What is the effect of legislative package deals on EU policy outcomes?  
 
To that end, the thesis analyzes legislative decision-making between the Council of 
Ministers and the European Parliament across all EU legislation completed in the period 1 
May 1999 - 30 April 2007. Legislative bargaining in the European Union is analyzed in the 
co-decision and consultation procedures across 2369 issues, 973 legislative proposals, 19 
policy areas, and 8 legislative years.  
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The main argument of the thesis is that package deals alter the traditional 
lawmaking process and affect legislative outcomes in the European Union. Package deals 
allow the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers to trade support for their 
preferred issues through logrolling. Given their interdependence, different preference 
intensities, repeated interactions in lawmaking, and their ability to conclude and enforce 
informal commitments, EU legislators find it profitable to cooperate through package deals.  
Package lawmaking allows Member States to establish control over the financial 
aspects of legislative acts and to ensure that legislation is adopted without significant delay. 
In exchange, the European Parliament receives further opportunities for legislative 
influence, increased institutional powers and access to some of the EU‟s most salient policy 
areas. Trialogue procedures provide the institutional structure for inter-chamber legislative 
gains from trade. Their informal nature allows EU legislators to exchange information 
during the decision-making process and to negotiate acceptable to both sides deals, thus 
avoiding gridlock. In addition, the thesis argues that timing affects EU policy outcomes. 
Time pressure can shadow the procedural power rules of the consultation and co-decision 
procedures. Delay and impatience may increase the power of a legislative actor beyond the 
procedural power allocated by the treaties.  
The argument has three core elements. First, package deals and legislative delay 
increase the legislative influence of the European Parliament in the consultation procedure. 
By linking issues and proposals in the consultation procedure and delaying its opinion, the 
EP extracts legislative concessions from the Council. Second, package deals and Council 
impatience increase the EP‟s legislative influence in the co-decision procedure. By linking 
issues and proposals in co-decision and cooperating with an impatient Council, the EP 
extracts legislative concessions from the Member States. Third, package deals increase the 
legislative influence of the European Parliament in distributive policy areas.  
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Overall, inter-chamber package deals allow Member States to control the policy 
agendas they value the most and, in exchange, to offer side payments to the European 
Parliament for its cooperative behaviour. In exchange for allowing Member States to 
realize their budgetary and policy preferences, the European Parliament gains additional 
institutional powers in policy areas where it has been traditionally weak or even excluded. 
The Commission also gains from the enforcement of inter-cameral package deals. The 
Commission facilitates such institutional mechanisms, because it gains closer access to the 
decision-making process.  
One of the most important features of legislative package deals is that despite their 
informal character, they have to be officially approved through voting by each of the EU 
legislative chambers. Any informal agreements made between representatives of the 
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers have to go through the formal legislative 
process in order to become law. Package deals are binding and the Council and the EP 
commit to enforcing them without amendments. This feature of package lawmaking 
requires that package compromises are clearly identified within the legislative process, so 
that they can be passed as block votes without amendments. The publicly available EP 
Legislative Observatory and the Council‟s Document Register provide sufficient data for a 
systematic study of the effects of package deals in the EU legislature.  
Although theories of legislative exchange have occupied a central place in 
legislative studies, the idea of gains from exchange has received little attention in EU 
legislative research. This thesis argues that EU decision-making presents legislators with 
multiple issues for consideration and that their repeated interactions create opportunities for 
exchange of support. The thesis extends the standard logrolling argument, developed in the 
context of single chamber bargaining, to the bicameral setting of the EU legislature. The 
thesis tests empirically whether the theory of legislative exchange holds in the European 
Union context and if so, what the effects of package deals are on policy outcomes. 
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The thesis is structured in two parts. Part I focuses attention on the development of 
package deals in the EU legislative process. Chapter I reviews the existing literature on EU 
legislative politics. Chapter II reviews the theoretical explanations of the use and 
enforcement of informal institutional deals as offered by rational choice theorists and 
organizational theorists. Chapter III presents the theoretical argument of inter-chamber 
logrolling in the European Union. Chapter IV outlines the empirical data and methodology 
used throughout the thesis.  
Part II presents the empirical tests of the theoretical argument. Chapter V examines 
the conditions for the use of package deals in the EU legislative process. Chapter VI 
analyzes the effect of package deals and timing on the legislative influence of the European 
Parliament in the consultation procedure. Chapter VII examines the effect of package deals 
and timing on the legislative influence of the EP in the co-decision procedure. Chapter VIII 
studies the effect of package deals on the legislative influence of the European Parliament 
across policy areas and across time. 
Chapter I provides an overview of the development of legislative package deals and 
informal procedures in EU decision-making since 1999. The chapter draws attention to the 
two main legislative procedures in the EU: the co-decision and consultation procedures. It 
reviews the existing procedural literature on EU legislative politics and it identifies the 
need for studying EU lawmaking as a repeated process, where exchange of favours can 
take place between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.  
Chapter II reviews two different literatures, which offer explanations of the 
emergence and enforcement of package deals in legislative organizations: rational choice 
theory and organization theory. Although the two literatures develop in different directions, 
both analytical approaches seek to explain the existence of informal institutional 
arrangements. They assume interdependence and repeated interactions between actors, 
where cooperative behaviour can emerge.  
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Based on the insights from these two approaches, Chapter III proposes the 
theoretical argument of inter-chamber logrolling in the European Union. The chapter 
describes the elements of the argument, its assumptions, and the main propositions to be 
tested in the empirical chapters. Particular attention is paid to legislators‟ motivations to 
engage in logrolls, their methods for doing so, and the potential gains from legislative 
exchange. The chapter outlines the hypotheses about the use of package deals and their 
effects on EU policy outcomes across legislative procedures, policy areas and time.   
Chapter IV presents the empirical data and methodology for assessing the content 
of legislative proposals and for measuring the effect of package deals on legislative 
outcomes. It introduces the sources of the data and the process of compiling the dataset of 
all EU legislation (1465 proposals), proposed and completed between 1 May 1999 and 30 
April 2007. The reliability of the data and measures are discussed. The empirical analysis is 
based on quantitative statistical methods and qualitative case studies. 
Chapter V examines the conditions for the use of package deals in the EU 
legislative process. It argues that inter-chamber logrolling in the European Union is likely 
to take place on distributive and urgent legislation. This hypothesis is tested across all co-
decision and consultation proposals completed between 1 May 1999 and 30 April 2007. 
The chapter finds that package deals are used regularly by EU legislators across several 
policy areas. Package deals allow the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament to 
exchange favours across issues and benefit mutually from the adoption of legislation.  
Chapter VI analyzes the effect of package deals and timing on the legislative 
influence of the European Parliament in the consultation procedure. It argues that package 
deals and legislative delay increase the likelihood of EP success in influencing legislative 
outcomes. This hypothesis is tested across all consultation proposals (925) completed in the 
period 1999 - 2007. The results confirm that despite its limited legislative powers in 
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consultation, the EP is more likely to influence policy outcomes through package deals and 
delay. These results are illustrated with two case studies.  
Chapter VII examines the effect of package deals and timing on the legislative 
influence of the European Parliament in the co-decision procedure. It argues that package 
deals and Council impatience increase the likelihood of EP success in influencing 
legislative outcomes. This hypothesis is tested across all co-decision proposals (540) 
completed in the period 1999 - 2007. The results confirm that EP influence in the co-
decision procedure is conditional on the availability of multi-package proposals and 
Council impatience. These results are illustrated with two case studies. 
Chapter VIII studies the effect of package deals on the legislative influence of the 
European Parliament across policy areas and across time. It argues that package deals 
increase the likelihood of EP success in influencing distributive policy outcomes in the EU. 
This hypothesis is tested across 2369 issues, contested in 973 pieces of legislation, falling 
in 19 EU policy areas, and negotiated in a period of 8 years. The results confirm that 
package deals allow the European Parliament to influence distributive legislative proposals 
and to gain greater institutional powers in some of the EU‟s most expensive policy areas. In 
addition, timing has a significant effect on EU legislative outcomes. 
The concluding chapter reviews the main arguments of the thesis and the empirical 
results of the effects of legislative package deals and timing on EU policy outcomes. Inter-
chamber package deals alter the traditional lawmaking process and affect legislative 
outcomes in the EU. Through package deals, Member States establish control over the 
financial aspects of legislative acts and ensure that legislation is adopted without delay. In 
exchange, the EP receives further opportunities for legislative influence and increased 
institutional powers. The final chapter addresses the contributions of the thesis with 
reference to the literature on EU legislative politics and the wider literature on legislative 
logrolling.  
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CHAPTER 1 : THE EU LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
PACKAGE DEALS  
More than two hundred pieces of legislation are passed every year through the EU 
legislature. EU laws have direct consequences for the scope and timing of government 
action across Member States. A slow-paced legislative process may have damaging effects 
on government performance and can impede the ability of Member States to act on salient 
national and international issues. The EU legislature, however, has become bicameral. The 
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament are now co-legislators in many policy 
areas. Given their interdependence and repeated interactions in the EU‟s bicameral 
legislative system, governments and MEPs find it profitable to cooperate and resolve inter-
chamber conflict through informal means.  
The institutional framework of the European Union has been restructured 
significantly by the changes introduced by the Single European Act (1987), the Maastricht 
treaty (1993) and the Amsterdam treaty (1999). Legislation was adopted initially through 
the consultation procedure, which was followed by the introduction of the cooperation, co-
decision I (Maastricht) and co-decision II (Amsterdam) procedures. Especially since the 
signing of the Amsterdam treaty, the EU legislative process has experienced the 
development of informal procedures, which reduce the costs of collective action.  
Legislative package deals between the Council and the Parliament have become a 
preferred and efficient alternative in bicameral decision-making. Despite the increasing 
amount of EU legislation made through informal bargains, students of EU legislative 
politics have said little about the consequences of this phenomenon. The chapter briefly 
examines the two main EU legislative procedures and traces the development of inter-
chamber package deals, trialogue procedures and timing in EU decision-making since 
1999. The chapter reviews the existing literature on EU legislative politics and it identifies 
need for an explanation of the use and effects of package deals in the European Union. 
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1.1 Legislative Procedures in the European Union  
The legislative process of the European Union has developed as a highly efficient 
mechanism for proposing, amending and adopting laws. Today, EU laws are agreed 
between the European Parliament
1
 and the Council of Ministers through two main 
legislative procedures: the co-decision and consultation procedures. In the 5
th
 legislature 
(1999-2004), almost a half of EU legislation was decided under the co-decision procedure, 
the rest under consultation, no proposals under cooperation and only a small fraction of 
proposals under the assent procedure (see Figure 1.1). In comparison, in the 4
th
 legislature 
(1994-1999), decisions were primarily made through the consultation procedure, followed 
by co-decision, with a small fraction decided under cooperation and assent. In the 6
th
 
legislature (since May 2004), around 50 % of EU legislation has been agreed through the 
co-decision procedure, and the rest under the consultation procedure. This section outlines 
briefly how the two main EU legislative procedures work.  
 
Figure 1.1 Development of EU Legislative Procedures (1994-2007) 
 
Source: European Parliament Legislative Observatory (OEIL): 01/05/1994 – 30/04/2007
2 
                                                 
1
 The European Parliament was made up 626 MEPs in the period June 1999 - May 2004. It consisted of 732 
MEPs in the period June 2004 - December 2006 and 785 MEPs in the period January 2007 – May 2009. 736 
MEPs are to be elected in June 2009.  
 
2
 The data were obtained from the European Parliament Legislative Observatory (OEIL). All procedures were 
taken into account (including, procedures completed, lapsed or withdrawn, and procedures under way). Each 
period starts on 1 May and ends on 30 April i.e. 01/05/1999 – 30/04/2000, etc. The period pictured runs from 
01/05/1994 – 30/04/2007.  
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The Consultation Procedure 
The consultation procedure was introduced by the Rome Treaties (1957) and until the 
signing of the Single European Act (1987) it was the main legislative procedure. Under 
consultation, the Member States in the Council are the key decision-making body and the 
European Parliament has only a consultative role. The procedure works in the following 
way. First, the Commission proposes legislation. The Parliament gives its opinion on the 
Commission proposal in the form of amendments. The Commission then may or may not 
incorporate the EP amendments in its revised proposal, which is submitted to the Council 
for a final decision. Usually, in order to adopt a proposal, the Council needs a qualified 
majority and in order to amend it - unanimity. Consultation is the simplest of all legislative 
procedures and although it was replaced in many policy areas, today the procedure applies 
to areas such as agriculture, budget, justice, freedom and security, and social and 
employment matters. 
Although the European Parliament has only consultative formal powers in this 
procedure, it has the power to delay legislation. The consultation procedure involves only 
one reading and specifies no time limits. However, Member States cannot adopt legislation 
without the formal opinion of the European Parliament. The ability to delay legislation 
becomes an important tool for legislative influence for the EP, especially when 
governments are pressed by time and deadlines.   
 
The Co-decision Procedure  
The introduction of the co-decision procedure marks a significant increase in the legislative 
powers of the European Parliament. The procedure was established under the Maastricht 
treaty (1993) (known as co-decision I), extended and simplified by the Amsterdam treaty 
(1999) (known as co-decision II) and further extended by the Nice treaty (2003). The co-
decision procedure gives the EP a co-legislative status with the Council. For a proposal to 
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become law both legislative chambers have to agree to an acceptable compromise. The 
procedure works as follows. First, the Commission proposes legislation, which is sent 
simultaneously to the EP and the Council for consideration. The first reading under co-
decision is equivalent to the consultation procedure, with no specified time limits. The 
Amsterdam treaty introduced the option of reaching agreement at first reading (known as 
the fast-track procedure). If the Council accepts the position of the Parliament at first 
reading or vice versa, then the text is adopted.  
If the Council and the EP are unable to agree at first reading, the proposal moves to 
second reading. The Council adopts a common position on the Commission proposal and 
this common position returns to the EP for a second reading. The Parliament within three 
months may accept, reject or amend the text. If the EP approves the text, the Council‟s 
common position becomes law. If the EP rejects the common position by an absolute 
majority, the legislation falls. If the EP proposes amendments to the common position, the 
proposal is returned to the Council. The Commission delivers its opinion on the EP 
amendments. The Council has three months (extendable with 1 month) to approve the EP 
amendments by qualified majority or unanimity (depending on the position of the 
Commission). If the Council rejects any of the EP amendments or fails to make a decision 
within the time limit, the proposal goes to conciliation (third reading).  
A conciliation committee is convened within six weeks between an equal number of 
Council members and MEPs, and a non-voting representative of the Commission. The 
conciliation committee has six to eight weeks to negotiate a compromise text based on the 
common position of the Council and the EP‟s second reading amendments. In conciliation, 
the representatives of the two chambers seek to adopt a joint text. If both sides reach an 
agreement, within six to eight weeks the joint text has to be adopted by the each of the 
legislative chambers. The Maastricht version of co-decision allowed the Council to 
reaffirm its common position, if the conciliation committee failed to agree a joint text. The 
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Amsterdam version of co-decision made the conciliation committee the last stage of the 
legislative process. If representatives of the Council and the EP cannot agree to a joint text 
in conciliation, the proposed legislation falls. Similarly, if either the Council or the EP fails 
to approve the text, the legislation falls. 
Although the co-decision procedure is longer and more complex than the 
consultation procedure, it has evolved smoothly allowing the European Parliament and the 
Council of Ministers to reach inter-institutional compromise. Only on few occasions have 
the co-legislative institutions been unable to find a compromise
3
. Co-decision applies to a 
wide range of issues including financial services, environment, telecommunications, energy 
and transport. Most importantly, co-decision creates institutional interdependence between 
the Council and the Parliament and governments are bound to negotiate with MEPs if 
proposals are to be adopted by the EU legislature.  
The formal process of adopting legislation in the EU through the consultation and 
co-decision procedures is outlined in the diagram in Figure 1.2. While formal procedures 
provide the general framework for legislative action, EU legislators have found informal 
ways for facilitating decision-making and reaching compromise without delay. Due to the 
development of package deals in the EU, much of the bargaining falls outside the frames of 
such „textbook diagrams‟ of EU decision-making. The following section draws attention to 
the development of package deals, informal trialogue procedures, and timing in the EU 
legislative process since 1999. The chapter then reviews the existing literature on EU 
legislative politics and it identifies the gaps in the literature in explaining the effect of 
package deals on EU policy outcomes.  
                                                 
3
 Since the introduction of co-decision, the EP has rejected the following pieces of legislation: 
3
rd
 reading rejections:  
The Voice Telephony Directive (COD/1992/0437) was rejected on 19 July 1994.  
The Biotechnology Directive (COD/1988/0159) was rejected on 1 March 1995.   
The Securities Directive (COD/1995/0188) was rejected on 11 May 1998.   
The Takeover Directive (COD/1995/0341) was rejected on 1 July 2001.   
The Port Services Directive (COD/2001/0047) was rejected on 20 November 2003.   
2
nd
 reading rejections: The Computer Patents Directive (COD/2002/0047) was rejected on 6 July 2005.  
1
st
 reading rejections: The Port Services Directive (COD/2004/0240) was rejected on 17 January 2006.  
Source: European Parliament Legislative Observatory (OEIL)  
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Figure 1.2 „A Textbook Diagram‟ of EU Legislative Procedures 
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Source: adapted from http://www.europa.eu and Corbett et al. (2005)
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1.2 Legislative Package Deals in EU Lawmaking   
The Concept of Package Lawmaking  
Legislative package deals are informal bargains agreed between representatives of the 
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Package deals allow the linkage of 
issues and proposals and their simultaneous decision by Council members and MEPs. 
Issues are not decided on a case-by-case basis, but are linked to one another. Usually 
agreed through informal negotiations, these legislative compromises serve as binding 
commitments and each of the legislative chambers has to accept the deals without further 
amendments. Package lawmaking allows the exchange of support between the EP and the 
Council across different types of issues to which the EU legislative chambers attach 
different preference intensities
4
. Logrolling allows some of the most controversial 
legislative proposals, which would otherwise face gridlock, to be negotiated successfully 
and passed without delay.  
Package deals are increasingly used in the European Union legislative process. 
Initially associated with the budgetary procedure, package deals are now employed 
regularly in the EU‟s bicameral legislature in different policy areas5. While only 21% of the 
legislative proposals were negotiated through a package deal in 2000, more than 41% of the 
proposals were package compromises in 2006. In the period between 1 May 1999 and 30 
April 2007 around 25% of the legislative proposals were negotiated through the bundling 
of issues and proposals together. 244 proposals involved an inter-chamber package 
compromise in the EU legislature (see Table 1.1). 72% of all package deals fell under the 
co-decision procedure (176 proposals) and around 28% of the package deals took place in 
consultation (68 proposals). In total, around 14 % of consultation legislation and 37% of 
co-decision legislation was decided through an inter-chamber package deal.  
                                                 
4
 Such exchange of support, votes, control or favours among legislators has traditionally been referred to in 
the US literature as „logrolling‟ (see Mueller, 2003).  
 
5
 Evidence of budgetary packages can be found in the Council negotiations in the mid-1960s, early 1970s 
and the early 1980s, as well as the Delors I package of 1987. 
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Table 1.1 Use of Legislative Package Deals in the European Union  
 
  Consultation Procedure   Co-decision Procedure 
 Year No Package Package Deal Total   No Package Package Deal Total 
1999/2000 52 1 (2%) 53  32 12 (27%) 44 
2000/2001 70 9 (11%) 79  52 24 (32%) 76 
2001/2002 69 6 (8%) 75  45 25 (36%) 70 
2002/2003 60 14 (19%) 74  30 31 (51%) 61 
2003/2004 70 8 (10%) 78  62 22 (26%) 84 
2004/2005 43 5 (10%) 48  33 24 (42%) 57 
2005/2006 42 21 (33%) 63  24 26 (52%) 50 
2006/2007 29 4 (12%) 33  16 12 (43%) 28 
Total 435 68 (14%) 503  294 176 (37%) 470 
Source: Own calculations; see Chapter IV 
 
How is package lawmaking different from traditional lawmaking? 
 Package deals in the EU legislature can take several forms. First, package deals 
between the European Parliament and the Council can be concluded on single proposals 
where multiple issues are bundled together. Such multi-issue proposals have also been 
known as „omnibus‟ legislation6. Examples of single multi-issue package deals can be 
found in co-decision legislation. These include the Services Directive (2004), the Mobile 
Roaming Charges Regulation (2006) the Energy Efficiency Directive (2003), the 
Genetically Modified Organisms Regulation (2002), the Spirit Drinks Regulation (2005), 
and the Domain .EU Regulation (2000)
7
.  
 Second, legislative packages may often be decided on several proposals, linked in a 
multi-proposal package. Multi-proposal packages may include legislation, falling under the 
same or different decision-making procedures. Consider the Solidarity and Management of 
Migration Flows Package (2005)
 8
. This package involved three co-decision proposals on 
the European Refugee Fund, the European Borders Fund, the European Return Fund, and a 
consultation proposal on the European Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals. 
                                                 
6
 Such proposals usually involve a large number of issues and hence the term „omnibus‟ (see Krutz 2001). 
7
  COD/2004/0001, COD/2006/0133, COD/2003/0300, COD/2002/0046, COD/2005/0028, and    
    COD/2000/0328 
8
  COD/2005/0046, COD/2005/0047, COD/2005/0049, and CNS/2005/0048. 
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 Another example of a multi-proposal package is the Company Law Package 
(2004)
9
, which involved three co-decision directives: the Statutory Audit Directive, Annual 
Accounts and Consolidated Accounts Directive, and the Formation of Public Limited 
Companies Directive. A further example of multi-proposal package legislation is the Road 
Safety Package (2003)
10
, which involved the decision on four co-decision directives, the 
Directive on Seats, Anchorages, Head Restraints and Safety Belts, the Directive on Safety 
Belts and Restraint Systems, the Directive on Anchorages of Safety Belts, and the Directive 
on Frontal Protection Systems on Motor Vehicles.  
Figure 1.3 presents the distribution of package deals completed between 1999 and 
2007 across policy areas. The policy areas with the highest percentage of legislative 
proposals decided through package deals were Budget (60%), Research (77%), Energy and 
Transport (42%), and Information Society (41%). On the other hand, the smallest 
percentage of package deals falls in the policy areas of Fisheries (2%) and External 
Relations (5%).  
 
Figure 1.3 Percentage of Package Deals Across EU Policy Areas: 1999-2007 
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Source: Own calculations; Policy areas are defined by Commission Directorate - General (DG). 
                                                 
9
 COD/2004/0065, COD/2004/0250, and COD/2004/0256. 
10
 COD/2003/0128, COD/2003/0130, COD/2003/0136, and COD/2003/0226. 
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 Package lawmaking allows the EU legislative bodies to obtain their most preferred 
outcomes by exchanging support on some issues for support on other issues. When 
decisions are made on packages of legislation and issues and proposals are linked together, 
EU lawmaking cannot be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Due to their informal nature, 
package compromises require the support of both chambers in order to be enforced. The 
instability of informal agreements has led to the development of an institutionalized 
mechanism for their enforcement – the trialogue.   
 
1.3 Trialogue Procedures in EU Lawmaking 
The development of the co-decision procedure has increased inter-chamber collaboration in 
the EU. Since 1999 a growing number of legislative proposals have been accepted at first 
reading and this has lead to a significant decrease in decision-making time. While only 
21% of co-decision proposals were decided at first reading in 2000, more than 72% of the 
proposals were first reading agreements in 2006. Accordingly, while the average decision-
making time in 2000 was 630 days, legislative decision-making only took on average 350 
days in 2006. With the view of resolving inter-chamber conflict, exchanging information, 
and reaching consensus earlier in the legislative process, the Council and the EP have 
intensified the use of trialogue procedures. 
 
Figure 1.4 Percentage of Adopted Co-decision Legislation (1994-2007) 
 
Sources: European Parliament Legislative Observatory, Own Calculations 
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Trialogues are informal legislative meetings that consist of a limited number of 
participants from the Council, the European Parliament, and the Commission
11
. They 
facilitate negotiations between the EU legislative institutions prior to formal voting. 
Trialogues can be conducted at any time of the legislative process and may include EP 
rapporteurs, shadow-rapporteurs and political party leaders as well as Council ministers, 
Presidency representatives, Coreper and working group officials. While initially associated 
with the preparation of third reading conciliation committees, trialogue procedures have 
been gradually institutionalised across first and second readings. The 2007 Joint 
Declaration on Practical Arrangements for the Co-decision Procedure includes a reference 
to the practice of trialogue negotiations
12
. These informal inter-chamber meetings have not 
only been used in the framework of co-decision, but they have also been employed in the 
consultation procedure. The use of trialogues procedures in consultation has gradually 
increased, especially since 2004. 
Table 1.2 presents the distribution of co-decision and consultation proposals 
completed between 1 May 1999 and 30 April 2007 and the yearly use of trialogue 
procedures in EU decision-making. On average 76% of the amended co-decision 
legislation and 5% of the amended consultation legislation went through at least one 
informal inter-institutional meeting. In co-decision, all third readings, 79% of the first 
readings and 61% of the second reading legislative proposals were discussed by the 
Council, the Parliament and the Commission in informal meetings
13
. In 2000, only 41% of 
the co-decision proposals (including the third readings) involved trialogue contacts. In 
2006, more than 94% of the proposals were negotiated between the Council and the 
Parliament through informal contacts.  
                                                 
11
 Trialogues were first introduced in 1995 (Shackleton, 2000). 
 
12
   „... cooperation between the institutions in the context of codecision often takes the form of tripartite 
meetings (trialogues) which have demonstrated their vitality and flexibility in increasing significantly the 
possibilities for agreement at first and second reading stages, as well as contributing to the preparation of the 
work of the Conciliation Committee‟ (European Parliament, 2007: 7-9). 
 
13
   Own calculations. See Chapter IV.   
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Table 1.2 Development of Trialogue Procedures in the EU Legislative Process 
  Consultation Procedure   Co-decision Procedure 
 Year No Trialogue Trialogue Total   No Trialogue Trialogue Total 
1999/2000 53 0 (0%) 53  26 18 (41%) 44 
2000/2001 76 3 (4%) 79  28 48 (63%) 76 
2001/2002 75 0 (0%) 75  26 44 (63%) 70 
2002/2003 73 1 (1%) 74  13 48 (79%) 61 
2003/2004 77 1 (1%) 78  15 69 (82%) 84 
2004/2005 43 5 (10%) 48  3 54 (96%) 57 
2005/2006 51 12 (19%) 63  0 50 (100%) 50 
2006/2007 29 4 (12%) 33   0 28 (100%) 28 
Total 477 26 (5%) 503  111 359 (76%) 470 
 
Source: European Parliament Legislative Observatory and Council of Ministers‟ Document Register 
 
Figure 1.5 presents the use of trialogue procedures across EU policy areas. The 
policy areas with the highest percentage of legislative proposals decided through trialogue 
negotiations were Information Society (81.8%), Enterprise and Industry (76.8%), Energy 
and Transport (75.8%), Environment (74.1%), Internal Market and Services (68.1%) and 
Education and Culture (55.2%). The smallest percentage of trialogues is found in the areas 
of Fisheries (2.8%), Agriculture and Rural Development (5%) and Economics and 
Financial Affairs (6.7%).  
 
Figure 1.5 Percentage of Trialogue Procedures Across EU Policy Areas 
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1.4 Timing in EU Lawmaking 
The speed of EU decision-making has also increased since 1999. Whereas the average 
decision-making time in the consultation procedure has remained more or less constant 
between 1999 and 2007, the co-decision procedure has seen a gradual decrease in decision-
making time. In 2000/2001 decision-making in the co-decision procedure took on average 
686 days, whereas in 2005/2006 it took 506 days. It seems that since the 2004 enlargement, 
the speed of EU decision-making has increased further in both procedures (see Table 1.3).  
 Between 1999 and 2007, decisions on legislative proposals under the consultation 
procedure took on average 301 days, whereas legislative proposals under the co-decision 
procedure took on average 635 days. Due to the longer decision-making process and the 
greater involvement of the European Parliament, the co-decision procedure takes on 
average twice as long as the consultation procedure. This applies to legislative proposals to 
which the EP submitted amendments and to proposals which the EP passed without any 
amendments. Non-amended proposals in the consultation procedure took on average 251 
days, whereas non-amended proposals in the co-decision procedure took on average 419 
days. Generally, since 1999, the frequent interactions between the European Parliament and 
the Council of Ministers and the development of informal contacts have helped EU 
legislators reduce decision-making time.  
  
Table 1.3 Average Time (Days) of EU Decision-Making 
 Consultation Procedure  Co-decision Procedure   Both Procedures 
 Year 
Non – 
Amended 
Amended Total   
Non - 
Amended 
Amended Total   
Non - 
Amended 
Amended Total 
1999/2000 319 307 312   623 739 729   346 490 442 
2000/2001 202 325 272   341 730 686   222 525 430 
2001/2002 241 362 306   426 670 642   264 510 426 
2002/2003 254 382 342   386 551 532   280 458 417 
2003/2004 324 315 319   538 572 566   375 448 425 
2004/2005 258 397 315   660 704 700   290 564 449 
2005/2006 264 368 327   149 541 506   251 445 389 
2006/2007 159 242 191   214 344 310   168 289 228 
Total 251 342 301   419 668 635   275 499 424 
European Parliament Legislative Observatory http://www.europarl.eu/oeil; Own calculations  
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Moreover, the speed of EU decision-making varies across different types of 
legislation and policy areas. Table 1.4 presents the average decision-making time of EU 
legislation between 1999 and 2007 according to the type of legislative act: Directives, 
Regulations, and Decisions. On average, Directives took (682 days) almost twice as long as 
Regulations (370 days) and Decisions (338 days). Directives took on average 768 days in 
the co-decision procedure and 425 days in the consultation procedure. Regulations took on 
average 566 days in the co-decision procedure and 270 days in the consultation procedure. 
Decisions took on average 473 days in co-decision and 307 days in consultation. 
Finally, the timing of EU decision-making varies across different policy areas (see 
Figure 1.6). On average, decision-making took the longest is in the policy areas of Health 
and Consumer Protection (714 days), followed by Enterprise and Industry (698 days), and 
Energy and Transport (670 days). These policy areas cover mainly co-decision legislation. 
In contrast, EU decision-making took the shortest amount of time in the policy areas of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (201 days), Budget (209 days), Economics and 
Financial Affairs (206 days) and Fisheries (259 days). 
 
Table 1.4 Average Time (Days) of EU Legislative Acts 
 
 Consultation Procedure  Co-decision Procedure   Both Procedures 
 Year Directive Regulation Decision   Directive Regulation Decision   Directive Regulation Decision 
1999/2000 
(6)  
559 
(42)  
334 
(47)  
262 
  
(26) 
863 
(12)  
567 
(5)  
421 
  
(32) 
806 
(54)  
386 
(52) 
277 
2000/2001 
(14) 
528 
(61)  
260 
(65) 
 227 
  
(52) 
705 
(25)  
737 
 (10) 
455 
  
(66) 
668 
(86) 
 399 
(75) 
258 
2001/2002 
(11) 
549 
(59) 
 241 
(70) 
323 
  
(30) 
701 
(34)  
667 
(14) 
455 
  
(41) 
660 
(93)  
397 
(84) 
345 
2002/2003 
(12) 
382 
(57)  
300 
(38) 
394 
  
(32) 
621 
(27) 
 485 
(10) 
372 
  
(44) 
556 
(84)  
359 
(48) 
390 
2003/2004 
(13) 
331 
(63)  
252 
(60) 
387 
  
(35) 
755 
(45) 
 508 
(22) 
383 
  
(48) 
640 
(108) 
359 
(82)  
386 
2004/2005 
(11) 
339 
(41)  
342 
(66) 
293 
  
(25) 
737 
(25)  
696 
(13) 
636 
  
(36) 
615 
(66) 
 476 
(79) 
350 
2005/2006 
(8) 
405 
(44)  
253 
(52) 
378 
  
(11) 
386 
(24)  
501 
(20) 
577 
  
(36) 
394 
(66)  
341 
(79) 
433 
2006/2007 
(3)  
170 
(45)  
198 
(37) 
184 
  
(15) 
295 
(17)  
298 
(6)  
381 
  
(18) 
274 
(62)  
226 
(43) 
212 
Total 
(78) 
425 
(412) 
270 
(453) 
307 
  
(231) 
768 
(209) 
566 
(100) 
473 
  
(309) 
682 
(621) 
370 
(535) 
338 
 
Note:  Number of directives, regulations and decisions included in parentheses.  
5 directives were excluded from the 1999/2000 co-decision as they were extreme outliers, lasting more than 
2000 days and were lagged from the previous 1994-1999 legislature.  
Source: European Parliament Legislative Observatory http://www.europarl.eu/oeil; Own calculations  
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Figure 1.6: Average Time (Days) per Policy Area 
 
Source: European Parliament Legislative Observatory http://www.europarl.eu/oeil; Own calculations  
 
Legislative package deals, trialogue procedures, and decision-making time have 
been central features of EU lawmaking since 1999. First, legislative package deals are 
regularly agreed between representatives of the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament. Decisions are not made on a case-by-case basis, but proposals and issues are 
bundled in packages and agreed as a whole. Second, trialogue procedures have developed 
across the co-decision procedure and they are now employed in the consultation procedure. 
While initially associated with conciliation committees, trialogue procedures have been 
gradually institutionalized and are employed frequently in different policy areas. Third, the 
speed of EU decision-making has increased. The timing of EU decision-making varies 
according to procedure, type of legislation and policy area.  
Despite the importance of legislative package deals, trialogue procedures and 
legislative timing, the existing literature on EU legislative politics has paid little attention 
to these factors. Spatial procedural models have been predominantly used in existing EU 
legislative research. Such models analyse how formal rules affect legislative outcomes, but 
they neglect the importance of informal negotiations, the existence of actors‟ different 
preference intensities and the opportunities for legislative exchange in the European Union.  
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1.5 Existing Research on EU Legislative Politics  
 
Procedural Spatial Models of EU Legislative Politics  
Rational choice institutionalism has been the most widely used theoretical approach for 
studying EU legislative politics
14
. Borrowing from theories and spatial models of 
legislative behaviour and organization, students of EU legislative politics have adapted and 
tested various models to understand the decision-making process in the European Union 
(Pollack, 2006, 14). Spatial models have played a central role in the analysis of legislative 
politics (Stewart, 2001). Spatial modelling has also been very popular in analyses of US 
legislative decision-making (Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997).  
 Spatial modelling is also the most widely used analytical tool in the existing EU 
legislative literature. This approach was developed in some of the best known models of 
EU decision-making (Tsebelis, 1994; Steunenberg, 1994; Crombez, 1996; Tsebelis and 
Garrett, 2000). These studies analyse how formal procedural rules and institutions shape 
legislative outcomes. Spatial models of EU legislative politics address the effects of 
agenda-setting, amendment and voting rights on policy outcomes (König, 1999).  
 In most spatial analyses of EU decision-making, legislators‟ expected utilities are 
measured by the distance between the location of their ideal policy position(s), the status 
quo and proposed amendments to Commission proposals (see Selck, 2004a, 2004b; König 
and Poter, 2001; Steunenberg and Selck, 2002; Selck and Steunenberg, 2004; König, 
2005). Procedural models do not consider the possibility of actors‟ different intensities of 
preferences on different issues. Actors‟ preferences are not assigned any weights. Such 
models do not analyze actors‟ ability to link their voting positions across different issues.  
Decision-making is viewed as a one-shot game, where the possible effects of cooperation 
on past or future legislation are not taken into account. Actors are also assumed to make 
                                                 
14
 This is not surprising as the most well-known studies of US legislative politics have also been based on 
rational choice theories (Kiewet et al, 2002, 5). 
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decisions on a one-dimensional policy space, and issues are decided on a case-by-case 
basis (Schulz and König, 2000). The existing procedural models of EU legislative politics 
analyse situations where no trading of favours, support or votes is possible. Informal 
negotiations in these models, if at all considered, do not deviate from procedural rules. 
Therefore, policy outcomes are not affected by informal commitments. Despite their 
preoccupation with the effects of formal rules and institutions, the existing procedural 
analyses have contributed immensely to the better understanding of EU lawmaking.  
The academic debate started with a disagreement over the powers of the European 
Parliament in the consultation and cooperation procedures (Tsebelis, 1994; Steunenberg, 
1994; Moser, 1996, 1997; Hubschmid and Moser, 1997; Kreppel, 1999). The Maastricht 
version of co-decision (1993) was a controversial topic in EU legislative research. Some 
regarded it as largely increasing the powers of the EP vis-à-vis the Council (Jacobs et al., 
1995; Crombez, 1997; Scully, 1997; Kreppel, 2002). Others found it to have the opposite 
effect, thus decreasing the powers of the European Parliament (Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996, 
1997; Tsebelis, 1997; Steunenberg and Dimitrova, 1999; Tsebelis et al., 2001). Since the 
introduction of the Amsterdam version of co-decision (1999), there has been a consensus 
on the institutional parity between the Council and the Parliament (Tsebelis and Garrett, 
2000; Rittberger, 2000; Maurer, 2003; Crombez, 2000a; Hix, 2005).  
In the context of the cooperation procedure, Tsebelis (1994) claimed that the 
European Parliament enjoyed increased legislative influence due to its conditional agenda-
setting power. His argument is based on the assumption that in cooperation it is more 
difficult for the Council to modify an EP proposal (provided it was accepted by the 
Commission) than to accept it. Thus, the Parliament could offer a proposal that made a 
qualified majority of the Council better off and thus ensure Council support for EP 
amendments (Tsebelis, 1994, 131).
15
 Moser (1996) criticized this argument, claiming that 
                                                 
15
 Tsebelis (1995) provides examples of how the EP uses its conditional agenda-setting powers 
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Parliament‟s power under cooperation was even more limited than it was under 
consultation. This was due to the EP‟s dependence on the Commission‟s decision to 
include EP amendments in its revised proposal. Thus, the Commission was the empowered 
actor in EU decision-making and  not the EP (Moser, 1996, 834). Steunenberg (1994) also 
argued that the cooperation procedure left the Parliament a weak legislative institution. 
Moser (1997) and Hubschmid and Moser (1997)  found that the European 
Parliament could be influential in cooperation if unexpected changes took place in the 
legislative process and modified the positions of the Council and the Commission (Moser, 
1997, 345). In her empirical analysis of over 500 EP amendments, Kreppel (1999: 533) 
also found that the European Parliament was a significant legislative actor in the 
cooperation procedure. Although it was easier for EP amendments to pass when they were 
largely technical, the EP was able to amend legislation in a substantive way. 
Under the co-decision I procedure, the EP‟s right to unconditionally veto proposals 
after conciliation committees was widely regarded as empowering the European Parliament 
(Jacobs et al., 1995; Crombez, 1997; Scully, 1997). However, co-decision I allowed the 
Council to revert to its common position in the absence of an agreement with the EP during 
conciliation. This led some to conclude that the balance of power in the EU was weighted 
towards the Council. Instead of increasing the powers of the Parliament, the Maastricht 
version of co-decision diminished its conditional agenda-setting powers (Garrett and 
Tsebelis, 1996, 1997; Tsebelis, 1997).  
This argument was supported by the empirical analysis of some 5000 EP 
amendments carried out by Tsebelis et al (2001). The authors found that the conditional 
agenda-setting powers accorded to the EP by the co-operation procedure were more 
important than the veto powers ascribed by co-decision I (Tsebelis et al, 2001, 573). 
Steunenberg and Dimitrova (1999) also found that although conciliation committees were 
officially co-chaired by both institutions, the Council had greater agenda-setting powers 
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due to its more important role at the preparatory stage of conciliation meetings. Kreppel 
(2002) challenged this view with an examination of more than 1000 EP amendments, 
proposed under the cooperation and co-decision procedures between 1989 and 1996. The 
results confirmed that the Parliament was more successful under the co-decision procedure 
than it was under cooperation (Kreppel, 2002, 810).  
The Amsterdam version of the co-decision procedure (co-decision II) is now 
generally regarded as making the European Parliament an equal co-legislator with the 
Council (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000; Crombez, 2000a; Tsebelis and Kreppel, 1998; 
Crombez et al, 2000; Garrett et al, 2001; Hix, 2002; Kreppel, 2003; Maurer, 2003; Corbett 
et al, 2003). Initially, some authors were rather sceptical about the innovative nature of co-
decision II (Kasack, 2004
16
; Napel and Widgren, 2004
17
) and found no apparent symmetry 
between the Parliament and the Council. In contrast, Hix (2005: 33) claimed that co-
decision II transformed EU lawmaking to closely resemble a two-chamber legislature. 
While the Council and the Parliament share an equal standing in the co-decision 
procedure, the role of the Commission has been viewed as consistently declining (Tsebelis 
and Garrett, 2000; Tsebelis et al., 2001; Kreppel, 2002; Burns, 2004). Crombez (2000a: 53) 
even concludes that in the new version of co-decision the Commission is irrelevant, 
because it lacks formal power in the conciliation stage and can therefore be completely 
excluded from inter-chamber negotiations. In addition, due to the bicameral nature of EU 
law-making in co-decision, recent analyses of EU legislative politics have neglected 
decision-making in the consultation procedure despite the fact that it still applies in around 
50% of EU legislation and concerns a number of highly salient EU policies such as 
agriculture, budget, justice, freedom and security, taxation, and employment affairs.   
                                                 
16
 Kasack (2004: 258) indicates that the big step for the EP was made when progressing from cooperation to 
co-decision with the Maastricht Treaty and not from Maastricht to Amsterdam. 
 
17
 In their analysis of bargaining between the EP and the Council in the conciliation committee, (Napel and 
Widgren, 2004, 20) find no reason to conclude that the EP and the Council are equally powerful co-
legislators.  
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Largely accepting the equal footing between the legislative chambers under co-decision, 
academic attention has shifted to the analysis of legislative politics inside the Parliament 
and the Council. The effect of the Council‟s internal politics on policy outcomes is a 
central theme in EU legislative research (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 1997, 2006; Hayes-
Renshaw et al, 2006; Heisenberg, 2005; Hagemann, 2007; Lewis, 2003, 2005). In their 
intra-institutional analyses authors have identified the increasing importance of Coreper 
(Lewis, 2000; Bostock, 2002), the Council Presidency (Warntjen, 2008; Tallberg, 2003; 
Thomson, 2008) and Council working groups (Häge, 2007, 2008; Fouilleux et al, 2005). 
 Students of the internal politics of the European Parliament have recognized the 
legislative influence of parliamentary rapporteurs (Kaeding, 2004, 2005; Benedetto, 2005), 
political party groups (Hix et al., 2007; Noury and Roland, 2002; Hoyland, 2006) and 
parliamentary committees (McElroy, 2006, 2007; Bowler and Farrell, 1995; Whitaker, 
2005). While a full examination of the internal workings of the Parliament and the Council 
is beyond the scope of this thesis, some of the characteristics of intra-institutional decision-
making are later taken into account in the analysis of inter-chamber bargaining in the EU. 
Overall, standard spatial models of EU legislative politics are predominantly 
concerned with formal treaty provisions and the effect of procedural rules on legislative 
outcomes (Horl et al, 2005, 593). While realizing some of the limitations of existing 
models of EU legislative decision-making, much of the literature is still focused on 
explaining legislative behaviour through procedural spatial models, based on the treaty 
powers of the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers (Thomson et al., 2006; 
Selck, 2004b, 2005; Thomson and Stokman, 2006; Stokman and Thomson, 2004). 
Decision-making is viewed as a one-shot game, where issues are decided on a case-by-case 
basis. However, when EU legislative politics is analyzed as a repeated process where actors 
decide on several issues and proposals at a time, different conclusions may be made about 
legislative influence in the European Union.  
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Informal Procedures in EU Legislative Politics  
Recognizing the shortcomings of the traditional spatial literature, several authors have 
explored the development of informal procedures in EU lawmaking (Garman and Hilditch, 
1998; Shackleton, 2000, 2005; Farrell and Heritier, 2003, 2004; Shackleton and Raunio, 
2003; Rasmussen, 2003; Rasmussen and Shackleton, 2005; Stacey, 2003; Stacey and 
Rittberger, 2003; Christiansen et al., 2003; Steunenberg and Selck, 2006; Häge and 
Kaeding, 2007; Konig et al., 2007; Reh, 2008; Settembri and Neuhold, 2009). These 
authors recognize the need to examine both the formal and informal aspects of decision-
making and to trace their effects across the legislative process (Thomson and Hosli, 2006).  
 By examining the conciliation negotiations on several proposals, Garman and 
Hilditch (1998) identify the informal changes that have occurred in co-decision 
negotiations. They analyze informal inter-institutional meetings that precede official 
conciliation committees. However, the authors find insufficient evidence for the increased 
powers of any of the legislative chambers. Shackleton (2000) also recognizes the ability of 
informal norms to constrain institutional behaviour. Trialogues therefore may affect policy 
outcomes as the terms of informal negotiations are largely unregulated. In his study of the 
impact of informal agreements on the EU institutional balance, Stacey (2003) finds that the 
Parliament has gained in its negotiations with the Council. The EP has the ability not only 
to hold the Commission more accountable, but also to persuade it to support EP initiatives. 
The Commission, on the other hand, gains indirectly via the EP‟s gains vis-à-vis the 
Council and it simultaneously loses, due to the increase in inter-chamber agreements.   
Farrell and Heritier (2003, 2004) argue that the increasing use of informal 
negotiations in co-decision increases the legislative influence of the European Parliament. 
Through its involvement in informal legislative meetings, the Parliament gains legislative 
powers vis-à-vis the Council. The authors acknowledge the inability of standard procedural 
accounts, which treat each piece of legislation as a one-shot game, to adequately picture the 
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dynamic inter-institutional bargaining process. Steunenberg and Selck (2006: 81) also 
argue that informal trialogues allow the Parliament to shape legislative proposals in co-
decision . By making the initial proposal to the Council, the Parliament is perceived to have 
a first mover advantage, and to influence successfully the discussions in the subsequent 
stages of the legislative process. 
Häge and Keading (2007: 357) also find that the European Parliament can extract 
more policy concessions from Member States in informal negotiations. Reh (2008: 27) 
analyzes the development of informal trialogues in the context of the co-decision procedure 
and argues that "...where trialogues take place before the Council and the Parliament have 
established official positions that define the ground and scope for interaction....public 
deliberation and transparency are severely curtailed if not lost altogether". Settembri and 
Neuhold (2009: 145) also point to the increasing importance of trialogues and note that in 
addition to conciliation negotiations, trialogues have spread to first and second readings, 
particularly after the 2004 enlargement.  
Research in this area has been concerned to a large extent with EP - Council 
relations, neglecting the Commission‟s role in informal trialogues. The co-decision 
procedure makes it harder for the Commission to press for an outcome close to its 
preferences and reduces its formal institutional influence (Burns, 2004, 5). Nevertheless, 
Rasmussen (2003: 10) argues that the Commission can still be an influential actor. Through 
reliance on informal sources it is able to strategically persuade both the Council and the EP 
to take on board its policy preferences. Due to its co-existence with the other EU 
institutions, the Commission optimizes its influence, while participating in trialogues with 
the legislative chambers. Konig et al. (2007) study bicameral negotiations in conciliation 
committees and they also find that the Commission is an influential player in the co-
decision procedure. While the importance of informal negotiations has been noted, little 
has been said about the effect of package deals in bicameral legislative decision-making.  
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Existing Accounts of Package Deals in the EU Legislative Literature  
Departing from the traditional procedural literature, several authors have explored the 
importance of actors‟ preference intensities over issues and whether taking these into 
account has effects on EU policy outcomes (Arregui et al., 2006; Arregui and Stockman, 
2004;  Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman, 2004; Selck, 2004a). Several models that imply 
gains from legislative exchange in the context of EU decision-making have been developed 
recently. These are the position exchange model (Stokman and Van Oosten, 1994), the 
expected utility model (Bueno de Mesquita, 1994) and the spatial model of logrolling 
(Crombez, 2000b). Generally, these models analyse informal bargaining through which 
actors influence legislative outcomes and therefore are different from the existing formal 
procedural models. In contrast to procedural models, these analyses view EU decision-
making as a repeat-play environment in which informal norms and cooperation can emerge 
among legislative actors (Bueno de Mesquita, 2004:133). 
The first two models assume that actors are goal-oriented, but effective influence 
depends on cooperation between them. The Stockman and Van Oosten (1994) exchange 
model assumes the possibility of actors exchanging voting positions over a set of decisions. 
The authors argue that under certain conditions, two actors can gain expected utility 
simultaneously by exchanging voting positions on two decisions or issues. Both actors can 
expect to gain utility if actor A supports the policy position of actor B on issue 1 in 
exchange for support from actor B on issue 2. Collective decision-making is represented as 
a cooperative game in which all actors can gain under certain conditions and in which 
promises to shift positions are taken as binding commitments (Bueno de Mesquita, 1994).  
Crombez (2000b) develops a spatial model of logrolling in the European Union. He 
defines logrolling as „the exchange of votes among countries and MEPs‟. A logroll is a 
policy that results from such an exchange of votes. Crombez argues that consideration of 
multiple issues may motivate exchanges of votes among policy makers. Divergent policy 
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preferences create opportunities for such vote trading or logrolling. Crombez (2000b) 
argues that the EU‟s complex institutional framework provides multiple opportunities for 
efficient and stable logrolling. Every „legislative proposal arguably offers a means to 
formalize a logroll. Although the EU uses strict germaneness rules and does not pass 
omnibus bills dealing with seemingly unrelated matters, legislative proposals naturally 
involve more than one dimension and represent opportunities for logrolling‟ (p. 709).  
Several exchange models have also been developed in the analysis of legislative 
politics inside the Council of Ministers (Thurner and Linhart, 2004; Wallace, 1976). 
Relying on bargaining models as developed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Pappi and 
Henning (1999) develop a model of bargaining where utility maximizing Member States 
trade over multiple issues. Konig and Proksch (2006) develop an exchange model of 
Council decision-making, and empirically apply it to a case study on the Honey directive. 
However, there have been no analyses of possible logrolling practices inside the EP. While 
these models of legislative exchange has been developed, there has been no empirical 
testing of these models so far.  
 
Existing Discussions of Package Deals in the Broader EU Literature 
In contrast to the sparse literature on package deals in EU legislative politics, the 
concept of issue linkages and package deals has occupied a central place in the broader EU 
integration literature. As early as the 1960s package deals were identified as a means to 
Community decision-making and EC integration (Haas 1958; 1980; Lindberg 1963; 1965; 
Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970; Wallace, 1985; Nugent, 1989; Weber and Wiesmeth, 
1991; Bulmer, 1996; Hosli, 1996; Wessels, 1997; Friis, 1998; Radaelli, 1999; Elgstrom et 
al., 2001). Package compromises and issue linkages have been core themes in the 
neofunctionlist writing of Haas (1958) and Lindberg (1963). Especially in the 1960s and 
1970s, package deals were perceived by neofunctionalists as key to conflict resolution in 
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the European Communities. Haas (1958) and Lindberg (1963) argued that the use of 
deliberate linkages and package deals was an inseparable part of collective decision-
making (at the time concentrated in the Council of Ministers). These neo-functionalist 
studies of Community policy-making stressed that over time political linkages resulting in 
package deals would become more and more central to the decision-making process. 
Lindberg (1965) noted that especially in the Agricultural sector, package deals are very 
likely to be constructed where issues from other functional sectors are introduced to 
compensate for agricultural concessions. EU integration, therefore, could progress by 
means of deliberate linkages that created mutual gains (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989, 99).  
Lindberg and Sheingold (1970) identified log-rolling and side-payments as 
mechanisms aiding European integration. Logrolling involved bargains designed to attract 
the support of more political actors to a particular proposal. Package deals ensured the 
presence of necessary coalitions in support of specific proposals or policies. In fact, log-
rolls and package deals were almost inseparable parts of the decision-making process as 
defection by individual Member States was no longer a credible threat (Lindberg and 
Sheingold, 1970, 118). Thus, the bundling of issues has been considered as a powerful tool 
for overcoming distributional obstacles to cooperation among national governments (Haas, 
1980; Keohane, 1984). Issues in EC decision-making are almost always complex and 
multidimensional. To reduce them Member State governments have used package deals 
agreed through extensive informal negotiations and personal contacts (Wallace, 1985). In 
order to achieve consensus in the Council of Ministers, unrelated policy issues are often 
linked in packages to create mutual rewards (Nugent, 1989, 249). 
Complex bargains and informal agreements have been considered the norm in high 
politics negotiations surrounding the CAP and the Budget since the mid 1960s, early 1970s 
and the early 1980s (Swinbank, 1989; Spence, 1995). Distributive politics in the European 
Union are characterised by intense negotiations resulting in logrolling and side-payments. 
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Denton (1984) identifies successful issue linkage in the 1984 European Council CAP 
negotiations. Member States reached agreement on the agricultural package as increases in 
the Budget were linked to CAP reform. Weber and Wiesmeth (1991) also point to a 
successful package compromise in the negotiations over the establishment of the European 
Monetary System (EMS). Laffan (1997; 2000) finds that the negotiations of the Delors I 
package of 1987 were marked by issue linkages. The establishment of the internal market 
was linked to the budgetary package and several issues were linked together such as 
proposals for „a doubling of the structural funds, a reform to the CAP and the introduction 
of a new fourth Own Resource, related to the total GNP of member states‟ (Laffan, 1997, 
62-70). By bundling a broad range of issue areas into a single package that was negotiated 
simultaneously, the Union succeeded in achieving macro-reform.  
Lindner (2006) also discusses the importance of package deals in EU distributive 
politics. Due to the bundling of tightly interlinked reforms and the „package deal character 
of agreements on financial perspectives, member states‟ distributive demands were 
generally accommodated‟ (Lindner, 2006, 145). Finally, Radaelli (1999) identifies a 
successful package deal over the 1997 tax package. By the bundling of issues and their 
simultaneous decision, Member States losing on one specific tax policy issue received as a 
compensation gains in other issues. Thus, the „package deal approach facilitated 
agreement and put pressure on reluctant countries‟ (Radaelli, 1999, 674).  
While the concept of issue linkage and package deals has been identified as a 
prominent feature of EU decision-making, the majority of the existing analyses have 
concentrated on negotiations among Member States in the Council of Ministers and the 
European Council (Hosli, 1996; Bulmer, 1996; Wessels, 1997; Meerts, 1997; Friis, 1998; 
Metcalfe, 1998; Elgrstrom et al., 2001). The negotiation process among the Member States 
is iterative in nature and the requirement for unanimity in the Council of Ministers 
strengthens the incentives for issue-linkage. While providing rich insights on governments‟ 
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motivations to engage in logrolling, existing analyses of package dealing in the EU have 
not explored the idea of successful exchanges between two legislative chambers in a 
bicameral setting. The thesis therefore concentrates on analysing the exchange process 
between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers in the making of EU 
legislation. After observing the existence of package deals in Council decision-making, it 
should not be surprising that a version of package dealing between the European 
Parliament and the Council is present as the EU has developed a more bicameral legislative 
process. By taking into account legislators‟ saliencies over issues and the enforcement of 
package deals, this thesis develops the idea of inter-chamber exchange in the EU legislative 
process. The thesis extends the analysis of package deals to the inter-cameral level, where 
legislators from the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers exchange support 
across issues and proposals to achieve mutual gains. 
 
The Value of the US Legislature as a comparator to the EU Legislative System 
As Chapter II demonstrates, there exists a large body of literature on the US Congress 
analysing the effect of package deals in legislative decision-making. The analysis of inter-
chamber legislative exchange in the EU largely borrows from existing research based on 
the US legislature. How relevant is the US Congress literature to the study of the European 
Union legislative system? Of course, the US and the EU legislative systems are far from 
being identical. Power and Rae (2006) note that the US Congress is often used as a model 
in the analysis of other legislative systems. The authors confirm that the US Congress is a 
genuinely bicameral legislature and it has been a uniquely powerful legislature in 
comparative terms. However, they find similarities between the US and the EU legislatures. 
These include federalism, the separation of powers system, and a strengthening 
bicameralism. In both cases the legislatures possess effective policy-making power (Power 
and Rae, 2006, 13).   
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Despite some substantial differences between the US and EU legislature, Kreppel 
(2006) argues that the US case is particularly relevant to analyses of the EU legislature. 
Clearly, there are significant differences between the political systems and legislative 
branches of the US and the EU. However, despite these substantial differences, “there are 
also important similarities both in terms of the legislatures themselves and within their 
broader political environments” (Kreppel, 2006, 260). As in the US case, EU law enjoys 
supremacy over national law and legislation is made at the supranational level. In addition, 
the EU institutions, like those of the United States, include a method for representing the 
total population and the individual Member States – the European Parliament and the 
Council of Ministers. Although the balance of powers is different in the EU and the US, 
„both face a similar dispersion of legislative power with the executive and both chambers 
share between them the powers of initiation, adoption, and veto‟ (Kreppel, 2006, 262). 
Therefore, despite the differences between the US and the EU legislatures, the literature on 
the US legislative organization can inform a more advanced study of EU legislative 
decision-making (Bowler and Farrell, 1995, 25).  
 
Contextual Effects: Policy Areas and Time in EU Decision-Making  
In addition, the thesis analyses legislative influence in the European Union by taking into 
account the contextual effects of policy areas and timing. Thomson and Hosli (2006) 
acknowledge the importance of the variation of institutional influence across different 
issues, subject to the same decision-making procedures. Several recent studies attempt to 
explain legislative influence in the EU by studying institutional bargaining in different 
policy areas (Judge et al., 1994; Shackleton, 2000; Schmidt, 2001; Burns, 2005; Eberlein 
and Grande, 2005; Broscheid and Coen, 2007). Through the qualitative analysis of five 
single market case studies, Schmidt (2001) finds that in controversial cases with high 
distributional costs, the powers of the Commission are weakened vis-à-vis the Council‟s 
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Presidency. By focusing on informal rules and social norms in the Council, Schmidt argues 
the Commission is in practice a much weaker agenda-setter (Schmidt, 2001, 126).  
Burns (2005) studies the EP‟s influence across policy areas and she finds that the 
Parliament has more scope to influence regulatory policies than distributive policies. 
Placing legislative politics in different policy contexts helps to understand more fully 
legislative influence in the EU(Burns, 2005, 488). These studies agree that the regulatory 
field allows the EP a greater scope for legislative influence. In the area of the single 
market, Member States have been most prepared to pool sovereignty and delegate policy-
making powers to supranational institutions. Generally, legislation in regulatory policies 
requires technical experience and regulatory provisions do not affect radically Member 
States‟ national interests. Despite the general consensus over the difference between 
distributive and regulatory policy areas (Wallace et al., 2005), there exists no specific 
definition of distributive legislation or distributive policy areas in the EU. 
Broscheid and Coen (2007) have attempted to classify EU policy areas according to 
their distributive character. EU regulatory policies are characterized as largely technical 
areas, requiring more expertise. Distributive policies are assumed to be more politically 
salient. Hence, policies which consume large amounts of the EU‟s budget are assumed to 
be more politically salient than areas consuming little resources. 
 In addition to the effect of the policy context, the issue of timing has also become 
an increasingly important factor in the study of EU legislative politics (Golub, 1999, 2002, 
2007, 2008; Schulz and Konig, 2000; Konig, 2007, 2008; Golub and Steunenberg, 2007; 
Goetz and Meyer-Sahling, 2009). These authors have underlined the need to analyse EU 
decision-making by taking into account time pressure and deadlines. There have been 
different opinions on the methodology for calculating EU decision-making time and the 
legislative acts included in the analysis (Golub, 2007; Konig, 2007). Golub (2007) argues 
that analyses should focus on directives and not regulations and decisions as directives are 
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the most important legislative instruments in the EU. Konig (2008) contests this argument 
by pointing out that regulations and decisions can be as important as directives. The focus 
on directives may provide a limited picture of the timing of EU decision-making as most of 
the legislative proposals decided in the consultation procedure are regulations and decisions 
(see Table 1.4 above). 
 Despite the increasing amount of EU legislation made through package deals, 
students of EU legislative politics have said little about this phenomenon
18
. To fill this gap 
in EU legislative research, the thesis studies the causes and effects of legislative package 
deals in EU decision-making. In the following chapters the thesis explores the reasons for 
informal negotiations and cooperation through package deals between the EP and the 
Council. The analysis is based on the gains from exchange approach and its application in 
the context of the EU legislature. It explores the conditions for logrolling between the 
legislative chambers and the consequences of package deals for the transparency and 
efficiency of EU lawmaking.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter drew attention to the development of legislative package deals in the European 
Union, the increasing use of trialogue procedures in the co-decision and consultation 
procedures and the increasing speed of EU decision-making. It identified an important 
analytical gap in the current literature on EU lawmaking. Some of the best-known models 
of EU legislative politics (Tsebelis, 1994; Steunenberg, 1994; Crombez, 1996; Tsebelis and 
Garrett, 2000) focus solely on how formal rules shape legislative outcomes. Standard 
procedural models of EU decision-making analyse the effects of agenda-setting, 
amendment and veto powers on legislative outcomes.  
                                                 
18
 “New legislatures generally borrow organization and procedure from older legislatures and develop their 
own distinctive pattern only gradually. While they are new, their organization tends to be imitative, relatively 
simple, relatively dependent on written rules. With longer experience, legislatures generate precedents, 
customs and folkways of their own. They become more and more distinctive in the way they carry out their 
activities. They become institutionalized” (Loewenberg and Patterson, 1979, 166). 
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 Spatial models of EU decision-making generally ignore informal norms of 
behaviour that emerge as properties of repeat – play (Bueno de Mesquita, 2004:133). 
Decision-making is analyzed on a case-by-case basis and legislative actors do not hold 
different intensities of preferences over issues. Standard procedural models do not analyse 
situations in which actors link their voting positions on several issues and proposals. 
However, when EU legislative politics is analyzed as a repeated process where actors 
decide on several issues and proposals at a time, different conclusions may be made about 
the legislative influence of the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.   
The rest of the thesis attempts to develop a consistent theoretical argument about 
the use of package deals in the EU legislative process. It seeks to test empirically the 
argument across all EU legislation decided between 1999 and 2007 under the co-decision 
and consultation procedures. There are many reasons for assigning analytical priority to 
informal procedures and agreements
19
. Informal rules can limit the number of alternatives 
from which formal institutions are developed. They can persist when efforts at formal 
change are attempted and they can influence the distribution of resources in the 
establishment of formal institutions (Knight, 1992, 172).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 “Although party and committee organization are the main structural features of legislative bodies, every 
legislature has an informal, unofficial organization, which may complement or cut across party and 
committee organization” (Loewenberg and Patterson, 1979, 117). 
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CHAPTER 2 : PACKAGE DEALS IN LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATIONS: 
ANALYTICAL APPROACHES 
This chapter reviews two different analytical approaches that offer explanations of the 
emergence, enforcement and operation of package deals in legislative organizations: 
rational choice theory and organization theory. These literatures form distinct branches of 
institutionalist theory: organization theory has developed as a branch of sociological 
institutionalism and public choice theory has developed as a branch of rational choice 
institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters, 2001). Although the two literatures develop 
their analyses in different directions, theories of logrolling and organization theories 
provide useful insights to understanding the reasons for the use and enforcement of 
package deals in the European Union. 
 Logrolling theories analyze possible gains from exchange in the conclusion of 
package deals in legislative organizations. Organization theory analyzes interactions 
between organizations and it suggests that actors from different organizations have 
incentives to cooperate through informal channels just as actors within organizations. The 
argument of the thesis largely rests on the public choice theory of logrolling, but it borrows 
from organization theory the understanding that organizations have incentives to establish 
informal agreements with other organizations. Some of the best-known theories of 
logrolling are about exchange within a single legislative chamber. The thesis presents a 
theory about logrolling between two legislative chambers: the European Parliament and the 
Council of Ministers. These two actors cooperate through inter-chamber package deals. 
This chapter reviews how each of these theories explains the emergence and use of 
informal procedures in legislative organizations. Section I discusses the propositions 
offered by rational choice institutionalists. Section II discusses the propositions offered by 
organizational theorists. Based on the insights from these two approaches, Chapter III 
proposes the theoretical argument of inter-chamber logrolling in the European Union.  
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2.1 The Rational Choice Approach to Legislative Package Deals 
Rational choice theorists have devoted a large amount of time to understanding the 
development of informal deals in legislatures. Public choice theory developed as a branch 
of rational choice and aims at explaining political bargaining in legislative institutions and 
joint decision sets (Mueller, 2003). The establishment of institutions for legislative 
exchange has been a dominant topic in the literature of US legislative politics (Buchanan 
and Tullock, 1962, 2004; Coleman, 1966, 1990; Wilson, 1969; Ferejohn 1986; Weingast 
and Marshall, 1988; Mueller, 1989; Shepsle and Weingast, 1994; Stratmann, 1992, 1995, 
1997; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1994).  
 Analyses of logrolling and package deals take into account both the informal 
interactions among institutional actors and the formal rules of the legislative process. The 
definition of logrolling varies between different studies. In the US legislative literature, 
logrolling has been defined as the exchange of support, votes, control or favours, but 
overall, it is understood as „the exchange of loss in some issues for benefits in others 
resulting in mutual overall gain between actors with different interests...‟ (Mueller, 1989). 
Logrolling analyses have developed under a separate branch of legislative studies, known 
as distributive theories of legislative choice (Krehbiel, 1991).   
 Distributive theories of legislative organization are based on the assumption that 
legislators with diverse policy preferences find it in their interest to surrender some policy 
influence in less salient areas, in return for greater influence in policy domains that are 
more important to them (Kiewit et al, 2002, 8). The idea of logrolling is to establish links 
between issues, which are of different value for legislative actors. Actors accept loss in 
some fields to gain larger profit in others. The enforcement of package deals facilitates the 
expression of different preference intensities by legislative actors. Logrolling and package 
deals in many ways increase the internal predictability of decision outcomes for those who 
are involved in the process (Parisi, 2002, 187). Logrolling theories suggest that legislative 
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influence follows the extremity and intensity of legislators‟ preferences (Gilligan and 
Krehbiel, 1994). Initially, legislators table proposals to benefit themselves at the expense of 
others, but none of these proposals succeeds. Thus, legislators search for cooperation 
through legislative trades. In exchange for support, each legislator finds his proposal passed 
(Weingast and Marshall, 1988).  
 
A. Logrolling and Intensities of Preferences 
The origins of the gains from legislative exchange approach go back to Buchanan and 
Tullock‟s (1962) Calculus of Consent. Logrolling is simply defined as vote trading20. One 
member of Parliament or Congress will agree to vote for legislation that another member 
wants in return for his or her vote no another issue. Buchanan and Tullock argued that 
actors give up property rights of self-determination in situations of interdependence, as 
long as the expected utility of coordination is higher than the costs of coordination. 
Exchange and package deals are seen as a welfare enhancing solution, because vote trading 
allows legislators to express different intensities of preferences. Legislators can benefit 
from vote trading by lending their support to other legislators‟ favourite issues in exchange 
for those legislators‟ support for their own preferred issues. When actors decide on a 
package deal that includes two or more issues in a multidimensional space, the inclusion of 
issue salience can significantly affect the legislative outcome.  
 Issue salience and preference intensities differentiate logrolling theories from other 
spatial theories of legislative organization. Spatial theories, as discussed in Chapter I, 
address the effects of agenda-setting, amendment and voting rights on legislative outcomes. 
The theory of gains from exchange allows actors to enter into an exchange relationship in 
which they further their own interest by providing some product or service that is of direct 
                                                 
20
 “Logrolling is known by all students of politics, but until the development of public choice as a discipline it 
tended to receive little attention. Political scientists who did talk about vote trading viewed it realistically, but 
they also rarely had much to say and there was general moral disapproval of the phenomenon” (Tullock, 
2002, 29). 
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benefit to the individual on the other side of the logroll. Two institutional actors find it 
mutually advantageous to join forces to accomplish certain common purposes. Legislative 
actors find it profitable to explore the possibility of organizing an activity collectively when 
they expect to increase their utility (Buchanan and Tullock, 2004, 41).  
 The bargaining process can be described in terms of a simple two actors and two 
commodities exchange model as is illustrated in the Edgeworth box diagram (see Figure 
2.1). Logrolling in 2 actors - 2 issues negotiations is easy to visualize and is intuitive. It is 
the exchange of loss in one issue, usually less important in priority, for gains in the other 
issue, usually more important. The difference in preferences between the two issues results 
in an increase of the overall value to both parties, that is mutual gain (Tajima and Fraser, 
2001, 220). In the case of a two-actor trade, there may be many different exchanges, each 
of which would be beneficial to both parties. The initial position before agreement is 
reached, is shown at Y.  
 
Figure 2.1 Edgeworth Box: Two Actors with Two Goods Exchange 
 
 Source: Adapted from Varian (2006), Intermediate Microeconomics, 7
th
 ed., pp. 566 
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Actor A, in the low left-hand corner, has in his possession X¹a of Good 1 and X²a of 
Good 2. Actor B has in his possession the remaining amounts of the goods, X¹b of Good 1 
and X²b of Good 2. A‟s consumption bundle is denoted by Xa = (X¹a + X²a) and B‟s 
consumption bundle is denoted by Xb = (X¹b + X²b). The total amount of Good 1 is shown 
on the horizontal axis and the total amount of Good 2 is shown on the vertical axis. A pair 
of consumption bundles forms an allocation. An allocation is feasible if the total amount of 
each good consumed is equal to the total amount available, where X¹a + X¹b = Y¹a + Y¹b 
and where X²a + X²b = Y²a + Y²b. The initial endowment allocation is (Y¹a, Y²a) and (Y¹b, 
Y²b). The initial combination of commodities will offer to each individual a certain level of 
utility (Varian, 2006, 566).  
The indifference curves for actors A and B are drawn through point Y. Each point 
on A‟s indifference curve indicates the various combinations of commodities that provide 
A with the same level of satisfaction. Similarly, each point on B‟s indifference curve 
indicates combinations equally satisfactory to B. The enclosed (shaded) area includes all 
combinations of the two commodities that will provide more utility to both parties A and B 
than is provided by the distribution shown at Y. Moving in the north-easterly direction on 
the diagram, A‟s level of satisfaction increases. In contrast, B‟s satisfaction increases as his 
position shifts in the south-westerly direction. Therefore, gains from trade are possible and 
actors A and B can mutually benefit from exchange (Buchanan and Tullock, 2004, 96). 
The movement to M in the centre of the shaded region involves Actor A giving up 
[X¹a - Y¹a] units of Good 1 and acquiring in exchange [X²a - Y²a] units of Good 2. Actor B 
therefore gives up [X²b - Y²b] units in Good 2 but acquires [X¹b - Y²b] units of Good 1. 
Therefore, legislators that hold different intensities of preferences over two different issues 
may find it mutually beneficial to exchange support for each other‟s most preferred 
outcomes. Legislators will therefore engage in legislative trade and will gain in the issues 
they care about the most.  
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B. Interdependence and Repeat - Play 
Interdependence and repeat-play are central to theories of legislative exchange. According 
to Axelrod (1984: 10), cooperation will emerge in the presence of repeated interactions. 
Legislators are likely to cooperate if they anticipate future interactions with their present 
colleagues. Therefore, cooperation and logrolling situations are likely to emerge in policy 
areas where legislators are interdependent and anticipate to meet again in the near future. 
Reputations from past interaction and the anticipation of significant future interaction are 
likely to enforce informal arrangements between legislative actors. When legislators meet 
over multiple periods, a reputational equilibrium involving high contributions may obtain.  
Compliance in agreements between legislators would be achieved through the threat 
of stopping all future exchanges between parties (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1989; Kroszner 
and Stratmann, 1998). The termination threat will discipline behaviour to the extent that the 
present discounted value of the profits of continuing in the relationship exceeds the profit 
from cheating on the current transaction. In repeat-play situations, legislators will have an 
incentive to reduce uncertainty about their policy positions by developing clear and 
consistent reputations on particular issues. Bernholz (1978) shows that logrolling situations 
are plausible for a legislative assembly, whose members continually represent the same 
interests and have reasonably long tenure. 
McGinnis (1986) notes that issue linkage can be found in a typical repeat-play, 
iterated Prisoner‟s Dilemma situation21, where the players may be able to reward or 
punish the behaviour of each other and therefore establish a self-enforcing mode of 
cooperative behaviour. Two types of linkage strategies are found to foster cooperation: 
tit-for-tat arrangements
22
, in which players cooperate over time and quid-pro-quo 
                                                 
21
 In a single play of the Prisoner‟s Dilemma no matter what one player does, the other player is better off if 
he defects, and thus both, as rational actors, must defect (McGinnis, 1986). 
 
22
 As suggested by Axelrod (1984). In this case the sum of cooperative payoffs may be sufficient to provide 
each player the incentive to cooperate on them all as a package. Thus, the overall gains from cooperation on a 
package outweigh the incentive to cheat on any single issue (McGinnis, 1986, 151). 
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arrangements
23
, in which each player sacrifices on some issues in order to gain more on 
others (McGinnis, 1986, 142).  
Enelow (1986) argues that logrolling occurs when voters act as if they will consider 
an infinite number of issues. Just as a cooperative equilibrium exists in a prisoners‟ 
dilemma game played an infinite number of times, a stable outcome with logrolling might 
exist if players do not know which issue would be last. In the case of a finite number of 
issues, logrolling will occur if voters do not know how long they will remain members of 
the voting body. Under the assumption that the same types of issues arise again and again, 
the threat of re-voting is sufficient to protect against defections (Enelow, 1986, 290).  
 
C. Enforcement of Commitments  
Another core assumption of exchange theories is the enforceability of informal 
commitments. Coleman (1966, 1990) proposed a formal model of social exchange in which 
he assumes that actors face interdependencies over issues and that they expect possible 
benefits from exchange. Each actor shares partly control or authority over issues. The 
crucial feature of the assumption of a political exchange market is that control can be 
exchanged and that informal promises are kept and enforced. However, when vote trades 
are parts of only informal agreements and take place in sequence, legislators are motivated 
both to misstate their preferences at the time an agreement is formed and to violate the 
agreement after it is made.  
Because logrolls are informally negotiated, legislators may be bluffing, cheating 
and there are strong incentives to renege (Mueller, 1989, 87). Political agents are limited to 
the extent to which they can enter into enforceable informal bargains. It is difficult to bind 
future voting decisions in a logrolling context, or to constrain the choices of future office-
holders. In a traditional contract setting, a contractual agreement can be undone only with 
                                                 
23
 “This arrangement is suggested by the package deal that usually constitutes the outcome of a successful 
negotiations: each participant concedes more on those issues it values less in order to gain more on issues it 
deems more important” (McGinnis, 1986, 151). 
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the consent of all original contracting parties. In informal political agreements any agent 
can betray the original agreement (Parisi, 2002, 187). The availability of more than two 
players in a committee creates one of the major problems of logrolling
24
 - the fact that it 
implies cyclical group preferences (Bernholz, 1978). The problem of „cycling‟ is found in 
logrolling analyses in the US Congress (Tullock, 1981; Black, 1996). 
Weingast and Marshall (1988) view the legislature as „a market – like organization 
in which trades occur through policy bargains‟ (Krehbiel, 1991, 36). They also find that 
package logrolls face the problem of enforcement. The general non-enforceability of 
logrolls limits the deals that can be struck among legislators. There are multiple incentive 
to renege on informal package bargains. An institutional enforcement mechanism is 
therefore needed to ensure that informal deals are sustained. Weingast and Marshall (1988) 
argue that institutions exist in order to capture gains from trade. They find that the 
committee system in the US Congress serves this purpose.   
Huber (1996) finds that the enforcement of package deals depends on the ability of 
political group leaders to ensure the required support in the legislature. Party leaders are 
therefore pivotal for the enforcement of informal legislative logrolls, as they can exercise 
party discipline and ensure a vote in favour within the legislative chamber. Carruba and 
Volden (2000) study intra-chamber logrolling and find that it is easier to maintain 
cooperative coalitions for logrolls where: the number of legislators is small, the bills are 
much more beneficial than costly, the future is highly valued, the probability of re-election 
is high, coalitions can be formed quickly and easily, and voting rules are less inclusive. 
Especially vulnerable are informal deals that are agreed sequentially. Members of 
future sessions face incentives different from those faced when the trade occurred and may 
seek to amend, abolish, or ignore previous agreements. Logrolling arrangements “may 
stretch over several years and because they are merely promises, the rational legislator 
                                                 
24
 The classical intra-chamber logrolling situation has been modelled with two issues each with two 
alternatives, which turn up again and again in a group of three members (Coleman 1966; Bernholz 1973, 
1974, 1978; Stratmann, 1992).  
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may breach them” (Brady, 2002, 84). If bargains are concluded in sequence and the game 
is played but once, the first player has no means by which to influence the second player‟s 
decision at the time the latter is made. Thus, one would not expect vote trading to take 
place over issues decided sequentially. A stable, cooperative vote-trading game can be 
expected only when the issues on which votes are traded are all decided simultaneously, as 
part of an omnibus bill, or when the same constellations of issues come up repeatedly and a 
prisoners‟ dilemma supergame emerges (Shepsle and Weingast, 1994). 
 
D. Empirical Studies of Logrolling  
In contrast to the large body of theoretical research on legislative exchange, empirically the 
idea of logrolling has received less attention (Ferejohn 1986; Shepsle and Weingast 1994; 
Stratmann 1992; 1995; Kruz 2001; Evans, 2004). This is most probably due to the informal 
nature of logrolls and the secrecy surrounding their terms and enforcement. Empirically, 
logrolling has been traced within the decision-making process of the US Congress, as the 
exchange of votes between legislators.  
 The majority of the existing theories of logrolling in the US concern package deals 
on distributive legislation (Weingast 1979, 1994; Shepsle and Weingast, 1994). 
Distributive politics, spending and the budget are found to be marked by logrolling, 
informal negotiations and package deals (Enelow, 1986; Baron, 1991; Haggard and 
McCubbins, 2001). In their comparative analysis, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) distinguish 
between closed rules and open rules. A closed rule applies when a proposal is voted 
without amendment up or down by the legislature. An open rule allows an unlimited 
number of amendments to the proposal to be considered before the proposal is put to the 
vote. Baron and Ferejohn find that closed rules and restrictive procedures will be selected 
on distributive legislation. According to Heller (2001: 39) evidence of logrolling is most 
easily found in spending, „Chambers resolve their differences through huge, budget-
 55 
busting, deficit-inducing, intercameral logrolls‟. However, Evans (2004) establishes 
empirically that logrolling occurs on several types of policies, not just on distributive 
legislation. Stratmann (1995: 453) also finds that informal agreements are widespread in 
the lawmaking process across diverse policy areas and that logrolling plays an important 
role for legislative decision-making
25
. Therefore, although logrolling is most likely to 
develop on distributive legislation, it can also take place on general interest legislation. 
Legislators trade votes because intensities in preferences over proposals differ and 
because proposals would not pass if every legislator voted sincerely. Stratmann (1992) 
finds that logrolling agreements in the US Congress can take two forms. First, two issues y 
and w can be joined in a single proposal and be voted on as a package. These types of 
package deals are often referred to as „omnibus bills‟, which regularly appear in the US 
Congress. Second, the issue pairs can be voted upon separately, with y‟s supporters voting 
for w and w‟s supporters voting for y. Sinclair (1995; 2000) and Krutz (2001) also find 
evidence of package deals in the US Congress in different policy areas.  
 
E. Intra-Chamber Logrolling vs. Inter-branch Logrolling 
 As discussed above, the majority of logrolling analyses are developed in the context 
of an intra-chamber committee bargaining situation. However, in a study of US 
„unorthodox lawmaking‟, Sinclair (2000: 80) finds that „the textbook diagram of how a bill 
becomes a law no longer accurately describes the legislative process on major bills‟. Only 
recently has the concept of inter-chamber cooperation through exchange started to develop 
in the US literature. In their analysis of executive-legislative interactions in the US, 
Haggard and McCubbins (2001) note that logrolling between two legislative branches is 
not implausible given that in the negotiations of the yearly budget „the two branches 
communicate to each other through channels other than the formal proposal and  
                                                 
25
 According to Stratmann (1995) a logrolling situation is defined as, „Let (x, y) and (z, w) be pairs of 
mutually exclusive issues. Let voter preferences with respect to each pair be separable. Let each voter vote 
sincerely. P stands for social preference. A logrolling situation exists if xPy and zPw, but ywPxz‟. 
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amendments process‟ (130). Gailmard and Hammond (2006) also make a link between 
inter-cameral bargaining and intra-cameral organization. The authors note that single 
chamber models neglect the fact that the US Congress is bicameral and that each chamber 
has veto power over proposed legislation. Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1990), Diermeier 
and Myerson (1999) and Ansolabehere, Snyder and Ting (2003) also develop their analyses 
within the broader context of multi-chamber legislative politics. 
 The review of the existing rational choice literature on legislative exchange 
suggests that logrolling analyses have concentrated on intra-chamber decision-making, 
predominantly within the US Congress. Nevertheless, these distributive theories developed 
in the context of single chambers provide the basis for the argument of the thesis. Krehbiel 
(1991) identifies two central hypotheses that form the core of distributive theories. First, to 
hasten agreement, closed rules are more likely to be used on highly distributive legislation 
(based on Baron and Ferejohn, 1989). Second, to reliably capture gains from trade, 
legislatures will commit to certain institutional arrangements that regulate and enforce 
informal agreements (based on Weingast and Marshall, 1988). Therefore, logrolling in the 
EU legislature is expected to take place on highly distributive legislation. Furthermore, as 
in any legislature, logrolling agreements in the European Union will require certain 
institutional agreements to regulate and enforce informal commitments.  
 In Chapter III, the idea of logrolling is extended to inter-chamber decision-making 
in the European Union. However, a good analytical explanation is needed to justify why 
legislative institutions, such as the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers can 
be viewed as the actors in a logrolling situation. Organization theory provides a useful 
analytical frame that views organizations as the actors in inter-organizational cooperation. 
The following section reviews how the insights from organizational theory can be used in 
the development of a theory of inter-chamber logrolling in the EU.  
 57 
2.2 The Organizational Approach to Legislative Package Deals  
Organization theory aims at explaining organizational dynamics by taking into account the 
structure and design of organizations. The structure of organizations, however, involves 
formal and informal procedures. This theoretical approach makes a sharp distinction 
between the formal structure of an organization and its day-to-day informal procedures 
(Meyer and Rowan 1991; Pfeffer 1981, 1997; Selznick, 1957; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Tolbert and Zucker, 2002; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). 
 Organizational theorists analyze different types of organizations, including business 
corporations, firms and social organizations as well as legislatures and bureaucracies 
(Miller et al, 2002; Handy, 1999). While organization theory does not aim at explaining 
package deals in legislative organizations explicitly, this analytical approach contributes to 
understanding the development of informal package deals in the EU in two ways. First, 
organization theories place a great emphasis on informal rules and procedures in 
institutional decision-making. Second, organization theories view organizations as actors 
and analyze how organizations cooperate with other organizations in interdependent, 
repeat-play environments. 
 
A. Informal Rules and Procedures within Organizations  
The importance of informal rules and procedures has been a dominant topic for 
organization theorists (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939; Crozier, 1964; March and 
Simon, 1958, 1993; Simon, 1957; March, 1994; North, 1990; Krackhardt and Hanson, 
1993; Jepperson, 1991; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Mershon, 1994; Tolbert and Zucker, 
2002; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Given the wide research agenda in organizational 
theory, there are various views on how informal institutions manifest across 
organizations
26
.  
                                                 
26
 Roethlisberger and Dickson (1967: 559) describe informal rules as „the practically existing patterns of 
human interaction by which the work of the organization is performed‟. Others characterize them as „natural‟ 
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 Helmke and Levitsky (2004:727) define informal institutions as the „socially shared 
rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially 
sanctioned channels‟27. Informal decision-making processes are often so important that 
formal decisions are simply ratifications of decisions reached earlier through informal 
means (Chisholm, 1989, 145). Formal provisions lay out the official blueprint for 
organizational interactions, but that does not mean that institutional actors conform strictly 
to them (Meyer and Rowan, 1991, 42). In their generality, official rules leave procedural 
gaps, which informal practices emerge to solve. In day-to-day decision-making 
unanticipated decisions must often be made and unofficial practices are likely to furnish 
such decisions long before formal rules have been adapted to the changing circumstances.  
Although the official procedures coordinate and control behaviour, they can never 
completely determine and confine the social relations of the members of an organization. 
Therefore, the formal organization simultaneously gives rise to informal activities (North, 
1990, 46). Informal institutions are „not just a missing variable...they are more than 
behavioural regularities or unintentional by-products of formal institutions. They are not 
simply clashing, weak, or absent formal institutions‟ (Tsai, 2003, 4). Just like formal 
institutions, however, informal institutions can be either weakly or strongly influential, and 
effectively or ineffectively enforced. 
 Every organization has an established informal organization that does not appear on 
any formal chart but is familiar to all employees. Much of what gets done in an 
organization goes through the informal organization, in ways not revealed by the formal 
hierarchy. Organizational decision-making and coordination frequently take place outside 
the formally designed channels as people interact informally on the job (Jones, 2004, 153).   
                                                                                                                                               
vs. rational system (Selznick 1949; Thompson 1967), a „residual or cafeterial‟ effect, culture, negotiated order 
and discourse (see Laubach, 2005). 
 
27
 In contrast, formal institutions are defined as „rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and 
enforced through official channels, this including state institutions (courts, legislatures, bureaucracies) and 
state-enforced rules (constitutions, laws, regulations) but also organizational rules, or the official rules that 
govern organizations such as corporations, political parties and interest groups‟ (Helmke and Levitsky, 
2004, 727). 
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Thus, by establishing a formal structure of interrelated roles, managers are also 
creating an informal social structure that affects behaviour in ways that may be unintended. 
Informalities develop because individual actors in the system seek ways to reduce 
uncertainty resulting from inter-organizational interdependence. Uncertainty is produced 
because organizations, as open systems, depend on each other, but cannot control the 
behaviour of others (Chisholm, 1989, 190). Over time actors realise that it is possible and 
beneficial to work around the formal rules, and so they devise informal rules to guide 
behaviour, ensure coordination, and maximize efficiency (Tolbert and Zucker, 2002, 177).  
Institutional actors may develop informal arrangements to facilitate formal 
institutions. Because formal rules are usually incomplete, they cannot cover all situations 
incurred in day-to-day decision-making. Actors operating within a formal institutional 
context, such as bureaucracies and legislatures, develop norms and procedures that expedite 
their work or address unanticipated by the formal rules problems (Chisholm, 1989, 66). 
Moreover, institutional actors may develop informal arrangements to maximize their utility 
and to modify the organizational rules to suit their preferences (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Actors may create informal rules to modify formal institutions they come to perceive as 
flawed. As actors engage in repeated interactions over time, actors become aware of the 
gap between the outcomes they had intended and the outcomes they see structured by 
formal institutions (Mershon, 1994, 49). Therefore, informal institutions may be used by 
actors who do not have the power to change formal rules. 
 Just like the majority of rational choice analyses of intra-chamber legislative 
exchange, many organizational theorists have studied the development of informal 
institutions within organizations. Many of the earlier studies of organizations analysed the 
role of informal arrangements, norms and values and their effects on institutional structures 
(Mayo, 1933, Barnard, 1938, McGregor, 1960, Bennis 1966; Selznick, 1957; Child, 1972; 
Dawson, 1986; Scott, 1987, 1991; Jepperson, 1991; Fligstein, 1991). 
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B. Inter-Organizational Cooperation  
Central to the analysis of the thesis, however, is the idea of the development of inter-
organizational informal arrangements (Simon, 1957; Pugh et al, 1969; Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967; Scott and Meyer, 1991; Mulford, 1984; Parsons, 1960; Perrow, 1970; 
Thompson, 1967; Aldrich, 1979, 1999; Van de Ven and Ferry, 1980). These theorists 
assume that organizations cannot exist alone, they are in a constant relation with the outside 
world and are affected by larger systems of relations. Hall (1996: 237) finds that inter-
organizational relations occur due to the procurement and allocation of resources, in order 
to form coalitions of political advocacy and advantage, and to achieve legitimacy or public 
approval.  
 Through repeated interactions organizations develop common understandings and 
practices that form the institutions that define the organizational field and at the same time, 
these institutions shape the ongoing patterns of interaction from which they are produced. 
The negotiations associated with such inter-organizational collaboration tend to be more 
complex and fundamental, leading to new understandings, norms and practices that may be 
transmitted across organizations (Lawrence et al, 2002, 282).  
In their interaction with their external environments, organizations create inter-
organizational networks, which are linked together by a special type of relations to attain 
collective and self-interested goals or to resolve specific problems. Organizations must 
interact and transact with others who possess those resources, which makes organizations 
dependent on their environments (Sanders et al, 1998, 113). The continuous social 
interaction may give rise to social integrative bonds that unite organizational actors (Blau, 
1964, 65). However, ties formed to help generate the flow of resources into an organization 
also carry with them the risk of losing certain autonomy to organizations from which the 
resources flow (Doreian and Fujimoto, 2004, 45).  
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Similarly to the rational choice theories of exchange reviewed in Section I, 
organization theories that study inter-organizational cooperation assume repeat-play and 
interdependence. Interdependencies create uncertainty in decision-making because they 
may lead to the necessity of increased coordination and mutual control over each other‟s 
activities (Mulford, 1984, 6). Different forms of interdependence exist in organizations, 
including the interdependence which arises from joint activity on some work product, so 
that what one unit does to the product affects and may be affected by the actions of the 
other unit. Interdependence ties organizational participants together, and each is concerned 
with what the other does and obtains (Pfeffer, 1989, 68). 
The need for coordination is a function of the interdependence of the parts of an 
organizational system (Chisholm, 1989, 3). Informal channels of communication, informal 
bargains and agreements and norms of reciprocity all contribute directly and indirectly to 
processes of coordination. They also promote consensus in situations initially characterized 
by conflict. Where formal organizational arrangements are absent, insufficient, or 
inappropriate for providing the required coordination, informal adaptations develop to 
satisfy that need. The informal organization that develops may be quite stable and effective, 
more so than formal hierarchical arrangements (Chisholm, 1989, 18). Through their 
interdependence with external environments, organizational units come to resemble other 
units that face the same set of environmental conditions (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991, 67). 
While not focusing explicitly on explaining package deals in legislatures, 
organization theory offers two central analytical tools for the analysis of informal inter-
chamber bargains in the European Union. First, organization theories place a particular 
emphasis on informal institutional arrangements in formal organizations. Second, 
organization theories analyse interactions between organizations and suggest that actors 
from different organizations have incentives to cooperate through informal channels just as 
actions within organizations.  
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2.3 Explaining Package Deals in the European Union  
This chapter reviewed how two distinct institutionalist approaches understand and 
help to explain the emergence, enforcement, and operation of package deals in legislative 
organizations. Although they have developed as different branches of institutionalist  
theory (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters, 2001), organization theory and rational choice 
institutionalism share several assumptions (Zye, 1998). Both analytical approaches focus 
on the existence of informal institutional arrangements, and they aim at explaining 
cooperative behaviour between actors within interdependent, repeat-play contexts.  
 Section I discussed explanations offered by rational choice theorists. Theories of 
logrolling provide solid analytical tools for understanding package deals in legislatures. 
The argument of the thesis largely rests on rational choice institutionalism. However, the 
best-known distributive theories are about exchange within a single chamber, the US 
Congress (see Shepsle and Weingast, 1987, 1994; Marshall and Weingast, 1988). The 
argument developed in Chapter III, however, is about logrolling between two chambers in 
the EU legislature, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.  
 Therefore, the argument borrows from organization theory the understanding that 
organizations can establish informal agreements with other organizations. Section II 
discussed the contributions of organizational theorists to understanding the development of 
legislative package deals in the European Union. While not directly addressing informal 
deals in legislatures, organizational theory contributes by placing a strong emphasis on 
informal procedures and inter-organizational cooperation through repeated-play (see 
Chisholm, 1989; Doreian and Fujimoto, 2004; Sanders et al, 1998; Lawrence et al, 2002).  
 Chapter III develops an argument about inter-chamber logrolling in the EU. While 
borrowing its assumptions from rational choice theories of logrolling, the argument 
presented here extends the idea of legislative exchange from a single chamber context to a 
bicameral setting. 
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CHAPTER 3 : LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE DEALS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: ARGUMENT 
This chapter develops an argument about inter-chamber legislative package deals in the 
European Union. The key argument is that package deals increase the legislative influence 
of the European Parliament in EU decision-making across legislative procedures and policy 
areas. The development of legislative package deals in the European Union allows the 
Council and the Parliament to exchange support for their preferred policy outcomes. 
Member States ensure that legislation is adopted without significant delay and governments 
have greater control over the financial aspects of legislative acts. In exchange, the 
European Parliament receives further opportunities for legislative influence, increased 
institutional powers, and access to some of the EU‟s most salient policy areas. 
There are prospects for gains from exchange in the EU legislature, since logrolls 
can make both chambers better off. Once EU decision-making is viewed as a process where 
players interact repeatedly, credible commitments, informal deals and logrolling situations 
become possible. Logrolling is defined here as the exchange of support between Member 
States in the Council and Members of the European Parliament. A legislative package deal 
is the result of such an inter-chamber exchange of support, which is enforced by the 
legislative chambers through voting. 
Various legislative deals take place among members of committees, parties and 
working groups. In bicameral legislatures, in addition to intra-chamber deal-making, 
members of each chamber engage in bargaining with representatives from the opposite 
chamber in order to make laws (Longley and Oleszek, 1989; Tsebelis and Money, 1997). 
This inter-chamber deal-making stage is the focus of the argument. Without a doubt, 
numerous promises and informal agreements are made within each of the EU legislative 
institutions. While these are important, the thesis focuses on the macro inter-institutional 
level where informal package deals are enforced between the EP and the Council.   
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3.1 Why Legislative Package Deals in the European Union 
 
Package deals are fragile informal bargains agreed between representatives of the 
Parliament and the Council. Legislative proposals and the issues included in packages are 
discussed and voted as a whole. Usually agreed through informal negotiations, these 
legislative compromises serve as binding commitments and each of the legislative 
chambers has to accept such deals without any further amendment. Package deals allow the 
linkage of issues and proposals and their simultaneous decision by EU legislators. Issues 
are not decided on a case-by-case basis, but are linked to one another. Decisions on one 
issue are connected to decisions on another issue.  
Lawmaking through package deals allows the exchange of support between the 
Parliament and the Council across different types of issues to which the EU legislative 
chambers attach different preference intensities. Package deals allow the legislative bodies 
to obtain their most preferred outcomes by exchanging support on some issues for support 
on other issues. The distributive nature of EU legislation and the timing of legislative 
action induce the use of package deals. Logrolling allows some of the most controversial 
proposals that would otherwise face gridlock, to be successfully negotiated and passed. The 
bicameral EU legislative structure does not allow Member States to avoid the opinion of 
the European Parliament or to proceed without the EP‟s consent. This interdependence 
requires close cooperation between the legislative bodies. Package deals help the legislative 
chambers to resolve conflict and to reduce the costs of collective action.  
If there are no opportunities for legislative exchange, the Member States and the 
European Parliament negotiate legislative proposals on a case-by-case basis and the issues 
involved in these proposals are discussed one at a time. In such cases, no linkage of issues 
or proposals takes place. When package deals are not possible, EU lawmaking follows the 
procedural route of decision-making as described in Chapter 1.  
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Package Deals as Responses to Inter-Cameral Conflict and the Costs of Collective Action 
Due to the bicameral nature of the EU legislature, inter-chamber package deals 
serve two purposes: a) resolving conflict between the legislative chambers and b) reducing 
the costs associated with common action. 
 First, the use of legislative package deals in the EU is a solution to the problem of 
conflict resolution at the inter-cameral level. In bicameral legislatures, chambers may differ 
in their policy positions. The passage of a legislative proposal in either the Parliament or 
the Council does not constitute the end of the legislative process. Because different 
chambers can have different policy preferences, the inter-institutional bargaining process is 
crucial to legislative outcomes (Gailmard and Hammond, 2006, 3). Even if the two 
chambers are nearly identical in political alignment, this does not mean that legislative 
proposals will find identical support in both of them. Differences between the legislative 
chambers may persist to exist (Tsebelis, 2002, 144). Therefore, lawmaking through 
package deals in the EU has developed as a practical solution to resolving inter-chamber 
conflict.  
 The second reason for the sealing of package deals in the EU is the collective action 
problem. The larger the size of the group needed to take collective action, the more difficult 
it is to organize individual legislators around a common position (Olson, 1965). In order to 
facilitate the law-making process, reduce uncertainty, speed up decision-making and avoid 
gridlock, EU legislators develop informal procedures. Making the legislature work is a 
collective interest. By working closely at the very early stages of the procedures, legislators 
from the Council and the Parliament gain an idea on what goes on in the other chamber. 
Package deals hence serve as a coalition-building strategy (Evans, 2004, 31). The leaders in 
the EP and the Council work together on legislative packages and build support in each of 
their chambers around the package compromises. Package deals help each chamber 
coordinate its internal politics in order to enforce a possible inter-chamber compromise.  
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3.2 Assumptions 
The theory of inter-chamber logrolling in the EU is developed further with a discussion of 
the several assumptions made about the legislative actors, their preferences and intensities 
of preferences, their interdependence, their repeated interaction and the possibility of 
enforcing informal commitments. The argument shares these assumptions with the basic 
assumptions found in distributive theories (as discussed in Chapter II). 
 
A. The Actors in Inter-Cameral Lawmaking through Package Deals in the EU 
The analysis is concerned with logrolling between two legislative chambers: the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Most of the well-known theories of logrolling are 
about legislative exchange inside a single chamber, the US Congress. These are theories 
about logrolling at the micro intra-institutional level (Shepsle and Weingast (1987, 1994), 
Marshall and Weingast (1988), Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1990))
 28
. The argument here 
largely rests on these theories, but it borrows from organization theory the understanding 
that organizations can establish informal agreements with other organizations (Van de Ven 
and Ferry, 1980, Doreian and Fujimoto, 2004, Lawrence et al, 2002)
29
.  
 In this macro - level inter-chamber logrolling the two institutions become the actors 
that organize logrolls through legislative package deals. The argument makes the 
simplifying assumption that there are only two actors interacting in the making of EU law, 
the Council and the Parliament. The bargaining is bilateral. Informal exchange takes place 
between two legislative chambers. When both sides have something to gain from a package 
exchange, the Council and the EP enter the inter-chamber bargaining stage.  
                                                 
28
 Exceptions to this rule are several more recent studies by Gailmard and Hammond (2006), Diermeier and 
Myerson (1999) and Ansolabehere, Snyder and Ting (2003). These authors acknowledge the limitations of 
intra-chamber analyses of logrolling and take into account the effects of multi-chamber bargaining.  
 
29
 See also Mulford (1984), Chisholm (1989), Pfeffer (1989), Sanders et al (1998). 
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 Treating these two institutions as unitary actors can be problematic for many 
students of EU legislative politics. Authors who have studied intra-institutional decision-
making in the Council (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 1997, 2006; Fouilleux et al., 2005; 
Haege, 2008)
30
 and the European Parliament (Hix et al., 2007; Benedetto, 2005; McElroy 
2006, 2007)
31
 rightly point out that each of the legislative institutions is a collection of 
actors. Divisions among these actors are central to legislative politics and treating the 
Parliament and the Council as unitary actors can undermine the explanatory power of 
models (Hoyland and Hagemann, 2007). 
However, in the study of inter-cameral package deals, there is a good reason for 
treating the EP and the Council as unitary actors. When it comes to inter-cameral decision-
making, compromise depends on the consent of the EP and the Council. Although there are 
many important actors within the legislative institutions, at the inter-institutional stage, the 
representatives of the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers bargain on behalf 
of their respective institutions. Any agreements reached between these representatives are 
then binding on their parent chambers.  
 
B. Intensities of Preferences 
A key assumption of the argument is that actors can feel differently about policy outcomes. 
Therefore, the saliency they attach to legislative proposals and the issues within them can 
vary. The Council and the Parliament often disagree about the content of legislation. The 
assumption that actors can have different preference intensities is at the core of the most 
well-known theories of logrolling (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 2004; Coleman 1966, 
1990; Ferejohn, 1986; Weingast and Marshall, 1988; Mueller, 1989; Shepsle and Weingast, 
1994; Stratmann, 1992, 1995, 1997; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1998). Package deals cannot be 
                                                 
30
 see also Lewis, 2000; Bostock, 2002; Tallberg, 2003; and Warntjen, 2008. 
 
31
 see also Kaeding, 2004, 2005; Hoyland, 2006; Noury and Roland, 2002; Bowler and Farrell, 1995; and 
Whitaker, 2005.  
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profitable to legislative institutions if the actors attach the same saliency to proposals. If 
there are multiple issues, the two actors may value policy change on each issue differently.  
 Each actor is assumed to be more concerned about some dimensions of the 
legislature‟s activities than others. Each legislative institution is assumed to have well-
defined preferences and multiple issues to choose from (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1994, 187). 
The actors may feel more intensely about some issues than others. Member States in the 
Council are assumed to be more concerned about the financial matters in EU legislation. 
Governments are directly affected by the budgetary aspects of legislative proposals. The 
possibility of controlling the extent to which EU legislation affects governments‟ budgets, 
motivates the Council to engage in legislative trade with the EP. Issues of funding or 
budgetary contributions are therefore assumed to be much more salient for the Council than 
for the Parliament. On the other hand, the European Parliament, as the „voice of the 
people‟, is assumed to attach higher priorities to issues of human rights, transparency, 
privacy, and data protection. Impatience can increase the actors‟ intensity of preferences. If 
all intensities of preferences are identical over all issues, no trading of support is possible. 
In this case, the EP and the Council feel as strongly on one issue as on any other, and they 
will never rationally agree to exchange their support for reciprocal favours.    
 
C. Interdependence and Repeat - Play  
Moreover, the Council and the Parliament are assumed to be interdependent in the 
framework of the EU legislative system. The Parliament cannot avoid the Council and vice 
versa. This interdependence creates pressures for cooperation. The EU legislative actors are 
affected by each others‟ actions and seek ways for reaching compromise. The assumption 
of interdependence is also found at the core of logrolling theories (Buchanan and Tullock, 
1962; Coleman, 1966; Enelow, 1986; Bernholz, 1978; Axelrod, 1984; Kroszner and 
Stratmann, 1998). Cooperation is expected to emerge between interdependent actors who  
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meet repeatedly. Due to their interdependence, the EU legislative institutions cannot 
behave without affecting each other. This legislative interdependence creates the necessity 
to coordinate inter-institutional decision-making in order to sustain an efficient EU 
legislative process. The use of informal methods for compromise serves to facilitate this 
bicameral coexistence.  
 The two legislative chambers are assumed to participate repeatedly in EU law-
making. The choices made in the present may influence legislative outcomes in the future. 
This possibility may induce the actors to give up their ideal preferences and choose to 
cooperate. Repeat-play fosters cooperation (Axelrod, 1984). Due to repeat-play, when 
making decisions, actors take into account any reputations developed in the past as well as 
the possibility of future interactions. Legislative decisions on issues discussed repeatedly 
may be very different to decisions taken on a case-by-case basis. Repeat-play fosters the 
enforcement of informal agreements as cheating may be punished in the future. Legislators 
who are interdependent and meet repeatedly, therefore, are more likely to establish the 
terms of informal interactions and enforce inter-institutional informal commitments. 
 Considering that the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament will interact 
on future occasions within the same policy framework and within other policy areas, EU 
negotiators are likely to accept an outcome different from their ideal preferences. This way, 
bargaining in one legislative procedure can be linked to negotiations in another procedure. 
Therefore, the formal separation between co-decision and consultation matters can be 
overcome through the linkage of issues and proposals in packages. Factors such as the 
existence of previous legislation in the area and the opportunity of deciding under a 
different legislative procedure are central to understanding legislative behaviour. The 
repeated interaction of members of the Council and the EP leads to their cooperative 
behaviour.  
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D. Enforcement of Commitments 
The legislative chambers are assumed to be able to commit to a particular informal inter-
institutional arrangement. Following Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1990) and Diermeier and 
Myerson (1999) who assume the possibility of commitment to restrictive rules, this 
argument considers the case where legislative chambers can commit to agree and enforce a 
package deal. The Council and the Parliament can commit to enforce and sustain informal 
agreements. The representatives of each chamber have the authority and credibility to agree 
package deals at the inter-institutional level and to ensure that these are adopted by their 
parent chambers. Of course, EU legislators face the problem inherent in all informal 
agreements – the instability of informal deals.  
 Logrolling agreements face the general problem of non-enforceability. Informal 
agreements are difficult to enforce, as actors may cheat, deny, and seek to amend or abolish 
any previous commitments (Mueller, 1989; Shepsle and Weingast, 1994; Stratmann, 1992; 
Parisi, 2002). In the European Union context, the problem of non-enforceability of informal 
agreements between the legislative actors is overcome with the establishment of an 
institutional structure for political exchange. The need to organize the legislative process 
and the terms of political exchange lead to the development of institutional tools for inter-
chamber negotiations. As the legislative exchange is only bilateral and agreed between 
representatives of the two chambers, informal commitments are much easier to enforce. 
Inter-institutional meetings such as the trialogue provide the institutional framework for the 
agreement and enforcement of legislative package deals in the European Union.   
 
E. Information 
The success of legislative package deals depends on the ability of the agents of the Council 
and the Parliament to negotiate with clear information about the policy positions and 
preference intensities of their parent chambers. In a large legislature, such as the EU, 
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knowing the policy positions and preference intensities of individual legislators is almost 
impossible, especially during the early stages of the legislative process. Internally both the 
EP and the Council reduce the number of participants in drafting legislative proposals. The 
preparatory bodies in the Council and the legislative committees in the EP ensure that their 
members are aware of their policy preferences and the intensity of these preferences on 
different issues. Legislators have incentives to reduce uncertainty about their policy 
positions by developing clear and consistent reputations on particular issues. Therefore, the 
representatives of the EP and the Council enter the inter-institutional legislative stage with 
clear accounts of the policy preferences and salience of issues to their respective chambers.  
 
3.3 Modelling Legislative Package Deals in EU Decision-Making  
Given their interdependence, different preference intensities, repeated interactions, and 
their ability to conclude and enforce informal commitments, EU legislators find it 
profitable to cooperate through package deals. Following the methodology of Diermeier 
and Krehbiel (2003) and Huber and Shipan (2002), this section outlines the details of the 
legislative process, the possibilities for packaging issues and proposals, and the 
mechanisms for agreeing package deals between the EP and the Council. 
 Just as in Chapter II, the legislative inter-chamber exchange process can be 
described with an Edgeworth Box (see Figure 3.1). Actors A and B are now the Council 
and the Parliament. Goods 1 and 2 are two different types of issues, say, Institutional 
Powers and Budgetary Issues. Gains from exchange are possible in the following scenario. 
Actor A, the Council, in the low left-hand corner, holds preferences X¹a over Institutional 
Powers Issues and X²a over Budgetary Issues. Actor B, the Parliament holds preferences 
X¹b over Institutional Powers Issues and X²b over Budgetary Issues. The indifference 
curves of the Council and the EP are drawn through Y. The shaded area represents all 
points where exchange between the EP and the Council will lead to mutual gains.  
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Figure 3.1 Inter-Chamber Legislative Exchange in the European Union  
 
In order to gain in budgetary issues and to move from Y to M, the Council will have 
to give up [X¹a - Y¹a] in Institutional Power Issues and it will acquire in exchange [X²a - 
Y²a] in Budgetary Issues. In exchange, the Parliament gives up [X²b - Y²b] in Budgetary 
Issues, but it gains [X¹b - Y²b] in Institutional Powers. Given their different intensities of 
preferences over these two different types of issues, the two legislative chambers in the EU 
can engage in trade and achieve mutually beneficial outcomes.  
 
A. Three Stages of the EU Decision-Making Process  
The decision-making process in the EU legislature is presented as a three-stage process. 
The legislative process consists of the following stages: a) intra-chamber decision-making; 
b) inter-chamber bargaining; and c) voting. The process starts with decision-making within 
each legislative institution. The second stage of the process is the decision-making stage 
between the two legislative chambers: the Parliament and the Council. At this inter-
institutional stage, the Council and the EP can commit to sustain and enforce a package 
deal. Finally, informal commitments are enforced within each legislative chamber through 
voting, which constitutes the third stage of the legislative process. 
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Stage I: Intra-Chamber Decision-Making  
 The Commission proposes legislation. The Member States in the Council start the 
intra-chamber discussions (across working parties, Coreper, Presidency). At this first stage 
the EP drafting committee(s) also starts discussions on the proposal. First, both the EP and 
the Council reconcile the conflicting positions within their respective institutions so that an 
acceptable compromise can be achieved within each of the legislative chambers. The 
decision-making process within each chamber follows the procedural rules as prescribed by 
the internal rules of the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.  
Stage II: Inter-Chamber Bargaining 
 The EP and the Council enter a bargaining process to reconcile the differences 
between each other in the search for an inter-institutional compromise. The Council has 
two incentives to enter package deal negotiations with the EP regardless of the decision-
making procedure. First, the Council finds it profitable to conclude package deals with the 
EP in order to ensure that its policy preferences on salient for Member States legislation are 
reflected in legislative outcomes. The chambers are interdependent and meet repeatedly on 
a daily basis. Through package deals the Council ensures that the issues it feels most 
strongly about are not rejected by a non-cooperative Parliament.  
Second, the Member States may be impatient about the decision on a legislative 
proposal. Time may be pressing the Council to offer its support for the EP‟s demands in 
exchange for an instant EP opinion. When both sides have something to gain from such an 
exchange, the Council and the EP enter the inter-chamber bargaining stage. The inter-
institutional and intra-institutional stages are related. The intra-institutional stage does not 
always precede the inter-institutional stage. Package deals may be made first between the 
chambers at the inter-institutional stage, and may then be translated into the internal 
decision-making processes of the EP and the Council. Sometimes legislative package deals 
can shift several times between the two stages.  
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Stage III: Voting 
 Any commitments undertaken by the representatives of the European Parliament 
and the Council during the informal negotiations at stage II are later enforced within each 
chamber. The deals struck between the leaders of the legislative houses have to be voted in 
favour, without amendment, by the members of each institution. Package deals in the EU 
are enforced through restrictive procedures, where compromises are passed as a whole. 
Individual members of the legislative institutions are not encouraged to propose 
amendments to these packages. This way, legislative package deals in the EU resemble 
Baron and Ferejohn‟s (1989) closed rules where package texts are voted up or down as a 
whole by the legislative chambers, without further amendments.  
 
B. Where Do Legislative Package Deals Originate in the EU? 
This theory of inter-chamber logrolling applies to package deals within proposals and 
package deals across proposals. Furthermore, package deals are expected to be enforced 
when issues and proposals are discussed simultaneously. 
 One way of concluding a legislative package deal in the European Union is through 
a logroll on a single proposal, in which the two actors attach different saliencies to the 
multiple issues involved in the legislative act. A package deal on a single „omnibus‟ 
proposal ensures that the piece of legislation passes within each chamber and that it 
respects the priorities of the European Parliament and the Council. Another way of 
concluding a legislative package deal is through a logroll on multiple proposals. The two 
actors attach different saliencies to the multiple issues involved in the legislative acts, but 
an agreement is only possible if the two or more legislative proposals are passed together. 
Whether inter-chamber logrolling takes place within proposals or across proposals, package 
deals are expected to be agreed simultaneously.  
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Logrolls are likely to break if promises are made across time or policy areas. This is 
in line with the consensus in the more recent „gains from exchange‟ literature that informal 
deals are especially vulnerable when agreed sequentially (Shepsle and Weingast, 1994; 
Parisi, 2002). In the EU legislature, the Parliament and the Council may be represented by 
different bargaining agents in the future. Even if the bargaining agents commit to enforcing 
an informal agreement over time, the parent chambers may feel differently in future 
situations. Intra-chamber politics may lead to the inability of the EP and the Council to 
enforce informal commitments over time. Therefore, legislative package deals are not 
expected to be agreed sequentially.  
 Legislation in the EU may become part of a package deal through two routes. These 
are packages proposed by the European Parliament or the Council of Ministers and 
packages proposed by the European Commission. First, a package deal is negotiated when 
any of the legislative chambers proposes a logroll. This can be either the EP or the Council. 
A package deal will occur if there is room for exchange between the legislative chambers. 
The legislative actors propose the bundling of issues in order to find an overall 
compromise, satisfying their different preference intensities. However, if one looks earlier 
in the legislative process, it becomes clear that logrolling situations can be structured even 
when the Commission proposes legislation. 
 Second, a package compromise can be proposed by the Commission. If it proposes 
several pieces of legislation simultaneously and treats them as a package, the Commission 
structures the negotiations between the EP and the Council in a logrolling framework. By 
identifying that several legislative proposals are part of a package, and thus naming the 
bundle of issues and/or proposals – a package32, the Commission increases its ability to 
affect legislative outcomes. The Commission includes issues that would otherwise be 
                                                 
32
  See for example the Energy package (2003), the Telecom package (2002), the Single Sky package 
(2001), the Railway package (2004), the SIS II package (2005) (see Appendix I) 
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impossible to pass if proposed separately. When the Commission proposes package 
legislation, the EP and the Council engage in trade in order to get their most preferred 
policy outcomes as part of the package deal.  
   
C. Who Strikes the Deals on Behalf of the Legislative Chambers? Bargaining Agents 
When package deals are negotiated between the Parliament and the Council, this does not 
mean that all members of one chamber start negotiations with all members of the opposite 
chamber. Informal agreements are conducted between representatives from each legislative 
chamber, who have the authority to negotiate an inter-chamber deal on behalf of their 
institutions. The Parliament and the Council are represented by their bargaining agents at 
the inter-cameral decision-making stage. These agents serve two roles. First, the bargaining 
agents of each legislative institution negotiate the terms of package deals on behalf of their 
parent chamber. Second, these agents persuade the members of their parent chamber to 
accept the terms of the negotiated inter-institutional package compromise.  
While there are clearer rules on who represents the European Parliament in 
conciliation committees (Rasmussen, 2005, 2008), there are no clear rules of „electing‟ or 
„appointing‟ the EP‟s representatives to package deal negotiations with the Council. 
However, any informal agreement between the representatives of the two chambers has to 
be enforced through formal voting. Therefore, the EP is represented by people who have 
the authority and credibility to „sell‟ the package compromise back to the plenary. This can 
be the committee rapporteur (together with any shadow rapporteurs and committee chairs), 
who is in charge of writing the legislative report and ensuring that it passes through the 
Parliament. In addition, the EP can be represented by political group leaders who, although 
not in charge of writing legislative reports, have the power to motivate party members to 
pass package compromises in plenary.  
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The Council of Ministers operates a stricter procedure in its nomination of a 
representative to inter-cameral informal negotiations with the Parliament. To start informal 
contacts with the EP, the Council Presidency requires a mandate from Coreper and it is 
obliged to report back the results of the informal meetings. Usually, Coreper reviews the 
results and requires the responsible Council working party to draft a compromise text. The 
revised text is then referred to the Presidency for further negotiations with the EP. Only 
after it has been given a mandate from the Member States could the Presidency negotiate a 
package compromise on behalf of the Council. 
 
D. How are Legislative Package Deals Enforced in the EU?  
Trialogues serve as the institutional mechanisms for information exchange and capturing 
gains from legislative trade in the European Union. Trialogue procedures allow the EP and 
the Council to communicate their intentions informally and to exchange information on 
their positions early in the legislative process. Repeat-play and the time constraints of the 
legislative process require the close cooperation between the EP and the Council in order to 
accommodate the preferences of both sides. Consensus is therefore sustained through 
increased communication between the EP and the Council and through the establishment of 
a stable cooperative relationship between the two legislative branches. As decision-making 
is a costly activity, it is in the interest of both institutions to reach agreement early. 
Therefore, trialogue procedures allow EU legislators to cut the costs of lawmaking. They 
provide the informal setting in which binding enforceable agreements are reached between 
representatives of the Council and the Parliament. 
 In their study of the US Congress, Weingast and Marshall (1988) find that package 
logrolls face the problem of enforcement. The general non-enforceability of logrolls limits 
the deals that can be struck among legislators as there are multiple incentives to renege on 
informal package bargains. Weingast and Marshall argue that an institutional enforcement 
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mechanism is needed to ensure that informal deals are sustained. They find that the 
committee system in the US Congress serves this purpose. The committee system is a 
feasible institutional enforcement mechanism for capturing gains from trade within single 
legislative chambers. However, inter-chamber logrolling in the EU requires a different 
institutional mechanism to enforce these gains from trade.  
In the EU legislature informal trialogues serve this function. Trialogues provide the 
institutional structure for legislative exchange between the Parliament and the Council. 
Their informal nature allows EU legislators to exchange favours during the decision-
making process and to negotiate acceptable to both sides deals, thus avoiding gridlock. 
Trialogues provide the institutional setting in which governments and MEPs overcome the 
distinct clashes of their ideological, political and policy preferences in the creation of EU 
legislation.  
While trialogues facilitate the enforcement of informal package deals, these 
institutional arrangements do not directly lead to a successful logroll. Trialogues provide 
the institutional framework for legislative bargaining, but the success of a package deal 
depends on the terms of agreement and the ability of the representatives of the Council and 
the EP to enforce the informal agreements within their parent chambers
33
. It is not the 
participation at a trialogue that affects the legislative influence of a chamber, it is the 
package deal agreement negotiated at this trialogue that affects legislative outcomes.  
 Overall, the availability of legislative package deals in the EU helps minimize the 
costs of political bargaining. The possibility of credible commitments and their 
enforcement increases the stability of legislative outcomes. EU legislators gain utility when 
cooperating and are better off than playing against each other. Repeated interactions foster 
package deals and the development of long-term inter-chamber relationships. 
 
                                                 
33
 That is why, the authors (Farrell and Heritier, 2004; Steunenberg and Selck, 2006; Haege and Kaeding, 
2007) who argue that trialogue procedures in the EU lead to increased legislative powers of either the EP or 
the Council, are wrong. 
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E.  Conditions for Inter-Chamber Cooperation through Legislative Package Deals 
Legislative package deals allow each chamber to achieve its preferred policy outcomes. 
Member States establish control over the financial aspects of legislation and ensure that it 
is adopted without delay. In exchange, the EP receives further opportunities for legislative 
influence, increased institutional powers, and access to some of the EU‟s most salient 
policy areas. If logrolling is profitable to each legislative institution, why is only some 
legislation decided through package deals? Two key conditions lead to the use of package 
deals in the EU: the distributive nature of legislative proposals and their urgency. 
 
Distributive Proposals 
First, Member States are likely to be interested in discussing possible legislative exchange 
with the European Parliament if the issues have a distributive character. Governments feel 
intensely about the financial aspects of EU legislation. The prospects of controlling the 
extent to which EU legislation concerns their budgets, is a core condition for the Council‟s 
decision to engage in legislative trade with the European Parliament. Distributive proposals 
are highly salient for Member States. Budget allocating proposals have direct consequences 
for Member States and the Council has greater incentives to negotiate compromise package 
deals with MEPs
34
. Expensive legislative proposals are therefore more likely to be 
negotiated through logrolls as actors can trade their support in order to obtain their most 
preferred outcomes. The distributional aspect of such proposals leads the EP and the 
Council to use informal methods of decision-making in which each institution can gain the 
issues it cares about the most. This leads to the first hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Package deals are more likely to occur when proposals are distributive. 
                                                 
34
 However, if the Council of Ministers can take a decision on budgetary issues without the European 
Parliament‟s approval, then even though the EP may propose trade again and again, nothing guarantees the 
Council‟s interest in a package deal. For example, even though the same issues come up repeatedly in the 
areas of agriculture and fisheries, this does not lead to more inter-chamber logrolling in these areas.   
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Urgency  
Second, time is increasingly valued in the EU legislature. A sluggish EU legislative process 
can impede the ability of governments to act on salient national and international issues. 
Time is a precious resource for Member States and the inability of the EU legislature to 
adopt laws within set deadlines can have a damaging effect on government performance. 
As the time pressure increases, Member States have a greater interest in shaping the outputs 
of the EU legislature. Impatient legislators are more likely to consider alternative routes for 
cooperation in order to speed-up decisions. When time is limited, issues and proposals are 
more likely to be bundled together so that overall compromise could be reached.  
Package deals are likely to speed up the decision-making process and legislative 
decisions are likely to be fast-tracked. Legislators care not only about their successful input 
over the content of legislation, but also about avoiding delays in the decision-making 
process. Impatient legislators are also more likely to grant concessions to each other in 
order to avoid unnecessary delay. Urgent situations induce the use of logrolling and 
package deals serve as a practical solution to time pressure. Therefore, the second 
hypothesis states that:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Package deals are more likely to occur when proposals are urgent.  
 
3.4 The Effect of Legislative Timing  
Even when package deals are not possible, legislative timing is expected to affect the 
opportunities of EU legislators to influence policy outcomes. Timing has been found to be 
a crucial factor in bicameral decision-making (Tsebelis and Money, 1997; Binder, 1999, 
2003). Delay is a prominent factor in legislative bargaining (Cox and Kernell, 1991; 
Alesina and Drazen, 1991) and impatient legislators are more likely to grant concessions 
(Hiroi, 2008). Impatient Member States therefore are more likely to cooperate with and to 
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grant concessions to the EP in return for a fast-track decision. The European Parliament is 
more likely to realize its legislative demands in return for not using its power to delay an 
opinion. In contrast, when the EP is relatively more impatient about the conclusion of a 
legislative deal, it is in a weaker bargaining position. Therefore, urgency matters and the 
relative impatience of a legislative chamber will have an effect on its influence over policy 
outcomes.  
Time pressure can shadow the procedural power rules of the EU‟s consultation and 
co-decision procedures. Delay and impatience may increase the power of a legislative actor 
beyond the procedural power allocation found in the treaties. Therefore, although the 
European Parliament is very limited in its legislative powers in the consultation procedure, 
legislative timing may reduce the options of the Council. Delay can therefore increase the 
legislative influence of the European Parliament vis-à-vis the Member States. Similarly, 
although the European Parliament is considered to be an equal co-legislator with the 
Council in the co-decision procedure, legislative timing may reduce its decision options. 
Parliamentary impatience is likely to increase the legislative influence of the Council vis-à-
vis the EP.  
The rest of the chapter examines the effects of package deals and timing on EU 
legislative outcomes. The argument is presented from the viewpoint of the European 
Parliament. The hypotheses that follow are about the EP‟s legislative influence.  
 
Package Deals and Legislative Timing in Different Procedural and Policy Contexts 
The following section examines the interaction of the two legislative chambers in three 
different contexts: the consultation procedure, the codecision procedure and across policy 
areas. Legislative package deals and timing are analysed under different procedural and 
policy circumstances in order to explore in detail their possible effects on the legislative 
influence of the European Parliament.  
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3.5 Legislative Package Deals and Timing in the Consultation Procedure  
In the consultation procedure, the Council is the main decision-making body (see Chapter 
I). Formally, the European Parliament can propose amendments to Commission proposals, 
but the Member States in the Council have no obligation to accept these. The Member 
States must consult the EP of its opinion, but the Council can decide whether to incorporate 
the EP amendments in its final text. Hence, the Council can completely ignore the EP‟s 
preferences. Formally, in the consultation procedure the EP has limited legislative powers 
in relation to the Council. Informally, two factors allow the EP legislative influence in this 
procedure: a) package deals and b) legislative delay. 
 
1) Legislative Package Deals in the Consultation Procedure  
The consultation procedure allows the Council to decide on legislation without having to 
incorporate the EP‟s amendments in the legislative text. What kind of a package deal could 
there be in the consultation procedure? What can the European Parliament offer in 
exchange to the Council and receive concessions? First, the European Parliament can link 
its consultation opinions to proposals in co-decision. In co-decision, the Council must 
collaborate with the EP for a proposal to become law. The Parliament may refuse to 
cooperate under co-decision if the Council disregards the EP position under consultation.  
If the Parliament can trade its support in co-decision for support in consultation, 
then it is more likely to obtain concessions from the Council. By linking proposals from the 
two legislative procedures, the EP can block progress on whole packages of legislation. 
Faced with several blocked proposals, the Council is likely to reconsider its position and 
allow concessions in favour of Parliament‟s preferred outcome. Linking strategies can be 
used by a rapporteur, who is involved in negotiations on proposals falling in both co-
decision and consultation. Linkage can also be used by closely cooperating rapporteurs 
from different EP committees, who coordinate the blockage of proposals under both 
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procedures. In addition, if rapporteurs fail to negotiate a successful package exchange with 
the Council, party leaders may step in and take over the negotiations. Despite the formal 
consultation procedures, the linkage of proposals can confine the options available to the 
Council and allow the EP greater legislative influence.  
An EP committee rapporteur (in cooperation with other rapporteurs or party 
leaders) may choose to refuse to issue the committee report unless the Council considers it 
as part of a package of proposals. The Council has an incentive to enter package deal 
negotiations for two reasons. First, the Council and the EP are interdependent under co-
decision and an EP refusal to cooperate under co-decision may have detrimental effects on 
the policy outcome. Hence, the Council may find it profitable to exchange its support for 
the EP‟s demands under consultation in order to ensure the EP‟s support for the Council‟s 
preferred policy outcomes in co-decision. Second, the Member States may be impatient 
about the decision on the consultation proposal and time may be pressing the Council to 
offer its support for the EP‟s demands in exchange for an instant EP opinion. Package deals 
are expected to increase the legislative influence of the European Parliament. Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Package deals increase the likelihood of European Parliament success in 
influencing legislative outcomes in the consultation procedure.  
 
2) The Effect of Timing in the Consultation Procedure    
As indicated earlier, in the consultation procedure the Council can formally neglect 
Parliament‟s amendments to legislation. The EP is not a co-decisive legislator, but only a 
consultative body. Hence, the EP has little to lose if it does not act in a timely manner and 
it does not have an incentive to favour accelerated decision-making. Because the treaty 
does not set a consultation procedure deadline, the Parliament has the option to delay its 
opinion until it decides otherwise. The EP has an incentive to delay the vote on its position 
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in order to obtain concessions from the Council. The EP‟s power of delay is a bargaining 
tool, especially when the Member States in the Council are impatient about passing a 
legislative act. Therefore, despite its limited formal powers, legislative delay can 
informally increase the European Parliament‟s influence over legislative outcomes in the 
consultation procedure. As delay cannot occur without an EP majority voting in favour of 
it, a united Parliament is a crucial condition for the exercise of the power of delay. The 
rapporteur is expected to be the key figure in the exercise of the EP‟s „power of delay‟ in 
order to ensure majority in plenary supporting delay.  
The EP‟s power to delay dates back to the Isoglucose ruling, which stipulates that 
the Council cannot adopt a decision until the Parliament has delivered its opinion. The 
European Court of Justice confirmed the importance of the EP‟s opinion under consultation 
in the Roquette  Freres
35
 and Cabotage II
36
 rulings. The ECJ stated that disregard of 
Parliament‟s consultation made the legislative measures void. Because the treaty does not 
set a consultation procedure deadline, some authors have understood the lack of a 
procedural deadline as granting the EP an „indefinite power of delay‟ (Scully, 1997, p. 
235). However, the ECJ has set certain limits on the EP‟s right to exercise its delay powers. 
In the General Tariff Preferences
37
 ruling, the Court stated that the Parliament should not 
abuse its right of consultation and should fulfil its „obligation to cooperate sincerely with 
the Council‟ (Chalmers et al, 2006, p. 147).  
The EP‟s Rules of Procedure specify two routes through which the Parliament can 
delay its final opinion on a legislative proposal. First, the EP can decide to refer a proposal 
back to committee due to a rejection of a Commission proposal (Rule 52 (3)): The 
Parliament rejects the Commission proposal in its entirety, invites the Commission to 
withdraw the proposal, but the Commission refuses to do so. The rapporteur (or committee 
chair) proposes to the plenary not to issue a final opinion and refers the proposal back to 
                                                 
35
 Case 138/79 Roquette Freres v Council (1980) ECR 3333.  
36
 Case C-65/90 Parliament v Council (1992) I-4593.  
37
 Case C – 65/93 Parliament v Council (1995) I-643. 
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committee for further consideration
38
. Second, the EP can decide to refer a proposal back to 
committee when its amendments are not accepted in full by the Commission (Rule 53 (2)): 
The Parliament approves the Commission proposal with amendments, but the Commission 
does not accept all of them. The rapporteur (or committee chair) proposes to the plenary 
not to issue a final opinion and refers the proposal back to committee for further 
consideration
39
.  
Depending on the importance attached to an issue by the Council and the 
Commission, the European Parliament may be able to exploit its power to delay in order to 
obtain benefits in the decision-making process. First, through delay the Parliament may be 
able to find its demands incorporated in the final legislative text. Second, delay allows 
MEPs to negotiate informally with the Council and often to get a better deal through 
informal meetings. Third, delay gives an additional reading to the consultation procedure. 
The EP signals its position to the Council and the Commission, but refrains from issuing an 
opinion, so that another round of legislative negotiations can take place. Overall, legislative 
delay is likely to increase the EP‟s chances of influencing proposals under consultation. 
This leads to the hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Legislative delay increases the likelihood of European Parliament success in 
influencing legislative outcomes in the consultation procedure. 
 
                                                 
38
 Rule 52(3) “If the Commission does not withdraw its proposal, Parliament shall refer the matter back to 
the committee responsible without voting on the draft legislative resolution. In this case, the committee 
responsible shall, orally or in writing, report back to Parliament within a period decided by Parliament 
which may not exceed two months.”  
 
39
 Rule 53(2) “Where the Commission announces that it does not intend to adopt all Parliament's 
amendments, the rapporteur of the committee responsible or, failing him, the chairman of that committee 
shall make a formal proposal to Parliament as to whether the vote on the draft legislative resolution should 
proceed. Before submitting this proposal, the rapporteur or chairman of the committee responsible may 
request the President to suspend consideration of the item. Should Parliament decide to postpone the vote, the 
matter shall be deemed to be referred back to the committee responsible for reconsideration.”  
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3.6 Legislative Package Deals and Timing in the Co-decision Procedure  
In the co-decision procedure, the two legislative chambers have the power to propose and 
veto amendments. Formally, they must both agree on the content of legislation before a 
proposal can be adopted. The co-decision procedure, therefore, allows equal opportunities 
to both actors to influence legislative outcomes. The European Parliament and the Council 
are interdependent, because one chamber cannot decide without the consent of the other. 
Two factors are likely to increase the European Parliament‟s legislative influence in the co-
decision procedure: a) package deals and b) Council impatience. 
 
1) Legislative Package Deals in the Co-decision Procedure  
In order to reach compromise in co-decision, Member States in the Council may find it 
profitable to trade support for some issues in return for the EP‟s cooperation on other 
issues. EU legislators choose to trade policy packages in order to speed up their daily 
legislative work. Through the linkage of issues and proposals in package deals both the 
Parliament and the Council can obtain their most preferred items on the legislative agenda 
and compromise some of the other issues. Therefore, some legislative deals reached in co-
decision can be highly profitable for the European Parliament.  
The EP can be more successful in co-decision when it negotiates several acts in a 
package and treats them as one during the legislative process. The Parliament may refuse to 
cooperate with the Council on a proposal until the Member States respect the EP position 
on another co-decision proposal. Faced with several blocked proposals in a package, the 
Council is likely to reconsider its position and allow concessions closer to Parliament‟s 
preferred outcome. If the EP can trade its support on one issue for support on another, then 
it is more likely to get concessions from the Council. What motivates the enforcement of a 
package deal in co-decision? 
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 Co-decision gives the Council and the Parliament equal legislative powers. Both 
sides have incentives to enter package deals as the inability of one of the chambers to agree 
to a compromise text results in deadlock. The Council and the EP are interdependent under 
co-decision and each house has an interest in a package deal. Impatience can also play a 
role as time may be pressing each of the houses to offer support for the other chamber‟s 
demands in exchange for an early agreement under co-decision. Package deals are expected 
to increase the legislative influence of the EP. This leads to the fifth hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Package deals increase the likelihood of European Parliament success in 
influencing legislative outcomes in the co-decision procedure.  
 
As was discussed above, trialogues are increasingly employed in the co-decision 
procedure because they provide the structural framework for inter-international exchange. 
While legislative package deals are expected to be profitable for the European Parliament, 
there is no reason to believe that trialogues will increase the EP‟s legislative success in co-
decision. Trialogues are institutional arrangements, which serve as mechanisms for 
exchange of information about the policy positions of each chamber. Trialogues provide 
the institutional framework for capturing gains from exchange in the EU legislature. 
Trialogues facilitate cooperation among EU legislators and provide a common platform for 
negotiations. The mere participation at a trialogue, however, does not affect the legislative 
influence of a chamber. The package deal agreement negotiated at this trialogue is what 
affects legislative outcomes. This leads to the sixth hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 6: Trialogues do not increase the likelihood of European Parliament success in 
influencing legislative outcomes in the co-decision procedure. 
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2) The Effect of Timing in the Co-decision Procedure  
First readings in the co-decision procedure resemble the consultation procedure – there are 
no procedural deadlines for the delivery of an opinion. As in consultation, the European 
Parliament also has the option to delay its opinions before first readings in co-decision. 
Therefore, it is important whether the Council or the Parliament is more impatient about the 
passage of legislation. If Member States are impatient about the conclusion of a legislative 
proposal, the Council is more likely to cooperate with the Parliament in return for an early 
agreement. Even under co-decision, the European Parliament is expected to realize many of 
its legislative demands in return for not using its power to delay an opinion.  
While first readings set no time limits and the EP can delay its legislative opinion, 
second reading negotiations follow a strict deadline. In addition, second reading 
amendments, unlike those at first reading, require an absolute majority of MEPs in favour 
in order to pass. Although the European Parliament has the ability to use its veto in third 
reading, going all the way to conciliation involves high costs for the EP in terms of time 
and institutional resources. Therefore, Council impatience is expected to increase the EP‟s 
chances of influencing proposals under co-decision. This leads to the seventh hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 7: Council impatience increases the likelihood of European Parliament success 
in influencing legislative outcomes in the co-decision procedure.  
 
3.7 The Effect of Legislative Package Deals Across Policy Areas  
The previous two sections argued that package deals and legislative timing are likely to 
increase the European Parliament‟s influence over legislative outcomes in the consultation 
and co-decision procedures. What is the effect of legislative package deals beyond the 
procedural context? Logrolling allows the European Parliament to gain legislative presence 
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in the EU‟s distributive policy areas. Contrary to the conventional understanding that the 
EP‟s legislative influence is confined within regulatory policy areas (Judge et al., 1994; 
Burns, 2005), legislative package deals allow the European Parliament to influence 
distributive policy outcomes.  
Package deals reduce the ability of individual MEPs to participate fully in 
legislative bargaining with the Council. Logrolls are typically fast-tracked and they do not 
allow a large number of MEPs to participate, deliberate and include amendments to 
package compromise texts. Package deals also make the legislative process less transparent 
as they are usually agreed informally between a select number of representatives from the 
EP and the Council. However, package deals benefit the EP as a legislative institution. 
Through package deals, the Parliament gains legislative presence in some of the EU‟s most 
expensive policy areas.  
It was argued earlier that package deals are more likely to take place on distributive 
proposals. Policy areas that involve a large proportion of distributive proposals are 
therefore more likely to be marked by package deals. Although Member States retain 
control over the financial aspects of proposals in the EU‟s distributive policies, the 
European Parliament gains further opportunities for legislative influence as a side payment. 
In exchange for allowing Member States control over budgetary issues in legislation, the 
European Parliament gains increased institutional powers in distributive areas. Therefore, 
the value added of package deals for the EP is its legislative presence in policy areas from 
which it has been traditionally excluded. Therefore, the eighth hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 8: Package deals increase the likelihood of European Parliament success in 
influencing distributive policy areas. 
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Gains in Institutional Powers for the European Parliament 
What are the specific profits for the European Parliament from its repeated engagement in 
package deals with the Council? A core assumption of the thesis is that funding and 
budgetary matters are highly salient issues for governments. As package deals usually take 
place on distributive proposals, the stakes are very high and Member States are particularly 
interested in the budgetary terms of legislation. In exchange for allowing the Member 
States to realize their budgetary and policy preferences, the European Parliament gains 
additional institutional powers through logrolls. Hence, through logrolling the EP gains 
institutional powers. Such concessions are not assumed to be costly for Member States and 
this may be one of the motivations for the Council‟s willingness to offer such institutional 
side-payments to the EP. Despite their seemingly less substantial value, the European 
Parliament is able to exploit such institutional capabilities to extend its legislative powers.  
 The institutional powers the EP gains through package deals are different to the 
formal institutional powers assigned by treaty reform. Institutional powers here are those 
administrative powers the EP gains as additions to legislative deals. Such institutional 
powers include the ability of the EP to receive reports and to be consulted by the 
Commission and the Council on the implementation; the right to question the directors, 
boards and members of EU bodies as well as to oversee the activities of EU agencies; 
greater involvement in some policy areas, as well as a greater role in comitology 
committees. In contrast to the formal treaty increases in its institutional powers, package 
deals allow the European Parliament to obtain administrative rights, which ease the EP‟s 
more pronounced involvement in a broader range of policy areas. 
 First, the European Parliament often requires and gains the right to receive reports 
by the Commission and the Council. Examples of gains in such institutional powers can be 
found in numerous cases - the Trans - European Networks case (COD/2001/0296), the 
Fight Against Organised Crime case (CNS/2000/0817), the Development Cooperation case 
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(COD/2006/0116), the Maritime Transport case (COD/2003/0089) as well as the European 
Maritime Safety Agency case (COD/2005/0098). Second, the EP may often gain the right 
to question the directors, boards and members of EU bodies. Examples of such institutional 
gains can be found in the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drugs Addition case 
(COD/2005/0166), the European Training Foundation case (CNS/2002/0171), the 
European Agency for Health and Safety case (CNS/2002/0178), the European Food Safety 
Agency case (COD/2002/0179), the European Environment Agency case 
(COD/2002/0169), the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights case (CNS/2005/0124), and the 
Community Fisheries Control Agency case (CNS/2004/0108). During the negotiations on 
these proposals the European Parliament gained the right of scrutiny over the Agencies‟ 
activities, the right to receive annual reports by their directors as well as the right to 
overview the appointment of their board and directors.  
 In addition, the EP often receives as a side payment the right of further involvement 
in some policy areas. Examples of such institutional gains can be found in the Animal 
Diseases and Public Health case (COD/2004/0270B) and the Peace Process case 
(CNS/2000/0042) where the EP was granted greater involvement in the future development 
of these policies. Although such increases in the EP‟s further policy involvement are rather 
general, the EP may later exploit these institutional gains to increase its legislative 
influence in policies where it has been traditionally weak. Finally, the EP may require and 
receive as a concession from the Council a stronger role in comitology committees. 
Examples of such institutional gains can be found in the co-decision Spirit Drinks case 
(COD/2005/0028) as well as the European Financial Markets case (COD/2001/0086). 
Therefore, the EP‟s institutional gains from its involvement in package deals are different 
to and less substantial than the formal institutional gains found in treaty provisions. 
Nevertheless, such administrative capabilities strengthen the EP‟s presence in EU policy-
making and may prove substantial in the long-run. 
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When the two chambers attach different preference intensities to issues, trade is 
possible and logrolls can be profitable for both the Council and the EP. The thesis assumes 
that budgetary issues are much more salient to Member States than the institutional powers 
they give in exchange to the EP. Member States‟ preferences are expected to be much more 
intense about issues such as spending, financing, and funding for programs and Community 
actions than they are about institutional issues such as the EP‟s ability to monitor and 
control the establishment of new bodies, parliamentary scrutiny, or the writing of reports. 
On the other hand, MEPs are assumed to value highly an increase in the institutional 
powers of their chamber. This leads to the last hypothesis:   
   
Hypothesis 9: Package deals increase the likelihood of European Parliament success in 
gaining institutional powers. 
 
Gains in Agenda - Setting Powers for the Commission 
The story of EU lawmaking through package deals is centred around two actors – the 
Parliament and the Council. Package deals allow the EP and the Member States certain 
gains. In addition, the Commission, which is left out of the process of inter-chamber 
bargaining, also has something to gain from the enforcement of informal commitments in 
package legislation. Beyond the proposal stage, the Commission has limited access to 
information and can often be excluded from negotiations between the Council and the EP. 
This is generally true for the co-decision procedure, but in logrolling situations, this can 
also be true for the consultation procedure. However, the Commission can influence 
legislative outcomes through its ability to propose package legislation. It can influence 
legislative outcomes by proposing packages in the first place. If it proposes several pieces 
of legislation simultaneously and treats them as a package, the Commission structures the 
negotiations between the EP and the Council in a logrolling framework. By fostering 
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logrolling situations, the Commission regains its institutional presence in EU decision-
making. By identifying bundles of issues and/or proposals as a package, the Commission 
increases its ability to affect legislative outcomes. The Commission includes issues that 
would otherwise be unable to pass through on single proposals.  
 
3.8 Summary of the Argument and Empirical Implications 
The development of legislative package deals in EU decision-making allows the Council 
and the Parliament to exchange support for their preferred policy outcomes. Given their 
interdependence, different preference intensities, repeated interactions in lawmaking, and 
their ability to conclude and enforce informal commitments, EU legislators find it 
profitable to cooperate through package deals.  
The thesis argues that there are two conditions for the use of package deals in the 
European Union legislature: the distributive nature of legislative proposals, and their 
urgency. The key argument is that package deals allow Member States to establish control 
over the budgetary aspects of legislation and to ensure its speedy adoption. In exchange, 
the European Parliament receives further opportunities for legislative influence, increased 
institutional powers, and access to some of the EU‟s most salient policy areas. 
Trialogues are institutionalized at the inter-cameral level to facilitate information 
exchange and to capture gains from trade. Trialogues provide the institutional structure for 
legislative exchange between the Parliament and the Council. Their informal nature allows 
EU legislators to exchange favours during the decision-making process and to negotiate 
acceptable to both sides deals, thus avoiding gridlock. Trialogues offer the institutional 
setting in which governments and MEPs overcome the distinct clashes of their ideological, 
political and policy preferences in the creation of EU legislation.  
In addition to package deals, the thesis argues that legislative timing affects EU 
policy outcomes. Time pressure can shadow the procedural power rules of the EU‟s 
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legislative procedures. Delay and impatience may increase the power of a legislative actor 
beyond the procedural capabilities allocated by the treaties. Package deals and timing are 
placed under different procedural and policy circumstances in order to explore in detail 
their possible effects on the legislative influence of the EP.  
The argument has three core elements. First, package deals and legislative delay are 
expected to increase the legislative influence of the European Parliament in the 
consultation procedure. By linking issues and proposals in the consultation procedure and 
delaying its opinion, the EP extracts legislative concessions from the Council. Second, 
package deals and Council impatience are expected to increase the legislative influence of 
the European Parliament in co-decision. By linking issues and proposals in the co-decision 
procedure and cooperating with an impatient Council, the European Parliament extracts 
legislative concessions from the Member States.  
Third, package deals are expected to increase the legislative influence of the 
European Parliament in distributive policy areas. When it comes to funding and budgetary 
matters, Member States are less open to negotiations. However, through package deals the 
EP gains access and legislative presence in policy areas from which it has traditionally 
been excluded. In exchange for allowing Member States to realize their budgetary and 
policy preferences, the European Parliament gains additional institutional powers in the 
EU‟s distributive policy areas. 
Overall, logrolling allows the Member States to control the policy agendas they 
value the most, and in exchange to offer side payments to the European Parliament for its 
cooperative behaviour. In exchange for supporting the Council‟s policy and budgetary 
preferences, the EP gains further legislative influence and institutional presence in policy 
areas from which it is otherwise excluded or formally weak. The Commission also gains 
from the enforcement of inter-cameral package deals. The Commission facilitates such 
institutional mechanisms, because it gains closer access to the decision-making process.  
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Table 3.1 summarizes the hypotheses derived from the argument in this chapter. It 
outlines the chapters where the hypotheses will be tested empirically.   
 
Table 3.1 Summary of Hypotheses 
 Tested in: 
I. Why Package Deals In the European Union Legislative Process?   
  
Hypothesis 1: Package deals are more likely to occur when legislative 
proposals are distributive.  
Chapter V 
Hypothesis 2: Package deals are more likely to occur when legislative 
proposals are urgent.  
Chapter V 
  
II. The Effects of Legislative Package Deals and Timing: Consultation Procedure 
  
Hypothesis 3: Package deals increase the likelihood of EP success in 
influencing legislative outcomes in the consultation procedure. 
Chapter VI 
Hypothesis 4: Legislative delay increases the likelihood of EP success in 
influencing legislative outcomes in the consultation procedure. 
Chapter VI 
  
III. The Effects of Legislative Package Deals and Timing: Co-decision Procedure 
  
Hypothesis 5: Package deals increase the likelihood of EP success in 
influencing legislative outcomes in the co-decision procedure. 
Chapter VII 
Hypothesis 6: Trialogues do not increase the likelihood of EP success in 
influencing legislative outcomes in the co-decision procedure.  
Chapter VII 
Hypothesis 7: Council impatience increases the likelihood of EP success 
in influencing legislative outcomes in the co-decision procedure. 
Chapter VII 
  
IV. The Effects of Package Deals on EU Legislative Outcomes: Policy Areas 
  
Hypothesis 8: Package deals increase the likelihood of EP success in 
influencing distributive policy areas in the EU.  
Chapter VIII 
Hypothesis 9: Package deals increase the likelihood of EP success in 
gaining institutional powers. 
Chapter VIII 
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 This chapter proposed a theory of inter-chamber logrolling and outlined a three-
stage decision-making process under the co-decision and consultation procedures. In the 
following chapters, the hypotheses outlined here will be tested empirically. The empirical 
chapters test the main argument of the thesis that package deals and urgency increase the 
legislative influence of the European Parliament across legislative procedures and policy 
areas. This argument is tested in three different contexts: a) the consultation procedure, b) 
the co-decision procedure, and c) across policy areas and time.  
In Chapters V, VI, and VII and VIII these claims are applied to all legislation 
decided in the co-decision and consultation procedures in the period 1999 – 2007. These 
chapters illustrate why informal agreements matter for EU legislative politics, how they are 
enforced between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, and to what 
extent they affect the legislative influence of the European Parliament.  
Chapter V tests the conditions that lead to logrolling in the EU. It studies why 
package deals are enforced between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. 
Chapter VI, VII and VIII test the argument that package deals increase the legislative 
influence of the European Parliament. These chapters explore the effect of logrolling on 
legislative outcomes in the EU. Chapter VI tests the argument in the consultation 
procedure; Chapter VII tests the argument in the co-decision procedures; and Chapter VIII 
tests the argument across all EU policy areas and time.  
If the argument presented here is supported empirically, the following chapters 
should illustrate that the European Parliament frequently engages in informal deals with the 
Council of Ministers under the co-decision and the consultation procedures. Moreover, the 
chapters should find empirical evidence that the European Parliament gains further 
legislative influence from its involvement in logrolling with the Council of Ministers. 
Chapter IV provides an overview of the data and methodology used in the analysis. 
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CHAPTER 4 : METHODOLOGY, DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
The previous chapter developed an argument about package decision-making in the EU 
legislative process. This chapter discusses the data and the methodology used to test the 
empirical predictions of the argument. The chapter reviews the data analysed, the sources 
for these data, the operationalization of the variables used in the statistical analysis and the 
choice of case studies. The main goal of the empirical chapters is to evaluate the 
predictions of the argument, as outlined in Chapter III, and to compare the results with 
theoretical predictions found in the existing literature.  
The thesis examines EU legislative politics in the period 1 May 1999 – 30 April 
2007. The complete data set consists of all 1465 legislative proposals proposed and adopted 
between 1 May 1999 and 30 April 2007. These include 540 co-decision proposals and 925 
consultation proposals. The data were collected from the publicly available official 
European Union databases: the European Parliament‟s Legislative Observatory, the 
Council of Ministers‟ Document Register and the European Commission‟s Pre-Lex 
Legislative Database. The empirical analysis uses two methodologies: quantitative 
statistical analysis and qualitative case studies. 
A major strength of the thesis is that the data analysed cover all completed 
legislative proposals in the period 1999 – 2007. This reduces any errors that might occur 
due to selection bias and sampling (King et al., 1994, 128). The publicly available data 
make the study easily replicable. The dataset was compiled manually. Although many of 
the variables (such as legislative proposal ID; name and political affiliation of the 
rapporteur; reading; procedure; policy area; and EP committee) can be downloaded with an 
automated script, the manual compilation of the dataset has several benefits. First, the 
manual data collection allowed for a more thorough understanding of the EU legislative 
process. Second, it helped the finding of new patterns not informed by previous research. 
Third, some errors in the EU databases were identified and corrected.    
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4.1 Identifying Package Deals in the EU Legislative Process 
If package deals are informal, how could one trace these and find evidence for their 
existence? One of the most important features of legislative package deals is that despite 
their informal character, they have to be officially approved through voting by each of the 
EU legislative chambers. These informal bargains need to be enforced by the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Any agreements made between the 
representatives of the institutions, have to go through the formal legislative process in order 
to become law. Informal bargains made between the Council and the Parliament are 
therefore binding and their representatives have to commit to pass and enforce them 
without further amendments within their respective institutions.  
This feature of package lawmaking requires that package deals are clearly identified 
within the legislative process, so that they can be passed as block votes without additional 
amendments. Each of the legislative institutions keeps records of informal inter-chamber 
negotiations and the progress on them. The Council of Ministers‟ document register is a 
particularly good source on package compromises and informal trialogues. The working 
documents of the Council clearly indicate the frequency and scope of informal inter-
chamber negotiations with the Parliament. Contentious issues are identified, as well as the 
terms of package compromises.  
The use of package deals in the co-decision and consultation procedures was traced 
through the Council‟s Document Register and the European Parliament‟s Plenary Debates 
and Summaries of Sittings (available through the EP Legislative Observatory). A proposal 
was counted as a package deal proposal only if there was written evidence of a negotiated 
compromise package on a single legislative proposal or on several legislative proposals 
between the Council and the EP. Both the Council‟s Document Register and the European 
Parliament‟s Legislative Observatory contain enough data so that package deals can be 
traced and researched systematically. 
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4.2 Structure of the Complete Dataset 
The dataset used in the analysis is structured hierarchically across four levels: time, policy 
areas, proposals and issues. The complete dataset consists of 2369 issues i, which are part 
of 973 legislative proposals j, which are part of 19 policy areas k, and 8 legislative years l. 
Each of these structural components of the dataset is discussed here.  
 
A. Time: 1 May 1999 – 30 April 2007 
The period under study covers eight legislative years. It covers the full 1999 – 2004 
legislature and three years from the 2004 – 2009 legislature. Each year starts on 1 May and 
ends on 30 April. By studying all legislative proposals decided since 1999, the thesis 
controls for two factors. First, it studies proposals that were decided through the co-
decision procedure, as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty (co-decision II). Second, the 
thesis controls for any effects of enlargement by including proposals decided since 2004. 
By including the time level in the analysis, the thesis explores whether the use of legislative 
package deals and their effect on policy outcomes vary from year to year.  
 
B. Policy Areas 
As discussed in Chapter I, the policy area context is expected to affect legislative outcomes 
in the European Union (Judge et al., 1994; Shackleton, 2000; Burns, 2005; Thomson and 
Hosli, 2006). What constitutes a policy area? The definition of a policy area will have a 
clear effect on the results of the analysis. The existing studies of EU legislative politics that 
analyze the effect of policy areas, define policies according to the European Parliament‟s 
drafting committees. For example, if the EP‟s Committee on Civil Freedoms, Justice and 
Home Affairs is drafting a legislative proposal, the proposal would be assigned to the 
policy area of Justice and Home Affairs. However, this methodology can lead to inaccurate 
results. First, such a definition of policy areas can bias the results due to the existing 
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competition in the European Parliament among EP committees for certain proposals. 
Strong committees may draft proposals in policy areas not directly falling within their 
expertise. Second, it is an increasing practice for legislative proposals to be drafted not by 
one, but by several cooperating EP committees. Third, due to time pressure legislative 
proposals may be assigned to EP committees with less workload, despite the fact that the 
proposal does not fall within their particular policy expertise.  
 Therefore, the definition of a policy area according to the EP drafting committee is 
not appropriate. Nor is the definition of a policy area according to the Council approving a 
legislative proposal. A Council on Justice and Home Affairs can adopt proposals on Justice 
and Home Affairs as well as proposals in any other policy area. For example, a proposal on 
Air Transport can equally be adopted by a Council on Justice and Home Affairs and a 
Council on Agriculture.  
 The definition of policy areas according to the Commission‟s structure is more 
accurate. Policy areas are defined according to the Commission‟s Directorate - Generals 
proposing the legislation. Legislative proposals originating from the same DG are closely 
linked. This definition does not concern the internal structure of the European Parliament 
or the Council of Ministers. The EU legislative institutions decide proposals within the 
policy domains defined by the Commission.       
As Table 4.1 demonstrates several EP committees write reports within the same 
policy area. For example, in the policy area of Budgets, legislation in the Parliament was 
dealt with by four different committees: the Committees on Budgets, Budgetary Control, 
Culture and Education, and Economic and Monetary Affairs. Moreover, in the policy area 
of Health and Consumer Protection, legislation in the EP was dealt with by seven different 
committees: the Committees on Agriculture and Rural Development, Economic and 
Monetary Affairs, Employment and Social Affairs, Environment, Public Health and Food 
Safety, Fisheries, Internal Market and Consumer Protection and Legal Affairs.  
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Table 4.1 Policy Areas and EP Committees Responsible for Legislation 
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Agriculture & Rural Development x x x
Budget x x x x
Development x x x x x
Economic and Financial Affairs x x x x x x
Education and Culture x x x
Employment and Social Affairs x x x x
Energy and Transport x x x
Enterprise and Industry x x x x x x x x
Environment x x
Eurostat, Statistical Office x x x x x x x x
External Relations x x x x x x
Fisheries and Maritime Affairs x
General Secretariat x x x x
Health and Consumer Protection x x x x x x x
Information Society x x x x
Internal Market and Services x x x x x
Justice, Freedom and Security x x x x
Research x x
Taxation and Customs Union x x x x x  
Source: Own calculations based on the 1465 legislative proposals studied in the period 1999 – 2007.  
Note: Policy areas are defined according to the European Commission‟s Directorate Generals proposing the legislation. 
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C. Legislative Proposals  
The complete dataset of 1465 legislative proposals (see Appendix I) was compiled from 
information available from the three publicly available databases of the European 
Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the European Commission. The list of legislative 
proposals adopted and completed in the period 1 May 1999 - 30 April 2007 was obtained 
from the European Parliament Legislative Observatory. The proposals were selected 
through the database search function for proposed and completed legislation in this period. 
Only proposals for which the legislative process had already been completed between these 
two dates: 1 May 1999 and 30 April 2007, were returned
40
. Therefore, the dataset does not 
contain any legislative proposals listed as pending or withdrawn
41
. For the analysis of the 
effect of package deals on legislative outcomes, it was important to have access to the final 
legislative text. 
 Overall, 540 co-decision and 925 consultation proposals were returned by the 
search. These 1465 completed legislative proposals included 309 Directives, 621 
Regulations and 535 Decisions. The 540 co-decision proposals included 231 Directives, 
209 Regulations and 100 Decisions. The 925 consultation proposals included 78 Directives, 
412 Regulations and 453 Decisions. For each piece of legislation, the texts of the 
Commission proposals, EP opinions and Council positions as well as the final texts were 
read to identify the main issues involved in the proposals. Of the total 1465 completed 
legislative proposals, 494 proposals passed without any proposed amendments by the 
European Parliament. In assessing legislative influence, careful consideration should be 
paid to only those instances in which preferences conflict, for they are the only cases in 
which relative power can be observed. Therefore, the analysis focuses on the 973 
                                                 
40
 Note: All proposals returned by the database, as of October 2007, were included in the dataset. There have 
been several additions to the OEIL database since then. That is why, there may be a discrepancy of around 50 
proposals  if a search is carried out now.  
 
41
 In this period under the co-decision procedure, there were 34 proposals listed as pending and 33 proposals 
listed as lapsed/withdrawn. Under the consultation procedure, there were 68 proposals listed as pending and 
67 proposals listed as lapsed/withdrawn.  
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legislative proposals (470 in co-decision and 503 in consultation) to which the EP proposed 
amendments. This way the contentious issues can be identified, the different policy 
positions of the EP and the Council can be extracted and the terms of any resulting package 
deals can be determined.  
 While all 1465 legislative proposals have been used in the analysis of the use of 
package deals in EU legislative decision-making, the study of the EP‟s influence on policy 
outcomes concentrates on those 973 legislative dossiers to which the Parliament proposed 
amendments. Hence, the analysis of EP legislative success ignores the 494 legislative 
proposals that passed without amendments by the Parliament. One of the main reasons for 
concentrating on only those proposals to which the EP proposed amendments is the fact 
that the EP‟s proposed changes to the text can later be compared to the final legislative text. 
When the EP does not propose any amendments to legislative dossiers it is very difficult to 
pinpoint and to quantify the position of the European Parliament and whether or not its 
preferences are included in Commission proposals or Council texts. 
  The thesis, however, does not assume that silence on behalf of the EP links directly 
to no influence on legislation. On the contrary, proposals that pass without amendments by 
the EP may already contain the EP‟s desired preferences. The Commission may well have 
included the EP‟s preferred issues in its initial Commission proposal and hence there may 
be no need for the EP to rewrite the proposal. This may often happen in policy areas where 
legislation is reintroduced and where issues have been reoccurring. The Commission may 
have learnt from its previous experience in proposing legislation in such policy areas and 
may already include such possible amendments in its original proposal. In addition to 
finding its preference already included in Commission proposals, the EP may introduce 
changes by directly negotiating with the Council so that the EP and the Council 
amendments are all introduced by the Council‟s amended text. If the EP assumes that a 
piece of legislation will be subject to amendments in the Council, the EP representatives 
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may prefer to leave the proposal in the hands of the Council, while making clear what kind 
of changes the Parliament will be prepared to negotiate on. However, for the purposes of 
the thesis, such cases are not analysed due to the difficulty of finding the link between past 
EP amendments and Commission proposals.  
It is important to note the variation in proposed amendments to legislative dossiers 
across policies (see Table 5.1). The European Parliament proposes amendments under the 
consultation procedure less often than it does under co-decision. The proportion of co-
decision proposals to which the EP proposed amendments was 87% (470 of 540 proposals), 
whereas the proportion of consultation legislation to which the EP proposed amendments 
was only 54.5% (503 of 925 proposals). Therefore, in co-decision 70 proposals passed with 
no proposed amendments by the EP and in consultation 422 proposals passed with no 
proposed amendments by the EP. Overall, the European Parliament proposes amendments 
to 66.4% of the legislative proposals (973 of 1465) and the rest are passed subject to no 
amendment.  
The policy areas with the lowest proportion of amended by the European 
Parliament proposals are Budget (41.7%), General Affairs (29.4%), Agriculture and Rural 
Development (43.9%), Economics and Social Affairs (50.0%), External Relations (52.8%), 
Taxation and Customs (53.8%). On the other hand, the policy areas with the highest 
proportion of amended by the EP legislative proposals are Development (100%), 
Employment and Social Affairs (86.4%), Health and Consumer Protection (84.6%), 
Enterprise and Industry (82.4%), and Information Society (81.5%). While these 
percentages are indicative of the activity of the EP across policy areas, activity rates do not 
directly lead to EP success. It may be that EP committees that consists of more active 
MEPs propose amendments to legislation more often than committees that are made up of 
less active MEPs. Hence, high activity rates of proposed EP amendments do not directly 
mean a greater interest of the European Parliament in some policy areas. 
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D. Issues Contested by the European Parliament  
 
The influence of the European Parliament is analyzed through the examination of the issues 
the EP contested on each legislative proposal. A proposal may contain multiple issues and 
the influence of the European Parliament may differ according to the issue and its nature 
(Benedetto and Hix, 2007). Overall, 2369 issues were identified in the 973 amended 
proposals. Why was an issue-based methodology preferred over an amendment adoption 
methodology? The amendment adoption rate methodology employed by Kreppel (1999, 
2002) and Tsebelis et al. (2001) has been a powerful tool in the assessment of European 
Parliament legislative success. A major shortcoming of this methodology, however, is the 
fact that it does not take into account the substance and quality of EP amendments
42
. 
Recent research on EU legislative politics (Thomson et al, 2006) has pointed this out and 
has suggested the issue - based approach as a more appropriate methodology for assessing 
the European Parliament‟s legislative influence.  
The rise of package deals and informal agreements between the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers significantly undermines the strength of the 
„amendment adoption‟ methodology. First, as the use of informal trialogues and package 
deals has increased in recent years, many of the amendments the European Parliament 
submits are the result of compromise agreements with the Council. The large number of 
proposed EP amendments is very often the combination of the amendments of both the EP 
and the Council. With a view to concluding the legislative process early, the two 
institutions agree that all compromise amendments are included in the EP proposal. As a 
result, many of the amendments submitted to the EP plenary already contain the Council 
preferences. For example, in the case of the regulation on Spirit Drinks 2005/0028 (COD),  
                                                 
42
 For example, a single issue such as the change of a date in a legislative proposal may appear as several 
amendments, because the date appears in several places in the legislative text. Therefore, the EP amendment 
of “22 June 2002” replacing the text “22 April 2002” will results in as many amendments as the times the “22 
April 2002” is mentioned in the text. 
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the „rapporteur, Mr Horst Schnellhardt (EPP/ED-DE), presented a report on behalf of the 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety containing 123 
amendments…a number of informal contacts took place between the Council, the European 
Parliament and the Commission with a view to reaching an agreement on this dossier at 
first reading. Various political groups and individual MEPs tabled a further 26 
amendments … six amendments (amendments 126-7 and 142-5) were compromise 
amendments which correspond to the compromise package that was agreed during the 
informal contacts referred to above…the plenary adopted six amendments… The 
amendments adopted correspond to what was agreed between the three institutions‟ 
(Council of the EU, 2007). 
Second, instead of voting on a series of amendments, the European Parliament 
increasingly considers compromise texts that are submitted as a single amendment, 
containing the complete legislative text. For example, in the decision of the External 
Borders Fund 2005/0047 (COD) „…the rapporteur, Ms. Kudrycka (EPP/ED-PL) presented 
on behalf of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs the three draft 
reports, which contained the entire text of the Commission proposals thus amended, that 
correspond to the agreement reached during the informal contacts … Contrary to previous 
general practice, the reports were not composed of individually numbered amendments‟ 
(Council of the EU, 2006b). Therefore, what may seem as a single EP amendment to the 
Commission proposal, is in fact a revised version of the whole legislative proposal. In cases 
when the EP resolution is submitted as a compromise text and not in the form of 
amendments, it is impossible to distinguish the changes introduced by the Parliament alone. 
Therefore, the analysis of the number of amendments submitted by the EP and their 
adoption rate no longer offers an accurate way of measuring the EP‟s legislative influence. 
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Breaking the proposals to the contested issues offers an alternative for the analysis 
of the EP‟s legislative influence. Both the EP and the Council provide summaries of the 
main issues discussed during the course of the negotiations. Therefore, it is possible to 
identify the issues the European Parliament contests in each proposal and to trace whether 
the EP‟s demands on these issues have been included in the final text. The issues were 
classified in four categories: 1) budgetary issues, 2) policy substance issues, 3) fundamental 
rights issues and 4) institutional powers issues. On each piece of legislation, the decision-
making process was traced from the initial Commission proposal, the debates in the EP 
committees and plenary, the decision-making process within the Council, any informal 
Council-EP negotiations, the formal positions of each legislative institution and the final 
Council legislative act.  
 
Table 4.2 Classification of Issues According to Issue Type   
 
  Type of Issues Contested by the EP 
  Total  
Policy 
Substance 
Budgetary 
Fundamental 
Rights  
Institutional 
Powers  
Total proposals 973         
Total Issues 2369 1528 256 269 316 
 (%) of total    (64.5)  (10.8)  (11.4)  (13.3) 
      
Co-decision Proposals  470         
Co-decision Issues  1567 1080 146 196 145 
(%) of total   (68.9)  (9.3)  (12.5)  (9.3) 
      
Consultation Proposals 503         
Consultation  Issues 802 448 110 73 171 
(%) of total    (55.9)  (13.7)  (9.1)  (21.3) 
 
Source: Own calculations 
 
The issues were classified in the four categories according to the following criteria:  
1. Budgetary issues: These issues included EP demands for higher or lower spending by the 
Commission or the Member States, co-financing, funding for specific urgent matters; 
funding for specific programmes, budgetary undertakings by some Member States and not 
others, financial declarations, etc.  
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2. Policy substance issues: Such issues included EP demands for the extension or the 
limitation of the scope of the legislation, the introduction of further clarifications on the 
definitions and terms; requirements for in-depth impact assessments of the policy area; 
addition of clauses, specific for the subject field.   
3. Fundamental rights issues: These issues were EP demands for human rights, 
transparency, privacy, and asylum. They include EP demands for data protection, 
references to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, human rights conventions, protection of 
citizens and third-country nationals, children‟s rights.  
4. Institutional powers issues: These issues were EP demands for the establishment or the 
increase of the legislative powers of the European Parliament. The European Parliament 
may demand a greater role for the EP in the policy area; ability to monitor and control the 
establishment of new bodies; Parliamentary scrutiny of Council activities; reports by the 
Commission and the Council, submitted to the EP periodically. 
 
 
4.3 Sources: Publicly Available Databases of the EU Institutions 
 
A. European Parliament Legislative Observatory: http://www.europarl.eu  
The first source of information for the thesis‟ empirical analysis is the European Parliament 
Legislative Observatory OEIL. It contains information on individual legislative proposals, 
their progress and their legislative procedure. The Legislative Observatory also provides a 
useful gateway to internal EP sources such as committee documents and political group 
websites. This database provides direct links to Commission proposals, committee texts, 
rapporteurs‟ opinions and EP positions at the various stages of the legislative procedures as 
well as committee and plenary votes.  
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B. Council of Ministers Public Register: http://www.consilium.eu  
The second source of information is the Council of Ministers Public Document Register. It 
contains information on individual legislative proposals, and the various versions of the 
Council texts before a Council decision is reached. The Council‟s Document Register 
contains various versions of the Presidency compromises, internal communications 
between the Presidency and Member States, outcomes of EP decisions, and Commission 
communications. Most of the documents used were directly available online from the 
Council‟s Document Register. Some of the internal Council documents, however, were 
obtained via email from the Council‟s Services. These documents are available upon 
request.  
 
C. The European Commission‟s Pre-Lex Database: http://prelex.europa.eu  
The third source of information is the European Commission‟s Prelex Database. It allows 
users to follow the EU inter-institutional decision-making process online and it contains 
direct links to both European Parliament and Council documents. The database details all 
legislative procedures opened by official documents (proposals, recommendations, 
communications etc.) transmitted by the Commission to the Council and the Parliament and 
to other institutions and bodies. 
 
D. Plenary Debates and Speeches at the European Parliament 
The European Parliament plenary debates and speeches were also used in the analysis. All 
European Parliament debates for the period 1 May 1999 – 30 April 2007 are available in 
written form from the European Parliament website. For the above period, 485 plenary 
debates took place. The minutes and speeches in all of these debates were reviewed. In 
addition to the speeches of individual members, the plenary debates contain information on 
MEPs‟ political group affiliation and nationality.  
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Table 4.3 Plenary Debates Followed: 1 May 1999 – 30 April 2007 
 
 
Month Year 
Plenary 
Sessions 
Dates of Plenary 
Sessions 
  Month Year 
Plenary 
Sessions 
Dates of Plenary 
Sessions 
May 1999 4 3,4,5,6  May 2003 4 12,13,14,15 
June 1999 - -  June 2003 7 2,3,4,5,18,19,30 
July  1999 4 20,21,22,23  July  2003 3 1,2,3 
August 1999 - -  August 2003 - - 
September 1999 5 13,14,15,16,17  September 2003 8 1,2,3,4,22,23,24,25 
October 1999 10 4,5,6,7,8,25,26,27,28  October 2003 6 8,9,20,21,22,23 
November 1999 7 3,4,15,16,17,18,19  November 2003 6 5,6,17,18,19,20 
December  1999 7 1,2,13,14,15,16,17  December  2003 6 3,4,15,16,17,18 
January 2000 5 17,18,19,20,21  January 2004 6 12,13,14,15,28,29 
February 2000 7 2,3,14,15,16,17,18  February 2004 6 9,10,11,12,28,29 
March 2000 9 1,2,13,14,15,16,17,29,30  March 2004 7 8,9,10,11,29,30,31 
April 2000 5 10,11,12,13,14  April 2004 5 1,19,20,21,22 
May 2000 7 3,4,15,16,17,18,19  May 2004 4 3,4,5,6 
June 2000 4 13,14,15,16,  June 2004 - - 
July  2000 5 3,4,5,6,7  July  2004 3 20,21,22,23 
August 2000 - -  August 2004 - - 
September 2000 7 4,5,6,7,8,20,21  September 2004 4 13,14,15,16 
October 2000 10 2,3,4,5,6,23,24,25,26,27  October 2004 6 13,14,25,26,27,28 
November 2000 7 13,14,15,16,17,29,30  November 2004 4 15,16,17,18 
December  2000 5 11,12,13,14,15,  December  2004 6 1,2,13,14,15,16, 
January 2001 5 15,16,17,18,31  January 2005 6 10,11,12,13,26,27 
February 2001 6 1,12,13,14,15,28  February 2005 4 21,22,23,24 
March 2001 5 1,12,13,14,15  March 2005 4 7,8,9,10 
April 2001 4 2,3,4,5  April 2005 6 11,12,13,14,27,28 
May 2001 8 2,3,14,15,16,17,30,31  May 2005 6 9,10,11,12,25,26 
June 2001 4 11,12,13,14  June 2005 6 6,7,8,9,22,23, 
July  2001 4 2,3,4,5  July  2005 4 4,5,6,7 
August 2001 - -  August 2005 - - 
September 2001 7 3,4,5,6,12,19,20  September 2005 8 5,6,7,8,26,27,28,29 
October 2001 8 1,2,3,4,22,23,24,25  October 2005 6 12,13,24,25,26,27 
November 2001 6 12,13,14,15,28,29  November 2005 5 14,15,16,17,30 
December  2001 5 10,11,12,13,17  December  2005 5 1,12,13,14,15 
January 2002 4 14,15,16,17  January 2006 4 16,17,18,19 
February 2002 6 4,5,6,7,27,28  February 2006 6 1,2,13,14,15,16 
March 2002 5 11,12,13,14,20  March 2006 6 13,14,15,16,22,23 
April 2002 6 8,9,10,11,24,25  April 2006 6 3,4,5,6,26,27 
May 2002 6 13,14,15,16,29,30  May 2006 5 15,16,17,18, 31 
June 2002 4 10,11,12,13  June 2006 6 1,12,13,14,15,20 
July  2002 4 1,2,3,4  July  2006 4 3,4,5,6 
August 2002 - -  August 2006 - - 
September 2002 8 2,3,4,5,23,24,25,26  September 2006 8 4,5,6,7,25,26,27,28 
October 2002 6 9,10,21,22,23,24  October 2006 6 11,12,23,24,25,26 
November 2002 6 6,7,18,19,20,21  November 2006 6 13,14,15,16,29,30 
December  2002 6 4,5,16,17,18,19  December  2006 5 11,12,13,14,18 
January 2003 6 13,14,15,16,29,30  January 2007 5 15,16,17,18,31 
February 2003 4 10,11,12,13  February 2007 5 1,12,13,14,15 
March 2003 7 10,11,12,13,20,26,27  March 2007 6 12,13,14,15,28,29 
April 2003 4 7,8,9,10  April 2007 4 23,24,25,26 
Source: European Parliament: Plenary Sittings  
 
Note: the plenary debates (total 66) between April 2006 and April 2007 (in bold) were followed live through 
Europarl TV.  
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Table 4.3 lists all plenary sessions followed. The publicly available transcripts of 
EP plenary sessions debates were analysed with a qualitative analysis program AtlasTi. 
This programme, similar to other programs for computer-aided qualitative analysis such as 
NVivo and Alceste, allows for all 485 transcripts of the EP plenary debates to be put 
together, searched and coded simultaneously. The content analysis approach provides a 
systematic and transparent way of managing large amounts of text. „This avoids problems 
of reactivity of the respondent that may occur in interviews‟ (King et al, 1994). The 
analysis of the EP Plenary Debates was particularly useful for identifying instances of 
package deals and trialogue negotiations and for observing MEPs attitudes towards these 
informal institutional arrangements.  
E. Europarl TV: Live Parliamentary Debates 
Since April 2006, all European Parliament debates can be viewed online at Europarl TV. 
Between April 2006 and April 2007, 66 plenary sessions were followed from start to finish, 
that is more than 450 hours footage of parliamentary debates. The discussions on individual 
proposals were followed. The availability of directly observable parliamentary debates 
provides a good source of information on how the Parliament works, on the parliamentary 
procedures and rules, and on the way MEPs vote. It was possible to follow the debates very 
closely and to monitor the various viewpoints of MEPs from different political groups.  
F. Informal talks 
Several informal talks with representatives of the Parliament, the Council and the European 
Commission, involved in the EU legislative process were held in the period October 2007 - 
November 2008. No conclusions were drawn merely on the basis of these discussions. The 
interviews themselves do not lead to definitive conclusions about EU lawmaking, but they 
helped in the development of the argument and hypotheses. The informal talks were used to 
complement the findings from the quantitative analysis and the case studies and to compare 
the results of the empirical tests with the viewpoints of EU practitioners.  
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Table 4.4 Predicted Effect of Variables in the Empirical Analysis  
 
Legislative Package Deals in the European Union, 1999 – 2007  
             
  Chapter V Ex Obs Chapter VI Ex Obs Chapter VII Ex Obs Chapter VIII Ex Obs 
  All legislation     Consultation     Codecision     All legislation     
Dependent Variable  Package Deal      EP Success     EP Success     EP Success     
                       
Independent Variables                         
 (Argument)      Package Deal  +   Package Deal  +   Package Deal  +  
  Distributive Proposal +   Delay +   Trialogue -    Distributive Policy -    
  Council Impatience  +    Council Impatience  +     Council Impatience  +    Council Impatience  +   
  Urgent   +   Urgent  +    Urgent  +    Urgent  +    
       
Urgent for the 
Commission  +   
Urgent for the 
Commission +    
Urgent for the 
Commission +    
                      
Interaction effects -   
Delay * Urgent for the 
Commission +  
Trialogue * Institutional 
Powers Issues +  
Package Deal * 
Distributive Policy  +  
          
Package Deal * 
Institutional Powers +  
                          
 (Existing Literature)  Absolute Salience +    EP Cohesion +    EP Cohesion +    EP Cohesion +    
  Party Leaders Involved  +     
EP Committee 
Supported +   
EP Committee 
Supported +    
EP Committee 
Supported +    
  Policy Issue Complexity  +    Relative EP Salience  +    Relative EP Salience  +    Relative EP Salience  +    
  
EP - Council Salience 
Tie  -     
EP - Council Salience 
Tie -       
EP - Council Salience 
Tie -    
EP - Council Salience 
Tie -    
       Commission Support +    Commission Support -    Commission Support -    
       Issues Type   +     Issues Type   +     Issues Type   +     
       Council Unanimity   +     Reading   +    Codecision   +    
  Proposal Salience   +    Proposal Salience   +               
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4.4 Testing the Argument  
Chapter V: Analyzing Legislative Package Deals in the European Union 
Chapter V explores the conditions for the use of package deals in the EU legislative 
process. The following dependent and independent variables are used in the analysis.   
 
Dependent Variable  
Package Deal  
The use of package deals across legislative procedures, policy areas and time is tested with 
a dichotomous variable Package Deal. Here the unit of analysis is the legislative proposal. 
The use of package deals in the EU co-decision and consultation procedures was traced 
through the Council‟s Document Register and the European Parliament‟s Plenary Debates 
and Summaries of Sittings (available through the EP legislative observatory). A proposal 
was counted as a package deal proposal only if there was written evidence of a negotiated 
compromise package on a single legislative proposal or on several legislative proposals 
between the Council and the European Parliament. The variable = 1 if there was written 
evidence of a package compromise between the Council and the European Parliament on a 
proposal, and it = 0 if otherwise.  
 
Independent Variables  
Distributive Proposals  
The first hypothesis derived from the theoretical argument is that package deals are more 
likely to occur on distributive proposals. What makes a proposal distributive? Are some 
proposals more distributive than others? How can the distributive effects of legislation be 
estimated? Is it not the case that regulatory proposals contain distributive elements and vice 
versa? One way of identifying distributive proposals is to examine legislation in the EU‟s 
distributive policy areas, known to require considerable financial contributions by Member 
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States  such Budget, Agriculture, Fisheries, Taxation, Employment and Social Affairs, etc. 
However, this method may overestimate the distributive nature of some legislative 
proposals. Despite the generally expensive policy area, a legislative proposal may be 
simply an administrative adjustment or a recast version of the legislation already in force. 
For example, consider the proposals on EC/Denmark/Greenland Fisheries agreement 
(2003)
43
 and the EC/Cape Verde Fisheries agreement (2004)
44
. These proposals were 
simply modifications and extensions of already existing legislation. Therefore, what might 
appear as European Parliament success on a distributive proposal may simply be a 
European Parliament success on a high technical administrative proposal with little 
distributive effects in practice.  
Another way of defining distributive proposals may be to construct a continuous 
variable measuring the amount of money contained/required by the legislation. This 
measurement has the advantage of a greater differentiation between the distributive nature 
of legislative proposals. However, proposals that do not contain a specified amount of 
financial contributions in their legislative text can also have significant distributive effects. 
For example, consider the proposal on Economic and Social Cohesion, regarding the 
European Social Fund (2004)
45
. Although the legislative proposal did not contain a specific 
reference to financial contributions, the legislation has huge distributive effects. It deals 
with expenditure, grants, credits, co-financing, etc. Therefore, what might appear as 
European Parliament failure on a non-distributive proposal may be a European Parliament 
failure on a highly distributive proposal with serious financial consequences for Member 
States.  
 
                                                 
43
 CNS/2003/0236 EC/Denmark/Greenland Fisheries agreement: period from 1st January 2004 to 31 
December 2006: Modification of the 4th Protocol. 
 
44
 CNS/2004/0058 EC/Cape Verde Fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 1st July 2004 to 30 June 
2005. 
 
45
 COD/2004/0165 Economic and Social Cohesion: European Social Fund ESF for employment, social 
insertion, training and education, 2007-2013 (repeal. regul. 1784/1999/EC). 
 115 
The thesis adopts a methodology for defining distributive proposals by adapting the 
typology developed by Lowi (1964; 1972). The definition of distributive legislation 
adopted here is guided by the “Who pays?” question. Each legislative proposal was read to 
identify whether the costs incurred by the legislation were to be covered by a) private 
actors, b) the EU budget; c) Member States‟ budgets, or d) simply administrative costs (see 
Table 4.5 for classification of legislative dossiers according to Policy Area and Cost Type). 
These four categories form the basis of the categorical Proposal Cost Type variable, 
which tests the first hypothesis of the argument in Chapter III. The distributive nature of 
proposals was determined by reading the final legislative texts of every piece of legislation. 
To ensure consistency the variable was coded twice by the same person at different times, 
using exactly the same classification of categories. The proposals were classified according 
to four categories
46
:  
Category 1 = Regulatory Proposal: Legislative proposals were classified in this 
category if the final legislative text involved costs to be covered primarily by private actors 
(and there were no direct costs for Member States or the EU budget).  
Category 2 = Distributive (EU budget) Proposal: Legislative proposals were 
allocated in this category if the final legislative text involved the allocation of EU funding 
and contained a direct reference to the EU financial framework.  
Category 3 = Distributive (Member States budgets) Proposal:  Legislative 
proposals were classified in this category if the final legislative text involved costs to be 
covered largely by the Member States‟ own budgets.  
Category 4 = Administrative Proposal: Legislative proposals were classified in this 
category if the final legislative text involved no or minor costs.   
  
                                                 
46
 Although the categories classify EU legislation in four distinct groups, it should be noted that proposals in 
Category 2, for example, that allocate EU funding often imply matching national expenditure. Moreover, 
regulatory legislation (in Category 1) which imposes „private costs‟ is often taken extremely seriously by 
those Member governments, whose private sectors may be significantly affected by new legislation.  
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Table 4.5 Legislative Proposals According to Policy Area and Cost Type 
 
 
 
Policy Area (Commission DG) Total 
Regulatory 
Proposals 
Distributive Proposals 
 
Administrative 
Proposals 
Who pays?   private actors  EU budget Member States no costs 
Agriculture & Rural Development 80 40  (50.0%) 25  (31.3%) 15  (18.8%) - 
Budget 35 - 32 (91.4%) 1  (2.9%) 2 (5.7%) 
Development 13 3  (23.1%) 10 (76.9%) - - 
Economic and Financial Affairs 30 4  (13.3%) 19  (63.3%) 6 (20.0%) 1  (3.3%) 
Education and Culture 29 4  (13.8%) 18  (62.1%) 4  (13.8%) 3  (10.3%) 
Employment and Social Affairs  38 10  (26.3%) 7 (12.1%) 12  (31.6%) 6  (15.8%) 
Energy and Transport 99 57  (57.6%) 9  (9.1%) 24  (24.2%) 9  (9.1%) 
Enterprise and Industry 56 45  (80.4%) 9  (16.1%) 1  (1.8%) 1  (1.8%) 
Environment 58 34  (58.6%) 7  (12.1%) 11 (19.0%) 6 (10.3%) 
Eurostat, Statistical Office 33 10  (30.3%) 6  (18.2%) 14  (42.4%) 3  (9.1%) 
External Relations 38 8  (21.1%) 20  (52.6%) 3  (7.9%) 7  (18.4%) 
Fisheries 107 59  (55.1%) 11 (10.3%) 31  (29.0%) 6  (5.6%) 
General Secretariat 10 1  (10.0%) 2  (20.0%) 1 (10.0%) 6  (60.0%) 
Health and Consumer Protection 77 56  (72.7%) 6  (7.8%) 12  (15.6%) 3  (3.9%) 
Information Society 22 14  (63.6%) 7  (31.8%) - 1  (4.5%) 
Internal Market and Services 47 35  (74.5%) 7  (14.9%) 1 (2.1%) 4  (8.5%) 
Justice, Freedom and Security 147 78  (53.1%) 27  (18.4%) 27  (18.4%) 15  (10.2%) 
Research 26 2  (7.7%) 23  (88.5%) 1  (3.8%) - 
Taxation and Customs Union 28 5 (17.9%) 6 (21.4%) 13  (46.4%) 4  (14.3%) 
               
Total Legislative Proposals 973 465  (47.8%) 256 (26.3%) 175 (18.0%) 77  (7.9%) 
   
         Own calculations
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Legislative Timing 
Hypothesis 2 derived from the theoretical argument states that package deals are likely to 
occur on urgent proposals. The thesis adopts several measures of legislative timing: the 
dichotomous Urgent variable, the dichotomous Urgent for the Commission variable and the 
dichotomous Council Impatience variable. These variables are tested in all empirical 
chapters.   
First, the Urgent variable = 1 if there was a specific deadline according to which the 
legislative act had to enter into force and it = 0 if there was no deadline. Information on 
whether there was a deadline for the legislative act to come into effect was found either in 
the documents accompanying the Commission proposals, in the rapporteur‟s opinion 
accompanying the EP‟s opinion, or in the Council‟s internal documents. This variable does 
not take into account whether the deadline was set by the Commission or by the European 
Council‟s conclusions. 
Second, the variable Urgent for the Commission = 1 if the deadline was set by the 
Commission, but no political agreement was reached on the proposal at the European 
Council level. It = 0 if the call for urgent action originated in the European Council 
conclusions and the Member States had already discussed a possible legislative draft of the 
proposal. Information on this variable was found either in the documents accompanying the 
Commission proposals, in the rapporteur‟s opinion accompanying the EP‟s opinion, or in 
the Council‟s internal documents. 
Third, the variable Council Impatience tests whether the relative impatience of a 
legislative actor has an effect on the legislative outcome. It = 1 if the Council had started 
discussions and prepared a draft text of the legislative proposal before the EP had done so 
and it = 0 if the EP had started discussions and prepared a draft legislative text earlier than 
the Council. This variable was measured by comparing the dates of the first draft texts on a 
legislative proposal held in the EP‟s Legislative Observatory and the Council‟s Register.  
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Chapters VI, VII, VIII: The Effect of Package Deals and Timing on EP Success 
 
Dependent Variable 
European Parliament Success  
There is a single dependent variable across all three empirical chapters VI, VII and VIII, 
which tests for the EP‟s legislative influence: European Parliament Success. The empirical 
tests in these chapters aim at explaining why and under what conditions the European 
Parliament succeeds in influencing the legislative text. Of course, the definition of 
European Parliament Legislative Success is not an easy task
47
. The measurement of 
European Parliament success is operationalized in the following way.  
EP Success is understood as the ability of the European Parliament to have its 
demands incorporated in the final legislative text. Here the unit of analysis is the issue 
contested by the European Parliament and the Council. Hence, the dependent variable EP 
Success measures the EP‟s legislative influence on separate issues. EP Success was initially 
treated as an ordinal variable, including four degrees of success: high success (3), average 
success (2), low success (1) and failure (0). An issue was allocated to category 3 if the 
European Parliament‟s demand was inserted in the legislative text exactly as the EP had 
proposed it. An issue was allocated to category 2 if the European Parliament‟s demand was 
inserted in the final legislative text, but it was modified by the Council and did not satisfy 
the EP‟s demand in full. An issue was allocated to category 1 if the European Parliament‟s 
demand was largely modified by the Council and it departed from the EP‟s original 
position, but it was still included in the legislative text. An issue was allocated to category 
0 if the European Parliament‟s demand was completely ignored by the Council or it made it 
to the final legislative text, but aimed at correcting spelling or technical improvements. 
                                                 
47
  “If you hold a book over a table, say „fall, book‟ and then release the book from your hand, the book will 
fall back onto the table. Does this mean you have power over the book? Of course it does not. Gravity was 
responsible for the book‟s falling, not your persuasiveness, resources, or expertise” Jeffrey Pfeffer (1981: 44) 
on measuring power in organizations.  
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However, only 10.1% of all issues fell in categories 1 and 2. In the rest of the cases, 
the European Parliament either failed completely, or it managed to fully realize its 
legislative demands. In the consultation procedure, the distribution of EP success was as 
follows. 74.2% (595 issues) fell in category 0 = failure. Only 3.7 % (30 issues) of the 
observations fell in category 1 (low success) and 6.1 % (49 issues) fell in category 2 
(medium success). 16 % (128 issues) of the observations fell in category 3 (high success). 
In the co-decision procedure, the distribution of EP success was as follows. 34.9% (547 
issues) fell in category 0 = failure. Only 2.6% (41 issues) of the observations fell in 
category 1 (low success) and 7.5% (117 issues) fell in category 2 (medium success). 55 % 
(862 issues) of the observations fell in category 3 (high success).   
  
Table 4.6 Distribution of EP Success According to Success Degree 
 Issues Contested by the EP 
EP Success Ordinal  Consultation Co-decision Total  
Category 3 = High Success 128 862 990 
 (%) (15.9) (55.0) (41.8) 
Category 2 = Medium Success 49 117 166 
 (%) (6.1) (7.5) (7.0) 
Category 1 = Low Success 30 41 71 
 (%) (3.7) (2.6) (3.0) 
Category 0 = Failure  595 547 1142 
 (%) (74.2) 34.9 (48.2) 
    
Total 802 1567 2369 
Own calculations 
 
In total, 48.2% (1142 issues) fell in category 0 = failure. 3.0% (71 issues) fell in 
category 1 (low success) and 7.0% (990 issues) fell in category 2 (medium success). 41.8% 
(990 issues) of the observations fell in category 3 (high success). Due to the limited number 
of observations in categories 1 and 2, this variable was re-coded as a binary where 0 = 
failure and 1 = the three degrees of success (1 + 2 + 3). Chapters VI and VII treat EP 
Success as a binary variable. Chapter VIII pools all issues and legislative proposals and in 
addition to EP Success as a binary variable, the chapter treats EP Success as an ordinal and 
a categorical variable.  
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Independent Variables  
To test the hypotheses about the effect of package deals and timing on the EP‟s legislative 
influence, the following independent variables were used in the analysis in Chapters VI, 
VII and VIII. 
Package Deal  
The variable Package Deal which was the dependent variable in Chapter V, becomes an 
explanatory variable in Chapters VI, VII, and VIII. In addition to treating the variable as 
binary, the Package Deal variable is also coded as a categorical variable (in the analysis of 
the co-decision procedure).  Package Deal was coded as 2 if there was a package deal 
between the Council and the European Parliament on a single proposal, which involved 
multiple issues; it was coded as 1 if there was a package deal between the Council and the 
European Parliament on a multi-proposal package; and it  was coded 0 if there was no 
package deal on a legislative proposal. The inclusion of the different types of package deals 
in the analysis of EP success provides a better account of the types of logrolling in the EU 
and the possibilities for EP influence.  
Hypothesis 3 states that package deals increase the likelihood of European 
Parliament Success in the consultation procedure. Hypothesis 5 states that package deals 
increase the likelihood of European Parliament Success in the co-decision procedure. The 
variable Package Deal is therefore expected to be positively correlated and significant 
across all statistical tests.   
 
Legislative Timing: Delay 
Hypothesis 4 derived from the argument states that legislative delay increases the 
likelihood of European Parliament success in influencing legislative outcomes in the 
consultation procedure. This hypothesis is tested with the dichotomous Delay variable. A 
case is counted as delayed (and = 1) when the following is observed. First, a Commission 
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proposal was put to the vote in the EP plenary. Second, the MEPs present in plenary voted 
to refer the proposal back to the drafting committee. Third, the same proposal was 
discussed again by the EP at a later date, when the European Parliament issued a final 
opinion. Information on this variable was obtained through the European Parliament‟s 
Legislative Observatory and the EP Plenary Debates.  
 
Legislative Timing: Council Impatience  
Hypothesis 7 derived from the argument states that Council impatience increases the 
likelihood of European Parliament success in influencing legislative outcomes in the co-
decision procedure. This hypothesis is tested with the dichotomous Council Impatience 
variable. As noted earlier, this variable tests whether the relative impatience of a legislative 
actor has an effect on the legislative outcome. It = 1 if the Council had started discussions 
and prepared a draft text of the legislative proposal before the EP had done so and it = 0 if 
the Parliament had started discussions and prepared a draft legislative text earlier than the 
Council. This variable was measured by comparing the dates of the first draft texts on a 
legislative proposal held in the EP Legislative Observatory and the Council‟s Register. 
In addition, the other two measures of legislative timing: the dichotomous Urgent 
and the dichotomous Urgent for the Commission are also included in the analysis.  
 
Trialogues 
Hypothesis 6 states that trialogues do not increase the likelihood of EP success in 
influencing the legislative text in the co-decision procedure. No significant effect is 
expected as trialogues only provide the institutional structure for information exchange and 
legislative bargaining. This hypothesis is tested with the dichotomous Trialogue variable. 
The employment of trialogue meetings in the EU legislative process was traced through the 
Council‟s Document Register and the European Parliament‟s Plenary Debates and 
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Summaries of Sittings (available through the EP legislative observatory). The Trialogue 
variable = 1 if there was evidence in the Council‟s internal documents and/or in the EP 
plenary statements and summaries that an informal trialogue meeting between the Council, 
the European Parliament and the Commission had taken place during the course of the 
negotiations on a particular proposal and it = 0 if there was no written evidence. 
The Council Document Register contains evidence of 96% of the proposals that 
were negotiated at a trialogue in the period 1 May 1999 – 30 April 2007. The Council‟s 
working documents contain more detailed information on the participants, timing and 
agenda of informal meetings. The EP Plenary Debates and summaries of sittings account 
for around 45% of the trialogues. However, 135 (of 442) EP Plenary debates involved a 
discussion of the outcome of trialogue negotiations.  
 
The Distributive Character of EU Policy Areas 
Hypothesis 8 states that package deals increase the likelihood of European Parliament 
success in influencing distributive policy outcomes in the EU. However, similarly to the 
definition of distributive proposals, the literature of EU legislative studies lacks a precise 
definition of a distributive policy area. There is a clear distinction in the literature between 
the general characteristics of regulatory and distributive policies (Hix, 2005; Wallace et al., 
2005). Some authors have also classified EU policy areas with a binary variable: regulatory 
and distributive (Broscheid and Coen, 2007). However, as Table 4.4 above demonstrates, 
each EU policy area consists of regulatory as well as distributive proposals. Moreover, EP 
influence is here analysed through the examination of legislative proposals and the issues 
contested within them. Therefore, dichotomizing the distributive/regulatory divide in EU 
policy areas may lead to inaccurate results. To overcome this issue, the thesis adopts the 
following methodology for defining the distributive character of EU policy areas. First, as 
indicated in Table 4.5 above, each EU policy area includes administrative, regulatory and 
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distributive proposals. In the case of distributive proposals the costs are covered by either 
the EU budget or Member States‟ budgets. Such proposals are highly salient for Member 
States and governments often are reluctant to incorporate the EP‟s demands. These 
proposals were grouped into one category = Distributive. In the case of regulatory and 
administrative proposals, the costs are covered by either private actors or there are no 
significant costs. Such proposals should be relatively less salient for Member States and 
governments may be more willing to incorporate the EP‟s preferences. These proposals 
were grouped into the second category = Regulatory.   
Second, in each EU policy area the percentage of Distributive proposals and the 
percentage of Regulatory proposals were calculated. The continuous Distributive Policy 
Area variable was calculated as the proportion of distributive proposals in a policy area. 
The Distributive Policy Area variable is used as an independent variable in Chapter VIII. 
While the variable is expected to have a negative effect on EP success, its interaction 
Distributive Policy Area x Package Deal is expected to be significant and positively 
correlated with EP success when it is measured as a binary as well as an ordinal variable. 
 
Issue Types   
Hypothesis 9 states that package deals increase the likelihood of European Parliament 
success in gaining institutional powers. This hypothesis is tested with the Issue Type 
variable. It = 1 for budgetary issues, = 2 for policy substance issues, = 3 for fundamental 
rights issues, and it = 4 for institutional powers issues. This variable is included in all 
statistical tests and category 1 = budgetary issues is always the base category. Therefore, 
the results from the regression analysis will compare the success of policy substance issues, 
fundamental rights issues and institutional powers issues with the performance of 
budgetary issues. The interaction term Institutional Powers x Package Deal is expected to 
be significant and positively correlated with EP Success.  
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Independent Variables Suggested by the Existing Literature  
In addition to testing the predictions of the argument, the empirical chapters also test a 
number of variables identified by the existing literature on logrolling and on EU legislative 
politics. Chapter V includes several hypotheses derived from the existing logrolling 
literature. In addition to distributive and urgent proposals, the chapter tests whether the 
different preference intensities of the legislative chambers, the involvement of party  
leaders in the drafting of the legislation and the issue complexity of the policy areas have 
effects on the probability of the use of package deals in the EU.   
 
Measuring Salience and Intensities of Preferences 
The concept of different preference intensities is at the core of logrolling theories. 
However, it is difficult to measure an actor‟s intensity of preference, and it is even more 
difficult to compare the intensities of preference of two different actors. Two measures 
were adopted for the salience of the proposal to the legislative chambers. The number of 
EP committees involved in the drafting of a legislative proposal was taken as a proxy for 
the salience of the proposal to the EP. This is how the continuous variable EP Salience was 
constructed
48
. The more salient the proposal for the European Parliament, the more 
committees will be given the task to provide an opinion. The number of documents held in 
the Council‟s document register per legislative proposal was taken as a proxy for the 
salience of the proposal to the Council
49
. The more salient the proposal for the Council, the 
                                                 
48
 For example, the COD/2003/0256 REACH directive involved 10 EP committees, the COD/2001/0265 
Energy directive on Bio Fuels - 5 committees, the COD/2004/0137 Money Laundering directive -5 
committees, the COD/2005/0282 Motor Vehicles directive - 5 committees; the CNS/2002/0115 Fishing 
Vessels regulation - 2 committees, the CNS/2004/0020 regulation on the Protection of Deep-Water Coral 
Reefs - 2 committees,  and the COD/2003/0060 directive on Statistical Surveys of Milk and Milk Products - 1 
committee.  
 
49
 For example, the COD/2003/0256 REACH directive was associated with 180 documents, the 
COD/2001/0265 Energy directive on Bio Fuels - 36 documents, the COD/2004/0137 Money Laundering 
directive - 25 documents, the COD/2005/0282 Motor Vehicles directive - 22 documents; the CNS/2002/0115 
Fishing Vessels regulation - 9 documents, the CNS/2004/0020 regulation on the Protection of Deep-Water 
Coral Reefs - 9 documents,  and the COD/2003/0060 directive on Statistical Surveys of Milk and Milk 
Products - 9 documents.  
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more discussions there will be and the more documents there will be in the register. This is 
how the continuous Council Salience variable was measured.  
In order to make the EP Salience and Council Salience measures comparable, the 
variables were linearly rescaled according to a 10 point scale (1 = the lowest and 10 = the 
highest degree of salience). Three variables are used in the analysis of the relative 
preference intensities of the Council and the European Parliament over proposals: Absolute 
Salience Distance, Relative EP Salience and Salience Tie. All of these measures of 
preference intensities are at the proposal level. The measurement of preference intensities 
over proposals is more reliable than the measurement of preference intensities over 
separate issues
50
. Moreover, an inter-chamber logrolling situation only requires a difference 
in the preference intensities over proposals and the availability of multiple issues.  
 
Absolute Salience Distance 
First, the distance Absolute Salience Distance variable measures the absolute distance 
(capturing the size but not the direction) between the EP‟s and the Council‟s importance 
attached to a proposal. The Absolute Salience Distance variable was calculated by 
measuring the distance between the rescaled Council Salience and EP Salience variables. 
The larger the distance between the two actors, the more opportunities there will be for 
logrolling. This variable is expected to be significant and positively correlated with the 
probability of a Package Deal in the EU legislative process.  
                                                 
50
 There are several difficulties with the measurement of preference intensities over separate issues within 
proposals. First, not all proposals have multiple issues. Any measurement of issue salience within proposals 
will be useless for proposals in which the European Parliament contests only one issue. Second, detailed 
information on the preference intensities of the two actors on each issue is not always available. The decision-
making process is usually well documented for very important pieces of legislation, which involve multiple 
issues. The EP-Council intensity of preferences over issues in such salient pieces of legislation is possible, but 
only to a limited extent. A possible measurement of preference intensity over issues is the number of times 
the issue is mentioned in the EP reports and respectively in the Council‟s working documents. The more often 
an issue comes up in the internal documents of the EP and the Council, the more important it is to the 
legislative body. In a case with, say, six contested issues (a, b, c, d, e, f), it is possible to identify the most 
important issues (a and b) over which most of the negotiations take place. However, the difficulty comes from 
the rest four issues (c, d, e, and f), which are clearly less salient compared to a and b, but the preference 
intensity of an actor over c, d, e, f is difficult to measure. Therefore, it is possible to identify that a > c, d, e, f 
and that b > c, d, e, f. However, is c>d>e>f or is c<d>e>f or is c=d=e=f? This point is illustrated in the case 
studies presented in Chapters V, VI and VII.  
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Relative EP Salience  
Second, the distance Relative EP Salience variable measures the relative difference 
between the EP‟s and the Council‟s importance attached to a proposal. It was measured by 
subtracting the value of the Council Salience from the EP Salience variable. Compared to 
the Absolute Salience Distance variable, it captures the size as well as the direction of the 
relative institutional preference intensities on legislative proposals.  
 
Council – EP Salience Tie  
Third, the dichotomous Council – EP Salience Tie was included. It = 1 if the EP and the 
Council attached equal importance to a legislative proposal and it = 0 if the distance 
between the EP‟ and the Council‟s preference intensities was different from zero 
(regardless of the direction). When the Council and the Parliament attach equal importance, 
package deals are less likely to occur. Therefore, the variable is expected to be negatively 
correlated with the probability of a Package Deal in the EU legislative process.  
 
Proposal Salience  
In addition, the continuous Proposal Salience variable measures the general importance of 
the legislative act. It is measured by the number of recitals in a legislative proposal. The 
larger the number of recitals in a legislative proposal signified a more salient proposal. 
Information on this variable was obtained by reading every legislative proposal and 
counting the number of recitals contained in the final legislative text. Tsebelis (2002) 
argues against this methodology. However, the number of recitals seems to be a valid 
measure for the general importance of legislative proposals
51
. Haege (2007) also uses the 
same measurement for proposal salience in the European Union.  
                                                 
51
 For example, the COD/2003/0256 REACH directive contained 116 recitals, the COD/2001/0265 Energy 
directive on Bio Fuels – 29 recitals, the COD/2004/0137 Money Laundering directive - 48 recitals, the 
COD/2005/0282 Motor Vehicles directive – 27 recitals; the CNS/2002/0115 - Fishing Vessels regulation – 10 
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Party Leaders  
The thesis also tests whether the involvement of party leaders in drafting legislative 
proposals has an effect on the probability of package deals. The dichotomous Party 
Leaders variable = 1 if in addition to the committee rapporteur, the political group leaders 
in the EP participated in the writing of the proposal and the informal negotiations with 
Council representatives and it = 0 if the committee rapporteurs (shadow rapporteurs and 
chairmen) were solely responsible for the negotiations over a legislative proposal. 
Information on this variable was found in the EP‟s procedural pages and the Council‟s 
working documents. The variable is expected to be positively correlated with the 
probability of a Package Deal.  
 
Policy Area Issue Complexity  
The logrolling literature also suggests that the issue complexity of a policy area leads to the 
use of more package deals. This hypothesis is tested with the continuous Policy Area Issue 
Complexity variable. Proposals that contain multiple issues are more complex and more 
time consuming. The variable measures the proportion of multi-issue legislation in a policy 
area, that is, proposals containing two and more issues. First, the number of issues 
contested by the EP per legislative proposal was counted (see Appendix I). Second, the 
proportion of legislative proposals in a policy area containing two and more contested 
issues was calculated. The greater the proportion of complex proposals per policy area, the 
larger is the value of the variable. The variable is expected to be positively correlated with 
the probability of a Package Deal.  
In addition to the independent variables suggested by the existing theories of 
logrolling, in Chapter VI, VII, and VIII, the thesis tests a number of hypotheses derived 
from the existing studies on EU legislative decision-making. The addition of these 
                                                                                                                                               
recitals, the CNS/2004/0020 regulation on the Protection of Deep-Water Coral Reefs – 8 recitals, and the 
COD/2003/0060 directive on Statistical Surveys of Milk and Milk Products - 4 recitals.  
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variables makes the findings of the thesis not only relevant to the literature on  legislative 
exchange, but also to the more general research on legislative politics in the EU. 
 
European Parliament 
EP Cohesion in Committee  
Two variables are used to test the effect of the cohesion of the European Parliament on its 
legislative influence. Both variables are expected to have a positive effect on EP Success. 
Firstly, the continuous EP Cohesion variable is included in the analysis. The variable 
measures the size of the majority in the European Parliament drafting committee in favour 
of a report, as a percentage of those voting. Information on this variable was found in the 
EP‟s reports, under section Committee votes. These are obtainable from the procedural 
pages of legislative proposals through OEIL.   
 
EP Cohesion in Plenary  
There are occasions when despite a cohesive EP committee, other MEPs can propose 
completely different amendments to those proposed by the committee and obtain support in 
plenary. To measure EP cohesion at the EP Plenary level the dichotomous EP Plenary 
Support variable is used. It = 1 if the EP plenary supports the committee report in its 
entirety and MEPs do not submit replacement amendments and it = 0 if the EP plenary 
amends or rejects the committee proposal. Information on this variable was found in the 
summaries of sittings on each legislative proposal, the minutes of the EP plenary sittings, 
and Council‟s internal reports on the outcomes of votes in the European Parliament.  
 
Council of Ministers 
The Council Unanimity variable tests whether the European Parliament is more likely to 
succeed when the voting rule in the Council is unanimity. It = 1 if the legal base of the 
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legislative proposal requires unanimity in the Council and it = 0 if the legal base requires 
qualified majority voting. Information on this variable was found in the Pre-Lex database 
for the legal base of legislative proposals; the EU‟s gateway europa.eu website and Hix 
(2005) for voting rules. 
 
Commission Support  
The Commission Support variable tests whether the legislative influence of the European 
Parliament is conditional on Commission support. The variable is measured at the issue 
level. It = 1 if the Commission expresses its support for an EP demand in front of the EP 
plenary, after informal meetings with MEPs or in its opinion on the EP position; and it = 0 
if the Commission does not support the EP on a given issue. Information on this variable 
was found in the Commission statements at the EP plenary, Commission communications 
to the EP, as well as Council internal documents reporting on the progress of legislative 
decision-making. The variable is expected to be positively correlated with EP Success.  
 
Control Variables: 
The categorical variable Legislative Reading is introduced in chapter VI, to control for the 
timing of adoption of the legislative proposal in the co-decision procedure. It 1 = First 
Reading - if a proposal was adopted at first reading; 2 = Second Reading - if a proposal was 
adopted at second reading; and 3 = Conciliation - if a proposal was adopted at third 
reading. Information on this variable was obtained from the European Parliament 
Legislative Observatory
52
.  
 
                                                 
52
 Dummy variables were also used to test whether EP success depends on the Legislative type of the 
proposal (directive, regulation, decision, or recommendation). Information on this variable was obtained from 
the final legislative texts of completed proposals. Dummy variables are used to test the effects of the Political 
Group affiliation of the rapporteur on EP success. Dummy variables are used to test the effects of the drafting 
EP Committee on EP success. Information on these variables was obtained from the OEIL. However, none of 
these variables produced significant results, and were therefore not included in the final models.  
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Descriptive Statistics: EU Legislation: 1999 – 2007  
A major methodological strength of the empirical design is the fact that the same set of 
variables are tested across the co-decision and consultation procedures and across policy 
areas. Therefore, the results of each empirical chapter are comparable with the rest of the 
empirical tests. Table 4.7 and 4.8 present the summary statistics and correlations for the use 
of package deals in the EU (Chapter V). Table 4.9 and 4.10 present the summary statistics 
and correlations for EP success (802 issues) in the consultation procedure (Chapter VI). 
Table 4.11 and 4.12 present the summary statistics and correlations for EP success (1567 
issues) in the co-decision procedure (Chapter VII). Table 4.13 and 4.14 present the 
summary statistics and correlations for EP success across all 2369 issues (Chapter VIII).  
There are several interesting patterns suggested by the descriptive statistics and 
variable correlations. First, as can be seen from Table 4.7 package deals occur on average 
in 25.1% of the cases. In addition, 26.3% of all legislative proposals were distributive 
proposals (allocating EU funds). 18% of all proposals were distributive proposals (where 
the costs were to be covered by Member States‟ budgets). 47.8% of the proposals were 
regulatory (where the costs were to be covered by private actors) and 7.9% of the proposals 
were administrative (they involved no or insignificant costs and required the administrative 
updating of legislative acts).  
45 per cent of the legislative proposals were Urgent (there was a deadline for the 
legislation to come into effect). This supports the argument that legislative timing and 
deadlines are becoming increasingly important for EU decision-making. Moreover, the 
party leaders were involved in the drafting of 12% of the legislative proposals in addition to 
the EP committee rapporteur. In 37% of the cases, the European Parliament and the 
Council attached equal preference intensities to proposals and in the rest 63% of the cases, 
the two legislative chambers attached different preferences to legislation.  
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Table 4.7 Descriptive Statistics: Package Deals in the EU (V) 
 
 
Name Description of variables Sources Obs. Min. Max.  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Package Deal 
1 = Proposals and issues were decided as a package between the EP and the 
Council; 0 = otherwise 
Statements of EP rapporteurs, 
Council minutes 
973 0 1 .251  .434 
Independent variables          
Legislative Cost Type        
Distributive Proposal (EU 
budget) 
1 = A legislative proposal included a direct reference to the EU financial 
framework; 0 = otherwise 
Legislative text 973 0 1 .263 .441 
Distributive Proposal (Member 
States budgets) 
1 = A legislative proposal involved costs to be covered by Member States' 
budgets; 0 = otherwise 
Legislative text 973 0 1 .180 .384 
Regulatory Proposal (Private 
Actors) 
1 = A legislative proposal  involved costs to be covered by private actors (and no 
direct costs for EU budget or Member States); 0 = otherwise 
Legislative text 973 0 1 .478 .500 
Administrative Proposal 
1 = A legislative proposal involved no or insignificant costs and required the 
administrative updating of legal acts; 0 = otherwise 
Legislative text 973 0 1  .079 .270 
Urgent  1 = Specific deadline for the legislative proposal to come into force; 0 = otherwise Commission draft, EP Reports 973 0 1 .452 .498 
Council Impatience  
1 =  The Council started discussions and prepared a draft text of the legislative 
proposal before the EP had done so; 0 = the EP started discussions and 
prepared a draft text of the legislative proposal before the Council 
Council Document Register; 
EP Legislative Observatory 
973 0 1 .333 .471 
Absolute Preference Distance  
Absolute Preference Distance = EP Salience (linearly rescaled 1-10) - Council 
Salience (linearly rescaled 1-10), regardless of the sign (+ or -) 
Council Document Register; 
EP Reports, Procedural Pages 
973 0 9  1.062 1.263 
Parliament - Council Salience 
Tie 
1= Equal preference intensities attached to a proposal by the EP and the Council; 
0 = otherwise 
Council Document Register; 
EP Reports, Procedural Pages 
973 0 1 .372 .484 
Party Leaders Involved 
1 = Party leaders involved in the negotiations with the Council, in addition to the 
rapporteur 
Council Register; EP 
Procedural pages 
973 0 1 .120  .325 
Policy Area Issue Complex 
Percentage of legislative proposals per policy area containing two and more 
issues 
EP Legislative Observatory 973 14 90 55.062 22.385 
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Table 4.8 Correlations of Variables: Package Deals in the EU (V) 
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Package Deal 1.000           
Distributive Proposal (EU budget) 0.209 1.000          
Distributive Proposal (Member States budgets) -0.049 -0.280 1.000         
Regulatory Proposal (Private Actors) -0.098 -0.572 -0.448 1.000        
Administrative Proposal -0.091 -0.175 -0.137 -0.281 1.000       
Urgent 0.137 0.306 -0.076 -0.241 0.055 1.000      
Council Impatience 0.220 0.009 0.021 -0.012 - 0.021 0.046 1.000     
Absolute Salience Distance 0.122 0.100 0.002 -0.088 -0.003 0.071 0.088 1.000    
Parliament - Council Salience Tie -0.122 -0.083 -0.028 0.085 0.019 -0.059 -0.052 -0.648 1.000   
Party Leaders Involved 0.245 -0.120 0.049 0.089 -0.038 -0.044 0.128 0.164 -0.062 1.000  
Policy Area Issue Complexity 0.286 -0.006 -0.146 0.098 0.036 -0.006 0.211 0.071 -0.077 0.248 1.000 
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Table 4.9 Descriptive Statistics: the Consultation Procedure (VI) 
 
Name Description of variables Sources Obs. Min. Max.  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Success  
1 = EP demands included in final Council legislative act; 0 = EP demands NOT 
included in final legislative act 
EP report, amendments, 
Council final text 
802 0 1 .259 .439 
Independent variables        
Single Package Deal - - - - - - - 
Proposals Package Deal  
1 = Proposals and issues were decided as a package between the EP and the 
Council; 0 = otherwise 
Statements of EP rapporteurs, 
Council minutes 
802 0 1 .176 .381 
Delay  
1 = The EP voted in plenary to delay the vote and issued a final opinion at a later date; 
0 = no delay  
European Parliament Legislative 
Observatory, Plenary Debates 
802 0 1 .106 .308 
Council Impatience  
1 =  The Council started discussions and prepared a draft text of the legislative 
proposal before the EP had done so; 0 = the EP started discussions and prepared a 
draft text of the legislative proposal before the Council 
Council Document Register; EP 
Legislative Observatory 
802 0 1 .273 .446 
Urgent 1 = Specific deadline for the legislative proposal to come into force; 0 = otherwise Commission draft, EP Reports 802 0 1 .494 .500 
Urgent for the Commission 
1 = Deadline approaching, but no decision taken by European Council in advance; 0 = 
otherwise 
Commission Proposal, Council 
minutes, European Council 
conclusions 
802 0 1 .167 .373 
European Parliament 
Cohesion 
Percentage of MEPs in the drafting committee voting in favour of the committee report 
(of all committee members present) 
European Parliament Reports: 
Committee votes 
802 51 100 91.7 10.6 
EP Committee Supported 
1 = The EP plenary supports the committee report and no further amendments are 
tabled by MEPs; 0 = Committee report amended or rejected by the Plenary 
European Parliament plenary 
sittings 
802 0 1 .905 .293 
Relative EP Salience  
Relative EP Preference Intensity = EP Salience (linearly rescaled 1-10) - Council 
Salience (linearly rescaled 1-10), including the direction (+ or -) 
Council Document Register; EP 
Reports, Procedural Pages 
802 -8 5 .677 1.504 
EP - Council Salience Tie 
1= Equal preference intensities attached to a proposal by the EP and the Council; 0 = 
otherwise 
Council Document Register; EP 
Reports, Procedural Pages 
802 0 1 .382 .486 
Commission Support 1 = Commission support for issue contested by the EP; 0 = No Commission support  
Commission Statements at EP 
plenary, Communications to EP 
802 0 1 .379 .485 
Issues Type    802     
Budgetary Issues 1 = issue budgetary (EU spending, co-financing, funding for specific programmes); EP report, amendments 802 0 1 .137 .344 
Policy Substance Issues 
2 = issue policy substance (scope of the legislation, clarifications on definitions and 
terms;  
EP report, amendments 802 0 1 .559 .497 
Fundamental Rights Issues 
3 = issue fundamental rights (human rights, data protection, asylum, privacy,  
freedoms 
EP report, amendments 802 0 1 .091 .287 
Institutional Powers Issues 4 = issue institutional powers (change of decision-making procedure; reports);  EP report, amendments 802 0 1 .213 .410 
Council Unanimity  1 = legal basis requires unanimity; 0 = legal basis requires QMV  
Prelex for Legal Base, Europa 
for voting rules 
802 0 1 .584 .493 
Proposal Salience  Number of recitals in final Council legislative act Final Council Legislative Acts 802 1 73 14.9 11.1 
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Table 4.10 Correlations of Variables: the Consultation Procedure (VI) 
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Success 1.000                 
Proposals Package Deal  0.287 1.000                
Delay  0.360 0.341 1.000               
Council Impatience  0.091 0.239 0.025 1.000              
Urgent 0.161 0.258 0.260 -0.028 1.000             
Urgent for the Commission 0.215 0.285 0.313 0.071 0.260 1.000            
European Parliament Cohesion -0.044 0.071 0.085 -0.101 -0.052 0.206 1.000           
EP Committee Supported -0.013 0.049 -0.027 -0.002 -0.013 0.042 0.130 1.000          
Relative EP Salience  -0.032 0.115 -0.088 -0.202 0.086 0.072 0.059 0.103 1.000         
EP - Council Salience Tie -0.037 -0.107 -0.104 -0.078 -0.052 -0.125 -0.072 0.026 -0.354 1.000        
Commission Support 0.335 0.004 0.007 0.052 0.020 0.015 -0.062 -0.054 -0.039 0.001 1.000       
Issues Type                   
Budgetary Issues 0.045 0.140 0.075 0.114 0.027 0.045 0.017 -0.057 0.025 -0.030 -0.117 1.000      
Policy Substance Issues -0.184 -0.111 -0.151 -0.019 -0.191 -0.039 0.046 -0.004 -0.047 0.114 0.011 -0.449 1.000     
Fundamental Rights Issues 0.317 0.002 -0.010 0.040 0.052 -0.060 -0.119 -0.046 -0.073 0.037 0.325 -0.126 -0.356 1.000    
Institutional Powers Issues -0.037 0.016 0.127 -0.100 0.174 0.053 0.013 0.085 0.088 -0.139 -0.143 -0.208 -0.586 -0.165 1.000   
Council Unanimity  0.044 -0.095 0.094 -0.203 0.232 -0.001 -0.015 0.072 0.074 -0.107 0.081 -0.178 -0.135 0.206 0.168 1.000  
Proposal Salience  0.180 0.294 0.014 0.407 -0.012 -0.008 -0.160 -0.098 -0.091 -0.071 0.113 0.148 -0.032 0.104 -0.159 -0.178 1.000 
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Table 4.11 Descriptive Statistics: the Co-decision Procedure (VII) 
Name Description of variables Sources Obs. Min. Max.  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Success  
1 = EP demands included in final Council legislative act; 0 = EP demands NOT 
included in final legislative act 
EP report, amendments, 
Council final text 
1567 0 1 .652 .476 
Independent variables        
Single Package Deal 
1 = Issues within a proposal were decided as a package between the EP and the 
Council; 0 = otherwise 
Statements of EP rapporteurs, 
Council minutes 
1567 
0 1 .186 .390 
Proposals Package Deal  
1 = Proposals were decided as a package between the EP and the Council; 0 = 
otherwise 
Statements of EP rapporteurs, 
Council minutes 
1567 
0 1 .278 .448 
Trialogue 
1 = An informal trialogue meeting between the Council, Parliament and the 
Commission took place; 0 = no trialogue took place 
Council working documents; EP 
plenary statements and 
summaries of sittings; 
1567 0 1 .839 .368 
Council Impatience  
1 =  The Council started discussions and prepared a draft text of the legislative 
proposal before the EP had done so; 0 = the EP started discussions and prepared a 
draft text of the legislative proposal before the Council 
Council Document Register; EP 
Legislative Observatory 
1567 
0 1 .463 .499 
Urgent 1 = Specific deadline for the legislative proposal to come into force; 0 = otherwise Commission draft, EP Reports 1567 0 1 .449 .498 
Urgent for the Commission 
1 = Deadline approaching, but no decision taken by European Council in advance; 0 = 
otherwise 
Commission Proposal, Council 
minutes, European Council 
conclusions 
1567 
0 1 .196 .397 
European Parliament 
Cohesion 
Percentage of MEPs in the drafting committee voting in favour of the committee report 
(of all committee members present) 
European Parliament Reports: 
Committee votes 
1567 
51 100 87.9 14.3 
EP Committee Supported 
1 = The EP plenary supports the committee report and no further amendments are 
tabled by MEPs; 0 = Committee report amended or rejected by the Plenary 
European Parliament plenary 
sittings 
1567 
0 1 .639 .480 
Relative EP Salience  
Relative EP Preference Intensity = EP Salience (linearly rescaled 1-10) - Council 
Salience (linearly rescaled 1-10), including the direction (+ or -) 
Council Document Register; EP 
Reports, Procedural Pages 
1567 
-8 9 -.010 2.123 
EP - Council Salience Tie 
1= Equal preference intensities attached to a proposal by the EP and the Council; 0 = 
otherwise 
Council Document Register; EP 
Reports, Procedural Pages 
1567 
0 1 .257 .437 
Commission Support 1 = Commission support for issue contested by the EP; 0 = No Commission support  
Commission Statements at EP 
plenary, Communications to EP 
1567 
0 1 .592 .492 
Issues Type         
Budgetary Issues 1 = issue budgetary (EU spending, co-financing, funding for specific programmes); EP report, amendments 1567 0 1 .093 .291 
Policy Substance Issues 
1 = issue policy substance (scope of the legislation, clarifications on definitions and 
terms;  
EP report, amendments 
1567 
0 1 .689 .463 
Fundamental Rights Issues 
1 = issue fundamental rights (human rights, data protection, asylum, privacy,  
freedoms 
EP report, amendments 
1567 
0 1 .125 .331 
Institutional Powers Issues 1 = issue institutional powers (change of decision-making procedure; reports);  EP report, amendments 1567 0 1 .093 .290 
First Reading  1 = Proposal decided at first reading; 0 = otherwise   EP Legislative Observatory 1567 0 1 .280 .449 
Second Reading  1 = Proposal decided at second reading; 0 = otherwise  EP Legislative Observatory 1567 0 1 .481 .500 
Third Reading  1 = Proposal decided at third reading; 0 = otherwise  EP Legislative Observatory 1567 0 1 .239 .426 
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Table 4.12 Correlations of Variables: the Co-decision Procedure (VII)  
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Success 1.000                   
Single Package Deal -.032 1.000                  
Proposals Package Deal  0.051 -.296 1.000                 
Trialogue 0.000 0.201 0.163 1.000                
Council Impatience  0.058 0.173 0.004 0.227 1.000               
Urgent 0.015 -.013 0.168 -.033 0.145 1.000              
Urgent for the Commission 0.030 -.038 0.042 -.046 0.044 0.547 1.000             
European Parliament Cohesion 0.106 -.105 0.032 -.201 -.103 0.151 0.148 1.000            
EP Committee Supported 0.082 -.063 -.202 -.246 -.073 0.047 0.112 0.374 1.000           
Relative EP Salience  0.002 0.060 -.054 -.117 -.076 0.235 0.252 0.100 0.126 1.000          
EP - Council Salience Tie -.040 0.022 -.060 -.032 0.040 -.036 -.003 0.027 0.021 0.003 1.000         
Commission Support 0.105 0.080 -.051 -.068 0.008 -.060 -.068 -.057 -.028 -.043 0.033 1.000        
Issues Type                     
Budgetary Issues -.093 -.063 0.046 0.027 -.020 0.192 0.262 0.093 0.085 0.095 -.048 -.127 1.000       
Policy Substance Issues -.100 0.070 -.070 -.058 -.007 -.221 -.231 -.130 -.085 -.136 0.060 0.122 -.477 1.000      
Fundamental Rights Issues 0.142 -.042 0.046 0.045 0.055 0.105 0.052 0.031 0.031 0.075 -.028 0.110 -.121 -.563 1.000     
Institutional Powers Issues 0.090 -0.00 0.013 0.014 -.032 0.040 0.048 0.080 0.015 0.036 -.016 -.192 -.102 -.476 -.121 1.000    
First Reading  0.080 0.212 -.155 0.081 0.358 0.163 0.122 0.224 0.137 0.133 0.109 -.023 0.015 -.069 0.056 0.031 1.000   
Second Reading -.069 -.012 -.035 -.282 -.098 0.012 0.052 -.059 0.135 0.090 -.004 0.095 0.030 0.009 -.040 0.001 -.601 1.000  
Third Reading   -.002 -.210 0.205 0.246 -.262 -.186 -.190 -.167 -.303 -.246 -.109 -.087 -.051 0.062 -.013 -.034 -.349 -.539 1.000 
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Table 4.13 Descriptive Statistics: EP Success Across Policy Areas (VIII) 
 
Name Description of variables Sources Obs. Min. Max.  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Success  
1 = EP demands included in final Council legislative act; 0 = EP demands NOT 
included in final legislative act 
EP report, amendments, 
Council final text 
2369 0 1  .519 .500 
Independent variables        
Package Deal 
1 = Proposals and issues were decided as a package between the EP and the 
Council; 0 = otherwise 
Statements of EP rapporteurs, 
Council minutes 
2369 0 1 .366 .482 
Co-decision 1 = codecision procedure; 0 = consultation procedure  EP Legislative Observatory 2369 0 1  .661 .473 
Council Impatience  
1 =  The Council started discussions and prepared a draft text of the legislative 
proposal before the EP had done so; 0 = the EP started discussions and prepared a 
draft text of the legislative proposal before the Council 
Council Document Register; EP 
Legislative Observatory 
2369 0 1 .399 .490 
Urgent 1 = Specific deadline for the legislative proposal to come into force; 0 = otherwise Commission draft, EP Reports 2369 0 1 .464 .499 
Urgent for the Commission 
1 = Deadline approaching, but no decision taken by European Council in advance; 0 = 
otherwise 
Commission Proposal, Council 
minutes, European Council 
conclusions 
2369 
0 1 .186 .389 
European Parliament 
Cohesion 
Percentage of MEPs in the drafting committee voting in favour of the committee report 
(of all committee members present) 
European Parliament Reports: 
Committee votes 
2369 
51 100 89.2 13.3 
EP Committee Supported 
1 = The EP plenary supports the committee report and no further amendments are 
tabled by MEPs; 0 = Committee report amended or rejected by the Plenary 
European Parliament plenary 
sittings 
2369 
0 1 .729 .444 
Relative EP Salience  
Relative EP Preference Intensity = EP Salience (linearly rescaled 1-10) - Council 
Salience (linearly rescaled 1-10), including the direction (+ or -) 
Council Document Register; EP 
Reports, Procedural Pages 
2369 
-8 9 .222 1.963 
EP - Council Salience Tie 
1= Equal preference intensities attached to a proposal by the EP and the Council; 0 = 
otherwise 
Council Document Register; EP 
Reports, Procedural Pages 
2369 
0 1 .299 .458 
Commission Support 1 = Commission support for issue contested by the EP; 0 = No Commission support  
Commission Statements at EP 
plenary, Communications to EP 
2369 
0 1 .520 .500 
Issues Type         
Budgetary Issues 1 = issue budgetary (EU spending, co-financing, funding for specific programmes); EP report, amendments 2369 0 1 .108 .311 
Policy Substance Issues 
1 = issue policy substance (scope of the legislation, clarifications on definitions and 
terms;  
EP report, amendments 
2369 
0 1 .645 .479 
Fundamental Rights Issues 
1 = issue fundamental rights (human rights, data protection, asylum, privacy,  
freedoms 
EP report, amendments 
2369 
0 1 .114 .317 
Institutional Powers Issues 1 = issue institutional powers (change of decision-making procedure; reports);  EP report, amendments 2369 0 1 .133 .340 
Distributive Policy Area  Proportion of distributive proposals in a policy area Legislative text 2369 .170 .943 .413 .208 
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 Table 4.14 Correlations of Variables: EP Success Across Policy Areas (VIII) 
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Success 1.000              
Package Deal 0.186 1.000             
Co- decision 0.372 0.283 1.000            
Council Impatience 0.130 0.207 0.184 1.000           
European Parliament Cohesion 0.012 -0.062 -0.134 -0.124 1.000          
EP Committee Supported -0.052 -0.243 -0.283 -0.105 0.349 1.000         
Relative EP Salience -0.067 -0.025 -0.166 -0.133 0.111 0.162 1.000        
Parliament - Council Salience Tie -0.105 -0.091 -0.129 -0.023 0.015 0.057 -0.074 1.000       
Commission Support EP 0.237 0.069 0.202 0.058 -0.083 -0.089 -0.073 -0.006 1.000      
Issue Type Contested by EP                
Issue Budgetary  -0.065 0.018 -0.067 0.014 0.076 0.062 0.082 -0.031 -0.134 1.000     
Issue Policy Substance -0.070 0.000 0.129 0.014 -0.094 -0.096 -0.128 0.062 0.107 -0.469 1.000    
Issue Fundamental Rights 0.198 0.021 0.051 0.059 -0.013 -0.013 0.031 -0.013 0.181 -0.125 -0.482 1.000   
Issue Institutional Powers -0.028 -0.036 -0.168 -0.086 0.075 0.080 0.077 -0.047 -0.197 -0.137 -0.529 -0.140 1.000  
Distributive Policy Area -0.040 0.014 -0.277 -0.085 0.208 0.160 0.310 -0.085 -0.092 0.191 -0.230 0.028 0.122 1.000 
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4.5 Statistical Methods and Models  
 
Binary Logistic Regressions  
In Chapter V, VI, VII and VIII the dependent variables Package Deal and EP Success are 
dichotomous (0;1) variables. Logistic regressions are used to examine the effect of the 
independent variables (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). As indicated earlier the dataset is 
structured hierarchically into 2369 issues, nested in 973 proposals, nested in 19 policy areas 
and 8 legislative years. Therefore, the observations cannot simply be pooled, because this 
violates the assumption of the independence of the observations (Snijders and Bosker, 
1999). Individual issues cannot be treated as independent observations as some issues that 
are part of the same proposal, policy area and year may share a similar probability of EP 
success (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2005; Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002; Rasbash et al, 
2000). ANOVA tests are performed in each of the chapters in order to check whether the 
variance in the probability of the dependent variable = 1 can be explained by differences 
between the legislative proposals, policy areas or time (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002) 
Two techniques are employed to account for the clustered nature of the data. Firstly, the 
models can be estimated as robust logistic regressions, correcting the standard errors for 
clustering within legislative proposals and/or policy areas and years. Secondly, the models 
can be estimated as multi-level logistic regressions with issues at level 1 and proposals, 
policy areas and time at levels 2, 3, 4 (Gelman and Hill, 2007; Rasbash and Goldstein, 
1994; Leyland and Goldstein, 2001; Hox, 2002). As well as correcting for the dependence 
of observations within proposals, this method also makes adjustments to both within and 
between parameter estimates that take into account the clustered nature of the data
53
. Each 
of the models reports the coefficients, the standard errors and the full models present the 
                                                 
53
 “Political scientists often treat multilevel data structures as if no hierarchy between units of analysis 
existed. Consequently, observations are treated as independent, whereas in fact they are to some extent 
dependent because of the hierarchical nesting structure. This can easily lead to incorrect inferences, such 
as rejecting the null hypothesis of no effect too frequently” (Snijders and Bosker, 1999).  
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odds ratios of the independent variables. Robust logistic regressions and multi-level logit 
models are used in Chapters V, VI, VII and VIII.    
 
Ordinal Logistic Regressions 
In Chapter VIII, in addition to treating the EP success variable as a binary variable, EP 
success is studied as an ordinal variable with four outcomes (where 0 = failure, 1 = low 
success, 2 = medium success; 3 = high success). When the issues from the co-decision and 
consultation procedures are pooled together, none of the categories is empty or extremely 
small (Bickel, 2007). Therefore, it is possible to run an ordinal logistic test. By including 
the degree of EP success in the analysis, the results of the statistical tests will provide a 
clearer picture of the extent to which the European Parliament influences legislative 
outcomes across policy areas in the EU. Exactly the same set of independent variables is 
used in the analysis. The ordinal logistic regression models are estimated with robust 
standard errors to take into account the clustered nature of the data. 
One of the assumptions underlying ordinal logistic regression is that the relationship 
between each pair of outcome groups is the same. This is known as the proportional odds 
assumption (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2005, 148). Ordinal logistic regression assumes 
that the coefficients that describe the relationship between the lowest versus all higher 
categories of the dependent variable are the same as those that describe the relationship 
between the next lowest category and all higher categories (Dupont and Martensen, 2007). 
If there is a difference between the different categories, then a multinomial logit regression 
is more appropriate (Long, 1997; Agresti, 2007).  
 
Multinomial Logistic Regressions 
In Chapter VIII, the dependent EP success is also treated as a categorical variable and a 
multinomial logistic regression is estimated. The multinomial model will aid the analysis of 
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the effect of the independent variables for each EP success category (0, 1, 2, or 3). Here EP 
success is the dependent variable with four nominal outcomes (Agresti, 1990). Multinomial 
logit regression works like an ordinary binary logistic regression, except that all the 
different outcomes in the dependent variable are compared against each other. In a model 
with four alternative categories, outcome 0 (failure) is compared to outcome 1 (low 
success), outcome 1 (low success) is compared to outcome 2 (medium success), outcome 2 
(medium success) is compared to outcome 3 (high success) and outcome 3 (high success) is 
compared to outcome 0 (failure). As in the ordinal logistic regression, to account for the 
contextual effect of the policy area level, the multinomial regression is estimated with 
clustered robust standard errors. Exactly the same set of independent variables is used in 
this analysis, so that the results from the different estimations can be compared. 
 
4.6 Introducing the Illustrative Case Studies  
Choosing the Illustrative Case Studies: Legislative Proposals 
 
Three of the empirical chapters supplement the findings with illustrative case studies. The 
intention here is not to draw deep conclusions about the way EU policy-making works 
from five legislative proposals. Rather, these illustrative case studies are used as examples 
of some of the key arguments and of important trends identified in the quantitative sections 
of the thesis. All of the cases represent important pieces of legislation where informal 
negotiations and package deals play a central role in the decision-making process. The 
consultation cases were chosen to illustrate that the consultation procedure can also involve 
important informal trialogues, which are usually associated with the co-decision procedure. 
In addition, the cases illustrate that delay is important to the EP‟s influence, regardless of 
its limited formal consultation powers. In contrast, the co-decision cases were chosen to 
illustrate that co-decision does not always guarantee a co-equal status of the Parliament. 
The co-decision cases demonstrate that party leaders can often undermine the role of the 
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committee rapporteur in inter-cameral negotiations. The cases also show that EP influence 
in co-decision is not constant, but it varies according to the different policy contexts. 
Whereas none of the case studies shows all aspects of the argument in Chapter III, each of 
the cases provides contexts around some of the key findings of the thesis.  
The selected examples were chosen according to four factors: the type of legislative 
procedure (co-decision or consultation); the policy area they belong to; their salience; and 
the time period in which they were decided (1999 - 2007). The examples were not 
randomly chosen, nor are they intended to be representative of the whole population of 
legislative acts. The cases, however, illustrate the process and consequences of legislative 
package deals in the EU and the importance of the policy area context for legislative 
decisions. First, the case studies help in identifying and understanding the particular issues 
involved in legislation. Second, they help in identifying the actors who gain and lose from 
the EP‟s involvement in informal negotiations. Third, they help in understanding the gains 
and losses from the EP‟s commitments to informal package compromises. The illustrative 
examples look at legislative bargaining in the policy areas of telecommunications (co-
decision), agriculture (consultation), justice, freedom and security (consultation), insurance 
(co-decision), and energy (co-decision). 
Chapter V illustrates the way package deals work in the EU legislative process with 
a case study on the co-decision Data Retention Directive
54
. Chapter VI illustrates the 
possibilities for EP legislative success in the consultation procedure with two case studies – 
Voluntary Modulation of Direct Payments Regulation
55
 and the EU Agency for 
                                                 
54
 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of 
data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications 
services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC 
 
55
 Council Regulation (EC) No 378/2007 of 27 March 2007 laying down rules for voluntary modulation of 
direct payments provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing common rules for direct support 
schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, and 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 
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Fundamental Rights Regulation
56
.  These case studies demonstrate how package deals and 
proposal linkages increase the ability of the European Parliament to succeed in the 
consultation procedure. Moreover, these consultation case studies underline the power of 
the European Parliament to delay legislation and extract concessions from the Council of 
Ministers. Chapter VII illustrates the possibilities for EP legislative success in the 
codecision procedure with two case studies – the Reinsurance Directive57 and the Energy 
Efficiency Directive
58
. The case studies illustrate how package deals are enforced between 
the European Parliament and the Council. The examples also show that informal trialogues 
between the EP and the Council may often take place before first and second reading and 
such fast-tracked package compromises may undermine the EP‟s co-legislative status.  
 
Telecommunications: Data Retention Directive 
In Chapter V, the co-decision Data Retention Directive case study illustrates how informal 
agreements are made between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers in the 
co-decision procedure. Proposed in 2005, this piece of legislation aimed to harmonize 
Member States‟ legislation on the retention of data, processed by telecommunications 
companies. Once adopted, the directive would facilitate judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters and the investigation of serious criminal offences. This case underlines the 
importance of urgency, institutional impatience, and the involvement of party leaders in the 
conclusion of inter-institutional package deals. The case also illustrates how the success of 
informal agreements depends on their simultaneous decision. Informal agreements are 
likely to fall apart when promises are made sequentially. In exchange for supporting the 
Council‟s preferences on Data Retention, the European Parliament was promised a future 
                                                 
56
 Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 Establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
 
57
 Directive 2005/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2005 on reinsurance 
and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 92/49/EEC as well as Directives 98/78/EC and 2002/83/EC 
 
58
 Directive 2006/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 on energy end-use 
efficiency and energy services and repealing Council Directive 93/76/EEC (Text with EEA relevance)  
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pay-off in the negotiations of the VIS consultation legislation. Nevertheless, during the 
negotiations of the Schengen proposals, the Council refused to keep any previous promises 
or agreements with the EP. The case underlines the fragile nature of inter-chamber logrolls, 
but it demonstrates their important role for the EU legislative process.   
 
Common Agricultural Policy: Voluntary Modulation for Direct Payments Regulation 
The first case in Chapter VI is a study of the consultation Voluntary Modulation regulation. 
Proposed in 2006, this legislative act aimed to establish the practical rules for allowing 
Member States to use voluntary modulation. It laid down the procedures for shifting up to 
20% of direct payments from the first pillar to rural development under the CAP. The 
Council had previously agreed to cut payments to rural development and this proposal 
aimed partially to compensate for the lack of necessary funds under the second pillar of the 
CAP. In order to make the Commission and Council listen to its position, the EP decided to 
link its opinion on Voluntary Modulation to the funding of rural development programmes 
in the 2007 budget. In the framework of the 2007 annual budgetary procedure, the EP 
blocked and put into reserve 20% of the commitments and payments appropriations for 
rural development programs. This way the European Parliament linked its opinion on 
Voluntary Modulation to its opinion on other urgent budgetary legislation. Moreover, the 
EP delayed its opinion. The case illustrates that when issues are important and urgent to the 
Council, the EP can exploit its powers in other procedures and its right to delay in 
consultation in order to extract concessions from the Member States. Though delay, the EP 
agreed a package deal with the Council in which it realized some of its preferences. The 
case also illustrates that the European Parliament is able to influence legislation much more 
than what the official treaty provisions prescribe and what existing analyses have 
suggested. 
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Justice and Home Affairs: Agency for Fundamental Rights Regulation 
The second case in Chapter VI is a study of the consultation EU Agency for Fundamental 
Rights Regulation. The case again illustrates how the European Parliament can successfully 
influence legislation in the consultation procedure through delay. In 2005, the European 
Commission proposed the establishment of a Fundamental Rights Agency with the 
objective to provide assistance and expertise to the EU institutions and the Member States 
in relation to fundamental rights when they are defining policies or implementing 
legislation. The Agency‟s main responsibilities were the formulation of opinions and 
issuing of annual reports on the respect and visibility of fundamental rights in the EU. The 
case highlights that informal inter-chamber trialogue meetings take place in the 
consultation procedure as well. Although trialogue meetings have usually been associated 
with negotiations in the co-decision procedure, this case demonstrates that as many as six 
informal trialogues and numerous intra-chamber meetings took place between 2005 and 
2007 when final agreement was achieved. In this case the European Parliament also 
delayed its opinion and managed to gain concessions from the Council by having its 
demands included in the final legislative text.  
 
Insurance: Reinsurance Directive  
The first case in Chapter VII is a study of the co-decision Reinsurance Directive. Proposed 
in 2004, this legislative dossier aimed to provide a framework for the regulation of 
specialized reinsurers – those companies, whose sole activity is reinsurance. The drafting 
of the text was largely led by the Council Presidency who ensured that the EP‟s drafting 
committee made no amendments to the Council‟s compromise text. Decided under first 
reading, this fast-tracked procedure left little room for discussion, debate or inclusion of 
further amendments by MEPs outside the EP‟s drafting committee. The case demonstrates 
how informal contacts between the EP leadership and the Council Presidency weaken the 
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ability of ordinary MEPs to participate in the legislative process. Due to the accelerated 
fast-track agreement on this proposal, most committee members and MEPs did not have a 
chance to influence the legislative text. The EP plenary voted on a pre-agreed package 
compromise as a block vote without any further amendments.  
 
Energy: Energy Efficiency for End-Users Directive   
The second case in Chapter VII is a study of the co-decision Energy Efficiency directive. 
Proposed in 2003, the legislation aimed to stimulate energy efficiency by introducing 
mandatory savings targets for Member States and taking measures that would assist the 
development of the market in energy services. It aimed to contribute to the achievement of 
the EU's Kyoto emissions-reduction target and covered the great majority of forms of 
energy sold to end-users: electricity, gas, district heating, heating oil, and transport fuels. 
Similarly to the Reinsurance case, informal contacts between the EP party leaders and the 
Council Presidency weakened the ability of ordinary MEPs to participate in the legislative 
process. In this case, the role of the EP committee and the EP rapporteur was undermined 
due to the last-minute deal agreed with the majority party leaders. The agreement was again 
fast-tracked and the package compromise was passed in plenary as a block vote.  
 This chapter described the empirical material used to test the theoretical argument. 
The data consist of all EU legislation adopted in the period 1 May 1999 – 30 April 2007 
across all policy areas and the EU‟s co-decision and consultation legislative procedures. 
The chapter underlined that there is a lot of publicly available information, which allows 
the systematic tests of the argument. In Chapter V the analysis is applied to all 1465 
legislative proposals. In Chapter VI the analysis is focused on the consultation procedure 
(925 proposals). In Chapter VII the analysis is focused on the co-decision procedure (540 
proposals). In Chapter VIII the data from the consultation and co-decision procedures are 
pooled together and the analysis is applied to all 1465 legislative proposals. 
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CHAPTER 5 : WHY PACKAGE DEALS IN THE EU LEGISLATIVE PROCESS  
Introduction 
This chapter studies the use of package deals in European Union decision-making and it 
analyses the conditions for inter-chamber logrolling. Existing studies of legislative politics 
in the EU overlook the importance of the use of package deals in the EU legislative 
process. The possibility of logrolling between the European Parliament and the Council has 
attracted little theoretical attention and no empirical testing. This chapter explores the 
conditions for the use of legislative package deals in the European Union through the 
examination of 1465 legislative proposals completed between 1 May 1999 and 30 April 
2007 under the co-decision and consultation procedures.  
The chapter tests Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 that legislative proposals in the 
EU are more likely to be decided through a package deal when proposals are 1) distributive 
and 2) urgent. The chapter finds that package deals are regularly used by EU legislators as 
they allow the Council and the Parliament to achieve their most preferred policy outcomes 
through the exchange of support. In addition to distributive and urgent legislative 
proposals, the chapter tests whether logrolling occurs when, 3) the preference intensities of 
the EP and the Council on these proposals differ, 4) the EP party leaders are involved; 5) 
the policy area is issue complex.   
Section I of the chapter presents an overview of the development of package deals 
in the co-decision and consultation procedures between 1 May 1999 and 30 April 2007. 
Section II outlines the conditions that led to the employment of package deals in EU 
decision-making. Section III presents the statistical tests and reports the findings. Section 
IV illustrates the importance of package deals with a case study. The case highlights some 
of the most important characteristics of informal legislative logrolls and it further supports 
the argument that package deals are important for legislative decision-making in the EU.  
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Theoretical analyses of EU legislative politics have largely neglected the 
importance of informal rules and procedures and the possibility of logrolling and package 
deals in the decision-making process. The majority of the existing models of EU decision-
making view lawmaking as a process of single-shot interactions between the Council, the 
European Parliament and the Commission. They ignore the possibility of repeated 
interactions between the institutional actors and eliminate the idea of logrolling and the 
conclusion of package deals in the EU legislative context (Tsebelis, 1994; Steunenberg, 
1994; Crombez, 1996; Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996; Tsebelis, 2000; Tsebelis and Garrett, 
2000).  
The idea of logrolling has occupied a central place in the literature of legislative 
politics and theories of exchange have been most prominent in the literature of US 
legislative decision-making (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962, 2004; Coleman, 1966, 1990; 
Ferejohn, 1986; Weingast and Marshall, 1988; Mueller, 1989; Shepsle and Weingast, 1994; 
Stratmann, 1992; 1995; 1997; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1998; Krutz 2001). Analyses of 
logrolling and package deals take into account both the informal interactions among 
institutional actors and the formal rules of the legislative process. The definition of 
logrolling varies between the studies but overall, it is understood as „the exchange of loss in 
some issues for benefits in others resulting in mutual overall gain between actors with 
different interests...‟ (Mueller, 1989).  
In contrast, ideas of gains from legislative exchange in the EU context have 
received little attention, limited theoretical focus and no empirical testing. Recently, several 
theoretical models, implying logrolling have been developed in the EU decision-making 
literature (Stokman and Van Oosten, 1994; Bueno de Mesquita, 1994; Crombez, 2000b; 
Konig and Proksch, 2006). In addition to the procedural rules of the EU legislative process, 
these models focus on the informal bargaining through which institutional actors exercise 
legislative influence. These authors acknowledge that EU decision-making presents 
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legislators with multiple issues for consideration and that their repeated interactions in the 
EU legislative process create opportunities for logrolling and exchange of support. 
Nevertheless, there exist no empirical tests of whether legislative exchange is a significant 
process in EU decision-making.  
This chapter finds that logrolling in the EU manifests itself in the form of package 
deals between the Council and the European Parliament. Package deals are widespread in 
the EU legislative system and they are of central importance for EU decision-making in a 
large number of EU policy areas. Inter-chamber legislative package deals can be found in 
the co-decision as well as the consultation procedures.  
 
5.1 Package Deals in the EU Legislative Process 
 “Anyone familiar with lawmaking knows that legislators frequently vote for 
legislation they really do not like in return for another legislator‟s agreement to vote for 
something they favour strongly” (Tullock, 2002, 29).  
 
5.1.1 What Exactly is a Package Deal? The Concept of Package Legislating  
Package deals are fragile informal bargains agreed between representatives of the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Legislative proposals and the issues included in a 
package are discussed and voted as a whole. Usually agreed through informal negotiations, 
these legislative compromises serve as binding commitments and each of the legislative 
chambers has to accept the deal without any further amendment. 
 
5.1.2 Where Did the Package Deal Originate?  
The origins of the package deal in the European Union can be traced back to the 
development of the budgetary procedure and the CAP. The broader qualitative literature on 
EU decision-making suggests the use and importance of package deals in the Council of 
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Ministers. As discussed in Chapter I, package deals have long been associated with 
distributive politics in the EU. This is not surprising as the EU budget is renegotiated 
repeatedly and similar constellations of issues arise again and again. Cooperation on deals 
like these indicates repeated play among legislators, which is not implausible, given that 
the annual budgetary process must be repeated each year, and that the European Parliament 
and the Council of Ministers communicate to each other through channels other than the 
formal proposal and amendment processes outlined by the treaties (pictured in Figure 1.2).  
The origin of the package deal in the EU is similar to the development of package 
legislating in the US. Distributive politics, spending and the budget are found to be marked 
by logrolling, informal negotiations and package deals (Enelow, 1986, 291; Haggard and 
McCubbins, 2001, 130). According to Heller (2001: 39) „The easiest place to look for 
evidence of logrolls is in spending… Chambers resolve their differences through huge, 
budget-busting, deficit-inducing, intercameral logrolls‟. 
Before focusing on the use of package deals across policy areas, it is interesting to 
note the variation in amendment rates of proposals across policies (see Table 5.1). The 
European Parliament amends less legislation under the consultation procedure than it does 
under co-decision. The proportion of co-decision proposals to which the EP proposed 
amendments was 87% (470 of 540 proposals), whereas the proportion of consultation 
legislation to which the EP proposed amendments was only 54.5% (503 of 925 proposals). 
Overall, the European Parliament proposes amendments to 66.4% of the legislative 
proposals (973 of 1465) and the rest are passed subject to no amendment.  
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Table 5.1 Total EU Legislation Analysed: 1999 – 2007  
 
 
  Co-decision Procedure    Consultation Procedure   All Legislative Proposals 
Policy Area (Commission DG) 
Total 
proposals 
Non 
Amended 
Amended  
Total 
proposals 
Non 
Amended 
Amended  
Total 
proposals 
Non 
Amended 
Amended 
                        
Agriculture & Rural Development 8 1 7  129 60 69  137 61 76 (55.6%) 
Budget 12 3 9  72 46 26  84 49 35 (41.7%) 
Development 10 1 9  4 - 4  14 1 13 (92.9%) 
Economic and Financial Affairs 2 - 2  58 30 28  60 30 30 (50.0%) 
Education and Culture 26 1 25  13 9 4  39 10 29 (74.4%) 
Employment and Social Affairs  22 2 20  22 4 18  44 6 38 (86.4%) 
Energy and Transport 100 7 93  33 27 6  133 34 99 (74.4%) 
Enterprise and Industry 62 9 53  4 1 3  66 10 56 (84.8%) 
Environment 55 5 50  35 27 8  90 32 58 (64.4%) 
Eurostat, Statistical Office 39 7 32  4 3 1  43 10 33 (76.7%) 
External Relations 12 - 12  60 34 26  72 34 38 (52.8%) 
Fisheries 1 - 1  131 25 106  132 25 107 (81.1%) 
General Secretariat 3 1 2  31 23 8  34 24 10 (29.4%) 
Health and Consumer Protection 57 1 56  34 13 21  91 14 77 (84.6%) 
Information Society 24 4 20  3 1 2  27 5 22 (81.5%) 
Internal Market and Services 48 7 41  18 12 6  66 19 47 (71.2%) 
Justice, Freedom and Security 26 2 24  178 55 123  204 57 147 (72.1%) 
Legal Service 17 17 -  8 8 -  25 25  0 (0 %) 
Regional Policy 1 1 -  7 3 4  8 4 4 (50.0%) 
Research 7 - 7  37 18 19  44 18 26 (59.1%) 
Taxation and Customs Union 8 1 7   44 23 21   52 24 28 (53.8%) 
Total Proposals 540 70 470  925 422 503  1465 492 973 (66.4%)  
 
 
Source: European Parliament Legislative Observatory 
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The policy areas with the lowest proportion of amended by the European 
Parliament proposals are Budget (41.7%), General Affairs (29.4%), Agriculture and Rural 
Development (43.9%), Economics and Social Affairs (50.0%), External Relations (52.8%), 
Taxation and Customs (53.8%). On the other hand, the policy areas with the highest 
proportion of amended by the EP legislative proposals are Development (100%), 
Employment and Social Affairs (86.4%), Health and Consumer Protection (84.6%), 
Enterprise and Industry (82.4%), and Information Society (81.5%). 
Around 25% of the completed EU legislation in the period between 1 May 1999 
and 30 April 2007 was decided through a package deal. Of the total 1465 legislative 
proposals, 973 proposals were amended and 244 proposals involved a package compromise 
between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The use of package deals in 
the co-decision and consultation procedures was traced through the Council‟s document 
register and the European Parliament‟s plenary debates and summaries of sittings. A 
proposal was counted as a package proposal only if there was written evidence of a 
negotiated compromise package between the Council and the European Parliament. 72% of 
all package deals fell under the co-decision procedure (176 proposals) and around 28% of 
the package deals took place under the consultation procedure (68 proposals).  
Table 5.2 presents the distribution of all legislative proposals completed in the 
period according to policy area, procedure, and use of package deals in the legislative 
process
 59
. It confirms that package deals occur in many EU policy areas. The policy areas 
with the highest percentage of legislative proposals decided through package deals were 
Budget (60%), Research (77%), Energy and Transport (42%), and Information Society 
(41%). On the other hand, the policy areas of Fisheries (2%) and External Relations (5%) 
only rarely contain package legislation. 
                                                 
59
 Sources: European Parliament Legislative Observatory and Council of Ministers Register of Documents. 
Own calculations. 
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Table 5.2 Package Deals in Co-decision and Consultation Legislation: 1999 - 2007 
 
    Co-decision Consultation   
Policy Area (Commission DG) 
Total 
Amended 
Amended 
Proposals 
Single 
Package 
Multi 
Package 
Package 
Proposals 
Amended 
Proposals 
Single 
Package 
Multi 
Package 
Package 
Proposals 
Total Package 
Deals 
Agriculture & Rural Development 80 7 1 2 3 (43%) 73 - 17 17 (23%) 20 (25%) 
Budget 35 9 - 5 5 (56%) 26 - 16 16 (62%) 21 (60%) 
Development 13 9 - 3 3 (33%) 4 - - - 3 (23%) 
Economic and Financial Affairs 30 2 - 2 2 (100%) 28 - - - 2 (7%) 
Education and Culture 29 25 - 6 6 (24%) 4 - 1 1 (25%) 7 (24%) 
Employment and Social Affairs  38 20 1 6 7 (35%) 18 - - - 7 (18%) 
Energy and Transport 99 93 16 26 42 (45%) 6 - - - 42 (42%) 
Enterprise and Industry 56 53 8 10 18 (34%) 3 - - - 18 (32%) 
Environment 58 50 14 6 20 (40%) 8 - - - 20 (34%) 
Eurostat, Statistical Office 33 32 1 1 2 (6%) 1 - - - 2 (6%) 
External Relations 38 12 2 - 2 (23%) 26 - - - 2 (5%) 
Fisheries 107 1 - - - 106 - 2 2 (2%) 2 (2%) 
General Secretariat 10 2 - - - 8 - 4 4 (50%) 4 (40%) 
Health and Consumer Protection 77 56 13 10 23 (41%) 21 - - - 23 (30%) 
Information Society 22 20 5 4 9 (45%) 2 - - - 9 (41%) 
Internal Market and Services 47 41 12 4 16 (39%) 6 - - - 16 (34%) 
Justice, Freedom and Security 147 24 3 9 12 (50%) 123 - 11 11 (9%) 23 (16%) 
Research 26 7 1 3 4 (57%) 19 - 16 16 (84%) 20 (77%) 
Taxation and Customs Union 28 7 1 1 2 (29%) 21 - 1 1 (5%) 3 (11%) 
Total Legislative Proposals*** 973 470 78 98 176(37%) 503 - 68 68 (14%) 244 (25%) 
 
 
  *** = 243 directives, 468 regulations, 247 decisions and 14 recommendations. 
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5.2 Types of Inter-Chamber Package Deals 
Three types of package deals can be identified in the European Union legislative process
60
. 
These are package deals on: a) single proposals that involve multiple issues; b) several 
proposals that are decided simultaneously within the same legislative procedure; and c) 
several proposals that are decided simultaneously across the co-decision and consultation 
procedures.  
 
a) Single proposals with multiple controversial issues 
First, legislative package deals are concluded between the European Parliament and the 
Council on single proposals that involve multiple controversial issues. Package deals allow 
the legislative bodies to obtain their most preferred outcomes by exchanging support on 
some issues for support on other issues, part of the same legislative proposal. Hence, 
logrolling allows some of the most controversial legislative proposals that would otherwise 
face gridlock, to be successfully negotiated. Overall, 32% of the package deals in the 
period took place on single proposals (78 proposals). For example, in the negotiations of 
the regulation on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (2006/0033(COD)),  the 
“EP explained to the Chair of Coreper that it viewed the negotiations as a whole package 
and would be prepared to accept Article 2 as proposed by the Council, including the 15% 
in 2(c), should the Council for its part agree to increase the rate of co-financing to 50%”61. 
However, package compromises on single proposals only took place in the co-decision 
procedure.  
 
                                                 
 
60
 In the literature on the US Congress, Stratmann (1992) finds that logrolling agreements can take two forms. 
First, two issues y and w can be joined in a single proposal and be voted on as a package. This type of 
package deals are often referred to as „omnibus bills‟ (Sinclair, 2000; Krutz, 2001). Second, the issue pairs 
can be voted upon separately, with y‟s supporters voting for w and w‟s supporters voting for y.  
 
61
 Council Document 15696/06 Brussels, 22 November 2006).  
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b) Several proposals decided simultaneously under the same procedure 
Second, legislative package deals are agreed when several proposals are decided 
simultaneously either within the same legislative procedure or across the co-decision and 
consultation procedures. 68 % of the package deals involved the bundling of legislative 
proposals in packages and their simultaneous negotiation (166 proposals). Package deals on 
several proposals allow EU legislators to trade support across proposals and hence make 
compromises on legislative packages that would otherwise be difficult to pass. For 
example, during the negotiations on the Detergents regulation (2002/0216(COD), the 
Council reports: “On 8 December 2003 an informal trialogue meeting was held and a list 
of compromise amendments was drawn up… The European Parliament indicated that, 
should the compromise package be accepted by the Council, it was prepared to drop all 
other amendments and vote to approve the compromise package in January 2004…”62.  
 
c) Several proposals decided simultaneously across legislative procedures 
Third, package deals are concluded when several proposals are decided simultaneously 
across the co-decision and consultation procedures. Table 5.1 highlighted that EU policy 
areas contain draft proposals from both legislative procedures. Hence, package deals can 
also involve proposals from the co-decision and consultation procedures within the same 
policy area. For example, during the negotiations on the SIS II proposals: “On 31 May 
2005, the Commission submitted legislative proposals setting out the legal basis for SIS II: 
two Regulations to be adopted in co-decision procedures and one Council Decision to be 
adopted by unanimity and with EP consultation. However, the EP has very clearly 
indicated that these three legislative instruments will be dealt with as a package”63. 
 
                                                 
62
 Council Document 15894/1/03, Brussels 11 December 2003, on Regulation on Detergents).  
63
 Council Document 13050/06, Brussels, 22 September 2006, on SIS II legal instruments).  
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Therefore, there is evidence of both single omnibus legislation, where several issues 
are packaged in a single proposal and of multi-proposal package legislation, where several 
proposals are bundled together and decided simultaneously. It seems that in the EU single 
„omnibus‟ proposals are less popular than packages of several proposals decided 
simultaneously. „Omnibus‟ packaging on single proposals occurred only under the co-
decision procedure (78 package proposals). Proposals were decided together in bundles 
under the co-decision and consultation procedures (166 package proposals). 
The largest number of omnibus single proposals was in the policy areas of Energy 
and Transport (16), Environment (14), Health and Consumer Protection (13) and Enterprise 
and Industry (8). The largest number of multi-proposal package legislation was in the 
policy areas of Energy and Transport (26), Agriculture (17), Research (16), and Budget 
(16). Cross-procedure packaging of proposals took place in the policy areas of Justice, 
Freedom and Security, Research, Budget, Agriculture, Education and Culture, and 
Taxation. Altogether, there were 78 proposals decided as omnibus packages in the co-
decision procedure, 98 proposals decided as part of a multi-package deal in the co-decision 
procedure and 68 multi-package proposals in the consultation procedure.       
It is difficult to trace successful package deals between the Parliament and the 
Council over time. The general non-enforceability of informal political bargains limits the 
deals that can be struck among MEPs and representatives from the Council. It is difficult to 
bind future legislative decisions in a logrolling context because informal agreements can 
easily be amended or ignored (Shepsle and Weingast, 1994; Weingast and Marshall, 1998). 
When agreements are only informal and take place sequentially, actors are likely to 
„misstate their preferences at the time an agreement is formed and to violate the agreement 
after it is made‟ (Mueller, 1989, 87).  
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Package deals are fragile informal bargains and such agreements are also difficult to 
enforce across policy area. In informal agreements, „any political agent can betray the 
original agreement and destabilize the original coalition‟ (Parisi, 2002, 187). Therefore, in 
the EU context evidence of legislative exchange can easily be found when proposals are 
negotiated simultaneously, but logrolls are likely to break if promises are made across time 
or policy area. For example, the European Parliament was promised by the Council that if it 
supported the Council‟s position on the co-decision Data Retention directive (2006/24/EC), 
the Council would work closely together with the EP in deciding future proposals in the 
area of Justice, Freedom and Security. In return for reaching a compromise deal by the end 
of 2005, the Parliament was promised a pay-off  in the negotiations of the VIS consultation 
legislation (see this chapter‟s case study). Nevertheless, during the negotiations of the 
Schengen proposals, the Council refused to keep any previous promises or agreements with 
the EP. 
Finally, package legislating in the EU is an increasingly used practice for resolving 
inter-chamber conflict. While only 21% of the legislative proposals were negotiated 
through a package deal in 2000, more than 41% of the proposals were package compromise 
deals between the EP and the Council in 2006. Overall, between 1999 and 2007 around 
25% of the legislative proposals were negotiated through the bundling of issues and 
proposals together. Therefore, logrolling between the European Parliament and the Council 
is a significant process and package deals are increasingly employed across EU policy 
areas, going beyond the co-decision procedure. What explains the use of package deals in 
the EU legislative process? If informal bargaining and package deals obscure the decision-
making process, why does the EP participate in logrolling with the Council? If package 
deals benefit both the EP and the Council, why not use package deals all the time? 
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5.3 Why Legislative Package Deals in the EU  
The theoretical argument in Chapter III outlined two conditions for the use of package 
deals in EU decision-making. These are the distributive nature of legislative proposals and 
their urgency. In addition, several factors influencing the use of package deals in EU 
decision-making can be derived from the literature on legislative exchange. These are the 
differing preference intensities of the European Parliament and the Council, the 
involvement of political groups leaders, and policy area issue complexity.   
 
Distributive Proposals 
Logrolling in the EU is more likely to occur on distributive proposals. Distributive 
proposals are highly salient for both the EP and the Council and the decision-making 
process on such legislation is likely to be decided through package deals. Expensive 
legislative proposals are more likely to be negotiated through logrolls as actors can trade 
their support in order to obtain their most preferred outcomes. Proposals that involve 
budget allocation issues therefore, are more likely to be negotiated through a logroll. The 
distributional aspect of such proposals leads the EP and the Council to use informal 
methods of decision-making in which each institution can gain the issues it cares about the 
most. Furthermore, budget allocation proposals have direct consequences for Member 
States and the Council has greater incentives to negotiate compromise package deals with 
MEPs.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Package deals are more likely to occur when proposals are distributive.  
 
Urgency  
Second, package deals in the EU are more likely to take place on legislative proposals that 
require urgent conclusion. Impatient legislators are more likely to consider alternative 
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routes for cooperation in order to speed-up decisions. When time is limited, issues and 
proposals are more likely to be bundled together so that overall compromise could be 
reached. Package deals will speed up the decision-making process and legislative decisions 
will be fast-tracked. Legislators care not only about their successful influence on legislative 
outcomes, but also about avoiding delays in the decision-making process. Impatient 
legislators are also more likely to grant concessions to each other in order to avoid 
unnecessary delay. Urgent situations induce the use of logrolling and package deals serve 
as a practical solution to time pressure.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Package deals are more likely to occur when proposals are urgent.  
 
Intensity of Preferences 
Third, informal bargains are likely to be made when the intensity of preferences varies 
(Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Coleman, 1966, 1990). As discussed in Chapter II, a  crucial 
assumption of logrolling is that political support can be exchanged and that the informal 
promises achieved between the institutions can be kept and enforced. Legislators trade 
votes because the intensities in preferences over proposals differ. That is, legislative 
exchange between the EP and the Council will take place when the institutions can 
exchange their support for issues they are less interested in for support of issues they are 
more interested in. Therefore, in cases when the Parliament and the Council attach 
relatively equal importance to legislative proposals, political exchange is not possible and 
package deals are less likely to occur.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Package deals are more likely to occur when the EP and the Council attach 
different preference intensities to legislative proposals.  
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Party Leaders  
Moreover, package deals are dependent on the ability of political group leaders to ensure 
the required support in the legislature for the vote in favour of informal legislative logrolls 
(Huber, 1996). Package deals are used by the European Parliament and the Council to 
resolve difficulties and to reduce uncertainty in the making of EU policies. Package 
agreements require the Council and the EP to preserve the essential elements of legislative 
compromises achieved through informal means. Therefore, package deals are more likely 
to occur when the political group leaders in the European Parliament are involved in the 
inter-institutional negotiations.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Package deals are more likely to occur if EP party leaders are involved in 
the negotiations with the Council.   
 
Multi-Issue Legislation  
Logrolling is likely to increase as the issue complexity of the policy area increases (Krutz, 
2001). The large volume of multi-issue legislation in a policy area creates more interaction 
between the EP and the Council. The repeated interaction between legislators and the 
availability of multiple issues increase the likelihood of logrolling (Enelow, 1986, 290). 
The simultaneous consideration of multiple issues increases the complexity of legislative 
proposals and makes it more difficult for legislators to reach decisions quickly. The 
existence of multi-issue proposals also reduces the time available to legislators and 
complex proposals are more likely to be negotiated in packages. Package deals offer a 
practical way to agree on several proposals at the same time and avoid potential decision-
making delays.  
Hypothesis 5:  Package deals are more likely to occur as the issue complexity of the policy 
area increases. 
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5.4 Statistical Analysis of the Use of Package Deals in the EU Legislative Process 
 
Dependent Variable 
The probability of logrolling in the EU is analyzed through the examination of 973 
legislative proposals decided in the period 1999 – 2007 in the consultation and co-decision 
procedures. The dependent variable is whether a legislative proposal was decided through a 
package deal (Package Deal). This is a dichotomous variable where 1 =  a package deal on 
a proposal and 0 = no package deal. A legislative proposal was counted as a package 
proposal when there was written evidence in the Council‟s document register and the EP 
plenary debates and summaries of sittings of the bundling of issues and proposals in a 
package compromise between the EP and the Council.  
 
Independent Variables  
In order to test the five propositions for the use of package deals in the EU, several 
independent variables were used in the analysis
64
. The first hypothesis that package deals 
are more likely to occur on distributive proposals is tested with the categorical Legislative 
Cost Type variable. 1 = Regulatory Proposal if the text of a legislative proposal involves 
costs to be covered by private actors (and no direct costs for Member States or the EU 
budget). 2 = Distributive (EU budget) Proposal if the text of a legislative proposal involves 
the allocation of EU funding and contains a direct reference to the EU financial framework. 
3 = Distributive (Member States budgets) Proposal if the text of a legislative proposal 
involves costs to be covered by the Member States‟ own budgets. 4 = Administrative 
Proposal if the text of a legislative proposal involves no or minor costs (see Table 5.3 for 
classification).  
 
                                                 
64
 see Table 4.7 for full coding, sources and descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis;  
    see Table 4.8 for correlations between the variables. 
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Table 5.3 Legislative Proposals According to Policy Area and Cost Type65 
 
Policy Area (Commission DG) Total 
Regulatory 
Proposals 
Distributive Proposals 
 
Administrative 
Proposals 
Who pays?   private actors  EU budget Member States no costs 
Agriculture & Rural Development 80 40  (50.0%) 25  (31.3%) 15  (18.8%) - 
Budget 35 - 32 (91.4%) 1  (2.9%) 2 (5.7%) 
Development 13 3  (23.1%) 10 (76.9%) - - 
Economic and Financial Affairs 30 4  (13.3%) 19  (63.3%) 6 (20.0%) 1  (3.3%) 
Education and Culture 29 4  (13.8%) 18  (62.1%) 4  (13.8%) 3  (10.3%) 
Employment and Social Affairs  38 10  (26.3%) 7 (12.1%) 12  (31.6%) 6  (15.8%) 
Energy and Transport 99 57  (57.6%) 9  (9.1%) 24  (24.2%) 9  (9.1%) 
Enterprise and Industry 56 45  (80.4%) 9  (16.1%) 1  (1.8%) 1  (1.8%) 
Environment 58 34  (58.6%) 7  (12.1%) 11 (19.0%) 6 (10.3%) 
Eurostat, Statistical Office 33 10  (30.3%) 6  (18.2%) 14  (42.4%) 3  (9.1%) 
External Relations 38 8  (21.1%) 20  (52.6%) 3  (7.9%) 7  (18.4%) 
Fisheries 107 59  (55.1%) 11 (10.3%) 31  (29.0%) 6  (5.6%) 
General Secretariat 10 1  (10.0%) 2  (20.0%) 1 (10.0%) 6  (60.0%) 
Health and Consumer Protection 77 56  (72.7%) 6  (7.8%) 12  (15.6%) 3  (3.9%) 
Information Society 22 14  (63.6%) 7  (31.8%) - 1  (4.5%) 
Internal Market and Services 47 35  (74.5%) 7  (14.9%) 1 (2.1%) 4  (8.5%) 
Justice, Freedom and Security 147 78  (53.1%) 27  (18.4%) 27  (18.4%) 15  (10.2%) 
Research 26 2  (7.7%) 23  (88.5%) 1  (3.8%) - 
Taxation and Customs Union 28 5 (17.9%) 6 (21.4%) 13  (46.4%) 4  (14.3%) 
               
Total Legislative Proposals 973 465  (47.8%) 256 (26.3%) 175 (18.0%) 77  (7.9%) 
 
The second hypothesis that package deals are more likely to occur on urgent 
proposals is tested with two variables. The dichotomous Urgent variable = 1 if there was a 
specific deadline for the legislative proposal to come into effect and 0 otherwise. The 
dichotomous Council Impatience variable = 1 if the Council had started discussions and 
prepared a draft text of the legislative proposal before the EP had done so and it = 0 if the 
Parliament had started discussions and prepared a draft legislative text earlier than the 
Council. This variable was measured by comparing the dates of the first draft texts on a 
legislative proposal held in the EP and the Council‟s document registers. 
The third hypothesis that package deals are more likely to occur when the 
preference intensities of the EP and the Council differ is tested with two variables. First, the 
dichotomous Council - EP Salience Tie variable = 1 when the EP and the Council attached 
equal importance to a legislative proposal and = 0 if otherwise. In addition, a variable  
                                                 
65
 The general idea of this typology is based on the typology developed by Lowi (1964; 1972).  
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which measures the size of the preference intensity distance between the EP and Council is 
included. The Absolute Salience Distance variable tests whether the size of the absolute 
distance between the legislative institutions increases the likelihood of a package deal. The 
continuous variables EP Salience (measured by the number of EP committees involved in 
the drafting of a legislative proposal) and Council Salience (measured by the number of 
documents held in the Council document register on a legislative proposal) were linearly 
rescaled according to a 10 point scale (1 = the lowest and 10 = the highest degree of 
salience). This variable measures the size of the preference distance between the EP and the 
Council, regardless of its direction. 
The hypothesis that package deals are more likely to occur if the EP party leaders 
are involved in the negotiations on a proposal is tested with the dichotomous Party Leaders 
variable. It = 1 if in addition to the committee rapporteur, the political group leaders in the 
EP participated in the writing of the proposal and the informal negotiations with the 
representatives of the Council of Ministers and = 0 if the committee rapporteur (shadow 
rapporteurs and chairmen) were solely responsible for the writing and negotiations over a 
legislative proposal.   
Finally, the hypothesis relating to the policy area issue complexity is tested with the 
continuous Policy Area Issue Complexity variable. Proposals that contain multiple issues 
are more complex and more time consuming. The variable measures the proportion of 
multi-issue legislation in a policy area, that is, proposals containing two and more issues. 
First, the number of issues contested by the EP per legislative proposal was counted. 
Second, the proportion of legislative proposals in a policy area containing two and more 
contested issues was calculated. Large values of the variable signify a large proportion  of 
multi-issue complex proposals in a policy area. 
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Table 5.4 Conditions for the Use of Package Deals in the European Union 
Legislative Package Deals in EU Decision-Making, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: Package Deal 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5  Model 6 Model 7  Model 8 
 Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E.  Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E.  Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E.  Coef./S.E. Odds Ratio 
Fixed Effects             
Cost Type (base Administrative Proposal)             
Distributive Proposal (EU budget) - - -   1.855 ***  1.823 ***   2.025 ***  2.004 ***  1.937 *** 6.939 
     (.422) (.217)  (.485) (.484)  (.485)  
Distributive Proposal (Member States) - - -   1.012 ** .968 **   1.030 **  1.005 **   0.887 *  2.428 
     (.446) (.445)  (.503) (.501)  (.504)  
Regulatory Proposal (Private Actors) - - -  .721 * .686 *  .738  .714  .602 1.827 
     (.411) (.409)  (.470) (.468)  (.470)  
Urgent - - -  .496 *** .499 **  .400 * .412 *  .358  1.431 
     ( .189) ( .189)  ( .225) ( .226)  ( .229)  
Council Impatience  - - -  - -  - -   0.857 ***  2.356 
           (.226)  
Absolute Distance Salience - - -  .104 -  .095 -  - - 
     (.064)   (.074)     
Salience Tie - - -  - -.457 **  - -.541**  -.526** .591 
      (.184)   (.214)  (.215)  
Party Leaders Involved - - -  1.255 *** 1.303 ***  1.381 ***  1.417 ***   1.417 ***  4.127 
     ( .236) ( .233)  ( .270) ( .267)  ( .267)  
Policy Area Issue Complexity - - -  .039 *** .039 ***  .048 *** .048 ***  .044 *** 1.045 
     (.008) (.008)  (.009) (.009)  (.009)  
Intercept -1.199 *** -1.115 *** -1.728 ***  -5.137 *** -4.838 ***  -6.130 *** -5.843 ***  -5.821 *** - 
 (.269) (.157) (.211)  (.679) (.677)  (.781) (.789)  (.771)  
Random Effects              
Policy Area Level (std.dev.) 1.082 ***  1.686 ***   .535 **   .540 **   1.323 * 1.336 *  1.316 * - 
 (.219)  (.219)   (.157)  (.157)   (.202)  (.203)   (.200)  
Year Level  (std.dev.)  .385*** < .001  - -   .301  .321  < .001 - 
  (.128) (.543)      (.275)  (.270)   (.270)  
-2 x Log Likelihood 996.323 1081.314 936.867  896.941 893.216  831.123 826.654  812.689  
Model Improvement  - 59.456  99.382 103.107  164.711 169.67  183.634  
             
N Proposals 973 973 973  973 973  973 973  973  
N Policy Areas  19 19 19  19 19  19 19  19  
N Years  8 8 8   8 8   8 8   8   
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01             
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As the dependent variable is dichotomous (Package Deal/No Package Deal), 
logistic regressions are used to examine the effect of the independent variables on the 
probability of logrolling in the EU. The 973 proposals belong to 19 policy areas and are 
spread over 8 years. Three empty multilevel models are estimated to test whether proposals 
part of the same policy area and year share a similar probability of being decided through a 
package deal (Dupont and Martensen, 2007).  
The hypothetical effects of the policy area and time levels are tested to examine 
whether the variance of the probability of a package deal is due to these contextual factors. 
The relevance of the contextual level and the improvements in the fit of the models are 
compared after including the different contexts. The results show that the use of package 
deals in EU decision-making varies across policy areas and the years 1999 – 2007. 
Accounting for the contextual effects of the policy area and time levels, Modes 4 to 8 test 
for the effects of the independent variables discussed above. The results are presented in 
Table 5.4. The coefficients of the variables, their standard errors and the odds ratios are 
reported. 
 
5.5 Results 
The results support Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 of the theoretical argument. The 
probability of a legislative package deal agreement between the EP and the Council 
increases when 1) proposals are distributive; and 2) proposals are urgent. In addition, the 
probability of package deals increases when 3) the EP-Council preference intensities vary, 
4) the party leaders in the EP are involved in the negotiations and 5) the policy area issue 
complexity increases (see Model 8).  
First, package deals are more likely to occur on distributive proposals. When 
proposals contain a reference to the allocation of the EU budget, package deals are most 
likely to be used. Expensive proposals increase the likelihood of logrolling as legislators 
can trade their support in order to obtain their most preferred outcomes. Furthermore, 
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distributive proposals have direct consequences for Member States and the Council has 
greater incentives to negotiate compromise package deals with MEPs. As package deals 
allow each of the chambers to gain the issues it cares about the most, the Council can 
secure its preferred policy outcomes on budgetary matters and in exchange could offer 
support for the EP‟s issues as a side payment.   
Second, urgent proposals are more likely to be negotiated through a package deal in 
order to reduce decision-making time. The coefficient of the Council Impatience variable is 
positive and statistically significant. This indicates that package deals are more likely to 
take place when the Member States in the Council are impatient about the adoption of 
legislation. When time is limited, issues and proposals are more likely to be bundled 
together so that overall compromise could be reached. The Urgent variable loses its 
significance when Council Impatience is included in the model, although it shows some 
support for the hypothesis in the other models.  
Third, the preference distance between the EP and the Council on a legislative 
proposal increases the likelihood of a package deal. When there is a tie between the 
Parliament and the Council‟s intensity of preferences, package deals are less likely to 
occur. This is in line with the theoretical prediction that logrolling allows actors to express 
different intensities of preferences. Logrolls are more likely to occur if the EP and the 
Council can trade legislative support. When the preference intensities of the institutions are 
equal no legislative exchange can take place. As a result, the probability of a package deal 
increases when the preference intensities between the Council and the Parliament differ.  
The probability of the use of package deals in the EU legislative process increases 
with the increase in policy area issue complexity. The greater the proportion of multi-issue 
legislation in an EU policy area, the greater the likelihood of logrolling. The availability of 
multiple issues in proposals presents greater opportunities for legislative exchange between 
the EP and  the Council. This is especially the case, when the same constellations of 
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multiple issues reoccur in different legislative proposals. For example, in 2003 in the area 
of Agriculture, in the reform of the CAP, identical issues came up in the legislative 
proposals on Milk, Rice, Dried fodder and Cereals (legislative proposals CNS/2003/0006, 
CNS/2003/0007, CNS/2003/0008, CNS/2003/0009, CNS/2003/0010, CNS/2003/0011). 
In addition, the likelihood of package deals increases with the involvement of party 
leaders. The political group leaders in the European Parliament serve the essential role of 
logroll facilitators. In 69% of the package deals the committee rapporteurs were members 
of either the EPP-ED or the PES, but in 90% of the cases the political group leaders 
participated in the negotiations with the Council alongside the committee rapporteurs in 
order to ensure the enforceability of the logroll deals. The informal nature of logrolls 
between the EP and the Council requires the involvement of the political group leaders in 
order to ensure that the essential elements of the deal are preserved and supported in the EP 
plenary. 
 
Figure 5.1 Effect of Distributive Proposals and Policy Area Issue Complexity on the 
Probability of Logrolling in the EU  
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Source: Predicted probabilities based on Model 8 (Table 5.4) 
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Figure 5.1 plots the predicted probability of the use of package deals in the EU 
decision-making process, according to the distributive nature of legislative proposals and 
policy area issue complexity (based on Model 8). The plot illustrates the probability of 
logrolls on legislative proposals according to the costs associated with them. Distributive 
proposals that allocate EU funding are most likely to go through a logroll. They are 
followed by distributive proposals that involve costs to be covered by Member States‟ 
budgets. These are followed by regulatory proposals that involve costs to be covered by 
private actors and finally package deals are least likely to take place on administrative 
proposals. The plot highlights that the probability of logrolling in the EU increases with the 
increase in the issue complexity of a policy area.  
The statistical analysis of more than 1400 legislative proposals illustrated that 
package deals are an important part of legislative decision-making in the European Union. 
Informal logrolls allow the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers to exchange 
support for their preferred policy outcomes and hence avoid gridlock and reach 
compromise
66
.  
The next section presents a case study of a package deal on the 2005 co-decision 
Data Retention directive. It highlights some of the most important characteristics of a 
legislative logroll. The case is used as an example of an inter-chamber legislative exchange 
in the EU as it demonstrates the informal nature of package deal-making. The case 
underlines the fragile nature of inter-chamber logrolls, but it demonstrates their important 
role for the EU legislative process.   
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 Linda  McAvan (PSE): “Labour MEPs welcome today's agreement on nutrition and health labelling of 
foods. We accept that this is a compromise package and there are some elements, particularly on Amendment 
66, where we have reservations. We would have preferred the common position text, which allowed no 
derogations. However, the new law represents a major step forward in food labelling for consumers and 
improves the overall regulatory framework. It is on this basis that we supported the compromise package”, 
on the discussion of food labelling, Plenary Debates, 16 May 2006.   
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5.6 Case Study: Data Retention Directive 
67
 
 
EU Legislation on Electronic Communications 
EU legislation in the telecommunications sector has been oriented towards the completion 
of the internal market and the liberalization of the provision of services and infrastructure. 
In 2002, a new telecom regulatory framework was adopted. The purpose of this legislative 
package was to adapt the existing framework to the convergence between 
telecommunications, information technology and the media, allowing it to evolve with the 
rapidly changing market and technology. The regulatory instrument comprised of five 
harmonization directives: the Framework Directive, the Access and Interconnection 
Directive, the Authorisation Directive, the Universal Service and Users‟ Rights Directive 
and the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications (“Information Society” 26 
October 2006).   
At the same time, judicial and law enforcement authorities increasingly expressed 
concerns about the use of the technical innovations for the purposes of committing crimes. 
The continuous development of electronic telecommunications services posed difficulties 
for the detection of crimes and their investigation. These concerns related not only to 
communications by fixed phones, mobile phones, short message services (sms), electronic 
media services (ems) and multimedia services (mms), but also to internet protocols 
including email, voice over the internet, world wide web, file transfer protocols, network 
transfer protocols, voice over broadband etc.  
EU data retention legislation was needed, in the light of the European Council‟s 
Declaration on Combating Terrorism of 25 March 2004, as well as the Council conclusions 
of 20 September 2001 and 19 December 2003, related to electronic communications 
                                                 
67
 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of 
data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications 
services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC 
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systems. The series of terrorist attacks in Madrid and London made the issue of data 
retention a priority for EU Member States.  
Existing legislation in the telecommunications sector did not provide a sound 
regulatory tool for the tackling of problems of electronic security and combating terrorism. 
The 2002 Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications left the issue of data 
retention underspecified. A directive on the retention of data was needed to amend it and to 
provide a better piece of legislation in the fight of organized crime. 
 
Background of the Directive 
On 25 March 2004, the European Council issued a Declaration on combating terrorism, 
which instructed the Council to examine „proposals for establishing rules on the retention 
of communications traffic data by service provides‟ with a view to their adoption in June 
2005. At the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 29 and 30 April 2004, France, the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden submitted a joint proposal for a Framework Decision on the 
retention of communications data (CNS/2004/0813). The Council made use of its sole 
legislative power
68
, using a third pillar basis under Title VI of the Treaty of the European 
Union (“Draft Framework Decision” 23 November 2004).  
The Council, however, found it difficult to reach an agreement on data retention. 
The European Parliament unanimously rejected this Council proposal in June and 
September 2005, on the grounds that the Council had chosen the wrong legal basis. 
Supported by the Commission, the EP argued that Article 95 of the EC Treaty was the 
correct basis, which placed the proposal under Internal Market and made it a first pillar 
instrument.  
On 21 September 2005, the Commission filed its proposal for a Directive on Data 
Retention under the co-decision procedure, thus allowing the EP to participate fully in the 
                                                 
68
 In accordance with Title VI of the TEU, cited Article 31(1)(c) in conjunction with Article 34(2)(b)TEU  
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legislative process. The proposed piece of legislation aimed to harmonize Member States‟ 
legislation on the retention of data, processed by telecommunications companies. The 
differences in the regulatory and technical provisions in Member States for the retention of 
traffic data as presented obstacles to the Internal Market for electronic communications. 
Without a common regulatory framework, service providers were faced with different 
requirements regarding the types of data to be retained as well as the conditions of retention 
(“Initial Commission Proposal” 21 September 2005). Once adopted, the directive would 
facilitate judicial cooperation in criminal matters and the investigation of serious criminal 
offences. 
Stage I: Intra-Chamber Decision-Making 
By September 2005, when it received the Commission proposal, the Council had a 
very clear position on the issues at stake. Member States had already discussed the data 
retention issues under the consultation procedure within the Council‟s own Framework 
Decision since April 2004. The same bundle of issues had been discussed in the Working 
Party on Cooperation in Criminal Matters at its meetings between June and October 2004 
and by the Article 36 Committee at its meetings in October and November 2004 (“Draft 
Framework Decision” 23 November 2004). 
On 12 October the Justice and Home Affairs Council set out its precise preferences 
on the proposal and the UK Presidency initiated a series of informal trialogues with the EP 
with a view to reaching a fast-track decision
69
. The Presidency set to negotiate a package 
compromise deal with the EP so that a first reading early agreement could be achieved in 
co-decision. In Parliament the proposal was allocated to the Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs and Alexander Alvaro (ALDE, DE) was appointed rapporteur 
with shadow-rapporteurs Herbet Reul (EPP-ED) and Wolfgang Kreissl-Dörfler (PES). 
                                                 
69
 In accordance with the provisions of Article 251 (2) of the EC Treaty and the joint declaration on practical 
arrangements of the co-decision procedure, a number of informal contacts took place between the Council, 
the European Parliament and the Commission. 
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Table 5.5 Data Retention Directive Decision-Making Timeline 
 
Date Legislative activity 
    
28-Apr-04 
France, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom submit a proposal for a Framework Decision 
on data retention 
04-Jun-04 Working Party on Cooperation in Criminal Matters discussed data retention : First meeting  
14-Jun-04 Commission workshop on data retention 
25-Jun-04 Council questionnaire  on Member States' positions on Data Retention 
21-Sep-04 Second Commission workshop on data retention 
28-Sep-04 Working Party on Cooperation in Criminal Matters discussed data retention  
20-Oct-04 Working Party on Cooperation in Criminal Matters discussed data retention  
20-Oct-04 Article 36 Committee discussed data retention 
11-Nov-04 Article 36 Committee discussed data retention 
03-May-05 Parliament: LIBE Committee Hearing on Data Retention 
14-Sep-05 Parliament: LIBE Committee Meeting: Data Retention 
21-Sep-05 Commission files proposal 
05-Oct-05 Parliament: LIBE Committee: Exchange of Views 
12-Oct-05 JHA Council : Presidency presents results of discussions 
13-Oct-05 Parliament: LIBE Committee: Debate + Discussion of JHA Conclusions 
19-Oct-05 Parliament: LIBE Committee: Alvaro's Report 
11-Nov-05 Trialogue 
14-Nov-05 Parliament: LIBE Committee meeting: Discussion of Amendments  
15-Nov-05 Trialogue discussions in Strasbourg  
24-Nov-05 Parliament: LIBE Committee: Approval of Committee Report 
02-Dec-05 JHA Council : Council ready to reach a first reading deal  
13-Dec-05 Parliament: First Reading Vote in Plenary: Adopted 
14-Dec-05 Parliament: Rapporteur Alvaro Withdraws His Name from Report  
17-Feb-06 Council: Approval  
Source: European Parliament: OEIL Legislative Observatory; Council of the EU: Document Register 
 
The LIBE Committee met on 5, 13 and 19 October and 14 and 24 November 2005 
to discuss the directive and to draft amendments to the Commission proposal. In order to 
find common grounds on the data retention proposal, rapporteur Alvaro and LIBE 
chairman Jean-Marie Cavada participated in the informal meetings with the Council 
Presidency. Informal trialogues took place on the 11 and 15 November 2005. Largely 
incorporating the views of industry and civil society, rapporteur Alexander Alvaro filed his 
proposal on 19 November 2005 with 45 substantial amendments. The LIBE committee 
voted in favour of Alvaro‟s report with 33 votes, 8 against and 5 abstentions on 24 
November 2005 (“File Synopsis” 17 November 2006).   
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Stage II: Inter-Chamber Bargaining: Package Deal 
 Because the LIBE rapporteur proved difficult to reach a compromise with, the 
Council Presidency turned to finding an informal package deal agreement with the leaders 
of the largest political groups in EP: the EPP-ED and PES. A further informal trialogue 
took place, just before the first reading of 14 December 2005, between the Council 
Presidency and the EPP-ED and PES leaders. Consequently, a new package deal 
compromise on the Data Retention directive was agreed between the Council and the 
leaders of the PES - EPP-ED groups. This new package deal was very different from what 
had been agreed in the LIBE committee. This informal arrangement was to be formalized 
by the EP plenary at first reading. The Justice and Home Affairs Council met on 1-2 
December 2005. The text for consideration before the Council was not the LIBE 
committee‟s text of 24 November 2005, but the compromise package deal reached 
informally between the Presidency and the PES and EPP-ED group leaders.  
Stage III: Voting 
 At the first reading vote on the 14 December 2005 the EP adopted the compromise 
package deal text agreed between the Council Presidency and the leaders of the PES and 
EPP-ED groups through a „block vote‟ with 378 votes in favour, 197 against and 30 
abstentions. The PES/EPP-ED coalition, voting in favour, was opposed by the GUE/NGL, 
Greens EFA and UEN groups and some members of the ALDE group, including the 
rapporteur. In February 2006, the Council adopted the Directive.  
 
Key Issues 
There were three controversial issues, on which the positions of the Council and the EP 
differed substantially: 1) data retention periods; 2) types of data retained; and 3) 
reimbursement of costs for industry. 
  174 
Data Retention Periods  
 The Commission proposal simply provided for Internet data to be retained for 6 
months and Telephony data to be retained for 12 months. The LIBE Committee required all 
data (from telephony to internet) to be retained for a period of minimum 6 and maximum 
12 months. After this period, the EP called for all data to be erased. The Council favoured 
longer retention periods. Member States required an approximation based on a minimum 
level of 6 months for Internet data and12 months for telephony, with a maximum level of 
24 months retention. The final legislative text set the data retention period to a minimum of 
6 and a maximum of 24 months with the provision that Member States may decide on a 
longer term if they wish.  
Types of data to be retained  
 The Council favoured a very wide scope of application of the directive. It required 
the retention of data on fixed network telephony (i.e. name/address of person who calls + 
phone number; name/address of person/s who receive the call + phone number; date and 
time of the start and end of the conversation) and mobile telephony (i.e. name/address of 
person who calls + phone number; name/address of person/s who receive the call + phone 
number; date and time of the start and end of the conversation; international mobile 
subscriber Identity IMSI (sim card); location label at the start of the communication). 
In addition, the Council required a wide definition of the Internet access and 
Internet communication services
70
 as well as the inclusion of unsuccessful call attempts 
(„Data Retention‟ 10 October 2005). The LIBE Committee favoured a much restricted 
application of the directive.  
                                                 
70
 The Council preferred a definition of Internet access and Internet Communication Services that specified 
(„the user ID or telephone number of the intended recipient(s) of an Internet telephony call; the name(s) and 
address(es) of the subscriber(s) or registered user(s) and user ID of the intended recipient of the 
communication; the date and time of the log-in and log-off of the Internet access service, based on a certain 
time zone, together with the IP address, whether dynamic or static, allocated by the Internet access service 
provider to a communication, and the user ID of the subscriber or registered user; the date and time of the 
log-in and log-off of the Internet e-mail service or Internet telephony service, based on a certain time zone‟). 
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Table 5.6 Key Issues on Data Retention 
Text proposed by 
Commission 21 
September 2005 
Text proposed by  
Rapporteur and Approved 
by LIBE Committee 28 
November 2005 
Amendments Agreed by 
PES-EPP-ED Parties and 
Council 
Text voted on by 
Parliament 14 December 
2005 and Adopted by 
Council  
Article 1 Subject Matter and Scope     
1. This Directive aims to 
harmonise the provisions of 
the Member States 
concerning obligations on the 
providers of publicly available 
electronic communications 
services or of a public 
communications network with 
respect to the processing and 
retention of certain data, in 
order to ensure that the data 
is available for the purpose of 
the prevention, investigation, 
detection and prosecution of 
serious criminal offences, 
such as terrorism and 
organised crime.  
Amendment 19, Article 1, 1. This 
Directive aims to harmonise the 
provisions of the Member States 
concerning obligations on the 
providers of publicly available 
electronic communications 
services or of a communications 
network with respect to the 
processing and retention of 
certain data, and to ensure that 
the rights to the respect for 
private life and to the 
protection of personal data in 
the access and use of these 
data are fully respected, in 
order to ensure that the data is 
available for the purpose of the 
investigation, detection and 
prosecution of serious criminal 
offences 
1. This Directive aims to 
harmonise the provisions of the 
Member States concerning 
obligations on the providers of 
publicly available electronic 
communications services or of 
a public communications 
network with respect to the 
retention of 
certain data which are 
generated or processed by 
them, DELETED, in order to 
ensure that the data are 
available for the purpose of the 
investigation, detection and 
prosecution of serious crime, 
as defined by each Member 
State in its national law. 
Article 1 
Subject matter and scope  
1. This Directive aims to 
harmonise Member States' 
provisions concerning the 
obligations of the providers of 
publicly available electronic 
communications services or of 
public communications 
networks with respect to the 
retention of certain data which 
are generated or processed by 
them, DELETED, in order to 
ensure that the data are 
available for the purpose of the 
investigation, detection and 
prosecution of serious crime, 
as defined by each Member 
State in its national law. 
Article 6 Periods of Retention     
Article 7 Member States shall 
ensure that the categories of 
data referred to in Article 4 
are retained for a period of 
one year from the date of the 
communication, with the 
exception of data related to 
electronic communications 
taking place using wholly or 
mainly the Internet Protocol. 
The latter shall be retained 
for a period of six months. 
Amendment 34, Article 7 
Member States shall ensure that 
the categories of data referred to 
in Article 4 are retained for a 
period of 6-12 months from the 
date of the communication; 
thereafter, the data must be 
erased. Competent law 
enforcement authorities shall 
ensure that transferred data are 
erased by automated means 
once the investigation for which 
access to the data was granted 
is completed. 
Member States shall ensure 
that the categories of data 
referred to in Article 4 are 
retained for periods of not 
less than 6 months and for a 
maximum of two years from 
the date of the communication. 
Article 6 
Periods of retention 
Member States shall ensure 
that the categories of data 
specified in Article 5 are 
retained for periods of not 
less than six months and 
not more than two years 
from the date of the 
communication. 
Amendment 10 Reimbursement of Costs     
Article 10, Member States 
shall ensure that providers of 
publicly available electronic 
communication services or of 
a public communication 
network are reimbursed for 
demonstrated additional 
costs they have incurred in 
order to comply with 
obligations imposed on 
them as a consequence of 
this Directive.  
Amendment 41, Article 10, 
Member States shall ensure that 
providers of publicly available 
electronic communication 
services or of a public 
communication network are 
reimbursed for demonstrated 
additional investment and 
operating costs they have 
incurred in order to comply 
with obligations imposed on 
them as a consequence of this 
Directive including the 
demonstrated additional costs of 
data protection and any future 
amendments to it. 
Deleted Deleted 
Article 15 Transposition     
No provision No provision 2a. Each Member State may 
for a period of up to 18 months 
from the expiry of the deadline 
referred to in paragraph 1 defer 
application of this Directive to 
the retention of 
communications data relating 
to Internet Access, Internet 
telephony and Internet email. 
Any Member State which 
intends to make use of this 
paragraph shall, by way of a 
declaration, notify the 
Commission to that effect upon 
adoption of this Directive 
Article 15 
Transposition 
3. Until …*, each Member 
State may postpone 
application of this Directive to 
the retention of 
communications data relating 
to Internet Access, Internet 
telephony and Internet e-mail. 
Any Member State that intends 
to make use of this paragraph 
shall, upon adoption of this 
Directive, notify the Council 
and the Commission to that 
effect by way of a declaration.  
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The Committee accepted the inclusion of data on fixed network telephony and mobile 
telephony; but put forward a limited definition of the Internet access and Internet 
communication services
71
. The LIBE Committee opposed the inclusion of retention of 
unsuccessful calls (“Report by LIBE Committee” 28 November 2005). The final text 
contained the definitions of data as proposed by the Council.  
Reimbursement of Costs  
 The Commission proposed that Member States reimbursed the demonstrated 
additional costs, incurred by telecom companies in order to comply with the obligations of 
the directive. The LIBE Committee required that Member States ensured the 
reimbursement of all extra costs of retention, storage and transmission of data incurred by 
industry. The Council generally opposed the provision for the cost reimbursement. It 
required the discretion for Member States to decide at a national level whether and when to 
reimburse industry for the additional costs associated with the directive. The final 
legislative text lacked any provision for the reimbursement of telecom companies.  
 
Package Deals, Repeat Play and Legislative Timing   
The Council had already discussed the bundle of data retention issues within its own 
Framework Decision of April 2004 under the consultation procedure. Data retention had 
been discussed in the Working Party on Cooperation in Criminal Matters at its meetings on 
4 June, 27 and 28 September and 19 and 20 October 2004 and by the Article 36 Committee 
at its meetings on 19 and 20 October and 11 and 12 November 2004 („Draft Framework 
Decision‟ 23 November 2004).  Moreover, in 2002, the Presidency had already conducted a 
questionnaire on the retention of data within the 15 Member States
72
.  
  
                                                 
71
 The Parliament preferred a definition of Internet access and Internet communications Services that 
specified („IP address of computer; telephone number connecting to the internet; name/address of subscriber; 
date/time of subscriber; date/time of log-in and log-off; ADSL-calling telephone number for dial-up access 
and the digital ADSL subscriber‟). 
72
  Council document 14107/02. 
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Following this early consultation, the Council was aware that nine out of 15 
Member States would support an EU regulation on Data Retention
73
 (“Answers to 
Questionnaire” November 2002). In June 2004, the Irish Presidency conducted a further 
questionnaire on data retention in order to obtain the updated positions of the old 15 and 
the new 10 Member States (“Questionnaire on Traffic Data Retention” 25 June 2004).  
 The proposal was urgent. Although there was no deadline at first reading under co-
decision, some Member States in the Council were eager to pursue an early agreement deal 
with the EP. The Presidency was interested in fast-tracking the legislation. As soon as it 
knew the Council preferences on data retention, the Presidency initiated a series of 
informal trialogues with the EP in order to reach a first reading agreement. In its 
conclusions of the 12 October 2005 Justice and Home Affairs meeting, the Council 
“…agreed that informal contacts with the European Parliament should continue in order 
to maximise common ground between the Council and the EP on issues of substance, while 
respecting the Council‟s position…” (“Council Conclusions” 12 October 2005). 
On 15 November 2005 the Presidency met with representatives of the EP and the 
Commission at a trialogue meeting in Strasbourg. It noted the positive tone of the meeting 
and “the ongoing political willingness” of the EP to work for a deal on the  data retention 
directive by the end of 2005 (“Data Retention: Trialogue” 16 November 2005). The 
Council initially started the negotiations with the LIBE committee and its rapporteur, 
shadow-rapporteurs and chairman. Whereas the LIBE Committee proved difficult to reach 
a compromise with, the Council Presidency turned to finding an informal agreement with 
the leaders of the EPP and PES. The majority party leaders agreed to a new compromise 
package.  
 
                                                 
73
 The Member States in favour of the regulation on data retention were: DK, ES, GR, FR, IT, LU, PT, SE, 
and UK, while AT, BE, DE, FI, IR, NL opposed it. Source: “Answers to Questionnaire on Traffic Data 
Retention”. Council of the European Union. 20 November 2002. 
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Package Deals, the Role of Party Leaders and Enforcement of Informal Commitments 
The Council promised the leaders of the EPP-ED and the PES, that if they supported the 
Data Retention directive, the Council would in exchange work closely together with the EP 
in deciding future laws in the area of Justice, Freedom and Security. The EP would not 
have much influence over this Data Retention dossier, but in return for reaching a 
compromise by the end of 2005, the EP was promised a pay-off on future legislation. The 
EP would participate on equal footing along with the Council in the negotiations over 
future legislation in this highly controversial policy area („MEPs Deeply Unhappy‟ 20 June 
2006).  
As part of the logroll, the Council ensured the passage of the fast-track data 
retention legislation in the fight against terrorism. In exchange for its support for the 
Council‟s preferences in the policy substantial issues, the Parliament would be allowed 
greater institutional competences in deciding future legislation in this policy area. 
Furthermore, some Member States granted an extended period of grace to ISP and telecom 
companies before they complied with the directive. Some Member States reserved the right 
to postpone application of the directive for up to 18 months, pursuant to Article 15 (3)
74
. In 
exchange for an EP agreement before the end of 2005, the Presidency noted that“…the 
Council, the Commission and the EP have a unique opportunity to develop a mature 
relationship on JHA matters” („Letter to Jean-Marie Cavada‟ 17 October 2005).   
 The Council promised the EPP and PES party leaders that if they supported this 
directive, the Parliament would be allowed greater institutional competences in deciding 
future legislation in this policy area. Due to the accelerated decision-making process, the 
                                                 
74
 Article 15 (3) reads that: “…each Member State may postpone application of this Directive to the retention 
of communications data relating to Internet Access, Internet telephony and Internet e-mail. Any Member State 
that intends to make use of this paragraph shall, upon adoption of this Directive, notify the Council and the 
Commission to that effect by way of a declaration” 
 
Sixteen out of the 25 EU Member States declared their intention to postpone the implementation of the 
directive. The Member States which declared a delay in the implementation were AT, BE, CY, CZ, DE, EE, 
GR, FI, LU, LV, LT, NL, PL, SL, SE, UK while no delay was declared by DK, ES, FR, HU, IR, IT, MT, PT, 
SK Source: “Declarations by Delegations” Council of the European Union. 17 February 2006. 
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LIBE committee had only two months to produce the report. The Commission forwarded 
its proposal to Parliament on 21 September and the first reading vote was held on 14 
December 2005. The package legislating reduced the ability of individual MEPs to discuss 
and put forward amendments to the Commission proposal. The fast-track decision-making 
process also reduced the time available to the LIBE committee for public hearings and 
consultations with IMCO and ITRE committees
75
.  
The package deal between the Council and the EPP-ED and PES party leaders was 
opposed by members of the smaller parties in the European Parliament
76
. Individual MEPs 
and members of smaller parties were not happy about the informal package deal, as they 
could not follow and participate in the inter-chamber decision-making process. The 
Council notified the EP that the package deal was acceptable to the Council in the format 
agreed with the EPP-ED and PES groups, subject to no further amendments by the EP 
plenary. The Presidency concluded that “…provided that the European Parliament agreed 
                                                 
75
 In its report the LIBE committee expresses its disappointment with the fast-track decision-making: „This 
extremely accelerated legislative procedure has meant that there was little time for discussion….  There was 
also no time for a technology assessment or for a study on the impact on the internal market.  Bearing in 
mind the measures and plans aimed at better regulation at European level, it is to be hoped that the 
procedure used for debating data retention will not become the rule‟ (“Report by LIBE Committee” 28 
November 2005). 
 
76
 Alexander Alvaro expressed his disappointment with the way the procedure had gone and the behaviour of 
the two big groups. “I regard as in unbelievably bad taste the manner in which they behaved after we had 
spent eight weeks discussing these matters in great depth and considering our next steps…[in Committee]” 
(“Plenary Debates” 13 December 2005).  
 
Kathalijne Maria Buitenweg (Verts/ALE, NL) said: „We in this House are always talking about better 
lawmaking, and then along comes this sort of nonsense … you have now done a deal with the British 
Presidency before Parliament has even adopted a position, we are now faced with a fait accompli. The small 
groups were not even informed and even the rapporteur for this subject, Mr Alvaro, knew nothing about 
this…What we now have is a backroom deal on citizens‟ rights…‟ (“Plenary Debates” 13 December 2005). 
 
Considering the rushed negotiations over this directive, the disregard of fundamental rights and the little 
substance it carried, the Verts/ALE and GUE/NGL groups proposed an amendment 47, for the data retention 
proposal to be rejected
76
. Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann (GUE/NGL, DE) voiced these groups‟ discontent that 
“the compromise that the PPE-DE and PSE groups have negotiated with the Council is rotten to the core and 
stinks to high heaven” (“Plenary Debates” 13 December 2005).  
 
The rapporteur and the LIBE committee as a whole were sidelined by the Council (Erik Meijer (GUE/NGL) 
14 December 2005) and the hard work accomplished by the LIBE, IMCO and ITRE committees „was 
circumvented in the last meters by a deal between the Council, the Commission, and shame to say, by the two 
biggest groups in this house‟ (Kauppi, Piia-Noora, 13 December 2005).  
 
The compromise amendments tabled by the PES and EPP-ED confirmed“…Parliament‟s subordinate 
position in relation to the Council…” (Giusto Catania MEP, 13 December 2005).  
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amendments to the Commission proposal in the exact form as set out in Annex I … the 
Council would be in a position to adopt the proposed Directive” (“Item 8 on the Agenda” 6 
December 2005). At first reading on 14 December 2005, the EP plenary adopted the 
compromise package deal text agreed by the Council and the leaders of the PES and EPP-
ED groups. The new compromise amendments, agreed between the majority parties and the 
Council were presented before the plenary in the form of 42 block compromise 
amendments. As this was a highly sensitive issue, both Clarke from the Presidency and 
Frattini from the Commission were present for the vote.  
 
European Parliament vote on 14 December 2005 (First Reading)  
Subject Amendment No Author 
Type 
of 
vote  
Outcome 
of Vote  
RCV/EV-  
for, against, 
abstentions 
Proposal to reject 
the proposal for a 
directive 
47 Verts/ALE+GUE/NGL RCV Rejected 161,428,13 
Block 1 - 
Compromise 
51-68, 70-74, 76-80, 
82-84, 86-92 
PSE+PPE-DE RCV Adopted 402,184,24 
Block 1 - 
Compromise  – 
separate votes 
69, 75, 81 PSE+PPE-DE RCV Adopted 
414,155,44; 
407,192,17; 
410,194,14 
Block 2A – 
amendments by  
committee  
6,8,10,12-13, 23-25, 
27,29-34, 36, 40, 42-
43, 46 
Committee   Lapsed   
Block 2B – 
amendments by  
committee  
1-5, 7, 9, 11, 14-22, 
26, 28, 35, 37-39, 44-
45 
Committee   Rejected   
Vote: Legislative 
Resolution  
    RCV Adopted 378,197,30 
Source: „Results of Votes: Data Retention 14 December 2005‟. European Parliament: Minutes  
 
All Block 1 compromise amendments, proposed by the PES + EPP-ED groups and agreed 
informally between their party leaders and the Council Presidency, passed. All 
amendments, proposed by the LIBE Committee (Block 2A and Block 2B), were rejected. 
The proposal passed with 378 in favour, 197 against and 30 abstentions. The EPP-ED and 
PES groups voted in favour. The ALDE group was split. The main opposition to the 
proposal came from members of GUE/NGL, Verts/ALE, ALDE, and small fractions from 
the EPP-ED and PES
77
. 
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 After the vote, rapporteur Alvaro said: “It is scarcely to be expected that I should be happy with the 
outcome of the vote. As I can no longer put my name to this report, I withdraw it.” (“Plenary Debates” 14 
December 2005). 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the use of package deals and traced their employment in the EU 
legislative process. The chapter tested Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 of the conditions 
leading to package deals in the EU legislative process. In line with the theoretical argument 
presented in Chapter III, package deals in the EU are likely to occur when proposals are 
distributive and urgent. In addition, logrolling is likely to occur in the presence of party 
leaders involvement, different preference intensities between the EP and the Council, and 
policy area issue complexity. The chapter found that package deals are regularly used by 
EU legislators as they allow the Council and the EP to trade support for their most 
preferred policy outcomes.  
The existing studies of EU legislative politics overlook the importance of the use of 
package deals on EU legislative outcomes. This chapter studied all completed legislation 
passed under the co-decision and consultation procedures between 1 May 1999 and 30 
April 2007. It highlighted that logrolling is an important process in EU decision-making. 
The case study of the package deal on the data retention directive provided an example of 
an inter-chamber exchange in the EU. The case underlined the informal nature of logrolls 
and their important role for the legislative process.   
Having identified the importance of logrolling in the EU legislature, and having 
tested the conditions leading to the conclusion of inter-chamber package deals, the thesis 
proceeds with empirical tests of the effect of package deals on EU legislative outcomes. 
Chapter VI examines the effect of package deals and legislative timing on the legislative 
influence of the European Parliament in the consultation procedure. Chapter VII examines 
the effect of package deals and legislative timing on the legislative influence of the 
European Parliament in the co-decision procedure. Chapter VIII examines the effect of 
package deals on the legislative influence of the European Parliament across policy areas 
and across time.  
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CHAPTER 6 : PACKAGE DEALS AND THE LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE OF 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN THE CONSULTATION PROCEDURE 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an analysis of the European Parliament‟s legislative influence in the 
consultation procedure by examining the EP‟s power of delay. The existing studies of 
legislative politics in the consultation procedure find the role of the EP insignificant. This 
chapter tests Hypothesis 3 that package deals increase the likelihood of European 
Parliament success in influencing legislative outcomes in the consultation procedure. The 
chapter also tests Hypothesis 4 that legislative delay increases the likelihood of European 
Parliament success in influencing legislative outcomes in the consultation procedure. 
Whereas many authors recognise that the Parliament has in theory the „power of delay‟, 
there has been no empirical testing of whether the EP in fact uses this power, and if so, to 
what effect.  
This chapter examines the European Parliament‟s legislative activity on all 
consultation proposals (925) completed between 1 May 1999 and 30 April 2007. It 
investigates the conditions under which the EP is successful in influencing the final 
Council legislative text. The analysis is based on the examination of all pieces of legislation 
to which the Parliament proposed amendments and the issues it contested. The chapter tests 
a number of hypotheses offered by the existing literature of whether EP success depends on 
proposal urgency, the type of issue contested, Commission support, EP cohesion, Council 
voting threshold, and the salience of the proposal.  
The results confirm that the power of the European Parliament in the consultation 
procedure is extremely limited. The Council ignores the EP‟s demands in more than 80% 
of the legislative proposals. Nevertheless, the informal powers of the EP to link 
consultation proposals to co-decision and to delay are important legislative powers for the 
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European Parliament. The analysis demonstrates that the EP regularly uses its „power to 
delay‟ in order to affect legislative outcomes in the consultation procedure. Through delay, 
the EP enjoys a much stronger legislative influence than the formal treaty provisions 
prescribe. In addition to package deals and delay, the results indicate that urgency, 
Commission support, and issue type are also statistically significant predictors of EP 
success in the consultation procedure. This chapter adds to the literature on EU legislative 
bargaining by providing a more detailed account of the EP‟s legislative influence in the 
consultation procedure.  
 
6.1 The Standard Story  
Introduced by the Rome Treaties, the consultation procedure remains the simplest EU 
decision-making procedure as it consists of only one reading. Although it was replaced in 
many policy areas, since Amsterdam more than half of EU legislation has been decided 
through consultation
78
. Areas such as agriculture, budgetary matters, justice, freedom and 
security, and social and employment affairs have all been subject to this procedure. 
Nevertheless, academic interest in legislative bargaining under the consultation procedure 
has remained limited.  
The main reason is that under consultation the EP has very limited legislative 
powers in relation to the Council of Ministers. The Member States in the Council are the 
main decision-making body and the Parliament has only a consultative role. In this 
legislative procedure, the European Parliament must be consulted of its opinion on the 
Commission proposal before the Council can proceed with adopting it. However, nothing 
guarantees whether and to what extent the Member States in the Council will be prepared 
to take into consideration the opinion of the EP. Months of drafting work, public hearings, 
debates in committee and discussions in the EP plenary may have no effect on the final 
                                                 
78
 According to the European Parliament Legislative Observatory there were 540 co-decision and 925 
consultation proposals completed between 1 May 1999 and 30 April 2007. 
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legislation. The Council decides whether to incorporate the EP‟s proposed amendments in 
the legislative text and it can completely ignore them. 
Hence, the existing studies of EU decision-making in the consultation procedure 
neglect the role of the European Parliament due to its lack of „true legislative powers‟ 
(Westlake, 1994, p. 135). Crombez (1996) concludes that Parliament‟s role under 
consultation can be disregarded and his model takes into consideration only the 
Commission and the Council. Laruelle (2002, p. 90) also understands the consultation 
procedure as a game between the Commission and the Council, in which the Parliament 
„appears to be powerless‟. Jupille (2004, p. 48) also ignores the EP in his model of 
procedural politics and presents institutional bargaining as a two-stage game in which „the 
Commission proposes and the Council disposes…‟. Thomson et al. (2006) further confirm 
this negative view of the European Parliament‟s legislative powers. Most authors recognize 
that in the consultation procedure the EP enjoys a „power of delay‟. However, the existing 
literature concludes that the European Parliament‟s role in consultation is insignificant, 
with or without delay.  
Overall, the standard accounts of EU decision-making recognize that, in theory, the 
European Parliament has the power to delay legislation in the consultation procedure. 
Whereas a substantial body of theoretical and empirical literature has examined Council – 
Parliament legislative bargaining in the co-decision procedure, there has been no consistent 
empirical study on the role of the European Parliament in consultation. This chapter 
investigates legislative decision-making in the consultation procedure and studies the 
conditions that determine the EP‟s legislative success. Parliamentary success here means 
the incorporation of EP demands in the final Council legislative act.  
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6.2 Conditions for Legislative Success of the European Parliament 
The principal argument of the chapter is that package deals increase the legislative 
influence of the European Parliament. Despite its extremely limited legislative powers 
under the consultation procedure, the European Parliament can be an influential legislative 
institution if it links its consultation opinions to proposals in co-decision. In co-decision, 
the Council must collaborate with the Parliament in order for a proposal to become law. 
The Parliament may refuse to cooperate under co-decision if the Council disregards the EP 
position under consultation. If the Parliament can trade its support in co-decision for 
support in consultation, then it is more likely to obtain concessions from the Council.  
By linking proposals from the two legislative procedures, the European Parliament 
can block progress on whole packages of legislation. Faced with several blocked proposals, 
the Council is likely to reconsider its position and allow concessions in favour of 
Parliament‟s preferred outcome. Linking strategies are most likely to be used by a 
Parliamentary rapporteur, who is involved in negotiations on proposals falling in both co-
decision and consultation. Linking can also be used by closely cooperating rapporteurs 
from different EP committees, who coordinate the blockage of proposals under both 
legislative procedures. Despite the formal consultation provisions, such linking strategies 
can confine the options available to the Council and allow the EP greater legislative 
influence. This leads to the first hypothesis:  
 
H1: Package deals increase the likelihood of European Parliament success in influencing 
legislative outcomes in the consultation procedure.  
 
In addition, the power to delay under the consultation procedure can also make the 
European Parliament an influential legislative institution. While acknowledging the 
procedural limitations, the chapter argues that delay is a legislative power, which allows the 
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Parliament to enjoy several benefits in the decision-making process. First, delay attracts the 
attention of Member States and allows the Parliament to obtain concessions from the 
Council so that EP demands are incorporated in the final legislative text. Second, delay 
allows MEPs to negotiate informally with the Council and often to get a better deal through 
informal meetings. Third, delay gives an additional reading to the consultation procedure. 
The Parliament signals its position to the Council and the Commission, but refrains from 
issuing an opinion, so that another round of legislative negotiations can take place. Overall, 
legislative delay increases the EP‟s chances of influencing proposals under consultation. 
This leads to the second hypothesis: 
 
H2: The Parliament is more likely to succeed in influencing the legislative text under the 
consultation procedure when it delays its opinion  
 
In addition, this chapter will test several hypotheses offered by the existing literature on EU 
legislative politics. Furthermore, the European Parliament is likely to exert significant 
legislative influence in cases that require urgent decisions. Tsebelis and Money (1997) and 
Rittberger (2000) assert that when the Council is impatient about the decision on a certain 
proposal, Parliament‟s demands are more likely to be taken into account by the Member 
States. An impatient Council is very likely to grant concessions and allow the EP to move 
the final policy closer towards its ideal point. Corbett et al (2005, p. 200) also suggest that 
the EP‟s bargaining position in consultation is strengthened by the urgency of legislative 
proposals. The inability of the EU legislative system to produce the proposed legislation 
within a specific timeframe may impose significant costs on EU Member States and the 
Commission. The failure to pass an urgent legislative act further complicates the planning 
and execution of important programmes related to the functioning of national and EU 
policies. Moreover, the inability of EU legislators to find an agreement on a timely basis is 
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often perceived by the public as institutional inefficiency. This leads to the third 
hypothesis:  
 
H3: The Parliament is more likely to succeed in influencing the legislative text when the 
proposal is urgent  
 
The internal cohesion of the European Parliament is also likely to have a positive effect on 
the EP‟s legislative influence. Kreppel (2002) finds that the EP is more likely to succeed in 
obtaining concessions from the Council when it is united. It is easier for the Parliament to 
force the Member States to accept its amendments if the main political groups in the EP act 
cohesively. Divisions between the political groups weaken the bargaining position of the 
EP vis-à-vis the Council and the Commission. Thus, in order to find its demands 
successfully adopted by the Council, the EP should ensure its cohesive position on 
legislative proposals. Furthermore, the inability of the European Parliament to find the 
necessary majority in plenary may deprive the EP of its power to delay. Especially because 
the EP does not have a co-legislative status in consultation, a considerable majority is 
needed if the Parliament wishes to signal its position to the Member States and the 
Commission. Therefore:  
 
H4: The more cohesive the Parliament, the more likely it is to succeed in influencing the 
legislative text under the consultation procedure. 
 
Moreover, the formal voting rule in the Council is also likely to have an effect on the EP‟s 
chance to succeed in the consultation procedure (Tsebelis, 1994; Mattila and Lane, 2001; 
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006). On the one hand, the Parliament may be more 
successful under the qualified majority rule in the Council, as the EP only needs the 
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support of some, but not all Member States in order to see its preferred issues in the final 
text. On the other hand, the EP may be more successful under unanimity. Reaching 
unanimity among the Member States is a time-consuming task. Having once agreed on a 
proposal, Member States focus their attention on other urgent legislative proposals. 
Therefore, when the Council has already established political consensus on an issue, the 
Parliament has little chance of changing the positions of Member States. When the Council 
is unanimous and/or there is a sufficient number of Member States (according to the voting 
rule) in favour of the adoption of a proposal, the EP‟s opinion is likely to have little effect 
on the legislative outcome. The difficulty to satisfy the required Council voting threshold 
can be used by the Parliament as an opportunity to exert influence over legislative 
outcomes. The following hypothesis tests whether the Council voting rule affects EP 
success in the consultation procedure:  
 
H5: The Parliament is more likely to succeed in influencing the final legislative text when 
the Council voting rule is unanimity.  
 
The position of the Commission is also likely to have a significant effect on EP success 
(Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000). Formally, under the consultation procedure, the Commission 
has a decisive role. If the Commission supports the amendments introduced by the 
Parliament and incorporates them in its proposal, the Council can only amend it through 
unanimity. This makes it easier for the Council to accept a proposal than to amend it. The 
Commission can also act informally between the Council and the Parliament and it has the 
ability to persuade the Presidency and the Member States to respect Parliament‟s demands. 
Hence, Commission support is likely to work in favour of Parliamentary success. The EP‟s 
role in consultation is extremely limited by default. Thus, the Parliament will find it very 
difficult to influence legislative outcomes when the Commission is against it. Therefore: 
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H6: The Parliament is more likely to succeed in influencing the final legislative text when it 
is supported by the Commission. 
 
Finally, the type of issues the EP contests is also likely to have an important effect on EP 
success (Benedetto and Hix, 2007; Thomson et al., 2006). Legislators‟ positions can differ 
substantially on different types of issues, even if they are part of the same proposal. The 
Parliament is less likely to succeed in demands, which relate to the increase of the EP‟s 
legislative powers. Institutional power issues aim to benefit the EP as a legislature, but do 
not benefit the Member States directly. Hence, the Council has no incentives to incorporate 
Parliament‟s institutional demands. Similarly, the EP may be less likely to succeed on 
budgetary issues, which impose high costs on Member States. In contrast, EP success on 
issues concerning fundamental rights and freedoms can be expected to enjoy a higher 
success rate. Therefore:  
 
H7: The Parliament is more likely to succeed when it contests fundamental rights issues, 
which do not impose costs on the Member States and do not increase its institutional 
powers.  
 
By including the five hypotheses derived from the existing literature, the results of this 
chapter will be directly comparable to existing research on EU legislative politics.  
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6.3 EP Legislative Activity: Descriptive Statistics  
In order to analyse the legislative influence of the European Parliament, the chapter 
proceeds with the examination of all consultation legislative acts, proposed and concluded 
in the period 1 May 1999 - 30 April 2007. In total 925 proposals were obtained through the 
European Parliament Legislative Observatory, (676 proposals in the 1999 – 2004 period 
and 249 proposals in the 2004 – 2007 period). A first glance at the EP‟s role in all 
consultation legislation offers the following picture.  
 
Lower Amendment Rate compared to Co-decision  
First, the European Parliament amends less legislation under consultation than it does under 
co-decision. Whereas in the co-decision procedure the EP amends around 87% of the 
proposals, in consultation the EP proposes amendments in only 54% of the cases. 422 (of 
the 925) consultation legislative proposals passed non-amended (see Table 6.1). Given its 
limited legislative powers, the Parliament only attempts to amend half of the consultation 
legislative acts, and it concentrates on the longer and more substantial proposals
79
.  
Moreover, some policy areas stand out with a high number of non-amended 
proposals. In the period 1999 - 2007 the areas with the largest number of legislative 
proposals were Justice, Freedom and Security, Agriculture, Fisheries, Budgets, External 
Relations and Economic and Financial Affairs. The areas with the highest percentage of 
non-amended legislation were Energy and Transport (81%), Environment (77%), Statistics 
(75%), General Affairs (74%), Legal Affairs (100%), and Education and Culture (69%). 
The areas enjoying the highest percentage of EP amendments were Justice, Freedom and 
Security (69%), Fisheries (81%) and Employment and Social Affairs (82%).  
 
                                                 
79
 Proposal salience is measured by the number of recitals in a legislative act. More recitals signify a more 
salient proposal. 91.8% of the non-amended cases contained between 1 and 10 recitals, while 54% of the 
cases amended by the EP contained between 11 and 73 recitals.    
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Table 6.1 Legislative Proposals under the Consultation Procedure: 1999 - 2007 
 
Policy Area (Commission DG) 
Total 
proposals 
Non 
Amended 
Amended 
w/o delay 
Amended 
with delay 
     
Agriculture & Rural Development 129 60 62 7 
Budget 72 46 13 13 
Development 4 - 4 - 
Economic and Financial Affairs 58 30 27 1 
Education and Culture 13 9 4 - 
Employment and Social Affairs  22 4 17 1 
Energy and Transport 33 27 6 - 
Enterprise and Industry 4 1 2 1 
Environment 35 27 8 - 
Eurostat, Statistical Office 4 3 1 - 
External Relations 60 34 23 3 
Fisheries 131 25 106 - 
General Secretariat 31 23 4 4 
Health and Consumer Protection 34 13 21 - 
Information Society 3 1 2 - 
Internal Market and Services 18 12 6 - 
Justice, Freedom and Security 178 55 116 7 
Legal Service 8 8 - - 
Regional Policy 7 3 4 - 
Research 37 18 19 - 
Taxation and Customs Union 44 23 20 1 
Total Consultation Proposals 925 422 465 38 
Source: European Parliament Legislative Observatory; Own calculations 
 
Legislative Delay 
Most importantly, the EP uses its power to delay legislation regularly
80
. In the 1999-2007 
period, the EP delayed and referred back to committee 38 proposals (7% of all amended 
proposals). These include 8 delayed cases in the period 1 May 2004 – 30 April 2007 and 30 
delayed cases in the period 1 May 1999 – 30 April 2004. 89.5 % of all delayed proposals 
fall in five policy areas: Budget (13), Agriculture (7) and Justice, Freedom and Security (7), 
General Affairs (4) and External Relations (3). The rest are four single cases in the areas of 
Economic and Financial Affairs, Employment and Social Affairs, Enterprise and Industry 
and Taxation. The time it took the EP to issue a final opinion, following delay, was on 
average 5 months. This relatively short time indicates that the EP did not aim to block 
legislation. Rather, it delayed its opinion in order to signal its position to the Council.   
                                                 
80
 The exercise of legislative delay is not new to the European Parliament. During the 1994-1999 legislature 
the EP delayed 54 of the 854 consultation proposals passed.   
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The EP delayed more proposals under the unanimity requirement in the Council 
than it did under QMV. Overall, only 34% of all amended consultation proposals required 
unanimity in the Council. However, 73.7% (28) of the delayed cases required unanimity 
and only 26.3% (10) of the delays occurred under QMV. It seems that the Parliament uses 
the unanimity requirement in the Council as an opportunity to influence legislative 
outcomes. Furthermore, the Parliament tends to delay several pieces of legislation together 
(70% of all dossiers were delayed together with one or more acts). If dossiers are part of a 
legislative package, the EP may decide to delay its opinion on all legislative proposals in 
the package in order to put further pressure on the Council and Commission
81
.  
 
Low Success Rate of EP Amendments  
The fact that the European Parliament introduced amendments to half of the consultation 
proposals and delayed some of them does not automatically mean that it succeeded in 
designing the final Council legislative texts. The EP‟s attempt to influence legislative 
outcomes in consultation does not guarantee Council acceptance. The number of 
amendments the Parliament proposed to the 503 amended proposals varied between 1 and 
224. However, the majority of the amended cases (70%) included only between 1 to 20 
amendments. The EP only heavily amended (with 61+ amendments) 4% of the legislative 
proposals. The amendment adoption rate methodology employed by Kreppel (1999, 2002) 
and Tsebelis et al. (2001) was used in order to assess the success of the EP‟s amendments. 
An EP amendment was counted as failed if: a) it was fully ignored by the Council and not 
at all present in the final legislative text; or b) it made it to the final legislative text, but it 
was of a highly technical nature
82
.  
                                                 
81
 For example, the delay of 13 proposals in the area of Budgets by rapporteur Gianfranco Dell‟Alba in 1999-
2004.   
82
 Amendments were classified as highly technical if they aimed at: a) correcting spelling or wording 
mistakes in the original proposal; b) suggesting more appropriate words in definitions; or c) changing dates in 
the proposal. 
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Overall, the results of the EP amendments success assessment support the existing 
view in the literature of the European Parliament‟s extremely limited legislative role in the 
consultation procedure. In 81% of the cases, the Parliament failed to influence the final 
legislative text. The amendments proposed by the EP were either fully ignored by the 
Council (60.4%), or those that were included in the final acts were only technical 
clarifications of the legislative text (20.6%). These results prove that decision-making 
power under the consultation procedure lies in the Council of Ministers. Given its limited 
legislative powers, the Parliament attempts to influence legislation less often than it does in 
co-decision. Even when it proposes amendments, there is a high probability that the 
Council will simply ignore the EP‟s demands.  
Nevertheless, 19% of EP amendments were incorporated substantially in the final 
Council legislative texts. The European Parliament was influential on both delayed and 
non-delayed proposals. Hence, although in the majority of the proposals the Council fully 
ignored the EP‟s amendments, the EP managed to influence substantially the legislative 
outcomes on some of the most important pieces of legislation. The highest rejection rate of 
EP amendments was on shorter and less salient proposals (containing between 1 and 10 
recitals). The longer and more important proposals enjoyed a higher success rate of EP 
amendments. Thus, although it is extremely limited in consultation, the European 
Parliament can act as an influential legislative institution on some of the most important 
legislative proposals. A major shortcoming of the amendments adoption rate methodology, 
however, is the fact that it does not take into account the substance and quality of EP 
amendments.  
To overcome this issue the chapter proceeds with a more qualitative examination of 
the decision-making process on the same 503 amended by the European Parliament 
proposals (both delayed and non-delayed) in the period 1 May 1999 – 30 April 2007.  
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6.4 Parliament’s Legislative Influence: Assessment  
The influence of the EP is analyzed through the examination of the issues the EP contested 
on each legislative proposal. EP Success is understood as the ability of the Parliament to 
see its demands incorporated in the final Council legislative text. An EP demand was 
counted as a failure if: a) it was completely ignored by the Council or b) it made it to the 
final legislative text, but aimed at highly technical changes (such as correcting spelling or 
improving wording). If an EP demand was not ignored by the Council and it was to a 
certain extent incorporated in the final text, the issue was counted as a success (=1).
83
  
Each proposal was broken down to the several issues contested by the EP
84
. The 
issues were classified in four categories: budgetary, policy substance, fundamental rights 
and institutional powers issues. 802 issues were identified through the qualitative study of 
all 503 amended consultation proposals (see Appendix I). The number of issues contested 
by the Parliament varies between the cases from one to six. The 38 delayed proposals were 
broken down to 85 issues and the 474 proposals resulted in 717 issues. The distribution of 
the issues according to issue type was as follows: policy substance (448 issues), budgetary 
(110 issues), fundamental rights (73 issues), and institutional powers (171 issues).  
Overall, the European Parliament failed to make a visible impact on the legislative 
outcome in 74% of the issues (594 issues). These results confirm again that the EP is very 
limited in the consultation procedure. Despite the large amount of work MEPs do in order 
to amend legislative proposals, Member States are often reluctant to take on board the 
demands of the European Parliament. However, contrary to the conclusions of the existing 
literature, the European Parliament‟s legislative influence in this procedure is not 
                                                 
83
 EP Success was initially treated as an ordinal variable, including four degrees of success: high success (3), 
average success (2), low success (1) and failure (0). However, only 9.8% of all issues fell in categories 1 and 
2. In the rest of the cases, the EP either failed completely (74.2%) or it managed to fully realize its legislative 
demands (16%). 
 
84
 On each piece of legislation, the decision-making process was traced from the initial Commission proposal, 
the debates in the European Parliament committees and plenary, the decision-making process within the 
Council, any informal Council-Parliament negotiations, the formal positions of each legislative institution and 
the final Council legislative act. 
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„insignificant‟. The EP was successful in around 26% of the issues it contested (208 
issues). The results indicate that the EP success rate in delayed cases was 71.8%, whereas it 
was only 20.5% in non-delayed cases. Thus, it seems that the Parliament has certain 
legislative powers in the consultation procedure. The following section analyses EP success 
and tests the seven hypotheses outlined in Section II.  
 
 
Table 6.2 Success rate of issues contested by the EP according to policy area  
Policy Area (Commission DG) 
Total 
Proposals 
Total 
Issues 
EP Success 
Issues 
% EP 
Success  
          
Agriculture & Rural Development 69 142 31 21.8% 
Budget 26 43 30 69.8% 
Development 4 9 - - 
Economic and Financial Affairs 28 33 4 12.1% 
Education and Culture 4 8 - - 
Employment and Social Affairs  18 29 17 58.6% 
Energy and Transport 6 12 3 25.0% 
Enterprise and Industry 3 8 3 37.5% 
Environment 8 11 - - 
Eurostat, Statistical Office 1 2 2 100.0% 
External Relations 26 38 5 13.2% 
Fisheries 106 128 14 10.9% 
General Secretariat 8 22 9 40.9% 
Health and Consumer Protection 21 39 13 33.3% 
Information Society 2 5 2 40.0% 
Internal Market and Services 6 9 2 22.2% 
Justice, Freedom and Security 123 198 55 27.8% 
Legal Service - - - - 
Regional Policy 4 6 1 16.7% 
Research 19 33 12 36.4% 
Taxation and Customs Union 21 27 5 18.5% 
Total Issues Contested by EP 503 802 208 25.9% 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Variables used in the analysis 
The dependent variable EP Success is a dichotomous variable and it =1 if an EP demand 
was incorporated in the final text and it = 0 if an EP demand was not. In order to test the 
argument and the hypotheses outlined above, the following independent variables were 
used in the analysis
85
.  
 
                                                 
85
 see Table 4.9 for full coding, sources and descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis;  
    see Table 4.10 for correlations between the variables.  
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The first hypothesis that the EP is more likely to succeed if it links a consultation 
decision to a co-decision proposal is tested with the variable Package Deal. It = 1 if the 
Parliament blocks the decision-making process in co-decision or threatens not to cooperate 
with the Council in other proposals until the EP‟s opinion in consultation is respected; and 
it = 0 if no linkage is made by the EP between consultation and co-decision proposals.  
The second hypothesis that the EP is more likely to succeed if it delays its opinion 
is tested with the dichotomous Delay variable. A case is counted as delayed (and = 1) when 
the following is observed: a) a Commission proposal was put to the vote in the EP plenary; 
b) the MEPs present in plenary voted to refer the proposal back to the drafting committee; 
and c) the same proposal was discussed again by the EP at a later date, when the European 
Parliament issued a final opinion.  
The third hypothesis that the European Parliament is more likely to succeed when 
the proposal is urgent is tested with two dichotomous variables: Urgent and Urgent for the 
Commission. The Urgent variable = 1 if there was a specific deadline according to which 
the legislative act had to enter into force and it = 0 if there was no deadline. This variable 
does not take into account whether the deadline was set by the Commission or by the 
European Council‟s conclusions. The variable Urgent for the Commission = 1 if the 
deadline was set by the Commission, but no political agreement was reached on the 
proposal at the European Council level. It = 0 if the call for immediate action originated in 
the European Council conclusions and the Member States had already discussed a possible 
legislative draft of the proposal.  
The fourth hypothesis that the EP is more likely to succeed as the size of the EP 
majority supporting the amendments proposed increases is tested with two variables. The 
continuous EP Cohesion variable measures EP cohesion at the EP drafting committee level. 
It measures the size of the majority in the EP drafting committee in favour of a report, as a 
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percentage of those voting. In addition, the dichotomous EP Plenary Support variable 
measures EP cohesion at the EP Plenary level. It = 1 if the EP plenary supports the 
committee report in its entirety and MEPs do not submit replacement amendments and it = 
0 if the EP plenary amends or rejects the committee proposal.  
The fifth hypothesis that the European Parliament is more likely to succeed when 
the voting rule in the Council is unanimity is tested with the Council Unanimity variable. It 
= 1 if the legal base of the legislative proposal requires unanimity in the Council and it = 0 
if the legal base requires qualified majority voting.  
The dichotomous Commission Support variable tests the sixth hypothesis that the 
European Parliament is more likely to succeed if it is supported by the Commission. It = 1 
if the Commission expresses its support for an EP demand in front of the EP plenary or 
after informal meetings with MEPs; and it = 0 if the Commission otherwise.  
The seventh hypothesis that the EP is more likely to succeed when it contests 
fundamental rights issues is tested with the categorical Issue Type variable. It = 1 for 
budgetary issues, = 2 for policy substance issues, = 3 for fundamental rights issues, and it = 
4 for institutional powers issues (see Table 6.3 and Chapter IV for classification).  
 
Table 6.3 Success rate of issues contested by the EP according to issue type 
 
  Type of Issues Contested by EP 
  Total  
Policy 
Substance 
Budgetary 
Fundamental 
Rights  
Institutional 
Powers  
Total proposals 503         
Total Issues 802 448 110 73 171 
of which EP successful 
(%) 
208 
(25.9) 
84 
(18.8) 
34 
(30.9) 
51  
(69.9) 
39 
(22.8) 
      
Delayed proposals 38     
Delayed Issues  85 29 18 7 31 
of which EP successful 
(%) 
61 
(71.8) 
22 
(75.9) 
13 
(72.2) 
5 
(71.4) 
21 
(67.7) 
      
Non - delayed proposals 465         
Non - delayed Issues 717 419 92 66 140 
of which EP successful 
(%) 
147 
(20.5) 
62 
(14.8) 
21 
(22.8) 
46 
(69.7) 
18 
(12.9) 
Source: Own calculations. 
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The dichotomous Council Impatience variable controls for the effect of institutional 
impatience on legislative outcomes in EU decision-making. It = 1 if the Council had started 
discussions and prepared a draft text of the legislative proposal before the EP had done so 
and it = 0 if the Parliament had started discussions and prepared a draft legislative text 
earlier than the Council. This variable was measured by comparing the dates of the first 
draft texts on a legislative proposal held in the EP and the Council‟s document registers.  
To control for the impact of the relative intensities of preferences of the Council 
and the Parliament on EP success, two variables are included in the analysis. The 
dichotomous Council – EP Salience Tie variable controls for the distance between the EP‟ 
and the Council‟s preference intensities. It = 1 if the relative salience size was different 
from zero (regardless of the direction). The distance Relative EP Salience variable 
measures the relative difference between the EP‟s and the Council‟s importance attached to 
a proposal. It captures the size and the direction of the relative institutional preference 
intensities.  
The continuous Proposal Salience variable controls for the importance of the 
legislative act. It is measured by the number of recitals in a legislative proposal.  
 
Statistical Analysis 
As the dependent variable is dichotomous (Success/Failure), logistic regressions are used to 
examine the effect of the independent variables on the probability of EP success. The 
European Parliament contested 802 issues, which were part of 503 legislative proposals. 
However, the individual issues cannot be treated as independent observations as some 
issues that are part of the same proposal, may share a similar probability of EP success. The 
analysis of variance test
86
 confirms that the variance in the probability of EP success can be 
explained by differences between the legislative proposals.  
                                                 
86
 One-way ANOVA: variance between proposals = .226; variance within proposals = .136; F = 1.66, p value 
< .001 
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The seven two and three-level ANOVA tests presented in Table 6.4 explore the 
variance of EP success according to the hypothetical proposal, policy area and time levels. 
The models examine to what extent a contextual level is of relevance for the analysis and 
whether the fit of the model improves after including the different contexts. Even though 
the policy area level seems to have a conditioning effect on EP success, when the proposal 
level is also taken into account (in Models 6 and 7), the results show that the variance in the 
probability of EP success is attributable to differences between legislative proposals.  
 
Table 6.4 Variation in EP Success according to Policy Area, Proposals and Years  
European Parliament Success in the Consultation Procedure, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: European Parliament Success 
Empty Models  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. 
Fixed Effects        
Intercept -1.091 *** -1.100 *** -1.820 *** -1.389 *** -1.830 *** -1.619 *** -1.811 *** 
 (.163) (.225) (.225) (.190) (.306) (.371) (.272) 
Random Effects        
Proposal Level (std.dev.) - - 1.974 *** - 1.896 *** 1.665 ** 1.420 *** 
   (.298)  (.301) (.292) (.293) 
Policy Area Level (std.dev.) - .922 * - 1.224 * - 1.165 1.364 
  (.235)  (.205)  (.321) (.257) 
Year Level  (std.dev.) .290  - - < .001 .566 - < .001 
 (.131)   (.395) (.217)  (3.164) 
-2 x Log Likelihood 904.001 865.202 867.547 845.604 859.615 835.273 830.083 
N Years 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
N Policy Areas 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
N Proposals 503 503 503 503 503 503 503 
N Issues 802 802 802 802 802 802 802 
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
 
To account for the clustered nature of the data (802 issues nested in 503 proposals), 
two types of logit models are estimated. First, the models are estimated as logistic 
regressions, correcting the standard errors for clustering within legislative proposals. Model 
1 is the estimated for EP success in all delayed issues (n = 85 issues). Model 2 is estimated 
for EP success in all non-delayed issues (n = 717 issues). Models 3 is estimated for EP 
success in all consultation issues (n = 802) without the Delay variable. Model 4 adds Delay 
to the explanatory factors. Model 5 builds on Model 4 by adding the interaction term 
Delay*Urgent for the Commission.  
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Second, identical two-level logistic models are estimated for EP success with issues 
at the individual level 1 and proposals at macro-level 2. Table 6.5 presents the results. The 
results of two types of models are similar. The results of the logit estimation are a set of 
coefficients that relate changes in the independent variables to changes in the probability of 
EP success. A positive relationship indicates that higher values of the independent variable 
make it more likely that the European Parliament will succeed in influencing the legislative 
outcome. The coefficients of the variables, their standard errors and the odds ratios for the 
full models are reported.  
 
6.5 Results: What Explains EP Success in the Consultation Procedure  
 
Package Deals: Linking Proposals to Co-decision  
The empirical analysis of the all consultation legislative proposals decided between 1999 
and 2007 supports the argument that package deals increase the legislative influence of the 
European Parliament in the consultation procedure. The ability of the Parliament to link the 
decision-making process under consultation to negotiations in co-decision appears to be a 
very important and effective legislative strategy. As expected the Package Deal variable 
proved to be a significant predictor of EP success. Even when delay is accounted for (in 
Model 4 and 5), linking to co-decision remains a strong predictor of EP success. The 
Council incorporated the EP‟s position in consultation when the EP rapporteurs used 
Parliament‟s co-decision and budgetary powers. The Parliament managed to threaten the 
Council with non-cooperation on other legislative proposals, which were also urgent and 
salient for the Council and Commission. By linking proposals from the two legislative 
procedures, the Parliament managed to block progress on whole packages of legislation. 
Faced with several blocked proposals, the Council reconsidered its position and granted 
concessions in favour of the EP‟s preferred outcome.  
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Table 6.5 Conditions for European Parliament Success in Consultation: 1999 – 2007 
 
 
 
 
European Parliament Success in the Consultation Procedure, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: European Parliament Success 
Logit (Clustered S.E. Proposal) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 delayed nondelayed all issues all issues all issues  
Fixed Effects Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio Coef/S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio 
Individual Level Variables        
Single Package Deal - - - - - - - 
        
Proposals Package Deal  2.271 .893 ** 1.428 *** .952 *** 2.590 .783 ** 2.188 
 (1.451) (.447) (.354) (.379)  (.394)  
Delay  - - - 2.292 *** 9.897 1.703 *** 5.493 
    (.286)  (.490)  
Council Impatience -1.818 -.158 -.352 -.218 .804 -.111 .895 
 (2.329) (.359) (.336) (.321)  (.325)  
Urgent .159 .162 .260 .101 1.106 .146 1.157 
 (1.005) (.269) (.248) (.252)  (.252)  
Urgent for the Commission 6.068 *** .473 1.124 *** .847 *** 2.332 .452 1.572 
 (1.641) (.350) (.294) (.298)  (.338)  
European Parliament Cohesion -.062 -.014 -.016 -.017 .983 -.017 .983 
 (.047) (.011) (.011) (.011)  (.011)  
EP Committee Supported -5.681 * .697 .185 .344 1.411 .419 1.520 
 (3.448) (.495) (.406) (.375)  (.385)  
Relative EP Salience  -.093 -.050 -.161 -.069 .933 -.035 .965 
 (.400) (.155) (.104) (.121)  (.134)  
EP - Council Salience Tie -.723 -.508 -.680 ** -.533 * .587 -.495 * .609 
 (1.078) (.323) (.265) (.275)  (.290)  
Commission Support 6.771 ** 1.602 *** 1.554 *** 1.699 *** 5.470 1.684*** 5.385 
 (2.942) (.284) (.238) (.262)  (.264)  
Issues Type (base budgetary)        
Policy Substance Issues .297 -.611 * -.682** -.613 ** .542 -.647 ** .524 
 (1.310) (.350) (.301) (.314)  (.320)  
Fundamental Rights Issues - 1.592 *** 1.232 *** 1.404*** 4.073 1.374*** 3.951 
  (.473) (.416) (.453)  (.456)  
Institutional Powers Issues -2.370 -.342 -.464 -.561 .571 -.694 .536 
 (2.478) (.405) (.337) (.378)  (.390)  
Council Unanimity  -6.398 ** - .201 - .068 - .267 .766 - .364 .695 
 (1.967) (.274) (.247) (.240)  (.245)  
Proposal Salience  .049 .026 ** .015 .020 * 1.020 .019 * 1.019 
 (.090) (.013) (.012) (.011)  (.011)  
Delay x Urgent for Commission - - - - - 2.124 *** 8.385 
      (.878)  
Intercept 12.398 ** -1.704 -.629 -.956  -.891  
 (4.842) (1.182) (1.071) (1.050)  (1.041)  
Wald Chi-Squared 78.37 *** 119.10 *** 127.44*** 142.87***  151.70***  
Pseudo R Sq (McFadden) .61 .24 .26 .31  .32  
Log Pseudolikelihood -19.795 -275.170 -340.212 -315.558   -311.403   
N Proposals 38 465 503 503  503  
N Issues 85 717 802 802   802   
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01     
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Conditions for EP Success in Consultation: 1999 – 2007 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
European Parliament Success in the Consultation Procedure, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: European Parliament Success 
Two-Level Models  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 delayed nondelayed all issues all issues all issues  
Fixed Effects Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio Coef/S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio 
Individual Level Variables        
Single Package Deal - - - - - - - 
        
Proposals Package Deal  2.271 * 1.251 *** 2.107 *** 1.350 *** 3.857 1.138 *** 3.121 
 (1.378) (.471) (.449) (.419)  (.417)  
Delay  - - - 2.957 *** 19.247 2.156 *** 8.632 
    (.530)  (.571)  
Council Impatience -1.818 -.191 -.448 -.280 .756 -.157 .855 
 (2.048) (.357) (.369) (.345)  (.336)  
Urgent .159 .090 .233 .019 1.020 .062 1.064 
 (1.576) (.398) (.318) (.307)  (.299)  
Urgent for the Commission 6.068 *** .569 1.426 *** 1.009 *** 2.744 .535 1.708 
 (2.265) (.429) (.424) (.390)  (.426)  
European Parliament Cohesion -.062 -.021 -.026 * -.024 * .976 -.023 ** .976 
 (.055) (.014) (.014) (.013)  (.012)  
EP Committee Supported -5.681 * .860 .236 .459 1.583 .506 1.658 
 (3.505) (.544) (.506) (.484)  (.474)  
Relative EP Salience  -.093 -.092 -.210 ** -.112 .894 -.076 .926 
 (.380) (.109) (.106) (.103)  (.103)  
EP - Council Salience Tie -.723 -.466 -.725 ** -.540 * .583 -.507 .602 
 (1.206) (.331) (.333) (.319)  (.312)  
Commission Support 6.771 *** 1.907 *** 2.110 *** 2.085 *** 8.046 2.047 *** 7.741 
 (2.577) (.321) (.216) (.317)  (.313)  
Issues Type (base budgetary)        
Policy Substance Issues .297 -.752 * -.941** -.819 ** .441 -.829 ** .436 
 (1.036) (.399) (.377) (.372)  (.368)  
Fundamental Rights Issues - 1.881 *** 1.529 *** 1.591*** 4.908 1.551*** 4.716 
  (.555) (.543) (.524)  (.514)  
Institutional Powers Issues -2.370 -.445 -.781 * -765 * .466 -.729 * .453 
 (1.544) (.486) (.456) (.452)  (.449)  
Council Unanimity  -6.398 ** - .155 - .030 - .215 .806 - .334 .716 
 (3.162) (.328) (.324) (.311)  (.307)  
Proposal Salience  .049 .039 *** .026 * .030 ** 1.031 .028 ** 1.028 
 (.072) (.015) (.015) (.014)  (.013)  
Delay x Urgent for Commission - - - - - 2.452 *** 11.609 
      (1.011)  
Intercept 12.398 ** -1.875 -.450 -.986  -.807  
 (7.558) (1.431) (1.398) (1.346)  (1.308)  
Random Effects        
Proposal Level (std.dev.) <.001 1.295 *** 1.543 *** 1.307 ***  1.219 ***  
 (.684) (.293) (.291) (.284)  (.280)  
-2 x Log Likelihood 39.590 541.065 659.927 618.921   612.525   
N Proposals 38 465 503 503  503  
N Issues 85 717 802 802   802   
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01     
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The Power to Delay 
In addition, the right to delay is an important power that the European Parliament uses on a 
regular basis. It significantly increases the EP‟s probability of success in legislative matters 
under the consultation procedure. In addition, the urgency of legislative proposals also 
increases the EP‟s chances of success. The Urgent for the Commission variable is a strong 
predictor of EP success. When urgency is measured by the presence of a deadline for the 
Commission (which was not set by the European Council), the variable is a statistically 
significant factor for predicting EP success. The variable has the greatest value in Model 1 
(EP success in delayed issues), but it remains a significant explanatory factor when all 
consultation issues are included in the analysis. If there is a consensus reached at the 
European Council level, EP demands are unlikely to be respected by the Council, especially 
when they conflict with the Council‟s preferences. When the proposal is urgent for the 
Commission, but not extremely urgent for the Member States and there is no political 
agreement on the proposal in advance, the EP is more likely to succeed in influencing the 
legislative outcome. Therefore, the European Parliament is more likely to be successful in 
cases where the Commission sets the deadlines and no consensus has been reached by the 
Member States in advance. 
The interaction between Delay and Urgent for the Commission variables is also 
statistically significant (see Model 5). When the Parliament delays its opinions and the 
proposals are urgent for the Commission, but not so for the Member States, the 
Commission is more likely to support the EP. In order to complete its legislative work in a 
timely manner, the Commission readily supports Parliament‟s demands. This then makes it 
more likely for the Parliament to succeed in having its preferences incorporated in the 
Council text.  
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Salience  
The results show that the European Parliament is more likely to succeed in more salient 
legislative proposals. Whereas the EP‟s demands were ignored in the majority of the 
consultation cases, the Parliament tends to be more successful on longer and more 
substantial pieces of legislation. The Proposal Salience variable is not statistically 
significant in Model 1. This is due to the fact that the EP delayed several cases through the 
rejection route. The rejected pieces of legislation were not so highly salient, but by 
rejecting them, the EP signalled its discontent with the Commission proposals and the 
intentions of the Council. Overall, as shown in Models 4 and 5, salience is an important 
predictor for EP success in consultation. This finding provides further support for the 
argument that the European Parliament can act as an influential legislative institution even 
in the consultation procedure.   
Figure 6.1 plots the predicted probability of EP success according to the urgency 
and salience of the legislative act (based on Model 5). The plot highlights that EP success is 
much more likely on salient proposals. It also illustrates that the likelihood of EP success 
increases when the proposals are urgent for the Commission. 
Figure 6.1 Effect of Urgency and Salience on the Probability of EP Success in the 
Consultation Procedure 
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European Parliament Cohesion 
The EP seems to be highly cohesive and consensual under the consultation procedure. 
Regardless of the policy area, MEPs were united in their votes. 86.8% of all pieces of 
legislation were decided by a show of hands and only 13.2% were put to the roll-call vote. 
The examination of the roll-calls proves that there were no major divisions among the 
political groups in the European Parliament on consultation proposals. Most cases enjoyed 
a very cohesive Parliament, both in committee and in the plenary. The drafting committees 
voted either unanimously or with extremely large majorities - the mean of the EP Cohesion 
variable is 91.7.   
As delay cannot occur without an EP majority voting in favour of it, a united 
Parliament is a crucial condition for the exercise of the power of delay. There was no clear 
competition among the political groups in the delayed cases. This suggests that delay is not 
about party politics in the European Parliament. Rather than an intra-parliamentary game, 
delay appears to be about the institutional politics between the EP and the Council. As 
expected, the rapporteur was the key figure for the exercise of the EP‟s „power of delay‟. 
The rapporteur liaised with the rapporteurs of other parliamentary committees and with the 
leaders of the political groups in order to ensure majority in plenary in favour of delay.  
Overall, EP cohesion does not seem to affect the likelihood of EP success in the 
consultation procedure. While EP cohesion may be an important factor for EP influence in 
co-decision, the presence of a large majority in the EP under consultation is not a clear 
predictor of EP success (with or without delay). 
 
Voting Rule in the Council of Ministers 
The hypothesis that the EP is more likely to succeed in cases that require Council 
unanimity is not supported by the analysis. The Council voting rule is not a statistically 
significant predictor of EP success in consultation issues. On many occasions the Member 
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States in the Council could easily meet the voting threshold, despite the unanimity 
requirement. The only significance the Council Unanimity variable enjoys is in Model 1. 
The negative coefficient of the variable indicates that when the EP delays its opinions, it is 
more likely to succeed under the QMV requirement in the Council. This is probably the 
case because in the QMV cases (agricultural proposals) although the voting threshold was 
lower, many Member States had reservations or objections to certain aspects of the 
legislative text. This slowed down the Council decision-making process and the EP 
managed to participate informally in the Council negotiations. In the cases when the 
Council (or the European Council) had already established an overall political agreement 
on an issue, the unanimity requirement was not a problem for the Council and the European 
Parliament had little chance of changing the positions of the Member States. 
 
Commission Support  
The results provide sufficient support for the hypothesis that the EP is more likely to 
succeed when it has the backing of the Commission. The Commission played a vital role in 
persuading the Member States to respect and incorporate the EP‟s position. The 
Commission was actively involved in the Council – Parliament relations and it served as a 
mediator between the two institutions. This is in line with the conventional understanding 
in the literature that the Commission has a decisive role in the legislative process under the 
consultation procedure.  
 
Type of Issues 
Finally, the type of issue contested by the Parliament also appears to be a significant 
explanatory factor of EP success. As expected, the EP is most likely to succeed when it 
demands fundamental rights additions to the legislative text. This success may also be 
explained by the fact that the Commission usually supports fundamental rights issues. On 
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the other hand, the EP is least likely to succeed when it demands policy substance additions 
to the legislative text. Although the institutional powers variable is not statistically 
significant, its negative coefficient suggests that the European Parliament is less likely to 
succeed when it demands an increase of its legislative powers. The several exceptions to 
this rule were institutional powers issues where the Commission supported the EP and the 
EP managed to threaten the Council of non-cooperation on other proposals. Most 
importantly, the EP is successful in bringing more transparency to legislative proposals and 
greater protection for EU citizens. 
 
6.6 Case Study: Voluntary Modulation of Direct Payments
87
  
Legislation in the Area of Common Agricultural Policy  
 
Background of the Legislation 
In December 2005, the Brussels European Council introduced the possibility for Member 
States to “modulate” their market expenditure under the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP).  In its agreement on the Financial Framework for 2007-2013, the European Council 
allowed governments, at their discretion, to reduce their direct payments under the first 
pillar of the CAP up to a maximum of 20%. This amount was to be transferred to their rural 
development programmes, under the second pillar of the CAP
88
 (“Commission Proposal” 
24 May 2006). The European Council invited the Commission to submit a proposal, laying 
down the rules for voluntary modulation. As the proposal directly affected the amount of 
direct payments to the CAP by governments, the Council was in favour of a timely 
conclusion of the legislative procedure.  
                                                 
87
 “Voluntary modulation is but fancy phraseology for a very unpleasant practice, namely government grab of 
farmers‟ money... there is nothing voluntary about it...” James Hugh Allister (NI), “EP Debate” 13 November 
2006 
 
88
 CAP is divided into two pillars: Pillar I - Market support and direct payments to farmers and Pillar II - 
Rural development 
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This proposal aimed to establish the practical rules for allowing Member States to 
use voluntary modulation. It laid down the procedures for shifting of up to 20% of direct 
payments from the first pillar to rural development under the CAP. The Council had 
previously agreed to cut payments to rural development. And the proposal on voluntary 
modulation aimed partially to compensate for the lack of necessary funds under the 2
nd
 
pillar of the CAP. The proposal allowed the funds to be used freely by governments and co-
financing was not compulsory. Moreover, modulation was not subject to any conditions 
(“Report” 5 October 2006).   
Stage I: Intra-Chamber Decision-Making 
 The Commission submitted the proposal on Voluntary Modulation of Direct 
Payments on 24 May 2006. It was based on Article 37 of the EC Treaty, which provided for 
the consultation procedure and QMV in the Council. In Parliament, the proposal was 
allocated to the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) on 10 July 2006 
and Lutz Goepel (EPP-ED) was nominated rapporteur. The AGRI Committee met on 12 
July 2006, 11 September 2006 and 3 October 2006 to discuss the proposal. The Committee, 
led by the rapporteur, opposed the proposal in its entirety and on 3 October 2006 rejected 
the Commission proposal with 32 in favour and 3 against. The AGRI committee worked 
closely with the Committee on Budgets, which also unanimously rejected the proposal 
(“Report” 5 October 2006). The Council Special Committee on Agriculture, held meetings 
on 14 November 2006, 12 February 2007, and 5 March 2007 to discuss the proposal on 
Voluntary Modulation (“Proposal” 5 March 2007). 
On 14 November 2006, the EP Plenary rejected the proposal by an overwhelming 
majority of 559 votes to 64 with 16 abstentions. It invited the Commission to withdraw the 
proposal, but the Commission refused to do so. In that case, the EP decided to refer the 
matter back to committee, pursuant to Rule 52(3) of the EP Rules of Procedure. There was 
a high degree of agreement across political groups that voluntary modulation was “not the 
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right solution” for the existing underfunding of the second pillar of the CAP (“Second 
Report” 26 January 2007). The Commission did not support the overly critical position of 
the EP. Some Member States in the Council, led mainly by the UK, were particularly keen 
to see this proposal adopted.  
Stage II: Inter-Chamber Logrolling  
 In order to make the Commission and Council listen to its position on this proposal, 
the EP decided to link its opinion on Voluntary Modulation to the funding of rural 
development programmes in the 2007 budget. In the framework of the budgetary procedure 
for the adoption of the 2007 budget, the EP blocked and put into reserve 20% of the 
commitments and payments appropriations for rural development programs. The EP 
threatened the Council that the 20% reserve would only be lifted if the Council respected 
the EP consultation opinion on Voluntary Modulation (“Proposal” 5 March 2007).  
 Despite the EP‟s strong position against Voluntary Modulation and the delay of the 
EP vote, the Council was initially reluctant to negotiate with the EP. The rapporteur Lutz 
Goepel (EPP-ED), together with members from the AGRI committee called on the 
Commission once again to withdraw its proposal. The Commission refused to do so, on the 
grounds it was acting on an invitation by the European Council. That is why, on 14 
February 2007, the EP rejected the proposal again with 584 votes to 89 with 19 abstentions. 
As the EP continued to block 20% of the 2007 budget upon the condition that the Council 
respects Parliament‟s opinion seriously, the Council Presidency became more inclined to 
hold informal negotiations with MEPs in order to resolve the issue as soon as possible.  
Days after the EP‟s second rejection of the proposal, the Council Presidency 
approached the EP‟s representatives in the search for a package compromise. On 27 
February 2007, the Presidency of the Council met informally with Lutz Goepel (EPP-ED), 
Jan Mulder (ALDE) from the AGRI Committee and Herbert Bosch (PES, AU) from the 
Committee on Budgets. Informal negotiations between the Council and the EP continued 
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on 6 March and 14 March 2007. The Presidency needed to persuade the MEPs to lift the 
blockage of the rural development budget (“Proposal” 14 March 2007). Finally, a package 
deal between the EP and the Council was reached on 19 March 2007, under which 
Parliament‟s Budget Committee would lift the 20% blocked resources, but in exchange 
Voluntary Modulation would only be available to the UK and Portugal and none of the 
other EU Member States.  
Stage III: Voting  
 The EP lifted the suspension of the EU 2007 budget on 21 March 2007. On 27 
March 2007, the Council adopted (with the abstention of the Latvian delegation) a 
Regulation laying down rules for Voluntary Modulation of Direct Payments under the 
CAP. The final regulation introduced a legal basis, allowing only Portugal and the United 
Kingdom to apply the Voluntary Modulation scheme. 
Key Issues  
 The first issue the EP contested in this proposal was of a budgetary character. It was 
directly related to Member States‟ spending for the Common Agricultural Policy. The EP 
opposed the entire idea of allowing Member States to cut voluntarily, by up to 20%, direct 
payments to the CAP. The EP had expressed its strong reservations about voluntary 
modulation in a Declaration on the Inter-institutional agreement on Budgetary Discipline 
and Sound Financial Management of 17 May 2006. Such a far-reaching decision about the 
financing of the CAP could not be done with a consultation proposal.  
The voluntary modulation proposal allowed Member States unilaterally and without 
the involvement of the EP to increase expenditure on rural development by several billion 
Euros. This clearly disregarded the EP as branch of the budgetary authority (Article 272(9) 
TEC). The voluntary modulation scheme would change significantly the financing of the 
CAP. MEPs viewed the proposal as implying the “re-nationalization of agricultural policy 
through the back door” (“Second Report” 26 January 2007).  
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  The second issue the European Parliament contested was of a policy substance 
nature. The proposal was “unbalanced and incoherent”. Above all, voluntary modulation 
would “jeopardize the survival of many farms”. According to the EP report, it entailed the 
distortion of competition and discrimination against farmers in individual Member States. It 
disregarded Community objectives in rural areas. Furthermore, due to the urgency of the 
matter, the Commission had not performed an impact assessment. Acting upon an 
invitation by the Council, the Commission had filed a proposal, which did not contain a 
clear picture of what the effects of the 20% budget transfer from the 1
st
 to the 2
nd
 pillar of 
the CAP might be. The EP rapporteur noted that the legal act would clearly have a 
substantial impact on farmers, but no studies were conducted to forecast the effects of such 
a far-reaching measure (“Report” 5 October 2006).  
 
The EP’s Legislative Influence: Package Deals and Delay  
In this case, the EP‟s demands were related to budgetary and policy specific issues. The EP 
contested the plans of the Member States and the Commission to pass legislation, which 
affects a very sensitive EU policy area: Agriculture. The EP opposed the entire idea of 
voluntary modulation, as it allowed Member States in the Council to decide unilaterally 
such important budgetary matters. The Parliament required an impact assessment and 
monitoring by the Commission. The EP delayed its vote in order to guard the Community 
agricultural objectives and to prevent the serious effects the legislation would have on 
European farmers. As expected, the EP‟s strong position on the proposal was taken into 
account by the Council. The budgetary and policy specific issues contested by the EP 
affected EU citizens and the scope of the CAP as a whole. The EP hence succeeded in 
influencing the legislative outcome of this proposal, despite the fact it was decided under 
the consultation procedure. Through delay, the Parliament managed to strike a package deal 
with the Council and to influence the legislative text.  
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The Member States in the Council found it difficult to erase divisions on this 
proposal. Although the Member States were unanimous in their support for the voluntary 
modulation package, governments could not agree on some of the specifics of the proposal. 
Some Member States expressed their dissatisfaction with specific terms and definitions
89
. 
These reservations so were soon overcome, but they slowed down the decision-making 
process within the Council. The Council and the Commission issued a joint declaration, 
which took note of the strong vote with which Parliament rejected the Commission‟s 
proposal on voluntary modulation. They noted the proposal was not part of the co-decision 
procedure, but at the same time acknowledging, “...the firm statement of the Parliament on 
this issue is not to be overseen by both the Council and the Commission” (“Proposal” 5 
March 2007). The divisions in the Council made it easier for the EP to succeed in 
influencing the final legislative outcome.  
 
Package Deal: Linkage of Consultation and Budgetary Proposals 
In order to communicate its serious intentions to the Council, the EP decided to link its 
opinion on Voluntary Modulation to the funding of rural development programmes. In the 
framework of the budgetary procedure for the 2007 budget, on 26 October 2006, the EP put 
into reserve 20% of the commitments and payments appropriations for rural development 
programs (under Heading 2: Preservation and Management of Natural Resources). The 
20% blockage would only be lifted if the Council and the Commission collaborated with 
the EP on the voluntary modulation case. The non-availability of 20% of the 2007 budget 
for rural development programming created important problems and risks. It delayed the 
approval and implementation of rural development programs (RDPs) for the new 
                                                 
89
 These mainly related to article 1 paragraph 4 laying down the concept of "automatism" that any increase of 
the compulsory modulation would lead to a decrease of the rate of voluntary modulation (FR, DK, EL, IE, 
AT, IT, LU, ES, SI, FI, BE, CY); others held reservations (DK, EL, LU, NL and CZ) and one delegation (LV) 
entirely opposed the proposal. Overall, the Member States agreed on the broad package over voluntary 
modulation, but divisions occurred regarding the exact content and wording of the legal act (“Proposal” 5 
March 2007). 
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programming period. The Commission and the Council had already made plans about their 
2007 rural development programs without taking into account a possible block of 20% of 
the total amount.  
The EP‟s decision to put the 20% in reserve created financial uncertainties for 
Member States, which made it difficult for governments to design and implement their 
multiannual programmes. Lutz Goepel (PPE-DE) explained; “Until the Council and the 
Commission make us a firm offer, therefore, we should be united in rejecting this proposal. 
This is the only way to achieve results, and I believe that, if we do so, this issue will help to 
strengthen the role of the EP and, in particular, to support European farmers” (EP Debate 
13 February 2007). By linking its opinion on voluntary modulation to the 2007 budget, the 
EP presented a serious threat to the Council and Commission. The EP‟s decision to block 
the budget directly affected the ability of Member States and the Commission to operate 
sound rural development programmes
90
 (“Proposal” 21 February 2007).  
 
Final Outcome: The EP Successful in Consultation Through Packaging and Delay 
After several rounds of informal negotiations between the two legislative chambers, the 
German Presidency managed to strike a package deal with the rapporteurs from the AGRI 
and BUDG Committees. Voluntary modulation would be limited and only be available to 
two EU States: Portugal and the UK. In exchange, the EP released 20% bound 
appropriations from the reserve and allowed the approval and implementation of rural 
development programmes for the new programming period. By linking its opinion to the 
EU budget and by rejecting the proposal twice, the EP managed to influence the legislative 
outcome on this consultation proposal
91
.  
                                                 
90
 Commissioners Grybauskaite and Fischer Boel urged the EP not to delay the matter further, as delay would 
have serious consequences for the 2007 rural development programming (“Proposal” 21 Feb.07)  
 
91
 MEP Jan Mulder, Budgets Committee: "It is the first time in history that the European Parliament moves 
the Council to make this kind of concession in an agriculture dossier. Normally, the European Parliament has 
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6.7 Case Study: EU Agency for Fundamental Rights Regulation 
92
 
Legislation in the Area of Justice, Freedom and Security 
 
Background of the Legislation 
The Treaty of Rome contained no reference to the protection of fundamental rights. 
Gradually, the EU developed competences in this area and provisions aimed at the 
protection of human rights have been incorporated in the Treaties. The most important of 
these are Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty on European Union
93
, which were introduced by the 
Amsterdam Treaty. The importance of fundamental rights in the EU was highlighted by the 
proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU in 2000 (“Impact 
Assessment” February 2005). In 2005, the Commission launched a Framework Programme 
on Fundamental Rights and Justice: 2007-2013. The Commission proposed the 
establishment of a European Institute for Gender Equality and proposed the year 2007 to be 
proclaimed European Year of Equal Opportunities for All. The proposal for the 
establishment of an EU Agency for Fundamental Rights was an important step in the 
development in the EU human rights policy.  
In order to ensure respect and promotion of fundamental rights in the EU, the 
Community needed an independent body, which would collect and disseminate 
comparative data and information on fundamental rights in the Member States. The 
Commission proposed the establishment of the Fundamental Rights Agency with the 
objective to provide assistance and expertise to the EU institutions and the Member States 
in relation to fundamental rights when they are defining policies or implementing 
legislation. The Agency‟s main responsibilities were the formulation of opinions and 
                                                                                                                                               
only an advisory role to play. I regard this deal as a big victory for democracy in Europe." (“Voluntary 
Modulation of CAP” 21 March 2007). 
 
92
 Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 Establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
 
93
 Article 6(1) declares that: “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
fundamental rights and freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States”.  
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issuing of annual reports on the respect and visibility of fundamental rights in the EU 
(“Initial Legislative Document” 30 June 2005).  
In December 2003 the European Council agreed to extend the mandate of the 
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia and to transform it into a 
Fundamental Rights Agency. On 5 July 2005, the Commission submitted a proposal for a 
Council Regulation establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and a 
proposal for a Council Decision empowering the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights to 
pursue its activities in areas referred to in Title VI of the Treaty on the EU. These proposals 
fell under the consultation procedure (Article 308 TEC and Articles 30, 31, and 34 TEU). 
Stage I: Intra-Chamber Decision-Making 
 Right after receiving the Commission‟s draft proposal, the Council started work on 
revising the text. The Ad hoc Working Party on Fundamental Rights was the central 
Council body, responsible for this piece of legislation. Between 7 July 2005 and 4 
September 2006, the Working Party met more than fifteen times to discuss the regulation 
and find a common Council position. The British, Austrian and Finnish Presidencies, 
Coreper, the Working Party and the Justice and Home Affairs Councils worked closely 
together to achieve a Council consensus on the proposal. The regulation touched upon 
sensitive issues and some Member States were reluctant to act quickly on the dossier. In 
April 2006, the Presidency initiated trialogue meetings with representatives of the EP.  
In the EP the proposal was allocated to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs (LIBE) on 29 September 2005 and Kinga Gal (EPP-ED, HU) was 
appointed rapporteur. In addition to LIBE, four other parliamentary committees were 
required to give an opinion: AFCO, AFET, BUDG and FEMM (“Committee Report” 13 
September 2006). The rapporteur presented her draft report on 7 February 2006, which was 
discussed and amended in nine committee meetings between February and September 
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2006. The LIBE committee report was finally adopted on 13 September 2006 with 31 votes 
in favour and 6 against.  
Stage II: Inter-Chamber Bargaining 
 Several informal trialogues between the Council, Commission and the EP took 
place with the aim of solving the outstanding issues on the dossier. Such inter-institutional 
meetings took place on 4 and 25 April 2006, 17 May, 9 June, 3 October and 15 November 
2006. The EP was represented by LIBE‟s chairman Jean-Marie Cavada (ALDE) and 
rapporteurs Kinga Gal and Magda Kósáné Kovács (PES, HU) (“Outcome of Proceedings” 
1 June 2006). Despite the informal trialogues, the regulation was highly controversial for 
some Member States and they were not prepared to incorporate the EP‟s preferences as 
they stood.   
The EP was supposed to vote on the Fundamental Rights Agency proposal on 12 
October 2006. Unable to influence the legislative text at this stage, the EP used its power of 
delay. With the advice of Commissioner Franco Frattini, the LIBE rapporteur chose to 
postpone the final vote
94
 until an acceptable compromise with the Council was achieved. In 
October and November 2006, the Council and Commission held additional informal 
meetings, in which the Council‟s text was agreed without major changes. In return, the 
Council agreed to issue political declarations in addition to the regulation, which envisaged 
future actions in the area of fundamental rights. Another trialogue meeting took place on 15 
November 2006.  
Stage III: Voting  
 The EP voted on 30 November 2006 in favour of the proposal by a roll-call vote 
with 431 in favour, 94 against and 16 abstentions. The regulation was opposed by members 
of IND/DEM and GUE/NGL and a large fraction of the EPP-ED groups. The JHA Council 
adopted the regulation at its 2781
st
 meeting in Brussels on 15 Feb 2007.  
                                                 
94
 Under Rule 53(2) of the EP‟s Rules of Procedure the proposal was referred back to the LIBE Committee for 
further consideration. 
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Table 6.6 Agency for Fundamental Rights Regulation Decision-Making Timeline 
 
Date Legislative activity 
05-Jul-05 Commission files proposal 
07-Jul-05 Council: Ad hoc Working Party on Fundamental Rights: Presentation by Commission  
29-Sep-05 Parliament: LIBE Committee: Allocation of dossier 
04-Oct-05 Parliament: LIBE Committee: First Exchange of Views 
11-Oct-05 Council: Ad hoc Working Party on Fundamental Rights meeting 
07-Nov-05 Council: Ad hoc Working Party on Fundamental Rights meeting 
24-Nov-05 Council: Ad hoc Working Party on Fundamental Rights meeting 
24-Nov-05 Parliament: LIBE Committee: Evaluation of Inter-institutional dialogue 
06-Dec-05 Council: Ad hoc Working Party on Fundamental Rights meeting 
24-Jan-06 Parliament: LIBE Committee: Joint debate 
27-Jan-06 Council: Ad hoc Working Party on Fundamental Rights meeting 
07-Feb-06 Parliament: LIBE Committee:  Gal's Report   
17-Feb-06 Council: Ad hoc Working Party on Fundamental Rights meeting 
22-Feb-06 Parliament: LIBE Committee: Joint discussion of Gal's Report of 7.02.06 
17-Mar-06 Council: Ad hoc Working Party on Fundamental Rights meeting 
23-Mar-06 Parliament: LIBE Committee: Consideration of report and further amendments 
31-Mar-06 Council: Ad hoc Working Party on Fundamental Rights meeting 
04-Apr-06 Trialogue 
10-Apr-06 Council: Ad hoc Working Party on Fundamental Rights: Preparation of trialogue 
24-Apr-06 Council: Presidency Compromise Text 
25-Apr-06 Trialogue 
27-Apr-06 Council: Presidency meeting with NGOs 
28-Apr-06 Council: Ad hoc Working Party on Fundamental Rights meeting 
04-May-06 Parliament: LIBE Committee: outcome of trialogue of 25 April:  
12-May-06 Council: Ad hoc Working Party on Fundamental Rights meeting 
17-May-06 Trialogue 
23-May-06 Council: COREPER (2) meeting 
24-May-06 Council: Ad hoc Working Party on Fundamental Rights meeting 
01-Jun-06 Parliament: LIBE Committee: Discussion with AFET, BUDG, AFCO and FEMM 
06-Jun-06 Council: Ad hoc Working Party on Fundamental Rights meeting 
08-Jun-06 Council: COREPER (2) meeting 
09-Jun-06 Trialogue 
12-Jun-06 Parliament: LIBE Committee: Meeting 
15-Jun-06 Brussels European Council 
23-Jun-06 Council: Ad hoc Working Party on Fundamental Rights meeting 
10-Jul-06 Council: Ad hoc Working Party on Fundamental Rights meeting 
13-Sep-06 Parliament: LIBE Committee: Adoption of Report 
04-Sep-06 Council: Ad hoc Working Party on Fundamental Rights meeting 
27-Sep-06 Council: COREPER meeting 
03-Oct-06 Trialogue 
06-Oct-06 JHA Council : Presidency presents results of consultations 
12-Oct-06 Parliament: First Reading Vote in Plenary: Partial vote (Delayed) 
24-Oct-06 Council - Commission Informal Meeting 
05-Nov-06 Council - Commission Informal Meeting 
15-Nov-06 Trialogue 
22-Nov-06 Parliament: LIBE Committee meeting 
30-Nov-06 Council: COREPER: Examination of outstanding questions 
30-Nov-06 Parliament: First Reading Vote in Plenary: Adopted 
14-Feb-07 Council: Approval by COREPER (part 2) at 2172nd Meeting, Brussels  
15-Feb-07 Council: Approval of Regulation at 2781st Meeting of the Council (JHA) 
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Key Issues 
There were three key controversial issues, on which the positions of the Council and the EP 
differed. These were: 1) the geographical scope of the Agency; 2) the competence of the 
Agency regarding issues governed by the Title VI TEU; and 3) the role of the EP in the 
structure of the Agency. 
Geographical scope of the Agency   
 The Commission‟s original proposal confined the geographical scope of the Agency 
solely to the EU Member States. The EP‟s LIBE committee required the extension of the 
Agency‟s scope to candidate countries and to potential candidate countries (the Western 
Balkans) (“Committee Report” 25 September 2006). In contrast, some Member States in 
the Council rejected such an extended geographical scope of the Agency. The Council 
favoured an Agency for the EU Member States, in which candidate countries could 
participate as observers, but it rejected the inclusion of the Western Balkan countries. The 
final text defined the Agency‟s geographical scope only to the EU Member States, but 
allowed candidate countries to participate as observers. The option of inviting potential 
candidate countries to participate in the Agency was left open in the future, depending on a 
unanimous decision of the Council and the relevant Association Council (“Proposal for a 
Regulation” 7 June 2006).   
Competence of the Agency regarding issues governed by the Title VI TEU 
The Commission proposal included the extension of the Agency‟s remit to third pillar 
issues – police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The Commission advocated 
that an Agency with responsibility for promoting and protecting fundamental rights should 
not exclude the aspects of police cooperation and judicial activities (Franco Frattini, 12 
October 2006). The LIBE Committee pushed strongly for the extension of the Agency‟s 
competence to the third pillar (“Committee Report” 25 September 2006). The EU needed a 
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full scale support for the protection and promotion of fundamental rights in all areas of 
Community activity. Limiting the Agency‟s remit outside police and judicial cooperation 
would impede the access to information the Agency needed for the proper execution of its 
tasks. The Council was divided on this issue. Some Member States found the Agency‟s 
competence in the third pillar unacceptable and thus the Council could not support this 
option (“Proposal for a Council Regulation” 29 November 2006). In the final text, the 
regulation did not extend the Agency‟s remit to police and judicial cooperation issues. The 
Council adopted a declaration whereby it agreed to reconsider before 31 December 2009 
the possibilities to empower the Agency to pursue its activities in the areas covered by Title 
VI
95
.  
Role of the EP in the structure of the Agency 
In order to enhance the legitimacy of the Agency, the EP argued for a greater role in the 
design of the Agency‟s mandate and structure. The LIBE Committee required a stronger 
role for the EP in the appointment of the Director of the Agency. It was important for the 
Agency to be led by a strong and independent figure and the EP required much greater 
involvement in the appointment process than what the Commission proposal had 
prescribed. This pledge for a stronger role of the EP in the work of the Fundamental Rights 
Agency was reflected in the EP‟s own initiative report96 of 25 May 2005.  In the Council, 
however, fears were expressed that a stronger involvement of the EP would set up a 
precedent and will deviate from the horizontal line taken as regards the other EU Agencies. 
Finally, due to the exceptional nature of the Agency, as part of the package deal the EP was 
allowed a more prominent role in the appointment of the FRA director
97
. 
                                                 
95
 With regard to police and judicial cooperation, the Council declared that it “…agrees to re-examine, before 
31 December 2009, the remit of the Agency for Fundamental Rights, with a view to the possibility of 
extending it to cover the areas of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters”.  
96
 European Parliament Resolution on Promotion and Protection of Fundamental Rights: the Role of National 
and European institutions, including the Fundamental Rights Agency (2005/2007(INI)). 
 
97
 In its declaration, the Council explicitly stated that this cannot “in any way be regarded as constituting a 
precedent which could be referred to when nominating the director of any other agency…” (“Proposal for a 
Council Regulation” 12 February 2007). 
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Table 6.7 Key Issues on Fundamental Rights Agency 
 
 
Text proposed by Commission Text proposed by LIBE 
Committee 27.09.2006 and 
adopted by EP  
Text Adopted by Council: Final 
text 
Recital 9     
(9) The Agency should refer in its 
work to fundamental rights as 
defined in Article 6(2) of the Treaty 
on European Union and as set out in 
particular in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. The close 
connection to the Charter should be 
reflected in the name of the Agency. 
 
 
  
Amendment 3, Recital (9) The Agency 
should refer in its work to fundamental 
rights as defined in Article 6(2) of the 
Treaty on European Union, including 
those set out in the European 
Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, and as 
reflected in particular in the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. The close 
connection to the Charter should be 
reflected in the name of the Agency. 
(9) The Agency should refer in its work 
to fundamental rights within the 
meaning of Article 6(2) of the Treaty on 
European Union, including the 
European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
and as reflected in particular in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
bearing in mind its status and the 
accompanying explanations. The 
close connection to the Charter should 
be reflected in the name of the Agency. 
Article 3 Scope      
3. When pursuing its activities, the 
Agency shall concern itself with the 
situation of fundamental rights in 
the European Union and in its 
Member States when 
implementing Community law, 
without prejudice to paragraph 4 and 
to Articles 4(1)(e), 27 and 28. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. The Agency shall deal with 
fundamental rights issues in the 
European Union and in its Member 
States when implementing Community 
law. In addition, it may deal with 
fundamental rights issues within the 
scope of paragraph 1 in those 
countries referred to in Article 27(1) 
to the extent necessary for the 
gradual alignment to Community law 
of the country concerned and in 
accordance with Article 27(2). 
 
 
 
Article 3 Scope 
1. The Agency shall carry out its tasks 
for the purpose of meeting the 
objective set in Article 2 within the 
competencies of the Community as laid 
down in the Treaty establishing the 
European Community. 
2. The Agency shall refer in carrying 
out its tasks to fundamental rights as 
defined in Article 6(2) of the Treaty on 
European Union. 
3. The Agency shall deal with 
fundamental-rights issues in the 
European Union and in its Member 
States when implementing Community 
law. 
Article 5  Areas of Activity     
Article 5 1. The Commission shall 
adopt a Multiannual Framework for 
the Agency in accordance with the 
regulatory procedure referred to in 
Article 29(2).  
 
 
 
Amendment 23, Article 5 1. The 
Management Board of the Agency, 
taking due account of the guidelines 
arising from European Parliament 
resolutions and Council conclusions in 
the field of fundamental rights, shall, on 
the basis of a proposal by the 
Commission, adopt a multiannual 
framework.   
Article 5 
1. The Council shall, acting on a 
proposal from the Commission and 
after consulting the European 
Parliament, adopt a Multi-annual 
Framework for the Agency. When 
preparing its proposal, the Commission 
shall consult the Management Board. 
Article 28 Participation and scope in respect of candidate countries    
Article 27  
1. The Agency shall be open to the 
participation of those countries 
which have concluded an 
association agreement with the 
Community and have been identified 
by the European Council as 
candidate countries or potential 
candidate countries for accession 
to the Union where the relevant 
Association Council decides on such 
participation. 
Amendment 39, Article 27  
1. The Agency shall be open to the 
participation of candidate countries 
and countries with which a 
Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement has been concluded by 
the European Community. 
 
 
 
Article 28 
Participation and scope in respect of 
candidate countries and countries with 
which a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement has been concluded 
1. The Agency shall be open to the 
participation of candidate countries 
as observers. 
 
 
 
No provision No provision 
3. The Council, acting unanimously on 
a proposal by the Commission, may 
decide to invite a country with which 
a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement has been concluded by 
the European Community to 
participate in the Agency as an 
observer. In that case, paragraph 2 
shall apply accordingly. 
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The Council reached clarity on its position early, due to its internal coordination 
mechanism of collecting written statements of Member States‟ favoured positions. A 
number of discussions on the proposal were held in the Ad hoc Working Party on 
Fundamental Rights and Citizenship
98
. The Working party held discussions on the Agency 
on 11 October, 7 and 24 November, 6 December 2005, 27 January, 17 and 31 March, 10, 
24 and 28 April, 24 May, 6 and 23 June, 10 July, 4 September 2006
99
.  In order to move the 
negotiations forward, on 17 February 2006, the Austrian Presidency requested Member 
States‟ written contributions on the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. By the beginning 
of April 2006, it was clear that the Council would favour an Agency with a very limited 
scope of competence. Member States had very different institutional arrangements for 
national human rights institutions. The scope of competence, degree of independence and 
level of resources of these institutions differed substantially across the EU
100
. 
The trialogue discussions started on the 4 April 2006, when the Austrian Presidency 
had a clear view of where Member States stood on the key issues of the regulation
101
. The 
Council Presidency was unwilling to change any of the Council positions on the proposal 
and it was reluctant to incorporate the EP‟s request for the extension of the Agency‟s remit 
to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The EP used its power of delay on 12 
October 2006. On 24 October and 05 November 2006 the Council organized “an informal 
group, consisting of the Presidency, the previous and incoming Presidencies, 
                                                 
98
 This Ad hoc Working Party was initially set up by COREPER with a view to examining the proposal for a 
Council Decision establishing for the period 2007-2013 the specific programme “Fundamental Rights and 
Citizenship” as part of the General Programme “Fundamental rights and Justice” (“Modification of the 
Terms” 18 January 2007). 
 
99
 Source: Council Document Register.  
 
100
 A National Body Charged with Monitoring Compliance with Human Rights existed in the following 
Member States: CY, CZ, DK, DE, EE, GR, FR, IR, LU, LV, SK, but not in AT, BE, ES, FI, HU, IT, LT, MT, 
NL, PL, PT, SK, SL, SE, and UK (Source: "Commission Staff Working Chapter" 5 July 2005).  
 
101
 A minority of Member States supported the extension of the Agency‟s scope to Title VI of TEU (Policy 
and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters). CY, DE, IR, LV, MT, SK, UK in favour and AT, BE, EE, ES, 
FI, GR, FR, IT, HU, LU, PL, SE, SL against.  Source: “Proposal for a Regulation” Council of the European 
Union. 7 June 2006. 
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representatives of the Commission and the Council Secretariat, and the legal services of 
the Council and the Commission” (“Proposal for a Council Regulation” 20 November 
2006). During these informal discussions, all Council proposals were accepted. As the 
proposal was highly controversial, even a regulation in this form was an achievement for 
the Commission. In exchange, in order to appease the LIBE committee, the Member States 
in the Council agreed to issue political declarations to complement the regulation. The 
Council invited the EP to another trialogue meeting on 15 November 2006 during which 
“Parliament indicated it would proceed to vote in the plenary on 29 or 30 November 2006” 
(“Proposal for a Council Regulation” 20 November 2006).  
The EP found it more difficult to ensure a unified position on this piece of 
legislation, due to the longer committee work and the intra-parliamentary political 
differences. The EP started the discussions on the Agency almost as early as the Council in 
September 2005 and it was very active in debating a compromise solution to the proposed 
regulation in parallel to the Council. However, the EP was slowed down due to the many 
committees involved in the process. The AFCO, AFET, BUDG and FEMM Committees 
also had to file opinions on the proposal.  
The LIBE committee met for a first exchange of views on 04 October 2005. Joint 
debates followed on 24 November 2005 and 24 January 2006. Rapporteur Gal presented 
her draft report of 7 February 2006. The LIBE Committee met, together with 
representatives from AFCO, AFET, FEMM and BUDG on 22 February 2006 and 23 March 
2006 to discuss Gal‟s report and file further amendments. The LIBE, AFCO, AFET, BUDG 
and FEMM committees met again on 4 May and 1 June 2006. Close cooperation took place 
between LIBE rapporteur Kinga Gal (EPP-ED) and Cel Ozdemir (Verts/ALE) from AFET.  
Representatives from the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, the 
Dutch Senate, the UK House of Lords and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe were also present for the joint debates (“Meetings of LIBE” 2006). 
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Moreover, the LIBE committee position was contested during the EP plenary debate 
on 12 October 2006
102
. Such divisions among the MEPs made it very difficult for the EP as 
an institution to present a united front on fundamental rights before the Council. This 
division in the EP undermined the role of the LIBE Committee rapporteur as an effective 
negotiator with the Council. Kinga Gál requested that the vote be postponed under Rule 
53(2). This automatically brought her report to the LIBE Committee
103
. 
After the EP delayed the vote, another trialogue was organized on 15 November 
2005, under the direction of the Commission and the Council. Commissioner Franco 
Frattini underlined the need for the EP to show support for the proposal and to vote in 
favour of the initiative with a large majority: “We have worked together to give Parliament 
a strong and authoritative voice, even in the absence of the formal codecision procedure. 
Let us avoid a division in this Parliament that would give the Council the impression that, 
all things considered, it might even take decisions alone. This is a political necessity…” 
(“Parliamentary Debates” 12 October 2006).   
The EP delayed the vote on 12 October, but within a month it was clear that the 
political declarations were the maximum it could achieve
104
. Rapporteur Gal requested that  
                                                 
102
After some members of the EPP-ED group voiced their concerns about the future Agency and opposed its 
establishment, French Socialist MEP Martine Roure indicated that: “… in the [LIBE] Committee we seemed 
to be in agreement; at least that is what our votes indicate. I must admit that we are somewhat flummoxed by 
the position of the [EPP-ED] today, which does not match up in any way at all with the debate we conducted 
in the [LIBE] Committee. What purpose, then, is served by debates in committee?” (“Plenary Debates” 12 
October 2006).  
 
The creation of yet another Agency was seen as a purely bureaucratic and costly act (Hubert Pirker, PPE-DE, 
DE, 12 October 2006). 
 
 Moreover, introducing references to the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the regulation was seen as “trying 
to sneak large parts of the Constitution in through the back door” (Roger Knapman, IND/DEM, 12 October 
2006). 
 
103
 “We are looking forward to an acceptable compromise with the Council. It is for this reason that we are 
postponing the final vote and referring the report back to the Committee, in the hope that the Council will 
take seriously its own decision regarding the 1 January 2007 date. (“Plenary Debates” 12 October 2006).  
  
104
 This was reflected in Commissioner Frattini‟s speech on 12 October 2006 at the EP: “The trialogue 
method, which has enabled us to come to an agreement on many occasions, is, in fact, a political solution: 
even though, from an institutional and legal point of view, we are sadly not in the presence of a formal 
codecision procedure, this political solution has enabled us thus far to develop an excellent working 
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EP supported this arrangement on 30 November 2006: “…the Council and the Commission 
have decided to add political declarations to complement the legal document. This was 
accepted by Parliament in a round of trialogue discussions. I would therefore ask the 
House to vote in favour in the final vote on these issues and not block the process any 
more” (“Plenary Debates” 30 November 2006).  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the legislative influence of the European Parliament in the 
consultation procedure. It studied Parliament‟s role in legislative decision-making on all 
consultation proposals (925) completed between 1 May 1999 and 30 April 2007. In line 
with the existing literature, the chapter confirmed that the power of the European 
Parliament is very limited in consultation. Nevertheless, the results suggest that the 
European Parliament can act as an influential legislative institution in the consultation 
procedure. Package deals increase the legislative influence of the European Parliament in 
consultation. While the EP‟s ability to delay is largely conditional on Commission support 
and proposal urgency, the European Parliament has a much greater say in legislative 
matters than the established understanding of the consultation procedure implies.  
Without exaggerating Parliament‟s influence, the chapter found that delay is an 
important legislative power for the European Parliament. The power to delay allows the EP 
to enjoy important benefits in the legislative system. First, through delay the Parliament 
manages to force concessions from the Council and the Commission. Delay allows the EP 
to see many of its preferences incorporated in the final legislative texts. Second, delay 
opens the door for informal negotiations between the Council and Parliament. While 
informal negotiations have become a typical element of Council - EP legislative work 
                                                                                                                                               
relationship… what we are discussing here might also serve as a good example for many other sectors to 
which the codecision procedure has unfortunately not yet been applied” (“Plenary Debate” 12 October 2006). 
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under co-decision, there are few incentives for Member States to seek informal contacts in 
consultation. However, when the EP delays its opinion and Member States need an urgent 
decision, the Council has an incentive to speed-up the procedure through informal contacts. 
Third, delay gives the consultation procedure two readings. Formally, the consultation 
procedure consists of only one reading. However, by delaying its final vote, the EP gains an 
additional reading. The EP makes its position on the Commission proposal known, but the 
plenary refrains from issuing an opinion. Once aware of the EP‟s preferences, the Member 
States negotiate informally with MEPs in order to speed-up the decision-making process. 
Thus, through delay, the EP transforms the simple consultation procedure into a decision-
making procedure with two readings.   
The case studies demonstrated that informal negotiations also take place under the 
consultation procedure. Despite its very limited legislative role in consultation, through 
informal negotiations, package deals and delay, the EP actively participates in the 
legislative process. In addition to package deals and delay, the issue type contested and 
Commission support appeared to be significant predictors of EP success. Overall, the 
empirical analysis demonstrated that the European Parliament‟s role in the consultation 
procedure is far from insignificant. Contrary to the conventional understanding of 
legislative politics in consultation, the results indicate that the EP can act as an important 
legislative institution alongside the Council and the Commission. Most importantly, the EP 
has the ability to obtain gains over some of the EU‟s most substantial legislative proposals. 
The next chapter examines the  legislative influence of the European Parliament in the co-
decision procedure.  
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CHAPTER 7 : PACKAGE DEALS AND THE LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE OF 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN THE CO-DECISION PROCEDURE  
 
Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the European Parliament‟s legislative influence in the co-decision 
procedure by paying special attention to the informal trialogue negotiations, typical for co-
decision bargaining. The chapter tests Hypothesis 5 that package deals increase the 
likelihood of European Parliament success in influencing legislative outcomes in the co-
decision procedure. It tests Hypothesis 6, which states that trialogues do not increase the 
likelihood of EP success in influencing legislative outcomes. It also tests Hypothesis 7 that 
Council impatience increases the likelihood of European Parliament success in influencing 
legislative outcomes in the co-decision procedure. The chapter is a response to the limited 
research on the development of trialogue negotiations in EU legislative politics and the 
scarce empirical testing of their effect on the legislative role of the European Parliament.  
Informal trialogues do not automatically increase the legislative influence of the 
European Parliament. Trialogues are institutionalized at the inter-cameral level in order to 
capture the gains from trade. Trialogues provide the institutional structure for legislative 
exchange between the Parliament and the Council. Their informal nature allows EU 
legislators to exchange favours during the decision-making process and to negotiate 
acceptable to both sides deals, thus avoiding gridlock. Trialogue procedures provide the 
framework for legislative exchange where Member States realize their budgetary 
preferences while the European Parliament secures additional institutional powers.  
The chapter studies the European Parliament‟s legislative behaviour on all co-
decision proposals (540) completed between 1 May 1999 and 30 April 2007. The analysis 
is based on a detailed examination of all 1567 issues the European Parliament contested in 
470 amended pieces of legislation. The analysis tests whether and to what extent EP 
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legislative influence depends on the availability of package deals, Council impatience, the 
presence of trialogues, the salience of the proposal, the type of issues, EP cohesion and 
Commission support. The results confirm that trialogues do not automatically increase the 
legislative role of the European Parliament. EP influence in the co-decision procedure is 
conditional on the availability of package deals, Council impatience, salience, EP cohesion 
and Commission support.   
Section I of the chapter presents an overview of the development of trialogue 
procedures in the EU legislative process between 1 May 1999 and 30 April 2007 and 
reviews the existing literature on the effect of trialogues on EP legislative influence. 
Section II develops the hypotheses to be tested. Section III presents the analysis of the 
European Parliament‟s legislative success in co-decision through a detailed examination of 
the issues the Parliament contested in all proposals during the period. Section IV illustrates 
the findings with two case studies.  
 
7.1 Development of the Trialogue Procedure  
The development of the co-decision procedure has lead to an increased collaboration 
between the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the Commission. Since 
1999 a growing number of legislative proposals have been accepted at first reading and this 
has lead to a significant decrease in decision-making time. While only 25% of the co-
decision proposals were decided at first reading in 2000, more than 70% of the proposals 
were first reading agreements in 2006. Accordingly, while the average decision-making 
time in 2000 was 630 days, legislative decision-making only took on average 350 days in 
2006
105
.  
In the framework of the co-decision procedure, the members of the Council and the 
EP have established a new institutional mechanism with the view to resolving inter-
                                                 
105
 European Parliament Legislative Observatory http://www.europarl.eu/oeil; Own calculations  
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institutional conflict and reaching consensus earlier in the legislative process – the 
trialogue
106
. Trialogues are informal legislative meetings which consist of a limited number 
of participants from the Council, the EP and the Commission. They facilitate intense 
negotiations between the EU legislative institutions prior to formal voting
107
. While 
initially associated with the preparation of the conciliation committees, trialogue 
procedures have spread throughout the co-decision process and they have also been used in 
the consultation procedure.  
More than 74% of co-decision legislation went through at least one informal inter-
institutional meeting in the period between 1 May 1999 and 30 April 2007. All third 
readings, 79% of the first readings and 61% of the second reading legislative proposals 
were discussed by the Council and the EP in informal meetings
108
. In 2000 only around 
40% of the co-decisions (including the third readings) involved trialogue contacts. In 2006, 
more than 90% of the proposals were negotiated through informal meetings. Table 7.1 
presents the distribution of the 540 co-decision proposals completed in the period according 
to reading, policy area, and use of trialogue procedures in the decision-making process. The 
policy areas with the highest percentage of legislative proposals decided at trialogues were 
Environment (86%), Employment and Social Affairs and Information Society (85%), 
Justice, Freedom and Security (92%), Energy and Transport and Enterprise and Industry 
(80%), and Internal Market (78%). 
Because of their frequent use in the EU legislative process, trialogues have been 
gradually institutionalised in the EU legislative process. The guidelines on the preparation,  
                                                 
106
   Trialogues were first introduced in 1995 (Shackleton, 2000). Inter-institutional trialogue procedures 
require careful preparation and the intentional establishment of informal contacts by the Council and the EP. 
107
   Commissioner Michaele Schreyer (DE, Budget): „…we will begin the trilogue, that is to say, the actual 
negotiations.‟ (European Parliament, 2003b).  
 
108
   Own calculations. The employment of trialogue meetings in the co-decision procedure was traced 
through the Council‟s document register and the European Parliament‟s plenary debates and summaries of 
sittings.  A proposal was counted as a trialogue proposal if at least one informal trialogue between the 
Council, the EP and the Commission had taken place in the course of the negotiations. Evidence for the 
informal inter-institutional legislative contacts had to be found in the Council‟s working documents; in the 
EP‟s plenary summaries of sittings and debates; or in both.  
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participation and reporting of trialogue meetings were set out in the 2004 EP Guidelines for 
First and Second Reading Agreements. The 2007 Joint Declaration on Practical 
Arrangements for the Co-decision Procedure explicitly includes a reference to the practice 
of trialogue negotiations
109
. Despite their informal nature, trialogues are documented 
consistently by the Council and the EP. Both institutions report on the dates, the 
participants and the outcome of trialogue meetings
110
. Moreover, the negotiations in around 
5% of the consultation procedures involved a trialogue.  
Therefore, the initially informal practice of trialogue negotiations has become 
formalised in the EU legislative process. In 75% of the cases, trialogue negotiations 
involved the rapporteur of the EP drafting committee (and occasionally the 
chairperson/shadow rapporteurs), a representative from the Council Presidency and a 
representative from the Commission. However, in 25% of the cases the EP was represented 
by two negotiating agents: the rapporteur and the political group leaders. In some of the 
most controversial legislative proposals, the political group leaders were the effective 
negotiators on behalf of the EP, largely undermining the work of the rapporteur and 
overriding the position reached in the EP drafting committees.  
In contrast to the EP, the Council only mandates one actor with the right to 
negotiate an informal inter-institutional compromise, the Presidency. The Presidency 
initiates and leads the negotiations with the EP, but the established reporting practice in the 
Council allows it little agenda-setting freedom and ensures that Member States retain 
                                                 
109
   „... cooperation between the institutions in the context of codecision often takes the form of tripartite 
meetings (trialogues) which have demonstrated their vitality and flexibility in increasing significantly the 
possibilities for agreement at first and second reading stages, as well as contributing to the preparation of the 
work of the Conciliation Committee‟ (European Parliament, 2007: 7-9). 
 
110
   The Council document register contains evidence of 96% of the proposals that were negotiated at a 
trialogue in the period 1 May 1999 – 30 April 2007. The Council‟s working documents contain more detailed 
information on the participants, timing and agenda of informal meetings. The EP Plenary debates and 
summaries of sittings account for around 45% of the trialogues. However, 135 (of 442) EP plenary debates 
involved a discussion of the outcome of trialogue negotiations.  
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control over informal trialogue negotiations
111
. What explains the use of trialogue 
procedures in the EU legislative process?  
 
Table 7.1 Legislative Proposals under the Co-decision Procedure: 1999 – 2007 
Policy Area (Commission DG) 
Total 
proposals 
Non 
Amended 
Amended w/o 
trialogues 
Amended with 
trialogues 
          
Agriculture & Rural Development 9 1 6 2 (25%) 
Budget 12 3 7 2 (22%) 
Development 9 1 2 6 (75%) 
Economic and Financial Affairs 2 - - 2 (100%) 
Education and Culture 26 1 9 16 (64%) 
Employment and Social Affairs  22 2 3 17 (85%) 
Energy and Transport 102 7 19 76 (80%) 
Enterprise and Industry 64 10 11 43 (80%) 
Environment 53 4 7 42 (86%) 
Eurostat, Statistical Office 38 6 19 13 (41%) 
External Relations 12 - 5 7 (58%) 
General Secretariat 3 1 - 2 (100%) 
Health and Consumer Protection 57 1 15 41 (73%) 
Information Society 24 4 3 17 (85%) 
Internal Market and Services 48 7 9 32 (78%) 
Justice, Freedom and Security 26 2 2 22 (92%) 
Legal Service 17 17 - - 
Regional Policy 1 1 - - 
Research 7 - - 7 (100%) 
Taxation and Customs Union 8 - 6 2 (25%) 
     
Total Co-decision Proposals 540 70 121 349 (74%) 
 of which First Readings 248 58 39 151 (79%) 
    of which Second Readings  222 12 82 128 (61%) 
        of which Third Readings 70  - - 70 (100%) 
Source: European Parliament Legislative Observatory; the 540 proposals comprise of 231 directives, 211  
regulations, 89 decisions and 9 recommendations.  
 
 
7.2 Statistical Analysis of the Use of Trialogues in the EU Legislative Process 
As the dependent variable is dichotomous (Trialogue/No Trialogue), logistic regressions 
are used to examine the effect of the independent variables on the probability of trialogues 
in the EU. The 973 proposals belong to 19 policy areas and are spread over 8 years. Three 
empty multilevel models are estimated to test whether proposals part of the same policy 
area and year share a similar probability of being discussed through an informal inter-
institutional trialogue meeting.  
                                                 
111
   To start informal contacts with the EP, the Presidency requires a mandate from Coreper and it is obliged 
to report back the results of the informal meetings. Coreper reviews the results and requires the responsible 
Council working party to draft a compromise text. The revised text is then referred to the Presidency for 
further negotiations with the EP.  
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The hypothetical effects of the policy area and time levels are tested to examine 
whether the variance of the probability of a trialogue procedure is due to these contextual 
factors. The relevance of the contextual level and the improvements in the fit of the models 
are compared after including the different contexts. The results show that the use of inter-
chamber trialogues in EU decision-making varies across policy areas and the years 1999 – 
2007. Accounting for the contextual effects of the policy area and time levels, Modes 4 to 9 
test for the effects of several independent variables. The models tests of the effect of the 
presence of package deal negotiations, proposal salience and urgency, Council impatience, 
codecision, the concentration of multi-issue legislation in a policy area and the involvement 
of party leaders in the EP in the writing of a proposal. Model 4-6 are applied to all EU 
legislation, whereas Models 7-9 are applied to the co-decision procedure. The results are 
presented in Table 7.2. The coefficients of the variables, their standard errors, and the odds 
ratios are reported. 
First, the use of trialogue meetings is positively correlated with the development of 
the co-decision procedure. Legislative drafts proposed in recent years are more likely to be 
negotiated through a trialogue. Co-decision creates legislative interdependence between the 
EP and the Council and trialogues serve as the institutional mechanisms for the resolution 
of conflict and inter-chamber compromise. Second, trialogues are positively correlated with 
package deals. Logrolls and informal bargains are fragile agreements and they require an 
enforcement mechanism. The trialogue procedure serves as such an institutional 
enforcement mechanism.  
Third, the probability of trialogue use increases with Council impatience. When 
Member States are pressed by time, they are more likely to look for informal mechanisms 
for achieving compromise. This is further confirmed with the statistically significant and 
positively correlated Urgent variable.  
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Table 7.2 Use of Trialogue Procedures in the EU Legislative Process, 1999 - 2007 
Trialogue Procedures in the European Union, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: Trialogue 
         Co-decision Procedure  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E.  Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E.  Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E. Odds Ratio 
Fixed Effects              
Package Deal - - -   1.970 ***  1.849***  2.044 ***  - 1.690 ***  2.182 *** 8.866 
     (.265) (.306) (.391)    (.393) (.508)  
Proposal Salience - - -   .039  *** .040 ***  .055 ***  -  .070 ***  .084 *** 1.088 
     (.009) (.011) (.015)    (.017) (.022)  
Council Impatience  - - -  1.366  *** 1.541 *** .867 ***  - .852 *** .787 * 2.197 
     (.212) (.263) (.352)    (.380) (.450)  
Urgent - - -  .476 ** .556 ** .179  - .334 -.417 .659 
     ( .235) ( .285) (.344)    ( .378 ( .458)  
Urgent for the Commission - - -  -.375 -.682 ** -.885 **  - -.377 -.550 .577 
     ( .277) ( .337) ( .435)    ( .462) ( .566)  
Codecision - - -  - 4.273 *** 6.010 ***  - - - - 
      ( .336) ( .661)       
Policy Area Issue Complexity - - -  .041 *** - .018  - .018 * .024 1.024 
     (.015)  (.012)    ( .010) ( .015)  
Party Leaders Involved - - -  2.563 *** 1.880 ***  1.881***  -  1.729 ***  1.990 *** 7.315 
     ( .441) ( .479) ( .535)    ( .523) ( .607)  
Intercept -.529  -.414 ** -.648 *  -4.975 *** -5.074 *** -7.124 ***  2.155 ** -1.115 -1.365 - 
 (.334) (.193) (.354)  (.941) (.418) (1.073)  (.845) (.997) (1.360)  
Random Effects               
Policy Area Level (std.dev.) 1.390 ***  2.077 ***   1.219 ** *  .436 **  1.288 *  1.212 * - 1.262 * - 
 (.254)  (.233)   (.250)  (.189)  (.271)   (.274)   (.363)  
Year Level  (std.dev.)  .507*** .791  - -  1.757 *  2.313 ** 2.085 **  2.610 ** - 
  (.151) (.328)     (.539)   (.784)  (.757)  (.977)  
-2 x Log Likelihood 1026.206 1274.476 990.869  739.316 524.604 453.288  428.265 323.802 313.752  
Model Improvement  - 35.337  286,89 501,602 572.920    104.463 114.513  
              
N Proposals 973 973 973  973 973 973  470 470 470  
N Policy Areas  19 19 19  19 19 19  19 19 19  
N Years  8 8 8   8 8 8   8 8 8   
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01              
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When proposals are urgent and there is an approaching deadline, trialogues are 
more likely to take place. The Urgent for the Commission variable is negatively correlated 
with the use of trialogues. This signifies that trialogue procedures are not about coping with 
administrative urgency. Rather, trialogues are likely to be used when proposals are urgent 
for the Member States (when the proposal adoption was discussed at a previous European 
Council meeting).  
Moreover, the probability of trialogues increases with the salience of the legislative 
proposal. Longer and more important legislative dossiers require frequent informal contacts 
between the Council and the EP prior to the formal vote
112
. In addition, trialogues are more 
likely to take place in issue-complex policy areas as the need for inter-institutional 
compromise leads to the use of trialogue procedures. The greater the issue complexity in a 
policy area, the greater is the interaction between the Parliament and the Council. Due to 
these repeated interactions, the legislative chambers resort to informal means of inter-
institutional lawmaking.  
The agreements made at trialogue meetings are regarded as binding enforceable 
commitments by both the European Parliament
113
 and the Member States
114
. The 
involvement of political group leaders in the writing of a legislative proposal is also 
positively correlated with trialogues. This is an expected outcome, as political group 
leaders have the institutional tools to enforce the informal commitments agreed at  
                                                 
112
   Salience is measured by the number of recitals in a proposal. For example, the Services directive 
(COD/2004/0001) contains 118, the Money Laundering directive (COD/2004/0137) and the SIS II 
(COD/2005/0106) regulation contain 48 and 36 recitals respectively, while the regulation on Forest protection 
(COD/2001/0268) contains only 6 recitals.   
 
113
   Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann (GUE/NGL, DE), MEP: „It is not acceptable that new demands should be 
made after the conclusion of the trilogue, thereby putting a pistol to Parliament‟s head‟ (European 
Parliament, 2006a). 
 
114
   „In accordance with the provisions of Article 251(2) of the EC Treaty and the joint declaration on 
practical arrangements for the codecision procedure, a number of informal contacts have taken place 
between the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission with a view to reaching an agreement on 
this dossier at first reading, thereby avoiding the need for a second reading and conciliation...The 
amendments adopted correspond to what was agreed between the three institutions and ought therefore to be 
acceptable to the Council.‟ (Council of the EU, 2006a). 
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trialogues. In 96% of the cases the compromises achieved at trialogue meetings were voted 
in favour without amendment by the European Parliament and were accepted by the 
Council as they stood. Hence, trialogue meetings are not only frequently used in the EU 
legislative process, but they are also regarded by the EU legislators as procedures leading to 
enforceable inter-chamber deals. What is the effect of the use of trialogue procedures on 
EU legislative outcomes?  
Several authors have recognized the development of trialogue arrangements in the 
co-decision procedure (Garman and Hilditch, 1998; Shackleton, 2000; 2005; Shackleton 
and Raunio, 2003; Rasmussen, 2003; Rasmussen and Shackleton, 2005; Stacey, 2003; 
Stacey and Rittberger, 2003; Farrell and Heritier, 2003; 2004; Steunenberg and Selck, 
2006; Haege and Kaeding, 2007; Reh, 2008; Settembri and Neuhold, 2009). Farrell and 
Heritier (2003, 2004) argue that the increasing use of informal negotiations in the co-
decision process leads to a greater legislative influence of the European Parliament. 
Through its involvement in informal legislative meetings, the Parliament is understood to 
gain legislative powers vis-à-vis the Council.  
Steunenberg and Selck (2006: 81) also argue that informal trialogues allow the 
Parliament to shape the legislative proposal in co-decision and to influence the discussions 
in the subsequent stages of the legislative process. By making the initial proposal to the 
Council, the Parliament is viewed as having a first mover advantage, which forms the 
starting point for further negotiations. Haege and Keading (2007: 357) also find that „...the 
Parliament can extract more concessions in terms of policy from its counterparts in 
informal negotiations‟.  
Contrary to these arguments, this chapter argues that trialogues do not increase the 
European Parliament‟s influence on policy outcomes in the EU. It argues that package 
deals and Council impatience increase the EP‟s probability of affecting legislative 
outcomes. 
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7.3 Parliament’s Legislative Influence  
 
Package Deals 
In order to reach compromise in co-decision, Member States find it profitable to trade 
support for some issues in return for the EP‟s cooperation on other issues. EU legislators 
choose to trade policy packages in order to speed up their daily legislative work. Through 
the linkage of proposals and issues in package deals both the EP and the Council can obtain 
their most preferred items on the legislative agenda and compromise some of the other 
issues. Therefore, some legislative deals reached in trialogues can be highly profitable for 
the Parliament. At the same time, every exchange involves certain losses. While gaining in 
some issues the EP will simultaneously lose in others. 
Package deals ensure the enforceability of legislative bargains as they involve the 
binding of several legislative proposals and their discussion and decision at the same time. 
Thus, the general non-enforceability of Council-Parliament informal deals is overcome 
through the conclusion of package deals. As package deals allow each chamber to extract 
its most favoured outcomes, the linkage of proposals in a package increases the likelihood 
of European Parliament success in legislative outcomes.  
The EP will be more successful in co-decision when it negotiates several issues 
and/or acts in a package and treats them as one during the legislative process. The 
Parliament may refuse to cooperate with the Council on a proposal until the Member States 
respect the EP position on another co-decision proposal. Faced with several blocked 
proposals in a package, the Council is likely to reconsider its position and allow 
concessions closer to Parliament‟s preferred outcome. Therefore, if the EP can trade its 
support on one proposal for support on another co-decision proposal, then it is more likely 
to get concessions from the Council. This leads to the first hypothesis:  
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Hypothesis 1: Package deals increase the likelihood of EP success in influencing the 
legislative text under the co-decision procedure. 
 
The chapter argues that trialogues do not automatically lead to greater legislative influence 
for the European Parliament in the co-decision procedure. Trialogues structure the 
framework of inter-institutional exchange in the EU, but package deals are the results of 
successful legislative trade between the EP and the Council. In exchange for supporting the 
Member States‟ financial preferences, the European Parliament receives further 
institutional and administrative powers as a side payment. Therefore, through its 
participation in trialogues the European Parliament loses in budgetary issues, while in 
return it gains additional institutional capabilities.  
Trialogues provide the institutional structure for legislative exchange between the 
Parliament and the Council. Their informal nature allows EU legislators to exchange 
favours during the decision-making process and to negotiate acceptable to both sides deals, 
thus avoiding gridlock. Trialogues do not directly lead to increased EP legislative influence 
as they only provide the institutional framework for legislative bargaining between the EP 
and the Council. Trialogue procedures have become institutionalized as a practical reaction 
to three structural features of the EU legislative system: co-decision interdependence, inter-
institutional conflict, and legislative transaction costs. First, the co-decision procedure 
creates an environment of repeated interactions between the Parliament and the Council. 
Agreement on co-decision proposals depends on the consent of both legislative institutions. 
This interdependence creates the necessity to coordinate inter-institutional decision-making 
in order to sustain an efficient EU legislative process.  
Second, trialogues serve the common purpose of conflict resolution. They provide 
the institutional setting in which governments and MEPs overcome the distinct clashes of 
their ideological, political and policy preferences in the creation of EU legislation. 
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Trialogue procedures allow the EP and the Council to communicate their intentions 
informally and to exchange information on their positions early in the legislative process. 
Consensus in co-decision is therefore sustained through increased communication between 
the EP and the Council and through the establishment of a stable cooperative relationship 
between the two legislative branches.  
Third, as decision-making is a costly activity, it is in the interest of both legislative 
institutions to reach agreement early in the decision-making process. The failure of the 
Parliament and the Council to find consensus leads to the non-adoption of legislation. The 
time constraints of the legislative process require the close cooperation between the EP and 
the Council in order to accommodate the preferences of both sides. Therefore, trialogue 
procedures allow EU legislators to cut the costs of co-decision making. They provide the 
informal setting in which binding enforceable agreements are reached between 
representatives of the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission. The mere 
participation at a trialogue, however, does not imply that the European Parliament will 
succeed in striking a successful legislative deal with the Council. This argument is tested 
with the second hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Trialogues do not increase the likelihood of EP success in influencing 
legislative outcomes under the co-decision procedure. 
 
The urgency of legislative proposals is expected to induce a larger number of concessions 
granted to the European Parliament by Member States. In co-decision, it is important 
whether the Council or the Parliament are more impatient about the passage of legislation. 
If the Council is impatient about the conclusion of the legislative process on a certain 
proposal, it is more likely to cooperate with the Parliament and to grant it concessions in 
return for an early conclusion. In cases when the Council is relatively more impatient than 
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the EP, the Parliament has a greater chance of influencing legislation. On the other hand, 
when the Parliament is impatient about the conclusion of a legislative deal, it will be in a 
weaker bargaining position and it will be less successful in influencing the legislative text.  
Early discussions in the Council and the preparation of a Presidency draft text imply 
the Member States‟ strong interest in ending the legislative process quickly. When the 
Member States are interested in a legislative compromise they are more likely to grant 
concessions to the EP. If Member States in the Council initiate the drafting of a proposal, 
they are more impatient about its conclusion and are more likely to cooperate with the EP 
in order to reach a deal earlier. Under this condition, legislative negotiations are likely to 
work in favour of the EP. A more impatient and hence a more cooperative Council is more 
likely to take on board the EP‟s demands. This leads to the third hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 3: The relative impatience of the Council increases the likelihood of EP success 
in influencing the legislative text under the co-decision procedure. 
 
Several hypotheses derived from the existing literature are included in the analysis. This 
way, the findings of this chapter can be directly linked to existing knowledge about the co-
decision procedure. First, the different preference intensities of actors may have an effect 
on EP success in the co-decision procedure. The institution of the trialogue is sustained 
because it allows the legislative institutions to express different intensities of preferences 
on legislative proposals (Stratmann 1995). Due to their flexible nature trialogues expand 
the horizon for legislative exchange of both institutions by allowing the EP and the Council 
to benefit from informal decision-making. The EP can lend its support for the Council‟s 
favourite issues in exchange for the Council‟s support for the EP‟s most salient matters. 
Legislators‟ positions can vary substantially on different types of issues, even if they are 
part of the same proposal. 
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In very salient for the Council cases, the Council is more likely to cooperate with 
the Parliament. These incentives to cooperate will allow the Parliament to realize its 
preferences in the legislative text. For legislative exchange to take place, the EP and the 
Council need to attach different intensities of preferences to a proposal. If a proposal is 
equally important to the EP and the Council, no opportunities for legislative trade exist. 
The Parliament can benefit from legislative exchange only if there is a difference in the 
levels of institutional preferences of the Council and the EP. If the relative intensity of 
preferences between the Parliament and the Council differs, then the legislative institutions 
can trade their support. This implies that the EP is more likely to succeed in influencing 
legislative proposals under co-decision if it attaches relatively higher salience to an issue 
than the Council. Therefore:  
 
Hypothesis 4: The greater the relative salience of the proposal for the Parliament, the more 
likely the EP is to succeed in influencing the legislative text under the co-decision 
procedure. 
 
Moreover, the Parliament may be more likely to succeed in obtaining concessions from the 
Council when it is cohesive (Kreppel, 2002). Divisions between the political groups 
weaken the bargaining position of the EP vis-à-vis the Council. The Council is unlikely to 
enter negotiations with the EP if there is a pronounced division in the Parliament. Any 
compromises achieved between the Council and the representatives of a divided Parliament 
may easily be rejected and overturned by the plenary vote. Divisions in the EP also 
undermine the negotiating position of the EP‟s bargaining agents due to the uncertainty of 
the direction and size of the EP‟s preferences. Thus, in order to find its demands 
successfully adopted in the legislative text, the Parliament should ensure it secures a large 
majority in favour of the proposed committee position.  
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In addition, the EP is more likely to be successful if it speaks with one voice at 
inter-institutional meetings. The EP is more likely to succeed in negotiations if a single EP 
representative enters legislative trade relations with the Council. The EP will be more 
successful in cases where the Council and the EP rapporteur conclude a legislative deal and 
the plenary supports it. The availability of more than a single negotiating agent on behalf of 
the EP suggests internal divisions in the EP. The Council gains the opportunity to choose 
with whom to strike a legislative deal. As the political group leaders control „those with the 
numbers‟, the Council is likely to choose them in the bargaining process. This can 
undermine and often exclude the rapporteur and the committee‟s position. Hence, inter-
institutional deals between the Council and MEPs, other than the rapporteur, are likely to 
decrease the EP‟s legislative influence. If the EP plenary supports the committee report as it 
stands, the EP is more likely to be influential on the legislative text. Therefore:  
 
Hypothesis 5: The more cohesive the Parliament in its support for the committee proposal, 
the more likely it is to succeed in influencing the legislative text. 
 
The institutionalization of trialogue procedures in co-decision may also be a profitable 
institutional arrangement for the Commission (Rasmussen, 2003; Rasmussen and 
Shackleton, 2005; Konig et al. 2007). Trialogues allow the formally weak Commission to 
regain its seat at the legislative table alongside the EP and the Council. Through the 
informal arrangements, the Commission gains presence in the inter-institutional 
negotiations on some of the EU‟s most controversial legislative proposals. Although in the 
co-decision procedure the EP and the Council have the formal power to change entirely the 
legislative text regardless of the Commission‟s position, the Commission still seems to be 
an important legislative player.  
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As the Commission ensures its participation in co-decision making, its position and 
support are likely to affect the legislative balance between the EP and the Council. The 
Commission acts informally between the Council and the Parliament and it has the ability 
to persuade the Presidency and the Member States to incorporate Parliament‟s demands. 
Even in informal trialogues when the Council and the Parliament can reach compromise 
without the active participation of the Commission, the opinion of the Commission is still 
highly respected. Hence, the support of the Commission is likely to work in favour of 
Parliamentary success. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 6: Commission support increases the likelihood of EP success in influencing the 
legislative text under the co-decision procedure.  
 
7.4 Empirical Analysis of the EP’s Legislative Influence in Co-decision 
Whereas in the consultation procedure the EP amends only 55% of the legislative 
proposals, in the co-decision procedure it amends around 87% of the proposals. The 
number of amendments the EP proposed to the 470 amended proposals in the period 1999 – 
2007 varied between 1 and 322. However, as the use of informal trialogues has increased in 
recent years, many of the amendments the EP submits are the result of compromise deals 
with the Council. The large number of proposed EP amendments is very often the 
combination of the EP‟s and the Council‟s amendments. With a view to concluding the 
legislative process early, the two chambers agree that all compromise amendments are 
included in the EP proposal. As a result, many of the amendments submitted to the EP 
plenary already contain the Council preferences
115
. 
                                                 
115
   For example, in the case of the regulation on Spirit Drinks 2005/0028 (COD) the „rapporteur, Mr Horst 
Schnellhardt (EPP/ED-DE), presented a report on behalf of the Committee on the Environment, Public 
Health and Food Safety containing 123 amendments…a number of informal contacts took place between the 
Council, the European Parliament and the Commission with a view to reaching an agreement on this dossier 
at first reading…Various political groups and individual MEPs tabled a further 26 amendments … six 
amendments (amendments 126-7 and 142-5) were compromise amendments which correspond to the 
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Furthermore, instead of voting on a series of amendments, the European Parliament 
increasingly considers compromise texts that are submitted as a single amendment, 
containing the complete legislative text
116
. Therefore, what may seem as a single EP 
amendment to the Commission proposal, is in fact a revised version of the whole legislative 
proposal. In cases when the EP resolution is submitted as a compromise text and not in the 
form of amendments, it is impossible to distinguish the changes introduced by the 
European Parliament. Therefore, the examination of the number of amendments submitted 
by the European Parliament and their adoption rate no longer offers an accurate way of 
measuring the European Parliament‟s legislative influence in the co-decision procedure. 
Breaking the proposals to the contested issues offers an alternative for the analysis 
of the legislative influence of the European Parliament. Both the EP and the Council 
provide summaries of the main issues discussed during the course of the negotiations. 
Therefore, it is possible to identify the issues the European Parliament contests in each 
proposal and to trace whether the EP‟s demands on these issues have been included in the 
final legislative text
117
.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
compromise package that was agreed during the informal contacts referred to above…the plenary adopted 
six amendments… The amendments adopted correspond to what was agreed between the three institutions‟ 
(Council of the EU, 2007).  
 
116
   For example, in the decision of the External Borders Fund 2005/0047 (COD) „…the rapporteur, Ms. 
Kudrycka (EPP/ED-PL) presented on behalf of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 
the three draft reports, which contained the entire text of the Commission proposals thus amended, that 
correspond to the agreement reached during the informal contacts … Contrary to previous general practice, 
the reports were not composed of individually numbered amendments‟ (Council of the EU, 2006b).  
 
117
   The issues contested by the EP were identified through the examination of the Council internal 
documents, Presidency notes and Working Party/Coreper minutes, the EP committee reports and the EP 
Plenary debates. On each piece of legislation, the decision-making process was traced from the initial 
Commission proposal, the debates in the EP committees and plenary, the decision-making process within the 
Council, the reports from the informal Council-Parliament negotiations, the formal positions of each 
legislative institution and the final legislative acts. 
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Measurement and Distribution of EP Success in Co-decision Legislation 
In this section, the influence of the European Parliament is analyzed through the 
examination of the issues the EP contested in all amended legislative proposals in the 
period 1999 – 2007. The dependent variable is whether the European Parliament succeeded 
on a particular issue (EP Success). EP Success is understood as the ability of the Parliament 
to see its demands incorporated in the final legislative text. EP Success was coded as a 
binary variable where 1 = success and 0 = failure. An EP demand was counted as failed if it 
was rejected completely or it made it to the final legislative text, but aimed at correcting 
spelling or technical improvements. If an EP demand was incorporated in the final text, the 
issue was counted as successful
118
.  
1567 issues were identified in the study of the 470 amended co-decision proposals 
(349 trialogue and 121 non-trialogue proposals). As trialogue negotiations generally take 
place on more salient pieces of legislation, the number of issues identified in the trialogue 
cases was much higher (1314 issues) than in non-trialogue legislation (253 issues). The 
issues were classified in four categories: 1) budgetary: 146 issues (9.3%), 2) policy 
substance: 1081 issues (69%), 3) fundamental rights: 197 issues (12.6%) and 4) 
institutional powers: 140 issues (8.9%). 
Overall, the European Parliament succeeded in 65.2% (1022 issues) and it failed to 
make a visible impact on the legislative outcome in 34.8% (545) of the issues. The 1567 
individual issues are part of 470 proposals, which belong to 19 policy areas and are spread 
over 8 years. It is important to find out whether there are significant differences in EP 
Success according to these different contexts. It is interesting to establish whether 
individual issues part of the same proposal, policy area and year share a similar probability 
of EP success. 
                                                 
118
   EP Success was initially treated as an ordinal variable, including four degrees of success: high success 
(3), average success (2), low success (1) and failure (0). However, only 10.1% of all issues fell in categories 1 
and 2. In the rest of the cases, the EP either failed completely or it managed to fully realize its legislative 
demands. 
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Table 7.3 Variation in EP Success according to Policy Area, Proposals and Years  
 
European Parliament Success in the Codecision Procedure, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: European Parliament Success 
Empty Models  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. 
Fixed Effects        
Intercept .629 *** .681 *** .629 *** .670 *** .629 *** .681 *** .670 *** 
 (.056) (.080) (.013) (.069) (.056) (.080) (.069) 
Random Effects        
Proposal Level (std.dev.) - - < .001 - < .001 < .001 < .001 
   (.126)  (.125) (.121) (.114) 
Policy Area Level (std.dev.) - .174 ** - .281 *** - .174 ** .281 *** 
  (.086)  (.100)  (.086) (.100) 
Year Level  (std.dev.) .048 - - < .001 .048 - < .001 
 (.124)   (.113) (.125)  (.113) 
-2 x Log Likelihood 2024.750 2022.089 2024.793 2020.820 2024.750 2022.089 2020.820 
N Years 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
N Policy Areas 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
N Proposals 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 
N Issues 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
 
In order to examine the variance of EP success according to the hypothetical 
proposal, policy area and time levels, several empty multi-level models are estimated in 
Table 7.3. The models examine to what extent a contextual level is of relevance for the 
analysis and whether the fit of the model improves after including the different contexts. 
The results show that the probability of EP success in the co-decision procedure does not 
vary across proposals or across the years 1999 - 2007. The policy area is the only 
contextual level at which the probability of EP success varies. Therefore, variance in the 
probability of EP success is attributable to differences between policy areas, but not to 
differences between legislative proposals or across time. The number of issues per policy 
area ranged from 9 (General Affairs) to 350 (Energy and Transport).  
Table 7.4 presents the average EP success rate in each of the 19 EU policy areas. EP 
success ranges from 46.7% in Agriculture to 60.6% in Energy and Transport to 88.9% in 
General Affairs.  
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Table 7.4 Success rate of issues contested by the EP according to policy area 
Policy Area (Commission DG) Total 
Proposals 
Total 
Issues 
% EP 
Success  
        
Agriculture & Rural Development 8 15 46.7% 
Budget 9 28 75.0% 
Development 9 20 80.0% 
Economic and Financial Affairs 2 14 57.1% 
Education and Culture 25 74 75.7% 
Employment and Social Affairs  20 68 67.6% 
Energy and Transport 93 350 60.6% 
Enterprise and Industry 53 146 69.2% 
Environment 50 205 62.4% 
Eurostat, Statistical Office 32 48 64.6% 
External Relations 12 28 78.6% 
General Secretariat 2 9 88.9% 
Health and Consumer Protection 56 206 67.0% 
Information Society 20 57 66.7% 
Internal Market and Services 41 151 57.0% 
Justice, Freedom and Security 24 94 73.4% 
Legal Service - - - 
Regional Policy - - - 
Research 7 32 71.9% 
Taxation and Customs Union 7 22 54.5% 
Total Issues Contested by EP 470 1567 65.2% 
Own calculations 
 
Independent Variables  
Package Deal 
In order to test the argument and the propositions outlined in Section II several independent 
variables were used in the analysis
119
. The Package Deal variable tests the first hypothesis 
that the Parliament is more likely to influence co-decision legislation if it negotiates 
legislation as a package. The Package Deal variable here is coded as a categorical variable. 
It = 2 if there was a package deal between the Council and the European Parliament on a 
single proposal, which involved multiple issues; it = 1 if there was a package deal between 
the Council and the European Parliament on a multi-proposal package; and it = 0 if there 
was no package deal on a legislative proposal. The inclusion of the different types of 
package deals in the analysis of EP success provides a better account of the types of 
logrolling in the EU and the possibilities for EP influence.  
                                                 
119
  see Table 4.11 for full coding, sources and descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis;  
       see Table 4.12 for correlations between the variables.  
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The second hypothesis that trialogues do not increase the likelihood of EP success 
in influencing legislative outcomes is tested with the dichotomous Trialogue variable. It = 1 
if there is evidence in the Council‟s internal documents and/or in the EP plenary statements 
and summaries that an informal trialogue meeting between the Council, the EP and the 
Commission has taken place during the course of the negotiations on a particular proposal 
and it = 0 if there is no evidence. 
The third hypothesis that the EP is more likely to succeed if the Council is impatient 
about the agreement on a legislative dossier is tested with the Council Impatience variable. 
It = 1 if the Council had started discussions and prepared a draft text of the legislative 
proposal before the EP had done so and it = 0 if the Parliament had started discussions and 
prepared a draft legislative text earlier than the Council. This variable was measured by 
comparing the dates of the first draft texts on a legislative proposal held in the EP and the 
Council‟s document registers.  
To test the fourth hypothesis about the impact of the relative intensities of 
preferences of the Council and the Parliament on EP success, two variables are included in 
the analysis. The Relative EP Salience variable measures the relative distance (capturing 
the size and the direction) between the EP‟s and the Council‟s importance attached to a 
proposal. The continuous EP Salience (measured by the number of EP committees involved 
in the drafting of a proposal) and Council Salience (measured by the number of documents 
held in the Council document register on a proposal) were linearly rescaled according to a 
10 point scale (1 = the lowest and 10 = the highest degree of salience). The Relative EP 
Salience variable was calculated by subtracting the Council‟s salience from the EP‟s 
salience. In addition, the dichotomous Council – EP Salience Tie was included in the 
analysis. It = 1 if the EP and the Council attached equal importance to a legislative proposal 
and it = 0 if the distance between the EP‟ and the Council‟s preference intensities was 
different from zero (regardless of the direction).  
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The fifth hypothesis that the EP is more likely to succeed if it is more cohesive is 
tested with two variables. To measure EP cohesion at the EP drafting committee level, the 
continuous EP Cohesion variable is used. It measures the size of the majority in the EP 
drafting committee in favour of a report, as a percentage of those voting. However, as was 
discussed earlier, there are occasions when despite a cohesive EP committee, other MEPs 
can propose completely different amendments to those proposed by the committee and 
obtain support in plenary. To measure EP cohesion at the EP Plenary level the dichotomous 
EP Plenary Support variable is used. It = 1 if the EP plenary supports the committee report 
in its entirety and MEPs do not submit replacement amendments and it = 0 if the EP 
plenary amends or rejects the committee proposal.  
The sixth hypothesis that the Parliament is more likely to succeed if it is supported 
by the Commission is tested with the Commission Support variable. It = 1 if the 
Commission expresses its support for an EP demand in front of the EP plenary, after 
informal meetings with MEPs or in its opinion on the EP position; and it = 0 if the 
Commission does not support the EP on a given issue.   
To capture the effect of the different issues the EP contests and their probability of 
success the categorical Issue Type
120
 is included in the analysis where 1 = budgetary issues, 
2 = policy substance issues, 3 = fundamental rights issues, and 4 = institutional powers. To 
test the principal argument of the chapter that through the trialogue the EP gains in 
institutional matters the analysis includes the interaction terms Trialogue x Institutional 
Issues,  Trialogue x Fundamental Rights and Trialogue x Policy Substance. 
The categorical Reading variable controls for the timing of adoption of codecision 
proposals. It 1 = if a proposal was adopted at first reading; 2 = if a proposal was adopted at 
second reading; and 3 = if a proposal was adopted after conciliation.  
 
                                                 
120
 See Chapter IV for classification of issues according to issue type.  
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Table 7.5 Success rate of issues contested by the EP according to issue type 
 
  Type of Issues Contested by the EP 
  Total  
Policy 
Substance 
Budgetary 
Fundamental 
Rights  
Institutional 
Powers  
Total proposals 470         
Total Issues 1567 1080 146 196 145 
of which EP successful (%) 
1022 
(65.2) 
670 
(62.0) 
75 
(51.4) 
163  
(83.2) 
114 
(78.6) 
      
Proposals with trialogues 349     
Trialogue Issues  1314 890 127 173 124 
of which EP successful 
(%) 
857 
(65.2) 
549 
(61.7) 
65 
(51.2) 
141 
(81.5) 
102 
(82.3) 
      
Proposals without trialogues 121         
Non - trialogue Issues 253 190 19 23 21 
of which EP successful (%) 
165 
(65.2) 
121 
(63.7) 
10 
(52.6) 
22 
(95.7) 
12 
(57.1) 
 
Statistical Analysis 
As the dependent variable is dichotomous (Success/Failure), Models 1-6 are estimated as 
logistic regressions to examine the effect of the independent variables on EP influence. To 
account for the two-level hierarchical structure of issues nested in policy areas, two logit 
models are estimated (Dupont and Martensen, 2007). First, a two-level logistic model is 
estimated with issues at level 1 and policy areas at level 2. Second, a logistic regression 
model is specified where the standard errors are clustered according to the 19 policy areas. 
Models 1- 3 are estimated for EP success in first, second and third readings. Model 4 and 5 
are estimated for EP success in all co-decision issues with and without the Reading control. 
Models 6 is estimated for all co-decision issues and it also includes the interaction 
effects between trialogues and issue types. The results of the logit estimation are a set of 
coefficients that relate changes in the independent variables to changes in the probability of 
EP success (Agresti, 1990). A positive relationship indicates that higher values of the 
independent variable make it more likely that the EP will succeed in influencing the final 
legislative outcome. The results are presented in Table 7.6. The coefficients of the 
variables, their standard errors, and the odds ratios in the full models are reported. 
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Table 7.6 Conditions for EP Success in the Co-decision Procedure: 1999 –2007 
 
European Parliament Success in the Codecision Procedure, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: European Parliament Success 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 1 reading 2 reading 3 reading all issues all issues all issues  
Fixed Effects Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio 
Individual Level Variables        
Single Package Deal -.094 -.149 .666 -.123 -.075 -.071 .931 
 (.305) (.240) (.661) (.156) (.163) (.163)  
Proposals Package Deal  .870 * .496 ** .263 .310 ** .326 ** .321 ** 1.378 
 (.477) (.223) (.278) (.143) (.145) (.146)  
Trialogue  -.020 -.174 - .067 -.082 -.086 .918 
 (.453) (.220)  (.170) (.179) (.510)  
Council Impatience .760 ** .250 ** .210 .351 *** .364 *** .363 *** 1.438 
 (.361) (.181) (.307) (.121) (.135) (.136)  
Urgent -.370 -.147 .278 -.165 -.165 -.177 .838 
 (.314) (.211) (.320) (.144) (.146) (.167)  
Urgent for the Commission .210 .385 -.428 .230 .247 .252 1.286 
 (.356) (.255) (.400) (.184) (.186) (.186)  
European Parliament Cohesion .025 ** .012 * .008 .013 *** .011 *** .011 *** 1.011 
 (.013) (.006) (.008) (.004) (.004) (.004)  
EP Committee Supported .377 .281 .583 ** .340 *** .410 *** .425 *** 1.530 
 (.316) (.203) (.290) (.130) (.136) (.136)  
Relative EP Salience  -.023 -.040 .026 -.012 -.007 -.008 .992 
 (.090) (.040) (.065) (.028) (.029) (.029)  
EP - Council Salience Tie -.068 -.321 * -.239 -.258 ** -.263 ** -.270 ** .763 
 (.278) (.185) (.338) (.127) (.129) (.129)  
Commission Support -.025 .794 *** .724 *** .538 *** .580 *** .592 *** 1.807 
 (.254) (.176) (.235) (.116) (.118) (.118)  
Issues Type (base budgetary)        
Policy Substance Issues .791 ** .792 *** -.420 .529 *** .502 *** .558 1.747 
 (.411) (.282) (.483) (.196) (.197) (.500)  
Fundamental Rights Issues 2.514 *** 1.560 *** .566 1.528 *** 1.496 *** 2.775 *** 16.036 
 (.591) (.374) (.634) (.266) (.267) (1.134)  
Institutional Powers Issues 3.032 *** 1.302 *** .694 1.446 *** 1.450 *** .252 1.287 
 (.760) (.304) (.650) (.172) (.273) (.653)  
Reading (base 3 reading)        
First Reading  - - - - - .076 - .075 .918 
     (.270) (.535)  
Second Reading  - - - - - .405 ** - .412 ** .663 
     (170) (171)  
Trialogue x Policy Substance - - - - - - .075 .928 
      (.535)  
Trialogue x Fundamental Rights - - - - - - 1.370 .254 
      (1.165)  
Trialogue x Institutional Issues - - - - - 1.462 ** 4.317 
      (.719)  
Intercept - 2.835 ** -2.105 *** -.599 -1.868 *** -1.396 *** -1.379 **  
 (1.325) (.677) (.862) (.460) (.491) (.632)  
Random Effects        
Policy Area Level (std.dev.) 1.006 *** .109 <.001 .125 .138 .136  
 (.330) (.145) (.186) (.093) (.096) (.100)  
-2 x Log Likelihood 457.108 934.180 452.756 1903.259 1894.163 1883.757   
N Policy Areas 18 17 9 19 19 19  
N Issues 439 754 374 1567 1567 1567   
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01    
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Conditions for EP Success in the Co-decision Procedure: 1999 –2007 (continued) 
European Parliament Success in the Codecision Procedure, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: European Parliament Success 
Logit (Clustered S.E.PolicyArea) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 1 reading 2 reading 3 reading all issues all issues all issues  
Fixed Effects Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio 
Individual Level Variables        
Single Package Deal -.119 -.153 .666 ** -.132 -.093 -.089 .915 
 (.200) (.236) (.317) (.170) (.182) (.178)  
Proposals Package Deal  .316 .514 *** .263 .306 ** .331 *** .325 *** 1.383 
 (.485) (.183) (.228) (.136) (.116) (.126)  
Trialogue  .331 -.182 - .077 -.066 -.081 .923 
 (.497) (.237)  (.196) (.195) (.744)  
Council Impatience .231 .352 ** .210 * .335 *** .337 *** .338 *** 1.402 
 (.265) (.153) (.122) (.107) (.117) (.117)  
Urgent -.636 ** -.166 .278 -.198 -.205 -.216 .805 
 (.302) (.179) (.210) (.134) (.135) (.139)  
Urgent for the Commission .495 ** .413 * -.422 .275 * .294 * .296 * 1.344 
 (.246) (.244) (.282) (.157) (.171) (.167)  
European Parliament Cohesion .018 .011 *** .008 * .013 *** .011 *** .011 *** 1.011 
 (.012) (.003) (.005) (.003) (.003) (.003)  
EP Committee Supported .531 * .287 ** .583 *** .339 *** .397 *** .412 *** 1.510 
 (.318) (.148) (.108) (.107) (.107) (.108)  
Relative EP Salience  .057 -.038 .026 -.007 -.002 -.003 .997 
 (.117) (.038) (.026) (.036) (.033) (.033)  
EP - Council Salience Tie -.204 -.317 *** -.239 -.246 *** -.251 *** -.259 *** .772 
 (.187) (.116) (.210) (.072) (.074) (.073)  
Commission Support .122 .783 *** .724 *** .533 *** .575*** .586 *** 1.796 
 (.277) (.152) (.288) (.110) (.109) (.113)  
Issues Type (base budgetary)        
Policy Substance Issues .448 .793 *** -.420 .533 *** .505 *** .550 1.796 
 (.356) (.170) (.681) (.133) (.146) (.633)  
Fundamental Rights Issues 1.907 *** 1.557 *** .566 1.522 *** 1.490 *** 2.770 *** 15.950 
 (.407) (.213) (.874) (.151) (.349) (.661)  
Institutional Powers Issues 2.476 *** 1.297 *** .694 1.445 *** 1.447 *** .239 1.270 
 (.672) (.451) (.917) (.339) (.349) (.817)  
Reading (base 3 reading)        
First Reading  - - - - - .040 - .050 .951 
     (.206) (.204)  
Second Reading  - - - - - .377 *** - .384 *** .681 
     (115) (112)  
Trialogue x Policy Substance - - - - - - .061 .941 
      (.763)  
Trialogue x Fundamental Rights - - - - - - 1.372 ** .254 
      (.659)  
Trialogue x Institutional Issues - - - - - 1.474 * 4.365 
      (.840)  
Intercept - 2.109 -2.062 *** -.599 -1.881 *** -1.455 *** -1.426 **  
 (1.298) (.491) (.592) (.401) (.428) (.724)  
Wald Chi-Squared 178.19*** 939.49*** - 2660.74*** 2463.36*** -  
Pseudo R Sq (McFadden) .10 .07 .07 .06 .06 .09  
Log Pseudolikelihood -237.532 -467.191 -226.373 -925.061 -947.568 -924.325   
N Policy Areas 18 17 9 19 19 19  
N Issues 439 754 374 1567 1567 1567   
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01    
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7.5 Results 
The empirical analysis of all co-decision legislative proposals completed between 1 
May1999 and 30 April 2007 supports the principal argument that package deals increase 
the likelihood of EP success in influencing legislative outcomes in the co-decision 
procedure. While trialogues show no effects on the probability of EP success, Council 
impatience conditions the likelihood of EP success in the co-decision.  
 
Package Deals  
Compared to non-package legislation, package deals are likely to lead to EP success when 
packages involve multiple proposals. The Package Proposal variable is positively 
correlated with EP success and it is statistically significant. This means that the European 
Parliament is more likely to influence legislation when it bargains on several proposals 
bundled in a package simultaneously. The results do not support this claim when package 
deals are concluded in single omnibus proposals that involve multiple issues. The Single 
Package variable is not statistically significant. This is most probably because package 
deals on single proposals involve less issues and there are less possibilities for a logroll. In 
contrast, when many proposals are bundled together, the possibilities for a logroll increase 
due to the larger number of issues. Faced with several blocked proposals in a package, the 
Council often reconsiders its position and allows concessions closer to Parliament‟s 
preferred outcome. The availability of multiple issues in package deals allows the Council 
and the Parliament to trade their support for their most salient issues. Therefore, through 
packaging multiple proposals together the EP succeeds in obtaining its preferred legislative 
outcomes. 
In addition, the Trialogue variable is not significant. This is exactly the expected 
effect. Trialogues serve as enforcement mechanisms for legislative exchange between the 
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EP and the Council. Trialogues are institutional arrangements and they do not directly 
affect the influence of an actor.  
The Council Impatience variable is significant and positively correlated with EP 
success. The Council is likely to start discussions and to prepare a draft text early if the 
proposal is urgent for the Member States. An impatient Council is more likely to cooperate 
with the EP and therefore more likely to grant concessions to the EP in return for a fast-
track decision. When the Council amends the legislative text earlier than the European 
Parliament, the proposal is very important for the Member States and they are ready to 
grant concessions to the EP‟s representatives. The European Parliament manages to realize 
many of its legislative demands in return for not using its power to delay an opinion. In 
contrast, when the EP is relatively more impatient about the conclusion of a legislative 
deal, it is in a weaker bargaining position
121
. The findings here are in line with the 
arguments of Tsebelis and Money (1997) and Rittberger (2000) that the EP is likely to 
enjoy significant legislative influence in urgent cases. 
The outcome of co-decision bargaining varies according to the timing of the 
adoption of proposals. In contrast to conciliations, second readings significantly decrease 
the likelihood of EP success in co-decision. While first readings set no time limits and the 
EP can delay its legislative opinion, second reading negotiations follow a strict deadline. In 
addition, second reading amendments, unlike those at first reading, require an absolute 
majority of MEPs in favour in order to pass. Although the European Parliament has the 
ability to use its veto in third reading, going all the way to conciliation involves high costs 
for the EP in terms of time and institutional resources. Thus, in order to avoid the 
uncertainty and costs of the conciliation process, the European Parliament seems to accept 
less favourable proposals at second reading.  
                                                 
121
   „To ensure that agreement on a joint text can nevertheless be reached at the earliest possible date, your 
rapporteur is consequently proposing that the Council amendments be taken over exactly as they stand, 
thereby enabling the Council to adopt the amended act in accordance with the first indent of Article 251(2) of 
the EC Treaty (adoption at first reading).‟ (European Parliament, 2003a).  
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Figure 7.1 plots the predicted probability of EP success according to the use of 
trialogues and EP cohesion (based on Model 1). The plot highlights that through the 
trialogue the EP it gains in terms of institutional powers. Assuming the other variables are 
at their mean, the probability of EP success in institutional matters is expected to be only 
60% without a trialogue and 80% with a trialogue. The possibility of gaining further 
institutional powers is a strong incentive for the EP to participate in informal trialogues 
with the Council. In return for its cooperative behaviour, the Parliament receives the 
Council‟s support for increased institutional competences. 
 
Figure 7.1 Effect of Trialogues and EP Cohesion on the Probability of EP Success in 
the Codecision Procedure 
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European Parliament Cohesion 
The size of the EP majority voting together on a proposal is an important predictor of EP 
success in co-decision negotiations. The European Parliament is likely to succeed when a 
larger majority votes in favour of the amendments to the Commission proposal. Divisions 
among the MEPs weaken the bargaining position of the EP vis-à-vis the Council and 
Commission. This result is in line with the argument of Kreppel (2002) who finds that the 
95% Confidence Interval 
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EP is more likely to succeed in getting concessions from the Council when it is united. As 
expected, the EP Plenary Support variable is also a significant predictor of EP success. The 
Parliament is more likely to succeed when the plenary supports the committee report in its 
entirety and other MEPs do not table different additional amendments to the committee 
report. Therefore, the EP can be more successful in trialogues where the Parliament is 
represented by a single agent - the committee rapporteur. The availability of different 
negotiators on behalf of the EP (committee rapporteur and political group leaders) makes it 
easier for the Council to undermine the priorities of the Parliament and to push through its 
own agenda
122
. Hence, last minute amendments voted by the EP Plenary in addition to 
committee reports undermine the legislative role of the European Parliament.  
 
Relative EP Preference Intensity 
The Relative EP Salience variable is not statistically significant. Its negative coefficient 
suggests that the European Parliament not only succeeds in cases to which it attaches 
relatively higher degrees of salience, but it also influences proposals that are more salient to 
the Council. In contrast, the Council - EP Salience Tie variable is significant and negatively 
correlated with EP success. The EP is more likely to fail to affect legislative outcomes 
when both institutions share similar intensities of preferences over proposals.  
This supports the argument that the EP will be more successful if it can trade its 
support on a salient for the Council proposal for the Council‟s support on a more salient for 
the EP proposal. This is because in cases of high Council salience, the Council has greater 
incentives to cooperate with MEPs. When the preference intensities of both institutions are 
                                                 
122
   For example, in the negotiations of the REACH directive the availability of several negotiators on behalf 
of the EP undermined its bargaining position: „In spite of the fact that the Committee on the Environment, 
Public Health and Food Safety demanded substantial improvements in REACH, the last trialogue only made 
things worse. It was the Group of the European People‟s Party (Christian Democrats) and European 
Democrats that played the chemical industry‟s game, but why did the others join in?‟ (European Parliament, 
2006b).  
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equal no legislative exchange can take place. As a result, the probability of EP success 
increases when the preference intensities between the Council and the Parliament differ.  
 
Commission Support for EP  
Finally, the probability of EP success in the co-decision procedure increases with the 
availability of Commission Support. This finding is in contrast with the generally accepted 
argument (Crombez, 2000a) that the European Commission is „irrelevant‟ under the co-
decision procedure. The Commission still enjoys strong institutional presence in the 
legislative process. This is in line with the findings of Rasmussen (2003) and Konig et al. 
(2007). Informal meetings usually involve a representative of the Commission, who serves 
as a mediator between the two institutions. The Commission has the sole right to initiate 
legislation and it has important implementing powers. Therefore, Commission support is 
decisive for EP success even under the co-decision procedure.  
In summary, the results of the chapter support the argument that the Parliament‟s 
legislative influence in the co-decision procedure is conditional on the availability of 
package deals and Council impatience. Trialogues do not automatically increase the 
legislative influence of the European Parliament. Trialogues provide a flexible institutional 
structure for legislative bargaining in the EU, which allows legislative exchange between 
the EP and the Council and the negotiation of enforceable agreements. Due to its 
cooperative behaviour in trialogues, the EP receives increased institutional capabilities. The 
results also demonstrate that the EP‟s legislative influence in the co-decision procedure is 
conditional on the difference of preference intensities between the EP and the Council, EP 
cohesion, reading and Commission support.   
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7.6 Case Study: Reinsurance Directive 
123
 
Legislation in the Area of Financial Services: The Insurance Sector  
 
Background of the Directive  
The financial services sector includes three major areas for which similar EU policies 
apply: banking, insurance and investment, and securities. Europe is the world‟s largest 
insurance market with 36.9% share
124
 and therefore a clearly defined EU insurance policy 
is central to the success of the financial services sector. The European Commission‟s 
Financial Services Action Plan (1999-2005) laid the foundations for a single EU financial 
market. To achieve the promotion of economic efficiency and market integration in 
insurance, the EU needed a common framework, which allowed insurers to establish, 
operate and provide services freely throughout the EU. This EU framework is founded on a 
series of life and non-life insurance directives, which harmonize essential rules for the 
existence of a single market in insurance services.  
Reinsurance is insurance for insurers. Reinsurance is a highly international industry 
with a limited number of large companies. Reinsurance allows direct insurers to „free 
themselves from the part of a risk that exceeds their underwriting capacity, which they 
cannot bear alone. It plays an important part in risk management and long term stability of 
financial systems‟ (“Committee Report” 12 May 2005). By 2004, the existing EU 
insurance legislation only provided for regulation of reinsurance activities carried out by 
direct insurers, but it did not provide a regulatory framework for the regulation of 
specialized reinsurers – those companies, whose sole activity is reinsurance. By proposing 
a draft reinsurance directive, the European Commission aimed to fill this gap in EU law.   
                                                 
123
 Directive 2005/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2005 on reinsurance 
and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 92/49/EEC as well as Directives 98/78/EC and 2002/83/EC 
 
124
  Europe is followed by North America, which accounts for 36%. Behind these two leaders, Asia accounts 
for 22.7% of world premium income and other continents (Africa, Latin America and Oceania) represent only 
4.4% (“Place of Europe in Worldwide Insurance” June 2006). 
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The Commission launched a thorough consultation campaign with reinsurance 
experts as early as February 2000 in order to design a sound legislative tool for the 
regulation of the reinsurance sector. The Commission argued that the lack of an EU 
regulatory framework for reinsurance resulted in significant differences in the level of 
supervision of reinsurance activities in the EU. The different national rules created 
uncertainty for direct insurance companies, barriers to trade within the internal market, 
administrative burden and costs as well as the weakening of the EU position in 
international trade negotiations. On 21 April 2004 the Commission filed a co-decision 
proposal for a directive on reinsurance, based on Articles 47 (2) and 55 of the TEC.  
 
Stage I: Intra-Chamber Decision-Making  
 In the Council, much of the drafting work was done by the Working Party on 
Financial Services, which since June 2004 met on numerous occasions in order to achieve a 
Council position on the directive. The Council managed to ensure a firm position on the 
dossier long before the European Parliament started serious debates on it. By November 
2004 the Council had already managed to come up with a revised text of the directive, 
which it forwarded to the responsible EP committee. The Working Party on Financial 
Services met for the first time on 7 June 2004 to begin the examination of the 
Commission‟s proposal for the Reinsurance Directive. It met on 2 July 2004, 17 September 
2004, 5 October 2004 and 18 October 2004. On 5 November 2004, only a few months after 
the launch of the proposal by the Commission, the Presidency (Irish) was ready with a 
compromise Council text (“Presidency Compromise” 5 November 2004). After two more 
revisions of the Financial Services Working Party (on 15 February 2005 and 15 March 
2005), the Council came up with a second refined version of the directive on 8 March 
2005, and then a third version on 17 March 2005.  
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The EP ECON committee only started substantial discussions on the Reinsurance 
proposals, after mid-March, i.e. after receiving the final Presidency Compromise Text by 
the Council (“Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs”, 2004-2009 documents). In 
the Parliament, the proposal was allocated to the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs ECON on 15 September 2004 and Peter Skinner (PES, UK) was appointed 
rapporteur on 21 September 2004 (“Committee Report” 12 May 2005).  However, the 
ECON committee only started serious discussions in mid-March 2005, after the 
Committee‟s rapporteur submitted his draft report, comprising of 55 amendments to 
Commission proposal text.  
 
Table 7.7 Reinsurance Directive Decision-Making Timeline 
 
 
Date Legislative activity 
    
21-Apr-04 Commission files proposal 
07-Jun-04 Council: Working Party on Financial Services First meeting  
02-Jul-04 Council: Working Party on Financial Services Second meeting  
03-Sep-04 Council: Presidency draft compromise text 
17-Sep-04 Council: Working Party on Financial Services further meeting  
28-Sep-04 Council: Presidency draft compromise text (revised) 
05-Oct-04 Council: Working Party on Financial Services further meeting  
05-Oct-04 Parliament: ECON Committee: First exchange of views 
18-Oct-04 Council: Working Party on Financial Services further meeting  
05-Nov-04 Council: Irish Presidency Compromise text 
30-Nov-04 Parliament: Public hearing: ECON Committee with industry experts 
15-Feb-05 Council: Working Party on Financial Services further meeting  
20-Feb-05 Trialogue 
03-Mar-05 Council: Luxembourg Presidency: Further version of Compromise text 
14-Mar-05 Parliament: ECON rapporteur Skinner: Draft report 
15-Mar-05 Council: Working Party on Financial Services further meeting  
17-Mar-05 Council: Luxembourg Presidency: Final version of Compromise text 
29-Mar-05 Parliament: ECON Committee: Discussion of  Draft report 
26-Apr-05 Parliament: ECON committee: Discussion of amendments and vote  
09-May-05 Parliament: ECON Committee: adoption of amendments and preparation of final 
report  
07-Jun-05 Parliament: First Reading Vote in Plenary: Adopted 
17-Oct-05 Council: Approval of Directive  
Source: European Parliament OEIL Legislative Observatory, Council of the EU Document Register 
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Inter-Chamber Bargaining 
 The Presidency initiated a series of informal meetings “due to the urgency of this 
proposal and the relatively small number of substantial political contentious issues” 
(„Proposal for a Directive” 9 March 2005). Member States agreed it would be desirable to 
reach an agreement with the EP in the first reading.  The Presidency had informal contacts 
with representatives of the European Parliament who by March 2005 “indicated their 
willingness to explore the possibilities for a first reading agreement”. Since November 
2004, however, rapporteur Skinner and the committee chairwoman Pervenche BERÈS 
(PES, FR) were involved in several informal meetings with the Council and the 
Commission to discuss the adoption of a compromise package deal text („Outcome of EP‟s 
first reading” 6 June 2005). Influenced by the Council through the trialogues, Skinner filed 
a report on 14 March 2005, which copied the form and substance of the text, proposed by 
the Council Presidency on 8 March 2005.  
The rapporteur and the committee chair managed to reconcile any outstanding 
differences within the ECON committee and achieved an almost unanimous support for the 
proposal. Parliament‟s ECON committee voted on its report on 27 April 2005 with 40 votes 
in favour, and 1 abstention. Right after the vote of the ECON committee, the chairman of 
COREPER sent a letter to the ECON‟s chairwoman Beres, to rapporteur Skinner and to 
Internal Market and Services Commissioner Charlie McCreevy. The letter notified them 
that the proposal was acceptable to the Council in the format agreed, subject to no further 
amendments by the Plenary. The letter read: “I am therefore in a position to confirm that, 
should the European Parliament adopt the amendments to the Commission proposal in the 
exact form as set out in the Annex to this letter, the Council would… adopt the proposed 
directive” (Council Communication” 2 May 2005). The Council stated that it would not 
accept any further amendments to the compromise package.  
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Stage III: Voting  
 This left little room for discussion, debate or inclusion of further amendments by 
other MEPs, outside the ECON committee. Eventually, on 7 June 2005 the EP voted by 
simple majority in favour of Skinner‟s report, passing the package compromise text and 
thus approving the proposal under the 1
st
 reading of the co-decision procedure. The 
outcome of the European Parliament‟s vote reflected the compromise agreement reached 
by the two chambers beforehand at the informal trialogue meetings. As the text adopted by 
the plenary was in no way different from the text, proposed by the Council Presidency, the 
proposal was acceptable to the Council and it adopted it on 17 October 2005.  
Key issues 
This proposal was largely technical, but touched upon several controversial issues for 
Member States. These were: 1) the solvency margin rules
125
 for life and non-life 
reinsurance; 2) the issue of collateralization
126
; and 3) the inclusion of provisions for 
substitutes for traditional reinsurance such as „Special Purpose Vehicles‟127 or „finite 
reinsurance‟128. 
 
Solvency margin rules for life and non-life reinsurance 
 In order to achieve a regulated reinsurance market in the EU, the Commission‟s 
proposal required an increase of the solvency requirements for life reinsurance compared to 
those for non-life reinsurance and a transition period of 24 months. The Council, supported 
                                                 
125
 The solvency margin is the extra capital that insurance undertakings are required to hold as a buffer 
against unforeseen events such as higher than expected claims levels or unfavourable investment results. 
126
 Collateralisation is a method of regulation used by States to protect the reinsurance process from failure. 
127
Special purpose vehicle (SPV) means „any undertaking, whether incorporated or not, other than an 
existing insurance or reinsurance undertaking, which assumes risks from insurance or reinsurance 
undertakings and which fully funds its exposure to such risks through the proceeds of a debt issuance or some 
other financing mechanism where the repayment rights of the providers of such debt or other financing 
mechanism are subordinated to the reinsurance obligations of such vehicle‟ (Article 2, Par1, Point (na). 
128
 Finite reinsurance means „reinsurance under which the explicit maximum loss potential, expressed as the 
maximum economic risk transferred, arising both from a significant underwriting risk and timing risk 
transfer, exceeds the premium over the lifetime of the contract, by a limited but significant amount, together 
with at least one of the following two features:  (i) explicit and material consideration of the time value of 
money; (ii) contractual provisions to  moderate the balance of  economic experience between the parties over 
time to achieve the target risk transfer‟ (Article 2, Paragraph 1, Point (nb). 
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by the reinsurance industry, opposed a far-reaching regulation on reinsurance. Most of the 
Member States did not have special national regulations for the reinsurance sector, and still 
the reinsurance industry was performing efficiently. The Council‟s amended proposal 
opposed the separation of solvency margin requirements to life and non-life reinsurance 
and proposed identical rules on both. Non-life reinsurance dominated the industry, 
comprising more than 80% of the overall premiums. Life reinsurance consisted mostly of 
savings and therefore had a small risk component and did not require higher solvency 
margins (“ECON Committee Report” 12 May 2005). The Council also required an 
extended period of 12 months in addition to the 24 months in order to allow longer for the 
transposition of the directive in national legislation. The ECON Committee agreed with the 
Council and required identical solvency margin rules for both life and non-life reinsurance. 
The Committee report also provided for an extension of the transition period with 12 
months. The Committee voted unanimously in favour of this version and the report was 
approved by the plenary at first reading.  
Use of collateralization 
 The Commission proposal required the abolition of collateralization. The use of 
collateral to secure reinsurance contracts, although still practiced in some Member States, 
was no longer an effective regulatory tool. It represented an inefficient use of capital, 
which could otherwise be released into the wider economy and thus potentially contribute 
to the goals of the Lisbon Strategy. The Council supported the abolition of collateral to 
secure reinsurance contracts. It agreed with the Commission that collateralization was an 
outdated and inefficient practice, but required that the method and the time to abolish it 
should be left to the discretion of Member States. In lines with the Council position, the 
Parliament opposed the use of collateral to secure reinsurance contracts, but left it to the 
discretion of Member States to decide on the methods and time-frame for the abolition of 
this practice.  
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Table 7.8 Key Issues on the Reinsurance Directive 
 
 
Text proposed by Commission Text proposed by the Council: 
Presidency compromise text of 17 
March 2005 
Text proposed by ECON Committee 
12 May 2005 and adopted by the 
European Parliament on 7 June 
2005 
Article 38: Solvency Margin Requirements for Life and Non-life reinsurance  
Different solvency margin 
requirements for life and non-life 
reinsurance 
Recital (21a) In the light of the similarities 
between life reassurance covering mortality 
risk and non-life reinsurance, in particular 
the cover of insurance risks and the 
duration of the life reassurance contracts, 
the required solvency margin for life 
reassurance should be determined in 
accordance with the provisions laid 
down in this Directive for the calculation 
of the required solvency margin for non-
life reinsurance; the home Member State 
should however be allowed to apply the 
rules provided for in Directive 2002/83/EC 
for the establishment of the required 
solvency margin in respect of life 
reassurance activities which are linked to 
investment funds or participating contracts. 
Amendment 8 Recital (21a) New In the 
light of the similarities between life 
reassurance covering mortality risk and 
non-life reinsurance, in particular the cover 
of insurance risks and the duration of the 
life reassurance contracts, the required 
solvency margin for life reassurance 
should be determined in accordance 
with the provisions laid down in this 
Directive for the calculation of the 
required solvency margin for non-life 
reinsurance; the home Member State 
should however be allowed to apply the 
rules provided for in Directive 2002/83/EC 
for the establishment of the required 
solvency margin in respect of life 
reassurance activities which are linked to 
investment funds or participating contracts. 
Article 38, 1. Subject to Article 40, 
the required solvency margin for life 
reassurance activities shall be 
determined as laid down in 
paragraphs 2 to 7 according to the 
classes of reinsurance 
underwritten. 
Article 38, 1. The required solvency margin 
for life reassurance activities shall be 
determined according to Article 37 of this 
Directive [required solvency margin for 
non-life reinsurance]. 
Amendment 28, Article 38, 1. The 
required solvency margin for life 
reassurance activities shall be determined 
according to Article 37 of this Directive 
[required solvency margin for non-life 
reinsurance]. 
Recital 25a: Inclusion of Finite Reinsurance and Special Purpose Vehicles 
 No provision 
Recital (25a) This Directive should be 
applicable to finite reinsurance activities; 
therefore a definition of finite reinsurance 
for the purposes of the application of this 
Directive should be necessary; due to the 
special nature of this line of reinsurance 
activity, the home Member State should 
be given the option to lay down specific 
provisions for the pursuit of finite 
reinsurance activities. These provisions 
could differ from the general regime laid 
down in this Directive on a number of 
specific points. 
Amendment 9, Recital (25a) New  This 
Directive should be applicable to finite 
reinsurance activities; therefore a 
definition of finite reinsurance for the 
purposes of the application of this Directive 
should be necessary; due to the special 
nature of this line of reinsurance 
activity, the home Member State should 
be given the option to lay down specific 
provisions for the pursuit of finite 
reinsurance activities. These provisions 
could differ from the general regime laid 
down in this Directive on a number of 
specific points. 
 No provision 
Recital (25b) This Directive should provide 
rules concerning those special purpose 
vehicles that assume risks from 
insurance  and reinsurance 
undertakings. The special nature of such 
special purpose vehicles, which are not 
insurance or reinsurance undertakings, 
calls for the establishment of specific 
provisions in Member States. Furthermore, 
this Directive should provide that the 
home Member State should lay down 
more detailed rules in order to set the 
conditions under which outstanding 
amounts from a special purpose vehicle 
can be used as assets covering 
technical provisions by an insurance or 
a reinsurance undertaking. This Directive 
should also provide that recoverable 
amounts from a special purpose vehicle 
may be considered as amounts deductible 
under reinsurance or retrocession contracts 
within the limits set out in this Directive, 
subject to an application by the insurance 
undertaking to the competent authority and 
after agreement of that authority. 
Amendment 10, Recital (25b) New This 
Directive should provide rules concerning 
those special purpose vehicles that 
assume risks from insurance  and 
reinsurance undertakings. The special 
nature of such special purpose vehicles, 
which are not insurance or reinsurance 
undertakings, calls for the establishment of 
specific provisions in Member States. 
Furthermore, this Directive should 
provide that the home Member State 
should lay down more detailed rules in 
order to set the conditions under which 
outstanding amounts from a special 
purpose vehicle can be used as assets 
covering technical provisions by an 
insurance or a reinsurance undertaking. 
This Directive should also provide that 
recoverable amounts from a special 
purpose vehicle may be considered as 
amounts deductible under reinsurance or 
retrocession contracts within the limits set 
out in this Directive, subject to an 
application by the insurance undertaking to 
the competent authority and after 
agreement of that authority. 
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References to „Special Purpose Vehicles‟ and „Finite Reinsurance‟ 
 The original Commission proposal did not contain any provisions for finite 
reinsurance activities or the use of Special Purpose Vehicles. It was the Council, which in 
its compromise texts of November 2004 and March 2005, introduced references to these 
special types of reinsurance activity. This was an innovative step in defining and regulating 
these types of reinsurance in the EU. However, such a fast track initiative of the Council 
left the wording of the conditions and provisions for these reinsurance activities very broad. 
The Council specified that, due to the special nature of these lines of reinsurance activity, 
Member States should have the option to lay down specific provisions, which can differ 
from the general provisions of the Reinsurance Directive. Therefore, although it contained 
references to these activities, the Council‟s text failed to provide specific conditions for 
their regulation. Accordingly, the Parliamentary committee introduced references to finite 
reinsurance and SPVs and gave Member States the option to lay down specific provisions 
in these activities, which can differ from the general provisions of the directive. Faced with 
a take-it-or-leave-it offer and pressed to fast-track the legislation, the Parliament did not 
have the option to consider improvements or further specifications of these provisions.  
 
Package Deal and Urgency 
The Council was interested in getting a first reading agreement. The Council had already 
worked on three compromise drafts before sending them to the ECON committee. The 
Commission proposal was largely modified by the Council and then its suggestions were 
sent to the Parliament. It was the Council, which took the initiative to draft the proposal 
and then offer it informally to the EP‟s ECON Committee. Overall, most Member States 
did not have special regulations in national legislation on the subject of reinsurance. As of 
January 2002, in Belgium, Ireland and Greece domestic professional reinsurers were not 
subject to any reinsurance supervision. Germany, France and the Netherlands applied 
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elements of their direct insurance supervisory regime to reinsurers. A reduced licensing 
regime existed in Austria, Italy, Spain and Sweden, where only Spain and Sweden imposed 
solvency margin requirements. Only in the UK, Denmark, Finland and Portugal were 
reinsurers subject to the comprehensive regulation and supervision applied to direct 
insurers, including licensing and thorough, continuous financial supervision (“Study into 
the Methodologies for Supervision”, p. 42). With such a diverse, but minimal type of 
reinsurance regulation across the EU, it was easy for the Council to support unanimously a 
very basic type of EU reinsurance regulation, which gave Member States the flexibility and 
freedom to decide on the appropriate measures in this sector. Such a position was supported 
by the reinsurance companies
129
. 
Due to more urgent legislative business, discussions on this directive in the EP did 
not start until mid-March. Most of the work by the Committee was done between 14 March 
2005, when the rapporteur presented his draft report and 27 April 2005, when the 
committee voted on its report. The Committee met to discuss the reinsurance dossier and 
consider additional amendments on 29 March, 18 April, 27 April and 9 May 2005 (ECON 
committee meetings, 2004-2009). Rapporteur Peter Skinner (PES) was the leading figure in 
the EP-Council negotiations, from the very beginning until the adoption of the resolution at 
first reading. In this case, the rapporteur, together with the committee chairwoman, led the 
informal talks with the Council and concluded the inter-chamber package deal
130
.  
 
                                                 
129
 The biggest European reinsurance companies - Munich Re (Germany), Swiss Re (Switzerland), 
Hannover Re (Germany), Lloyd‟s (UK), Allianz AG (Germany), SCOR (France), Converium 
(Switzerland) – were heavily affected by the directive. Although they would benefit from the regulation, 
they favoured largely the position of the Council for an equal treatment of life and non-life reinsurance 
and more flexible transition options for Member States. By using the support of the industry, the Council 
managed to insert the issues of finite reinsurance and Special Purpose Vehicles in its revised text. Source: 
“Study into the Methodologies” 31 January 2002. KPMG for European Commission; page 29. 
 
130
 For Peter Skinner “constructive cooperation between the co-legislators and the stakeholders, 
including the industry, can have a very positive impact and lead to legislation that meets the needs and 
expectations of all parties involved. Following several debates, hearings and discussions with my 
colleagues of the Finance Committee we have now reached an acceptable compromise...” (Peter Skinner 
MEP, October 2005).  
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Agenda for Meetings: Council Working Party on Financial Services Reinsurance 
17-Sep-04 05-Oct-04 18-Oct-04 
Agenda:  
1) Article 1 (scope),  
2) Article 2 (definitions),  
3) Article 6 (conditions),  
4) Article 32 (establishment of 
technical provisions),  
5) Article 33 (equalisation 
reserves),  
6) Article 34 (assets covering 
technical provisions),  
7) Article 37 (solvency 
requirements non-life),  
8) Article 38 (solvency 
requirements life),  
9) Article 47 (principle and 
conditions for conducting 
reinsurance business),  
10) Article 57 (amendments to 
Directive 73/239/EEC/Article 
59)  
Agenda:  
1) Article 47 (Principle and 
conditions for conducting 
reinsurance business,  
2) Article 57 and 59 
(Amendments to Directives 
73/239 and 2002/83),  
3) Article 2 and 40 (Captives),  
4) Finite Risk Reinsurers and 
Special Purpose Vehicles (as 
requested by the Irish 
Delegation),  
5) Article 18: Transfer of portfolio 
(as requested by the Austrian 
delegation),  
6) 2nd Draft compromise text 
(package deal),  
7) any other business.  
Agenda:  
1)  Feedback on the discussion 
with the European Parliament,  
2) Article 2 (Definitions): Changes 
in Article 2 (1) a and feedback on 
the informal meetings with several 
Member States,  
3) New provisions on arbitrage 
regarding mixed undertakings 
(with respect to assets covering 
technical provisions), 
4)  New provisions on Special 
Purpose Vehicles and Finite Risk 
Reinsurance,  
5) Package deal (with special 
attention to revised article 34),  
6) Comments from Member 
States on other changes,  
7) Comments from Member 
States on remaining issues 
Sources: Notices of Meetings, Council of the EU: 6 September 2004; 23 September 2004; 12 October 
2004.  
 
 
Enforcement of Informal Deals  
The package compromise had to be voted without amendments (as a block vote) in plenary 
at first reading. At the first reading on 7 June 2005, the European Parliament voted yes for 
the „block vote‟ of 54 amendments, proposed by the ECON committee. The EP managed to 
achieve such a fast-track agreement due to the “close cooperation with the Council, the 
competent authorities of the Member States and reinsurance industry representatives” 
Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt (PPE-DE, DE) (“Parliamentary Debate” 6 June 2005).  The 
accelerated procedure and the early trialogue agreement did not leave much room for 
debates or amendments by other MEPs
131
.  
 
                                                 
131
 This fact was recognized by Members of the ECON Committee such as Herald Ettl, (PSE, DE): “In order 
to reach a consensus with the Council as quickly as possible, the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs, which was the lead committee, accepted only one subparagraph amending the resolutions in the 
competent Council working party. All the proposed amendments were sacrificed to the accelerated 
procedure. That alone explains why the version laid before plenary does not include my amendment 
clarifying what government bonds can count towards the cover for a reinsurance undertaking‟s technical 
reserves... A little more would have achieved a great deal” (“Parliamentary Debate” 6 June 2005). 
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7.7 Illustrative Case Study: Energy End-Use Efficiency and Energy Services
132
 
Legislation in the Area of the Energy Sector  
 
Background of the Directive  
Energy has been one of the most controversial issues in the EU and the development of a 
common energy policy has been a reoccurring issue on the agenda since the 1960s. Despite 
its prominence, between the early 1970s through the 1980s energy remained largely in the 
hands of national governments. The period since the late 1980s, however, has been marked 
by increased attempts to introduce a Common Energy Policy (Andersen, 2000). In its 1988 
White Paper on Energy the Commission took a close look at the energy sectors in Europe 
within the framework of the Internal Market programme. With the rise of oil and gas prices 
and the increasing energy dependency of the EU on third countries, the European 
Commission set a goal to propose a series of legislative acts, which would serve as a basis 
for an effective EU energy policy.  
 The Commission‟s efforts to develop the internal energy market were formulated in 
its first 1996/1998 energy package. The Commission proposed the first set of directives – 
the 1996 Electricity Directive (96/92/EC) and the 1998 Gas Directive (98/30/EC). These 
pieces of legislation aimed at liberalising the internal market in electricity and gas. The 
EU‟s energy policy had to address the significant increase in costs affecting the Union‟s 
economy and to reduce the environmental impact and greenhouse gas emissions with the 
aim of meeting the Kyoto targets
133
. In June 2003 the Commission proposed its second 
energy package. This included a revised EU Electricity Directive (2003/54/EC) as well as a 
revised EU Gas Directive (2003/55/EC). The Directive on Energy Efficiency and Energy 
                                                 
132
 Directive 2006/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 on energy end-use 
efficiency and energy services and repealing Council Directive 93/76/EEC (Text with EEA relevance)  
 
133
 Since the year 2000, the European Commission has brought forward more ambitious pieces of legislation 
in the energy sector. These include a Directive on Energy Performance of Buildings (2002/91/EC), a 
Directive on Cogeneration (2004/8/EC), and a Directive on Eco-design (2005/32/EC).  
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Services was part of this second series of legislative measures, which promoted the 
development of a sustainable EU energy policy.  
 On 10 December 2003 the Commission presented a co-decision proposal for a 
Directive on Energy End-use Efficiency and Energy Services based on Article 175(1) of 
the EC Treaty. The Commission's proposal aimed to stimulate energy efficiency by 
introducing mandatory savings targets for Member States and taking measures that would 
assist the development of the market in energy services. It aimed to contribute to the 
achievement of the EU's Kyoto emissions-reduction target and covered the great majority 
of forms of energy sold to end-users: electricity, gas, district heating, heating oil, and 
transport fuels.  
 
Stage I: Intra-Chamber Decision-Making 
 In the European Parliament, the proposal was assigned to the Committee on 
Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) committee, with rapporteur Mechtild Rothe (PES, 
DE) and chair Giles Chichester (EPP-ED, UK). Shadow rapporteurs were Alejo Vidal-
Quadras Roca (EPP-ED, ED), Fiona Hall (ALDE, GB), Claude Turmes (Verts/ALE, LU) 
and Umberto Guidoni (GUE/NGL, IT). The ITRE committee met for the first time on 
Monday, 30 August 2004 in Brussels in order to exchange views on the Energy-Efficiency 
directive. The rapporteur presented her first draft proposal, consisting of 51 amendments, to 
ITRE on 20 December 2004, which was discussed and amended in the subsequent 
committee meetings between January and May 2005.  The ITRE Committee adopted its 
proposal on 25 May 2005, which was then put forward to the plenary for a first reading. On 
7 June 2005 the European Parliament adopted its legislative resolution with a total of 99 
amendments. The EP passed the committee‟s proposal with 458 votes in favour, 148 
against, and 27 abstentions.  
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As early as November 2004 the Council‟s Working Party on Energy started 
preparatory work. By February 2005, the Council Presidency came up with a compromise 
text and conducted a policy debate with the other Member States on the dossier. The 
directive touched upon sensitive for Member States issues and the Council was generally 
opposed to such a binding piece of legislation. The Council was reluctant to act quickly for 
an agreement with the EP and thus did not initiate any trialogue meetings and made no 
contacts with the EP before the first reading on 7 June 2005. As the EP‟s first reading 
resolution was unacceptable to Member States, the Council unanimously adopted its 
common position on 19 September 2005. Whereas it reflected some of the EP‟s 
amendments, the common position did not address and diverged in some respects very 
sharply from the EP‟s proposal and that of the Commission.  
 
Table 7.9 Energy Efficiency Directive Decision-Making Timeline 
Date Legislative activity 
  
10-Dec-03 Commission files proposal 
30-Aug-04 Parliament: ITRE Committee First exchange of views 
01-Oct-04 Council: Working Party on Energy: Discussions  
04-Nov-04 Council Presidency: Draft Compromise Text 
04-Nov-04 Council Presidency conducts a written questionnaire on MS positions 
20-Dec-04 Parliament: ITRE committee rapporteur - first draft proposal 
07-Jan-05 Parliament: ITRE committee meeting 
16-Feb-05 Parliament: ITRE committee meeting: further amendments to proposal 
20-Apr-05 Parliament: ITRE committee 
25-May-05 Parliament: ITRE Committee Votes on Proposal 
07-Jun-05 Parliament: First reading: Proposal Adopted 
15-Jun-05 Council: Political Agreement among Member States 
19-Sep-05 Council: Common Position 
19-Sep-05 Council: Working Party on Energy: Preparation of Informal trialogues 
04-Oct-05 Parliament: ITRE committee discussion of Common Position 
12-Oct-05 Council: Working Party on Energy: Preparation of Informal trialogues 
14-Oct-05 Parliament: ITRE committee extra meeting 
18-Oct-05 Trialogue: First trialogue 
19-Oct-05 Parliament: ITRE Committee rapporteur: New Report 
14-Nov-05 Trialogue 
23-Nov-05 Parliament: ITRE Committee discussion and Vote  
25-Nov-05 Council: Coreper meeting: Discussion on Package deal offer  
30-Nov-05 Trialogue 
30-Nov-05 Parliament: ITRE Committee votes on Proposal  
06-Dec-05 Trialogue: Council and Parliament reach an Informal Compromise 
13-Dec-05 Parliament: Second reading Vote in Plenary: Adopted 
Source: European Parliament OEIL Legislative Observatory, Council of the EU Document Register 
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Stage II: Inter-Chamber Bargaining 
 Several informal procedures involving the Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission took place before compromise was reached. Trialogue meetings took place 14 
November 2005, 30 November 2005 and 6 December 2005 with the aim of reaching 
agreement before the December 2005 second reading in the EP. These were accompanied 
by a series of technical meetings. The ITRE committee and rapporteur Rothe seemed 
determined to press for an elaborate, binding energy efficiency directive. The ITRE 
committee reinstated many of the EP‟s first reading amendments in its proposal for second 
reading, which was in major respects different from the Council‟s preferences. However, 
the Council managed to reach a compromise package deal with an EP delegation, made up 
of representatives from the main political groups. Again informally, just before the formal 
second reading EP vote, on 6 December 2005 the Council and the party group leaders 
negotiated a package deal, very different from what the ITRE committee had proposed 
earlier. This deal was to be formalized by the plenary at second reading.  
Stage III: Voting  
 On the 13 December 2005 the EP adopted a resolution with 582 votes in favour, 13 
against with 18 abstentions, which passed the compromise amendments proposed by the 
party groups and rejected all amendments, proposed by the responsible committee. As the 
text adopted by the plenary was in no way different from the compromise text, agreed at 
trialogue, the proposal was acceptable to the Council and it adopted it. 
 
Key Issues  
There were several key controversial issues, on which the positions of the Council and the  
EP differed considerably. These were: 1) mandatory vs. indicative savings targets for the 
public and private sectors and 2) period of application of the Directive; 3) the development 
of national reports on energy efficiency; 4) The measurement of energy savings.  
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Mandatory vs. Indicative savings targets and Period of Application  
 In order to achieve the EU goal of renewable energy contributing 20% of the 
overall energy consumption by 2020, the Commission proposal put forward a binding 1% 
annual general energy savings target and a 1.5% target for the public sector over a period of 
6 years. At first reading, the ITRE committee proposed more flexible but higher binding 
targets of energy savings of 11.5 % over 9 years (3% in the first three years, followed by 
4% and 4.5% in the final three), and a target of 16% for the public sector (4.5% in the first 
three years, 5.5% and 6.5% in the final three). The higher binding energy saving targets to 
both the public and private sector were supported by the Commission. Lobby groups from 
the European petrol and oil associations favoured low non-binding targets, whereas 
domestic appliance manufacturers and environmentalists supported high targets and greater 
commitments by Member States. The Council was opposed to binding targets on energy 
efficiency, basing its position on the grounds that Member States‟ legislation in this sector 
was very different.  
The Council‟s common position changed the mandatory target to an „indicative‟ 
target of 6 % over 6 years, and removed any reference to a separate target for the public 
sector. In its preparation for second reading, the ITRE committee removed the 
requirements for mandatory targets, but pushed for an overall indicative energy savings 
target of 11.5% (now removing the three year thresholds) over 9 years. It also reintroduced 
its amendment for higher energy savings targets for the public sector. In the end, as part of 
the deal the majority parties in the EP accepted an indicative energy savings target of 9% 
over 9 years and no separate requirement for the public sector.  
Development of National Reports on Energy Efficiency 
 The requirement for the production of annual Energy Efficiency reports did not 
figure in the Commission proposal, nor did it appear in the EP‟s first reading report. At 
second reading the EP rapporteur proposed the development of National Energy Efficiency 
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Action plans. The ITRE committee introduced an amendment in the text, which required 
Member States to write annual reports in the form of action plans on their progress in 
achieving the indicative targets set by the directive. The EP, supported by the Commission, 
put particular emphasis on reporting and monitoring in order to press the Member States 
into undertaking long-term comprehensive plans for energy efficiency and energy savings. 
In the final text, “Not later than 30 June 2007, Member States shall submit to the 
Commission a first Energy Efficiency Action Plan (EEAP). Not later than 30 June 2011, 
Member States shall submit to the Commission a second EEAP. Not later than 30 June 
2014, Member States shall submit to the Commission a third EEAP” (Mechtild Rothe, EP 
Debate, 12 December 2005). 
 
Measurement of Energy Savings 
 Measurability was a central requirement for the effective implementation of the 
directive. A bottom-up model for measuring energy savings was proposed by the 
Commission. This meant that technical measurement had essentially to be applied to each 
energy-saving measure. The Council favoured an evaluation using a combination of top-
down and bottom-up approaches. However, it did not specify what the relationship between 
the two was and how a uniform calculation model was to be guaranteed for all the Member 
States. The ITRE Committee felt that a mixture of bottom-up and top-down systems would 
create inaccuracies and different measuring methods. That is why the EP at first reading 
supported a harmonized bottom-up system in the EU.  However, realizing its inability to 
persuade the Council, the EP accepted at second reading a combination of bottom-up and 
top-down calculation methods for energy efficiency. The final text allowed Member States 
the freedom to choose their own strategies to achieve sound evaluation of energy-saving 
methods. In addition, no sanctions existed if governments were unable to achieve the 
„indicative‟ targets set. 
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Table 7.10 Key Issues on Energy Efficiency 
 
Text proposed 
by Commission 
Text proposed by 
ITRE Committee  
and accepted by 
EP at first reading 
Commission 
Opinion 
Amendments 
adopted by 
Council Common 
Position 
Text Proposed by 
EP Committee for 
Second reading  
Text Adopted by 
EP and Accepted 
by Council: Final 
text 
Article 4           
Article 4, 
paragraph 1. 
Member States shall 
adopt and meet a 
mandatory target 
for cumulative 
annual energy 
savings attributable 
to energy services, 
energy efficiency 
programmes and 
other energy 
efficiency measures. 
Amendment 28, 
Article 4, paragraph 
1 Member States 
shall adopt and meet 
mandatory targets 
for cumulative energy 
savings attributable to 
energy services, 
energy efficiency 
programmes and 
other energy 
efficiency measures.  
Accepted Rejected              
Article 4, 
paragraph 1 
Member States 
shall adopt and aim 
to achieve an 
overall national 
indicative energy 
savings target of 
6% for the sixth 
year of application 
of this Directive, to 
be reached by way 
of energy services 
and other energy 
efficiency 
improvement 
measures. Member 
States shall take 
cost-effective, 
practicable and 
reasonable 
measures designed 
to contribute 
towards achieving 
this target. 
Amendment 16 
Article 4, 
paragraph 1. 
Member States 
shall adopt and 
aim to achieve an 
overall national 
indicative energy 
savings target of 
11.5% for the 
ninth year of 
application of this 
Directive, to be 
reached by way of 
energy services 
and other energy 
efficiency 
improvement 
measures. 
Member States 
shall take cost 
effective, 
practicable and 
reasonable 
measures 
designed to 
contribute towards 
achieving this 
target. 
Article 4 General 
target 
1. Member States 
shall adopt and 
aim to achieve an 
overall national 
indicative energy 
savings target of 
9% for the ninth 
year of application 
of this Directive, to 
be reached by 
way of energy 
services and other 
energy efficiency 
improvement 
measures. 
Member States 
shall take cost-
effective, 
practicable and 
reasonable 
measures 
designed to 
contribute towards 
achieving this 
target. 
Article 4, 
paragraph 2 The 
target shall consist 
of an annual amount 
of energy to be 
saved that is equal 
to 1% of the amount 
of energy distributed 
and/or sold to final 
customers, as 
calculated for the 
base year according 
to Annex I. The 
costs of the 
measures adopted 
to achieve this 
target should not 
exceed their 
benefits. 
Amendment 29, 
Article 4, paragraph 
2 The targets shall 
consist of an amount 
of energy to be saved 
that in the first three 
years following the 
transposition of the 
Directive is equal 
overall to at least 
3%, in the next three 
years at least 4%, 
and in the three 
years after that at 
least 4.5%, of the 
amount of energy 
distributed and/or sold 
to final customers, as 
calculated according 
to Annex I. The costs 
of the measures 
adopted to achieve 
these targets should 
not exceed their 
benefits. 
Accepted 
Article 5           
Article 5, 
paragraph 2 2. The 
public sector target 
shall consist of an 
annual savings of at 
least 1.5% of energy 
distributed and/or 
sold to this sector, 
allocated and 
calculated in 
accordance with 
Article 4.3 and the 
methodology in 
Annex I. For 
purposes of 
comparison and for 
conversion to 
primary energy, the 
conversion factors 
set out in Annex II 
shall be applied. 
Amendment 39, 
Article 5, paragraph 
2 2. The public sector 
targets shall consist of 
savings in the first 
three years 
following the entry 
into force of the 
Directive of at least 
4.5% overall, in the 
next three years of 
at least 5.5% overall, 
and in the three 
years after that at 
least 6% overall of 
energy distributed 
and/or sold to this 
sector, allocated and 
calculated in 
accordance with 
Article 4(3) and the 
methodology in Annex 
I.  
Accepted Rejected Article 5, 
paragraph 1. Member 
States shall ensure 
that the public sector 
fulfils an exemplary 
role in the context of 
this Directive. 
To that end, they shall 
ensure that one or 
more energy 
efficiency 
improvement 
measures are taken 
by the public sector, 
focussing on cost-
effective measures 
which generate the 
largest energy 
savings in the 
shortest span of 
time.  
Amendment 20, 
Article 5, paragraph 
1. Member States 
shall ensure that the 
public sector fulfils an 
exemplary role in 
the context of this 
Directive. To that 
end, Member States 
shall ensure that 
higher indicative 
energy savings 
targets are set for 
the public sector, 
which are 
appropriate to that 
exemplary role. 
Energy efficiency 
and energy savings 
measures achieved 
thus far at regional 
and local levels 
should be taken 
into account.  
Article 5 Energy 
end-use efficiency 
in the public sector 
1. Member States 
shall ensure that the 
public sector fulfils 
an exemplary role 
in the context of this 
Directive. To this 
end, they shall 
communicate 
effectively the 
exemplary role and 
actions of the 
public sector to 
citizens and/or 
companies, as 
appropriate. 
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In this case, Member States‟ preferences were very different towards this far-
reaching proposal on energy efficiency. Because the Council needed more time for a 
consideration of the directive, it did not initiate or engage in trialogues or any other 
informal activity with the EP before the first reading. Only after achieving a common 
stance on the piece of legislation was the Council willing to initiate and enter trialogues 
with the EP and the Commission. The Council Presidency presented its version of the text 
and used the intra-parliamentary struggles between the political parties in order to influence 
the outcome of the negotiations. The EP had to formalize an already negotiated 
compromise at its second reading, so any public debate on the directive seemed 
meaningless.  
Right after receiving the Commission proposal, the Working Party on Energy 
started examinations of and discussions on the draft text. In November 2004 the Irish 
Presidency submitted a revised version of the proposal. The Presidency informed Member 
States that the opinion of the European Parliament on this particular dossier was not 
expected until February 2005. In order to reach a Council compromise, the Presidency 
offered a revised text. It aimed to increase Member States‟ flexibility regarding the 
definition of targets, the choice of implementing measures and reporting requirements and 
to clarify measurement issues (“Policy Debate”, 4 November 2004).  
On 4 November 2004, The Presidency, in cooperation with the General Secretariat 
conducted a written questionnaire on the positions of Member States on the substance of 
the directive
134
. In general, nearly all delegations indicated their readiness to support the 
principle of setting a target for energy efficiency and energy savings, on the condition that 
targets were indicative, and not binding. Bearing in mind the condition of an indicative 
                                                 
134
 A total of 23 Member States (AT, BE, CY, CZ, DK, DE, EE, ES, GR, FI, FR, HU, IT, LV, LT, MT, 
NL, PL, PT, SL, SK, SE, UK) returned the questionnaire. The responses of each Member State were 
extracted from the individual returned questionnaires, obtained from the Council‟s Document register. 
They are publicly available and can be accessed online. („Summary of the Written Replies to the 
Questionnaire‟, 17 January 2005). 
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character of the targets, a majority of delegations preferred indicative national targets based 
on a uniform reference value. With respect to setting a specific target for the public sector, 
Belgium, Italy and Slovenia agreed to a higher target for the public sector, but the majority 
of delegations considered that such a measure would not be useful. Such delegations had 
difficulties with a separate target for the public sector because according to them - separate 
statistics do not exist and a higher target would lead to distortion of competition with the 
private sector
135
. 
At the Energy Council press conference on 5 December 2004, the Presidency 
acknowledged the fact that an agreement in the Council on such a controversial proposal in 
the energy sector was very difficult to achieve. Although the Commission preferred 
mandatory targets, the Presidency admitted that a common Council position on this dossier 
was impossible to reach before the first reading of the EP.  
Because the Council was not interested in passing the law, as proposed by the 
Commission, it did not make any effort to establish informal trialogue meetings with the 
EP or to reach a compromise before the first reading. After the first informal trialogue the 
Council had already paved the way for a compromise deal, which favoured its preferences. 
In its internal communication to Coreper, the Presidency wrote: “... an informal trialogue 
took place (18 October) as well as several technical meetings with Parliament 
representatives. Substantial convergence has been provisionally achieved during these 
negotiations... the Parliament has shown flexibility and a willingness to compromise on a 
number of issues. In particular a readiness to give up the mandatory nature of the targets; 
greater flexibility regarding demands for the public sector” (“Preparation for the Next 
Informal Trialogue”, 23 November 2005). 
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 Overall, most supportive of the Commission draft, favouring strict measures in the field of energy 
efficiency was Slovenia, together with Slovakia. The Member States, most strongly opposed to the 
provisions of the Commission proposal, were the Czech Republic, Hungary, Finland, Malta, Poland and 
Portugal. They considered that setting binding EU energy targets at this stage was premature and required 
national flexibility in the energy sector.  
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The Council initially started the negotiations with the ITRE committee and its 
rapporteur, shadow-rapporteurs and chairman. However, the ITRE Committee proved 
difficult to reach a compromise with. It reinstated its amendments for mandatory targets 
and had incorporated the views of the manufacturing companies and environmental 
lobbyists for strong commitments by governments in the area of energy efficiency.  After 
the ITRE committee vote and before the second reading in the EP, the Council turned to 
finding an informal package deal with the leaders of the EPP and PES and reached a much 
more favourable compromise deal with an EP „delegation, made up of representatives from 
the main political groups‟ („EP Press Statement‟, 6 December 2005). The informal 
compromise package deal between the Parliament and Council, undermined the authority 
of the ITRE committee and the rapporteur. The ITRE committee was useful for the drafting 
of the proposal, but it was easily sidelined during the political inter-institutional bargaining.  
Despite doing most of the hard work in drafting the proposals, just before the 
second reading, the committee and its rapporteur were outplayed by the Council-Party 
group compromise. MEPs from the smaller parties and committee members were unhappy 
about this political logroll
136
. MEPs expressed their concerns about the informal nature of 
Council-EP package deal and the inability of the individual MEPs to influence substantially 
the outcome of this legislative act
137
.  
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 Fiona Hall (ALDE, UK): “Today there is an informal trialogue meeting on the Energy End Use Efficiency 
and Energy Services Directive, involving the Council (represented by a civil servant from UKREP, the UK‟s 
permanent representation in Brussels), the Commission and the European Parliament (represented by each 
political group‟s lead person on this piece of legislation...Progress is difficult. The UK rep claims that “other 
member states” will never agree to binding targets for energy savings. A friend of mine in the know thinks it 
is only two countries that are being completely stubborn on this – but Council discussions are shrouded in 
such secrecy that it is impossible to know what exactly is going on” (Fiona Hall MEP, 14 November 2005).  
 
Rapporteur Mechtild Rothe said: “... And what we achieved at the end of the day is not what we had hoped at 
the outset. I have to say that very clearly. And during the process there was a further amount of annoyance in 
Parliament about the very hesitant approach of Council...But Parliament like the Commission, was in favour 
of binding targets. We haven‟t managed to achieve that. In the Council we didn‟t find many backers for 
binding targets” („Press Conference on Agreement with Council‟, 6 December 2005).  
 
137
 Claude Turmes (Verts/ALE, LU) “The political reality is that Parliament was elected in 2004 and has a 
big number of conservative members who are opposed to mandatory targets. These people will be there until 
2009, so if the conservative group threatens not to vote a strong position in second reading, then of course 
the bargaining position of Parliament is weaker than it should be… Members like Mr [Herbert]Roil [EPP-
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Package Deals and their Enforcement 
The compromise deal between the Council and the political groups was different from what 
the ITRE committee‟s proposal put forward. The compromise required Member States to 
achieve energy saving targets of 9% over 9 years, but these targets were to be only 
indicative and in no way binding on Member States. While the Commission and the EP had 
argued for higher targets for the public sector, the compromise deal only mentioned an 
exemplary role for the public sector („Unity between EP and Council‟ 6 December 2005). 
In exchange for its support for non-binding targets, the Council agreed to adopt 
Parliament‟s proposal for multi-annual energy efficiency action plans, to be submitted to 
the Commission. Shadow rapporteur Claude Turmes, (Verts/ALE, LU) said: “National 
governments have to write National Energy Efficiency Action Plans by 1 June 2006. They 
are not happy about them, but ... we won that bit” (Interview: Claude Turmes, June 2006).  
 In the second reading of the Energy Services directive on 13 December 2005, the 
new compromise amendments, agreed between the parties and the Council were presented 
before the plenary in the form of block compromise amendments. Only block 1 
compromise amendments (proposed by the party groups) were voted for, whereas all 
amendments, proposed by the ITRE committee in the original committee report, fell.  
 
European Parliament vote 13 December 2005 (Second Reading)  
Subject Amendment 
No 
Author Type of 
vote  
Outcome 
of Vote  
RCV/EV 
Block 1 – 
compromise 
53-101 PES, EPP-ED, 
ALDE+ Verts/ALE 
+ GUE/NGL 
RCV Adopted For: 582 
Against: 13 
Abstentions:18 
Block 2 - 
amendments by 
the committee 
responsible 
1—52 Committee   Lapsed   
Source: “Results of Votes” European Parliament, 13 December 2005. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
ED, DE] or Mr [Werner] Langen [EPP-ED, DE] from the German conservatives, who are copy-paste of the 
German VDW, which are the four big German companies, have lobbied until the very last end, very 
powerfully. The German government was opposing even the agreement, which we have now. That is the 
political reality”. („Press Conference‟, 6 December 2005). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the legislative influence of the European Parliament in the co-
decision procedure. It examined the effect of package deals and Council impatience on the 
probability of EP success. It paid special attention to the EP‟s involvement in trialogue 
negotiations with the Council. The chapter studied the EP‟s legislative behaviour on all 540 
co-decision proposals completed between 1 May 1999 and 30 April 2007. It highlighted 
that the study of EU decision-making cannot ignore the proliferation of these informal 
procedures. Instead of dividing the analysis into formal vs. informal procedures, the chapter 
showed that the politics of co-decision involves frequent formal and informal negotiations 
between the EU legislative institutions. 
The results of the chapter support the hypotheses that the EP‟s legislative influence 
in the co-decision procedure is conditional on the availability of package deals and the 
impatience of legislative chambers. The EP is more likely to succeed when it negotiates 
several proposals simultaneously. When packages are negotiated on single proposals, the 
results are not statistically significant. This indicates that perhaps the availability of 
multiple proposals involves a greater number of issues. The availability of a larger number 
of issues on the other hand, creates more opportunities for gains from trade. In addition, 
when the Member States in the Council are impatient about the conclusion of the 
legislative process on particular proposals, the EP enjoys increased powers in co-decision.  
While trialogues do not automatically increase the legislative influence of the 
European Parliament, the EP can gain in institutional powers through informal 
negotiations. In addition, EP success in co-decision is conditional on proposal salience, 
reading, EP cohesion and Commission support. Chapters VI and VII studied legislative 
decision-making under the consultation and co-decision procedures separately. The 
following Chapter VIII puts together the two procedures and it studies legislative decision-
making across policy areas and time.  
  278 
CHAPTER 8 : PACKAGE DEALS AND THE LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE OF 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ACROSS POLICY AREAS AND TIME  
 
This chapter studies the effect of package deals on EU legislative outcomes across all 
policy areas and over time. Existing studies of legislative politics in the EU overlook the 
importance of the effect of package deals on EU legislative outcomes. The possibility of 
logrolling between the European Parliament and the Council has attracted little theoretical 
attention and no empirical testing. The chapter tests Hypothesis 8 that package deals 
increase the likelihood of European Parliament success in influencing distributive policy 
outcomes in the EU. The chapter also testes Hypothesis 9 that package deals increase the 
likelihood of European Parliament success in gaining institutional powers. It explores the 
effect of package deals in the EU through the examination of 1465 legislative proposals 
completed between 1 May 1999 and 30 April 2007 under the co-decision and consultation 
procedures.  
The previous chapters found that: 1) package deals are regularly used in the EU 
legislative process and 2) package deals increase the probability of EP legislative influence 
under the consultation and co-decision procedures. What is the overall effect, „the value 
added‟, of the use of package deals in the EU decision-making process? This chapter 
argues that package deals allow the European Parliament to influence legislation in the 
EU‟s distributive policy areas. Package deals are regularly used by EU legislators as they 
allow the Council and the EP to achieve their most preferred policy outcomes. While 
package deals reduce the ability of ordinary MEPs to participate in the decision-making 
process, they allow the European Parliament to influence distributive legislative proposals 
and to gain greater institutional influence in some of the EU‟s most expensive policy areas. 
The analysis is based on the examination of 2369 issues the EP  contested in 973 amended 
pieces of legislation falling in 19 EU policy areas and negotiated in a period of 9 years.  
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8.1 Explaining the European Parliament’s Gains from Legislative Package Deals  
What is the overall effect, „the value added‟, of the use of package deals in the bicameral 
decision-making process? What are the European Parliament‟s gains from its participation 
in logrolling? The principal argument of the chapter is that package deals increase the 
likelihood of European Parliament legislative influence in EU decision-making. Through 
the increasing use of package deals, the European Parliament successfully influences more 
important and more costly legislative proposals.  
Contrary to the conventional understanding that the EP‟s legislative influence is 
confined within regulatory policy areas (Judge et al, 1994; Burns, 2005), logrolling allows 
the European Parliament to gain legislative power in the EU‟s distributive policy areas. 
While logrolling might undermine the direct participation of regular MEPs in the informal 
inter-chamber bargaining process, overall, package deals benefit the European Parliament 
as a legislative institution.  
Package deals reduce the ability of individual MEPs to participate fully in 
legislative bargaining with the Council. Logrolls are typically fast-tracked and do not allow 
a large number of MEPs to participate, deliberate and include amendments to package 
compromise texts. Package deals also make the legislative process less transparent as they 
are usually agreed informally between a select number of representatives from the EP and 
the Council. However, through package deals the EP gains legislative presence in some of 
the EU‟s most expensive policy areas. Therefore, the main hypothesis here is: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Package deals increase the likelihood of EP success in influencing 
distributive policy outcomes in the EU. 
 
This argument is tested across 2369 issues contested by the European Parliament in 973 co-
decision and consultation proposals, falling in 19 EU policy areas and completed in the 
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period 1999 – 2007. The dependent variable is whether the European Parliament succeeded 
on a particular issue (EP Success). EP Success is understood as the ability of the Parliament 
to see its demands incorporated in the final legislative text. EP Success was coded as a 
binary variable where 1 = success and 0 = failure. Overall, the EP succeeded in 51.9 % of 
all issues it contested in the period. The average EP success rate in the consultation 
procedure was 25.9%, whereas it was 65.2% in co-decision (see Table 8.1).  
 
Table 8.1 Success rate of issues contested by EP according to issue type
138
 
  Type of Issues Contested by the EP 
  Total  
Policy 
Substance 
Budgetary 
Fundamental 
Rights  
Institutional 
Powers  
Total proposals 973         
Total Issues 2369 1528 256 269 316 
of which EP successful (%) 
1230 
(51.9) 
754 
(49.3) 
109 
(42.6) 
214 
(79.6) 
153 
(48.4) 
      
Co-decision Proposals  470         
Co-decision Issues  1567 1080 146 196 145 
of which EP successful (%) 
1022 
(65.2) 
670 
(62.0) 
75 
(51.4) 
163  
(83.2) 
114 
(78.6) 
      
Consultation Proposals 503         
Consultation  Issues 802 448 110 73 171 
of which EP successful (%) 
208 
(25.9) 
84 
(18.8) 
34 
(30.9) 
51 
(69.9) 
39 
(22.8) 
 
 
The Relevance of the Policy Area Context for the EP‟s Legislative Influence  
Several studies have suggested that the legislative influence of the European Parliament 
varies in different areas of EU policy (Judge et al, 1994; Shackleton, 2000; Burns, 2005; 
Thomson and Hosli, 2006). Judge et al (1994) argued that policy type is one of many 
important variables shaping the EP‟s influence and suggested that it is in the field of 
regulatory policy that the EP has the greatest scope for exercising influence. Through case 
studies, Burns (2005: 488) also studies the EP‟s influence across several EU policy areas, 
where she finds that the Parliament has more scope to comment on and to influence 
regulatory policies than distributive policies. Overall, the few empirical studies of EP 
                                                 
138
 See Chapter IV for classification of issue types  
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influence largely agree that the regulatory field allows the European Parliament greater 
scope to shape policy outcomes. This is a very realistic conclusion, given that co-decision 
largely applies to the regulatory field. By studying legislative decision-making across all 
EU policy areas, this chapter finds significant variation of EP influence across policies.  
 
Table 8.2 EP Legislative Influence: Policy Areas, Proposals, Issues: 1999 – 2007 
 
Policy Area (Commission DG) Co-decision Consultation Total  % EP 
Success  
  Proposals Issues Proposals Issues Proposals Issues   
Agriculture & Rural Development 7 14 73 148 80 162 23.5 % 
Budget 9 28 26 43 35 71 71.8 % 
Development 9 20 4 9 13 29 55.2 % 
Economic and Financial Affairs 2 14 28 33 30 47 25.5 % 
Education and Culture 25 74 4 8 29 82 68.3 % 
Employment and Social Affairs  20 68 18 29 38 97 64.9 % 
Energy and Transport 93 350 6 12 99 362 59.4 % 
Enterprise and Industry 53 146 3 8 56 154 67.5 % 
Environment 50 205 8 11 58 216 59.3 % 
Eurostat, Statistical Office 32 48 1 2 33 50 66.0 % 
External Relations 12 28 26 38 38 66 40.9 % 
Fisheries 1 1 106 128 107 129 11.6 % 
General Secretariat 2 9 8 22 10 31 54.8 % 
Health and Consumer Protection 56 206 21 39 77 245 61.6 % 
Information Society 20 57 2 5 22 62 64.5 % 
Internal Market and Services 41 151 6 9 47 160 55.0 % 
Justice, Freedom and Security 24 94 123 198 147 292 42.5 % 
Research 7 32 19 33 26 65 53.8 % 
Taxation and Customs Union 7 22 21 27 28 49 34.7 % 
Total Proposals/Total Issues  470 1567 503 802 973 2369 51.90% 
  Own calculations.  
 
Table 8.2 presents the average European Parliament success rate in each of the 19 
EU policy areas. The European Parliament was least successful in the policy areas of 
Fisheries (11.6%), Agriculture (23.5%), Economic and Financial Affairs (25.5%), Taxation 
and Customs (34.7%), External Relations (40.9%) and Justice, Freedom and Security 
(42.5%). These results are not surprising given that legislative proposals in these areas fall 
mainly under the consultation procedure. In contrast, the European Parliament was most 
successful in the policy areas of Budgets (71.8%), Education and Culture (68.3%), 
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Enterprise and Industry (67.5%), Employment and Social Affairs (64.9%), Information 
Society (64.5%) and Health and Consumer Protection (61.6%). 
In order to test the central argument of the chapter that the European Parliament can 
be influential in distributive policy areas through the use of package deals, an important 
methodological issue needs to be considered. What is a distributive policy area and how to 
define it? Is the distributive/regulatory divide a binary variable? Are some policies more 
distributive than others? 
 
Defining the Distributive Character of EU Policy Areas 
There is a clear distinction in the EU literature between the general characteristics of 
regulatory and distributive policies (Hix, 2005). Some authors have classified EU policy 
areas according to a binary divide: regulatory and distributive (Broscheid and Coen, 2007). 
However, as could be seen from Table 5.3 (in Chapter V), each EU policy area consists of 
both regulatory and distributive proposals. Moreover, European Parliament influence is 
here analysed through the examination of legislative proposals and the issues contested 
within them. Therefore, dichotomizing the distributive/regulatory divide in EU policy areas 
may lead to inaccurate results.  
To overcome this issue, the chapter adopts the following methodology for defining 
the distributive character of an EU policy area. First, as indicated in Table 5.3, each EU 
policy area includes administrative, regulatory and distributive proposals. In the case of 
distributive proposals the costs are covered by either the EU budget or Member States‟ 
budgets. Such proposals are highly salient for Member States and governments are 
reluctant to incorporate the EP‟s demands. These proposals were grouped into one category  
= Distributive. In the case of regulatory and administrative proposals the costs are covered 
by either private actors or there are no significant costs. Such proposals should be relatively 
less salient for Member States and governments may be more willing to incorporate the 
EP‟s preferences. These proposals were grouped into the second category = Regulatory.   
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Second, in each EU policy area the percentage of Distributive proposals and the 
percentage of Regulatory proposals were calculated. The continuous Distributive Policy 
Area variable was constructed to indicate the percentage of distributive proposals in a 
policy area. Therefore, EU policy areas with a relatively higher percentage of regulatory 
proposals are located on the left of the axis, whereas policy areas with a relatively higher 
percentage of distributive proposals are located to the right of the axis (see Figure 8.1 
below).  
 
Figure 8.1 Concentration of Distributive Proposals (%) per EU Policy Area  
 
 
 
Note: Distributive proposals here include distributive (EU budget) and distributive (Member States‟ 
budgets) proposals. Regulatory proposals include regulatory (private actors) and administrative 
(insignificant cost) proposals as defined in Table 5.3.     
 
The EU policy areas with a relatively higher percentage of distributive proposals 
were Budget (94.3%), Research (92.3%), Economic and Financial Affairs (83.3%), 
Education and Culture (75.9%), Development (76.9%), External Relations and 
Employment Affairs (60.5%). On the opposite side of the axis, the policy areas with a 
relatively lower percentage of distributive proposals were Internal Market (17%), 
Enterprise and Industry (17.9%), Health and Consumer Protection, and Environment 
(23.4%). 
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8.2 Statistical Analysis 
In order to test the main argument of the chapter that package deals increase the European 
Parliament‟s influence in distributive policy areas, two independent variables and their 
interaction term are of central importance for the analysis
139
.  
First, the individual-level dichotomous Package Deal variable is included in the 
models. It = 1 if there is evidence in the Council‟s internal documents and/or in the EP 
plenary statements and summaries that a package deal on a proposal between the Council 
and the EP has been concluded and it = 0 if otherwise. To capture the effect of the policy 
area type on EP success, the macro-level continuous Distributive Policy Area variable is 
included. It measures the difference between the percentage of distributive proposals and 
the percentage of regulatory proposals in a policy area (as described above). The analysis 
includes the cross-level interaction term Package Deal x Distributive Policy Area.  
Several control variables are also included in the model. First, the dichotomous Co-
decision variable is included to account for the effect of the legislative procedure. It = 1 for 
co-decision proposals and it = 0 for consultation proposals. Second, the categorical Issue 
Type variable captures the effect of the different issues the EP contests and their probability 
of success. It = 1 for budgetary issues, = 2 for policy substance issues, = 3 for fundamental 
rights issues, and it = 4 for institutional powers issues.  
Third, the dichotomous Council Impatience variable controls for the effect of 
institutional impatience on legislative outcomes in EU decision-making. It = 1 if the 
Council had started discussions and prepared a draft text of the legislative proposal before 
the EP had done so and it = 0 if the Parliament had started discussions and prepared a draft 
legislative text earlier than the Council. This variable was measured by comparing the dates 
of the first draft texts on a legislative proposal held in the EP and the Council‟s document 
registers.  
                                                 
139
 see Table 4.13 for full coding, sources and descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis;  
     see Table 4.14 for correlations between the variables. 
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In addition, two variables control for the internal cohesion of the European 
Parliament on its legislative influence. The continuous EP Cohesion variable measures EP 
cohesion at the EP drafting committee level. It measures the size of the majority in the EP 
drafting committee in favour of a report, as a percentage of those voting. In addition, the 
dichotomous EP Plenary Support variable measures EP cohesion at the EP Plenary level. It 
= 1 if the EP plenary supports the committee report in its entirety and MEPs do not submit 
replacement amendments and it = 0 if the EP plenary amends or rejects the committee 
proposal.  
Furthermore, to account for the impact of the relative intensities of preferences of 
the Council and the Parliament on EP success, two variables are included in the analysis. 
The dichotomous Council – EP Salience Tie variable controls for the distance between the 
EP‟ and the Council‟s preference intensities. It = 1 if the relative salience size was different 
from zero (regardless of the direction). The distance Relative EP Salience variable 
measures the relative difference between the EP‟s and the Council‟s importance attached to 
a proposal. It captures the size and the direction of the relative institutional preference 
intensities. 
Finally, the Commission Support variable controls for the impact of the 
Commission on the EP‟s legislative influence. It = 1 if the Commission expresses its 
support for an EP demand in front of the EP plenary, after informal meetings with MEPs or 
in its opinion on the EP position; and it = 0 if the Commission does not support the EP on a 
given issue
140
.  
Several empty multi-level models are estimated (in Table 8.3) to explore the 
hierarchical nature of the data and to determine whether to include an analytical level in the 
statistical analysis. The 2639 issues are nested in 973 legislative proposals, which are 
nested in 19 policy areas, which are nested in 8 years. The effects of each of these levels on 
                                                 
140
 Dummy variables were initially included, testing the effect of the Proposal type (directive, regulation, 
decision, regulation) and Political Group affiliation of the rapporteur. However, they proved insignificant and 
were removed from the models.  
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the probability of EP success are examined above. It seems that the year does not have an 
effect on the probability of European Parliament success in EU legislative outcomes. In 
contrast, the policy area level seems to have an important contextual effect on EP success. 
The models confirm that the probability of EP success depends on the policy areas context.  
In addition, the proposal level seems to have an effect on EP success. The 
significance of the proposal level seems to be stronger when both the policy context and the 
proposal context are taken into account simultaneously (as in Model 6). Therefore, the 
statistical tests of EP success (in Table 8.4) will include these two contextual levels 
(separately and combined) in addition to the independent variables.  
 
Table 8.3 Variation of EP Success across Proposals, Policy Areas, and Time  
European Parliament Success in EU Decision-Making, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: European Parliament Success 
Empty Models  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. 
Fixed Effects        
Intercept .077 * .045 -.006 .005 -.006 .015 < .001 
 (.044) (.176) (.056) (.009) (.056) (.193) (.101) 
Random Effects        
Proposal Level (std.dev.) - - .816 * - .816 * .583 *** .206 
   (.109)  (.109) (.116) (.269) 
Policy Area Level (std.dev.) - .727 * - .928 * - .794 * .933 * 
  (.132)  (.103)  (.147) (.105) 
Year Level  (std.dev.) .041 - - < .001 < .001 - < .001 
 (.096)   (.107) (.104)  (.108) 
-2 x Log Likelihood 3280.580 3091.223 3251.164 3109.822 3251.164 3081.3104 3109.656 
N Years 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
N Policy Areas 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
N Proposals 973 973 973 973 973 973 973 
N Issues 2369 2369 2369 2369 2369 2369 2369 
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
 
Several two and three - level logit models are estimated in order to take account of 
the hierarchical structure of data (2369 issues nested in 973 proposals nested in 19 policy 
areas). Models 1-3 are estimated with the individual level Package Deal and the macro-
level Distributive Policy Area variables. Models 4-6 include their cross-level interaction 
Package Deal x Distributive Policy Area, while accounting for the proposal and policy area 
contexts. Models 7 - 11 add the control variables outlined earlier.  
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Table 8.4 Conditions for EP Success in EU Decision-Making: 1999 – 2007 
European Parliament Success in EU Decision-Making, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: European Parliament Success 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Fixed Effects Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. 
Individual Level Variables       
Package Deal .968 *** .662 *** .719 *** .357 .029 .061 
 (.119) (.095) (.119) (.240) (.206) (.228) 
Co-decision - - - - - - 
       
Council Impatience - - - - - - 
       
Urgent - - - - - - 
       
Urgent for the Commission - - - - - - 
       
European Parliament Cohesion - - - - - - 
       
EP Plenary Support - - - - - - 
       
Relative EP Salience  - - - - - - 
       
Parliament - Council Salience Tie - - - - - - 
       
Commission Support - - - - - - 
       
Issues Type (base budgetary)       
Policy Substance Issues - - - - - - 
       
Fundamental Rights Issues - - - - - - 
       
Institutional Powers Issues - - - - - - 
       
Package Deal x Policy Substance - - - - - - 
       
Package Deal x Fundamental Rights - - - - - - 
       
Package Deal x Institutional Issues - - - - - - 
       
Macro - Level Variable       
Distributive Policy Area -.473 * -.203 -.238 -1.108 *** -.973 -.995 
 (.251) (.681) (.730) (.338) (.728) (.768) 
Cross-Level Interaction       
Package Deal x Distributive Policy - - - 1.433 *** 1.642 *** 1.657 *** 
    (.507) (.478) (.520) 
Intercept -.119 -.077 .097 .152 .235 .219 
 (.124) (.384) (.384) (.154) (.300) (.422) 
Random Effects       
Proposal Level (std.dev.) .731 ** - .494 *** .705 ** - .446 *** 
 (.109)  (.383) (.110)  (.136) 
Policy Area Level (std.dev.) - .681 ** .726 * - .691 * .725 * 
  (.126) (.136)  (.127) (.136) 
Year Level  (std.dev.) - - - - - - 
-2 x Log Likelihood 3171.894 3041.960 3036.533 3163.894 3029.841 3026.275 
N Years 8 8 8 8 8 8 
N Policy Areas 19 19 19 19 19 19 
N Proposals 973 973 973 973 973 973 
N Issues 2369 2369 2369 2369 2369 2369 
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
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European Parliament Success in EU Decision-Making, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: European Parliament Success 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Fixed Effects Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio 
Individual Level Variables       
Package Deal .568 *** .375 *** -.163 -.459 -.459 .632 
 (.104) (.107) (.220) (.398) (.398)  
Codecision - 1.563 *** 1.571 *** 1.592 *** 1.592 *** 4.193 
  (.139) (.140) (.138) (.138)  
Council Impatience .397 *** .299 *** .298 *** .305 *** .305 *** 1.356 
 (.100) (.102) (.102) (.103) (.103)  
Urgent .066 .026 .028 .023 .023 1.023 
 (.113) (.115) (.115) (.116) (.116)  
Urgent for the Commission .440 *** .346 ** .308 ** .298 ** .298 ** 1.347 
 (.146) (.150) (.150) (.151) (.151)  
European Parliament Cohesion .008 ** .007 ** .008 ** .008 ** .008 ** 1.008 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)  
EP Committee Plenary Supported .142  .345 *** .336 *** .341 *** .341 *** 1.407 
 (.117) (.120) (.120) (.120) (.120)  
Relative EP Salience  -.071 *** -.058 ** -.059 ** -.056 ** -.056 ** .945 
 (.026) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.026)  
Parliament - Council Salience Tie -.417 *** -.317 *** -.293 *** -.292 *** -.292 *** .746 
 (.106) (.106) (.106) (.106) (.106)  
Commission Support .805 *** .756 *** .753 *** .750 *** .750 *** 2.117 
 (.099) (.099) (.099) (.099) (.099)  
Issues Type (base budgetary)       
Policy Substance Issues .117 .142 .149 -.005 -.005 .995 
 (.160) (.164) (.165) (.209) (.209)  
Fundamental Rights Issues 1.544 *** 1.590 *** 1.615 *** 1.813 *** 1.813 *** 6.128 
 (.226) (.233) (.233) (.294) (.294)  
Institutional Powers Issues .573 *** .698 *** .692 *** .329 .329 1.389 
 (.195) (.200) (.201) (.355) (.355)  
Package Deal x Policy Substance - - - .343 .343 1.409 
    (.327) (.327)  
Package Deal x Fundamental Rights - - - -.644 -.644 .520 
    (.449) (.449)  
Package Deal x Institutional Issues - - - 1.026 ** 1.026 ** 2.791 
    (.424) (.424)  
Macro - Level Variable       
Distributive Policy Area -.383 .345 -.289 -.333 -.333 .717 
 (.635) (.404) (.453) (.435) (.435)  
Cross-Level Interaction       
Package Deal x Distributive Policy - - 1.371 *** 1.371 *** 1.371 *** 3.940 
   (.490) (.511) (.511)  
Intercept -1.673 *** -3.021 *** -2.757 *** -2.656 *** -2.656 *** - 
 (.507) (.448) (.448) (.456) (.456)  
Random Effects       
Proposal Level (std.dev.) - - <.001 - - - 
   (.186)    
Policy Area Level (std.dev.) .613 ** .310 *** .289 *** .248 *** .248 *** - 
 (.117) (.090) (.090) (.088) (.088)  
Year Level  (std.dev.) - - - - - - 
       
-2 x Log Likelihood 2815.010 2693.189 2685.311 2670.399 2670.399   
N Years 8 8 8 8 8  
N Policy Areas 19 19 19 19 19  
N Proposals 973 973 973 973 973  
N Issues 2369 2369 2369 2369 2369  
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
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8.3 Package Deals and EP Success: Results from the Binary Logistic Regressions 
 
The empirical analysis of the 973 legislative proposals (2369 issues) completed between 1 
May1999 and 30 April 2007 supports the principal argument that package deals lead to 
increased EP legislative influence in distributive policy areas. The results confirm the 
general understanding in the literature on EU policy-making that the European Parliament 
enjoys stronger legislative influence in regulatory policy areas. Although the EP is 
relatively weaker in distributive policy areas, the results support the argument that through 
package deals the European Parliament manages to influence important and costly 
legislative proposals.  
The Package Deal x Distributive Policy Area interaction term is significant and 
positively correlated with EP success. Even when the control variables are added to the 
model (Models 7 - 11), the coefficient of the cross-level interaction remains significant 
(Norton et al., 2004). Therefore, contrary to the traditional view of the European Parliament 
as a relatively weak legislative institution in distributive policies, through logrolling, the EP 
manages to influence legislation that is expensive for the Member States.  
Figure 8.2 plots the predicted probability of EP success on EU legislative outcomes 
according to the use of package deals and the concentration of distributive proposals in 
policy areas. The plot confirms that the legislative influence of the EP is much greater in 
regulatory policy areas. The probability of EP success significantly decreases with the 
increase in distributive proposals per policy area. EP success in the absence of a package 
deal is most likely in the policy areas of Internal Market and Services, Enterprise and 
Industry, Health and Consumer Protection, and Environment. In the absence of a package 
deal, the EP is least likely to succeed in the areas of Budget, Research, Economic and 
Financial Affairs, Development and Education and Culture. 
 
  290 
Figure 8.2 Effect of Package Deals and Distributive Policies on EP Legislative Influence  
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 Note: Probabilities predicted based on Model 11 in Table 8.4.   
 
 
However, although the EP enjoys very little legislative influence in distributive 
policy areas, when package deals are negotiated this is not the case. Package deals ensure a 
greater than 60% probability of EP success in all EU policy areas. Hence, although package 
deals are usually fast - tracked and deprive some MEPs of full participation in the decision-
making process, the European Parliament benefits as an institution from legislative 
exchange with the Council.  
Not surprisingly, the legislative procedure is a defining factor in the probability of 
EP influence on legislative outcomes. Co-decision allows the European Parliament an 
equal legislative status with the Council and this translates in the EP significantly 
influencing co-decision proposals. Nevertheless, as Figure 8.3 illustrates, package deals 
increase the likelihood of EP success in both the co-decision and consultation procedure. 
Informal logrolls allow the EP to negotiate consultation proposals on „co-decision like‟ 
terms with the Council.  
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Figure 8.3 Effect of Package Deals and Legislative Procedures on EP Legislative Influence  
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Assuming the other variables are at their mean, in the co-decision procedure, the 
probability of EP success through a package deal increases from 60% to 82 % as the 
concentration of distributive proposals per policy area increases. In the consultation 
procedure, package deals increase the likelihood of EP success from 25% to 55 % as the 
concentration of distributive proposals increases. These findings confirm that the use of 
package deals in the EU legislative process increases the likelihood of the EP‟s legislative 
influence on policy outcomes in both the consultation and co-decision procedures.  
The results support the argument that package deals increase the legislative 
influence of the European Parliament in distributive policy areas. Package deals are 
concluded regularly in EU decision-making as they allow the EP and the Council to 
exchange favours and negotiate enforceable agreements. Logrolls are usually fast-tracked 
and deprive some MEPs from their full involvement in the legislative process. 
Nevertheless, through package deals the European Parliament gains the ability to influence 
some of the EU‟s most expensive policies. Thus, the European Parliament manages to 
translate its budgetary powers into legislative influence.  
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8.4 What Exactly Does the European Parliament Gain in Package Legislation  
The previous section found support for the argument that package deals increase the 
legislative influence of the European Parliament in distributive policy areas. Package deals 
are concluded regularly in EU decision-making as they allow the EP and the Council to 
exchange favours and negotiate enforceable agreements. What is exchanged in legislative 
package deals? What is the European Parliament gaining through logrolls? Package deals 
allow both the Council and the European Parliament to get what they want from engaging 
in trade. What are the specific profits for the European Parliament from its repeated 
engagement in package deals with the Council?  
The argument presented in Chapter III holds that through logrolling, the EP gains 
institutional powers. As package deals usually take place on distributive proposals, the 
stakes are very high and Member States are particularly interested in the budgetary terms 
agreed in the legislation. When it comes to funding and budgetary matters, Member States 
are less open to negotiations. In exchange for allowing Member States to realize their 
budgetary and policy preferences, the European Parliament gains additional institutional 
powers. This section tests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Package deals increase the likelihood of EP success in gaining institutional 
powers. 
 
Table 8.5 below presents the distribution of EP success according to issue type in 
package and non-package legislation. First, package deal proposals contain more issues 
than non-package legislation. This is in line with the theoretical argument that package 
deals take place when multiple issues are negotiated at the same time. A package deal 
proposal contains on average 3.56 issues (868 issues in 244 package proposals) whereas a 
non-package deal proposal contains on average 2.06 issues (1501 issues in 729 proposals).  
  293 
Table 8.5 Success Rate of Issues according to Issue Type: Package Deals 
141
 
  Type of Issues Contested by the EP 
  Total  
Policy 
Substance 
Budgetary 
Fundamental 
Rights  
Institutional 
Powers  
Total proposals 973         
Total Issues 2369 1528 256 269 316 
of which EP successful (%) 
1230 
(51.9) 
754 
(49.3) 
109 
(42.6) 
214 
(79.6) 
153 
(48.4) 
      
Package Deal Proposals  244         
Package Deal Issues  868 560 100 106 102 
of which EP successful (%) 
557 
(64.2)  
343 
(61.3) 
51 
 (51.0)  
84 
(79.2) 
79 
(77.5) 
      
No Package Deal Proposals 729         
No Package Deal  Issues 1501 968 156 163 214 
of which EP successful (%) 
673 
(44.8) 
411 
(42.5) 
58 
(37.2) 
130 
(79.8) 
74 
(34.6) 
Own calculations 
 
Overall, the total EP success row shows that the EP was most successful when it 
contested fundamental rights issues (79.6%), followed by policy substance issues (49.3%), 
institutional powers issues (48.4%) and budgetary issues (42.6%). This result is intuitive. 
The Parliament as the „voice of the people‟ is likely to succeed in its demands for human 
rights, transparency, privacy, data protection, and children‟s rights. On the other hand, 
when it comes to funding and budgetary matters, Member States are less open to 
negotiations. That explains the EP‟s low success rate in budgetary issues.  
When the types of issues are considered it becomes clearer what in practice the 
European Parliament gains in package deals as compared to non-logrolled legislation. 
In package legislation the EP was most successful in fundamental rights issues (79.2%), 
followed by institutional powers issues (77.5%), policy substance issues (61.3%) and 
budgetary issues (51.0%). In non-package legislation, the EP was most successful in 
fundamental rights issues (79.8%), followed by policy substance issues (42.5%), budgetary 
issues (37.2%) and institutional powers issues (34.6%). The biggest increase in EP success 
between package and non-package legislation is in institutional powers issues. EP success 
increases with 42.9 per cent. This is followed by an increase of 18.8 per cent in EP success 
                                                 
141
 See Chapter IV for classification of issue types  
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in policy substantial issues and of 13.8 per cent in budgetary issues. Fundamental rights 
issues do not seem to be affected by package legislation, there is less than 1% difference 
between the two categories.  
This is confirmed by the statistical results (Table 8.4). The full binary logit models 
of EP success across all policy areas (Models 10 - 11) include interaction terms for 
Package Deals and Issue Types. The Package Deal x Institutional Powers Issue interaction 
is statistically significant and positively correlated with EP success, whereas the 
Institutional Powers Issue coefficient is non-significant. Therefore, the European 
Parliament is more likely to gain institutional powers issues when package deals are 
negotiated.  
Budgetary issues are much more salient to Member States than the institutional 
powers they are giving in exchange to the European Parliament. Member States‟ 
preferences are much more intense about issues such as spending, co-financing, funding for 
programs and Community actions than they are about institutional issues such as the EP‟s 
ability to monitor and control the establishment of new bodies, parliamentary scrutiny, the 
writing of reports to the EP periodically. On the other hand, MEPs value highly an increase 
in the institutional and legislative powers of their chamber. When the two chambers attach 
different preference intensities to issues, trade is possible and logrolls are profitable for 
both the Council and the European Parliament.   
In addition to the significant effect of package deals on EP legislative influence, 
several significant results were identified in this chapter. First, the impatience of the 
Council matters across EU policy areas. The Council Impatience variable is positively 
correlated with EP success. An impatient Council is more likely to cooperate with the EP 
and therefore more likely to grant concessions to the Parliament in return for a fast-track 
decision. In contrast, when the EP is relatively more impatient about the conclusion of a 
legislative deal, it is in a weaker bargaining position.  
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Second, EP Cohesion is a significant predictor of EP success across all EU policy 
areas. EP cohesion at the committee level seems to be slightly less important than EP 
cohesion at the plenary level. Nevertheless, both the EP Cohesion and EP Plenary Support 
variables are significant and positively correlated with EP success. Regardless of the policy 
area, the legislative influence of the EP depends on its ability to secure a cohesive 
institutional position on legislative proposals.  
Third, support from the European Commission significantly increases the chances 
of EP success. The Commission‟s position on EU legislation is important and the European 
Parliament benefits from the Commission‟s endorsement of EP proposals. The 
Commission‟s agenda-setting and implementation powers give it a strong voice in 
legislative decision-making and the EP benefits from having the Commission on its side. 
Member States are more likely to reconsider their positions when both the European 
Parliament and the Commission oppose them.  
Moreover, the Council - EP Salience Tie variable is significant and negatively 
correlated with EP success. The EP is more likely to fail to affect legislative outcomes 
when both institutions share similar intensities of preferences over proposals. Therefore, 
the European Parliament will be more successful if it can trade its support for a Council 
proposal in exchange for the Council‟s support on a salient EP proposal.  
 
8.5 A Closer Look at the Degree of the EP’s Legislative Influence 
In the previous chapters the variable EP Success was coded as a dichotomous variable with 
1 = success and 0 = failure. As indicated in Chapter IV, initially the EP success variable 
was coded as an ordinal variable with 4 degrees of success where 0 = failure, 1 = low 
success, 2 = medium success, and 3 = high success. Due to the limited number of 
observations in categories 1 and 2, this variable was re-coded as a binary where 0 = failure 
and 1 = the three degrees of success (1 + 2 + 3).  
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Table 8.6 Ordinal Distribution of European Parliament Success  
 Issues Contested by the EP 
EP Success Ordinal  Consultation Codecision Total  
Category 3 = High Success 128 862 990 
 (%) (15.9) (55.0) (41.8) 
Category 2 = Medium Success 49 117 166 
 (%) (6.1) (7.5) (7.0) 
Category 1 = Low Success 30 41 71 
 (%) (3.7) (2.6) (3.0) 
Category 0 = Failure  595 547 1142 
 (%) (74.2) 34.9 (48.2) 
    
Total 802 1567 2369 
Own calculations 
In the consultation procedure, the distribution of EP success was as follows. 74.2% 
(595 issues) fell in category 0 = failure. Only 3.7 % (30 issues) of the observations fell in 
category 1 (low success) and 6.1 % (49 issues) fell in category 2 (medium success). 16 % 
(128 issues) of the observations fell in category 3 (high success). In the co-decision 
procedure, the distribution of EP success was as follows. 34.9% (547 issues) fell in 
category 0 = failure. Only 2.6% (41 issues) of the observations fell in category 1 (low 
success) and 7.5% (117 issues) fell in category 2 (medium success). 55 % (862 issues) of 
the observations fell in category 3 (high). In total, 48.2% (1142 issues) fell in category  0 = 
failure. 3.0% (71 issues) fell in category 1 (low success) and 7.0% (990 issues) fell in 
category 2 (medium success). 41.8% (990 issues) of the observations fell in category 3 
(high success).  
It is important to explore the variation of EP success within policy areas (see Table 
8.7). The consideration of the different degrees of EP success will provide a more detailed 
account of the legislative influence of the European Parliament in EU policy areas. In some 
policy areas, the legislative influence of the EP fell predominantly in the two extreme 
categories (0 = failure or 3 = high success). For example, in the policy areas of 
Development, Information Society and External Relations, the EP either fully achieved its 
legislative demands or it failed to influence the legislative text (less than 5% of EP success 
falls in categories 1 and 2). On the other hand, in the policy areas of Budget, Internal 
  297 
Market and Services, and Research EP success varies considerably across categories 1, 2, 
and 3 (more than 18% of EP success falls in categories 1 and 2). 
 
Table 8.7 Degrees of EP Legislative Influence: Variation across Policy Areas 
 EP Legislative Influence: Degrees 
Policy Area (Commission DG) Failure =0 Success =1 Success =2 Success = 3 
  N % N % N % N % 
Agriculture & Rural Development 124 (76.5%) 4 (2.5%) 11 (6.8%) 23 (14.2%) 
Budget 20 (28.2%) 12 (16.9%) 2 (2.8%) 37 (52.1%) 
Development 13 (44.8%) 0 - 1 (3.4%) 15 (51.7%) 
Economic and Financial Affairs 35 (74.5%) 2 (4.3%) 1 (2.1%) 9 (19.1%) 
Education and Culture 25 (30.5%) 3 (3.7%) 7 (8.5%) 47 (57.3%) 
Employment and Social Affairs  34 (35.1%) 1 (1.0%) 5 (5.2%) 57 (58.8%) 
Energy and Transport 150 (41.4%) 17 (4.7%) 34 (9.4%) 161 (44.5%) 
Enterprise and Industry 50 (32.5%) 0 - 15 (9.7%) 89 (57.8%) 
Environment 88 (40.7%) 4 (1.9%) 8 (3.7%) 116 (53.7%) 
Eurostat, Statistical Office 18 (36.0%) 0 - 3 (6.0%) 29 (58.0%) 
External Relations 39 (59.1%) 2 (3.0%) 1 (1.5%) 24 (36.4%) 
Fisheries 114 (88.4%) 1 (0.8%) 7 (5.4%) 7 (5.4%) 
General Secretariat 14 (45.2%) 1 (3.2%) 2 (6.5%) 14 (45.2%) 
Health and Consumer Protection 94 (38.4%) 6 (2.4%) 19 (7.8%) 126 (51.4%) 
Information Society 22 (35.5%) 0 - 0 - 40 (64.5%) 
Internal Market and Services 72 (45.0%) 7 (4.4%) 23 (14.4%) 58 (36.3%) 
Justice, Freedom and Security 168 (57.5%) 8 (2.7%) 18 (6.2%) 98 (33.6%) 
Research 30 (46.2%) 2 (3.1%) 7 (10.8%) 26 (40.0%) 
Taxation and Customs Union 32 (65.3%) 1 (2.0%) 2. (4.1%) 14 (28.6%) 
            
Total Issues  1142 (48.2%) 71 (3.0%) 166 (7.0%) 990 (41.8%) 
Own calculations 
 
8.6 Package Deals and EP Success: Results from the Ordinal and Multinomial 
Regressions 
While the different success categories were grouped into one up to now, the 
following section will explore the conditions for EP legislative influence when the EP 
Success variable is treated as an ordinal/categorical variable. By including the degree of EP 
success in the analysis, the results of the statistical tests will provide a clearer picture of the 
extent to which the European Parliament influences legislative outcomes across policy 
areas in the EU. When the issues from the co-decision and consultation procedures are 
pooled together, none of the categories is empty or extremely small. Therefore, it is 
possible to run an ordinal logistic test.  
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In order to explore the variation of the degrees of EP legislative influence, the 
following models as estimated using ordinal and multinomial logistic regressions
142
. The 
standard errors are clustered around the 19 policy areas, in order to take account of the 
conditioning effect of the policy area on the probability of EP success. Exactly the same 
independent variables and interaction terms were used in the binary logit, the ordinal logit 
and the multinomial logit. The estimation of models for EP success with identical 
independent factors allows for an easy comparison of the effects of the independent 
variables and interaction terms when EP success is treated as a dichotomous, ordinal and 
categorical outcome. The ordinal logits in Table 8.8 (Models 1 to 5) were estimated with 
EP success as an ordinal variable where 0 = failure, 1 = low success, 2 = medium success 
and 3 = high success. The multinomial logits in Table 8.9 (Models 1 to 5) were estimated 
with EP success as a categorical variable where 0 = failure, 1 = low success, 2 = medium 
success and 3 = high success. 
The results of the ordered logit regressions (Table 8.8) confirm the findings of the 
previous section. Package deals increase the likelihood of EP success. The results confirm 
that the presence of package deals increases the probability of EP success in distributive 
policy areas. However, when the degree of EP success is taken into account the cross-level 
interaction term Package Deal x Distributive Policy has a weaker effect
143
. This finding 
suggests two things. 
                                                 
142
 One of the assumptions underlying ordinal logistic regression is that the relationship between each pair of 
outcome groups is the same. Ordinal logistic regression assumes that the coefficients that describe the 
relationship between the lowest versus all higher categories of the dependent variable are the same as those 
that describe the relationship between the next lowest category and all higher categories. This is called the 
proportional odds assumption (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2005, 154). If there is a difference between the 
different categories, then a multinomial logit regression is more appropriate. Multinomial logit regression 
works like an ordinary binary logistic regression, except that all the different outcomes in the dependent 
variable  are compared against each other. In a model with four alternative  categories, outcome 0 (failure) is 
compared to outcome 1 (little success), outcome 1 (little success) is compared to outcome 2 (medium 
success), outcome 2 (medium success) is compared to outcome 3 (high success) and outcome 3 (high success) 
is compared to outcome 0 (failure). 
 
143
 The coefficient of the interaction term and its significance are reduced when the degree of EP success is 
considered. If the full binary and ordered logit models are compared, the power of the cross-level interaction 
decreases from a predictor with a coefficient of 1.317 (se .511), significant at the 1% level with a 
corresponding odds ratio of 3.940 (in the binary model) to a coefficient of .988 (se .587), significant at the 
10% level and a corresponding odds ratio of 2.660 (in the ordered model). 
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Table 8.8 Ordinal Logistic Regressions: European Parliament Success 
 
European Parliament Success in EU Decision-Making, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: European Parliament Success 
 Ordered Logit (Clustered S.E) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Fixed Effects Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio 
Individual Level Variables       
Package Deal .731 *** .649 *** .375 *** -.046 -.243 .632 
 (.216) (.174) (.144) (.217) (.513)  
Codecision - - 1.771 *** 1.782 *** 1.781 *** 5.935 
   (.129) (.133) (.133)  
Council Impatience - .331 ** .250 ** .251** .263 ** 1.301 
  (.136) (.126) (.120) (.121)  
Urgent - - .140 .074 -.069 -.069 .937 
  (.136) (.112) (.119) (.120)  
Urgent for the Commission - .619 *** .396 ** .355 * .346 * 1.413 
  (.226) (.197) (.098) (.249)  
European Parliament Cohesion - .011 ** .011 *** .011 *** .011 *** 1.012 
  (.005) (.004) (.003) (.003)  
EP Committee Plenary Supported - .002 .328 *** .321 *** .326 *** 1.386 
  (.116) (.104) (.106) (.107)  
Relative EP Salience  - -.045  -.026  -.026  -.026  .974 
  (.036) (.027) (.037) (.037)  
Parliament - Council Salience Tie - -.432 *** -.251 *** -.233 *** -.232 *** .973 
  (.079) (.082) (.082) (.084)  
Commission Support - .818 *** .686 *** .685 *** .677 *** 1.967 
  (.136) (.128) (.128) (.124)  
Issues Type (base budgetary)       
Policy Substance Issues - .140 .122 .117 -.001 .999 
  (.104) (.219) (.217) (.236)  
Fundamental Rights Issues - 1.440 *** 1.527*** 1.539 *** 1.809 *** 6.104 
  (.139) (.286) (.283) (.369)  
Institutional Powers Issues - .513 * .785 ** .774 ** .440 1.553 
  (.289) (.348) (.339) (.373)  
Package Deal x Policy Substance - - - - .226 1.305 
     (.512)  
Package Deal x Fundamental Rights - - - - -.760 .467 
     (.635)  
Package Deal x Institutional Issues - - - - .909  2.483 
     (.809)  
Macro - Level Variable       
Distributive Policy Area -.434 -.689 .374 -.113 -.156 .856 
 (.502) (.556) (.509) (.229) (.522)  
Cross-Level Interaction       
Package Deal x Distributive Policy - - - 1.037 * .978 * 2.660 
    (.625) (.587)  
Cut 1  .157 1.644 3.384 3.192 3.100  
Cut 2  .140 1.783 3.538 3.346 3.256  
Cut 3  .431 2.109 3.903 3.711 3.624  
       
Log Pseudolikelihood -2345.973 -2202.982 -2065.833 -2062.794 -2053.491   
N Policy Areas 19 19 19 19 19 19 
N Issues 2369 2369 2369 2369 2369 2369 
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
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Table 8.9 Multinomial Logistic Regressions: European Parliament Success 
 
European Parliament Success in EU Decision-Making, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: European Parliament Success 
        
 Multinomial Logit (Clustered S.E) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Baseline (Failure = 0) 
Success 
1 
Success 
2 
Success 
3 
Success 
1 
Success 
2 
Success 
3 
Fixed Effects Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. 
Individual Level Variables        
Package Deal 1.078 *** .428 ** .811 *** .958 ** .371 * .717 *** 
 (.396) (.220) (.236) (.429) (.211) (.189) 
Codecision - - - - - - 
        
Council Impatience - - - -.060 .232 .367 ** 
    (.330) (.180) (.153) 
Urgent - - - .389 -.110 -.158 
    (.293) (.321) (.150) 
Urgent for the Commission - - - .396 .513 .725 *** 
    (.428) (.359) (.252) 
European Parliament Cohesion - - - -.011 -.007 .014 ** 
    (.011) (.005) (.007) 
EP Committee Plenary Supported - - - .202 .258 ** -.006 
    (.302) (.124) (.134) 
Relative EP Salience  - - - -.166 *** -.118 * -.056 
    (.055) (.067) (.043) 
Parliament - Council Salience Tie - - - -.604 *** -.174 -.499 *** 
    (.237) (.134) (.099) 
Commission Support - - - .238 .998 *** .885 *** 
    (.255) (.217) (.145) 
Issues Type (base budgetary)        
Policy Substance Issues - - - .276 .196 .162 
    (.636) (.357) (.118) 
Fundamental Rights Issues - - - .292 .939 *** 1.646 *** 
    (.695) (.280) (.152) 
Institutional Powers Issues - - - -.360 -.001 .609 ** 
    (.547) (.660) (.278) 
Package Deal x Policy Substance - - - - - - 
        
Package Deal x Fundamental Rights - - - - - - 
        
Package Deal x Institutional Issues - - - - - - 
        
Macro - Level Variable        
Distributive Policy Area 1.164 -1.200 * -.424 1.460 -.769 -.788 
 (1.014) (.720) (.571) (.904) (.744) (.629) 
Cross-Level Interaction        
Package Deal x Distributive Policy - - - - - - 
        
Intercept  -3.735 *** -1.588 *** -.263 -3.321 *** -2.134 *** -2.165*** 
 (.607) (.345) (.303) (1.142) (.783) (.695) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -2334.940 -2169.648 
N Policy Areas 19 19 19 19 19 19 
N Issues 2369 2369 2369 2369 2369 2369 
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
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Multinomial Logistic Regressions: European Parliament Success (continued)  
European Parliament Success in EU Decision-Making, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: European Parliament Success 
        
 Multinomial Logit (Clustered S.E) 
 Model 3 Model 4 
Baseline (Failure = 0) 
Success 
1 
Success 
2 
Success 
3 
Success 
1 
Success 
2 
Success 
3 
Fixed Effects Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. Coef/S.E. 
Individual Level Variables        
Package Deal .902 * .218 .388 *** -.834 -.454 -.022 
 (.479) (.215) (.149) (1.770) (.410) (.246) 
Codecision .100 .702 *** 2.065 *** .166 .714 *** 2.070 *** 
 (.495) (.237) (.167) (.661) (.236) (.172) 
Council Impatience -.087 .191 .265 ** -.100 .184 .265 ** 
 (.308) (.193) (.137) (.284) (.186) (.131) 
Urgent .407 -.088 -.090 .443 -.082 -.085 
 (.286) (.312) (.124) (.301) (.312) (.129) 
Urgent for the Commission .308 .366 .444 ** .088 .297 .400 * 
 (.450) (.342) (.212) (.423) (.324) (.217) 
European Parliament Cohesion -.011 -.006 .014 *** -.011 -.006 .014 *** 
 (.012) (.005) (.004) (.011) (.005) (.004) 
EP Committee Plenary Supported .211 .419 *** .343 *** .173 .402 *** .333 *** 
 (.282) (.126) (.112) (.282) (.137) (.113) 
Relative EP Salience  -.154 *** -.099 -.031 -.157 *** -.100  -.030 
 (.057) (.067) (.042) (.058) (.064) (.042) 
Parliament - Council Salience Tie -.611 ** -.087 -.307 *** -.520 ** -.056 -.289*** 
 (.256) (.163) (.091) (.250) (.167) (.091) 
Commission Support .220 .929 *** .777 *** .213 .924 *** .773 *** 
 (.230) (.221) (.146) (.235) (.221) (.144) 
Issues Type (base budgetary)        
Policy Substance Issues .233 .177 .117 .216 .182 .119 
 (.577) (.388) (.243) (.560) (.381) (.241) 
Fundamental Rights Issues .272 .964 *** 1.769 *** .308 .988 *** 1.781 *** 
 (.570) (.338) (.332) (.559) (.338) (.327) 
Institutional Powers Issues -.656 .102 .932 *** -.715 -.091 .920 *** 
 (.559) (.609) (.367) (.622) (.612) (.357) 
Package Deal x Policy Substance - - - - - - 
        
Package Deal x Fundamental Rights - - - - - - 
        
Package Deal x Institutional Issues - - - - - - 
        
Macro - Level Variable        
Distributive Policy Area 1.551 ** -.296 -.311 -.759 -1.008 -.109 
 (.686) (.700) (.546) (1.362) (.945) (.581) 
Cross-Level Interaction        
Package Deal x Distributive Policy - - - 3.850 ** 1.708 * 1.002 
    (1.770) (1.106) (.692) 
Intercept  -3.293 *** -2.808 *** - 4.177 *** -2.349 ** -2.526 *** -3.997 *** 
 (.861) (.886) (.534) (1.065) (.960) (.525) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -2028.344 -2021.225 
N Policy Areas 19 19 19 19 19 19 
N Issues 2369 2369 2369 2369 2369 2369 
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
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Multinomial Logistic Regressions: European Parliament Success (continued)  
European Parliament Success in EU Decision-Making, 1999 – 2007 
Dependent Variable: European Parliament Success 
        
 Multinomial Logit (Clustered S.E) 
 Model 5 
Baseline (Failure = 0) Success 1 Success 2 Success 3 
Fixed Effects Coef/S.E. Risk Ratio Coef/S.E. Risk Ratio Coef/S.E. Risk Ratio 
Individual Level Variables          
Package Deal -1.487 .226 -1.154 * .315 -.143 .867 
 (1.196)   (.637)   (.637)  
Codecision .137 1.147 .713 *** 2.039 2.088 *** 8.070 
 (.416)   (.235)   (.179)  
Council Impatience -.094 .910 .199 1.220 .280 ** 1.323 
 (.284)   (.185)   (.132)  
Urgent .472 1.605 -.199 .921 -.084 .920 
 (.314)   (.083)   (.132)  
Urgent for the Commission -.008 1.008 .260 1.297 .389 * 1.475 
 (.391)   (.365)   (.209)  
European Parliament Cohesion -.011 .988 -.007 .994 .014 *** 1.014 
 (.012)   (.005)   (.005)  
EP Committee Plenary Supported .211 1.235 .425 *** 1.530 .339 *** 1.403 
 (.283)   (.142)   (.112)  
Relative EP Salience  -.149 *** .862 -.096 .908 -.029  .971 
 (.057)   (.063)   (.042)  
Parliament - Council Salience Tie -.521** .594 -.053 .948 -.291 *** .748 
 (.246)   (.168)   (.095)  
Commission Support .182 1.200 .913*** 2.492 .766 ** 2.150 
 (.245)   (.218)   (.140)  
Issues Type (base budgetary)          
Policy Substance Issues -.105 .900 - .079 .924 .034 1.034 
 (.322)   (.432)   (.260)  
Fundamental Rights Issues -.651 .522 .917 ** 2.502 2.144 *** 8.530 
 (1.143)   (.441)   (.414)  
Institutional Powers Issues -21.174 ***   -.483 .617 .653 * 1.921 
 (.822)   (.663)   (.348)  
Package Deal x Policy Substance .584 1.793 .718 2.051 .196 1.216 
 (1.060)   (.500)   (.586)  
Package Deal x Fundamental Rights 1.292 3.641 .108 1.114 -1.013 .363 
 (1.071)   (.578)   (.712)  
Package Deal x Institutional Issues 21.756 ***   1.766 ** 5.849 .891 2.437 
    (.923)   (.920)  
Macro - Level Variable          
Distributive Policy Area -.774  .461 -.1.030 .357 -.150 .860 
 (1.338)   (.942)   (.582)  
Cross-Level Interaction          
Package Deal x Distributive Policy 3.739 *** 42.052 1.660 5.259 .940 2.560 
 (1.893)   (1.095)   (.670)  
Intercept  -1.836    - 2.266 **   -3.970 ***  
 (1.174)   (.950)   (.444)  
Log Pseudolikelihood -2007.037 
N Policy Areas 19 19 19 19 19 19 
N Issues 2369 2369 2369 2369 2369 2369 
  303 
First, even when the degree of EP influence is taken into account, package deals increase 
the probability of EP success and furthermore, they increase the probability of EP success 
in distributive policy outcomes. Second, when the degree of EP influence is taken into 
account, package deals are not such a strong predictor of EP success and the Package Deal 
x Distributive Policy interaction effect is much weaker. This implies that package deals 
allow the EP to influence legislation much more than it would in the absence of a logroll. 
However, while package deals allow the EP to insert its preferred policy outcomes in EU 
legislation, they do not guarantee that these preferences will be accommodated in full (i.e. 3 
= high success). Therefore, informal logrolls are important as they allow the EP to increase 
its legislative influence and impact legislative texts (to achieve outcomes different from 0 = 
failure). However, informal logrolls do not guarantee that the EP will realize its legislative 
demands to the fullest (to achieve outcomes in category 3 = high success). While Member 
States are interested to engage in trade with the European Parliament in distributive policy 
areas, the extent of the legislative influence gained from such trade for the EP is limited.  
The results of the multinomial logit regressions (in Table 8.9) confirm that 
package deals increase the likelihood of EP success. The presence of package deals 
increases the probability of EP success in distributive policy areas. However, the effect of 
package deals differs between the success categories. As is evident in Model 4, the effect of 
the cross-level interaction term Package Deal x Distributive Policy is strongest in the 
Success 1 category, followed by Success 2 and Success 3
144
. Package deals allow the EP to 
gain legislative influence on some issues, but the extent of these gains is limited. The EP is 
most likely to gain institutional issues in logrolls in distributive policy areas and these gains 
are most likely to be within the Success 1 category. Hence, the EP enjoys a greater 
legislative role through package deals, but it does not realize its preferences in full.  
                                                 
144
 In Model 4 the coefficient of the interaction term is 3.850 (se 1.770), significant at the 5% level for 
category Success 1 and it is decreases to 1.708 (se 1/106), significant at the 10% level for category 
Success 2. It is non-significant in category Success 3. When the full Model 5 is estimated, the interaction 
term remains statistically significant only in category Success 1.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the effect of package deals on the legislative influence of the 
European Parliament across policy areas and time. This chapter studied all completed 
legislation passed under the co-decision and consultation procedures between 1 May 1999 
and 30 April 2007. The chapter argued that through the package deal the EP gains 
legislative influence in the EU‟s distributive policy areas. The results of the empirical 
analysis of more than 2350 issues discussed between the EP and the Council supported this 
hypothesis. Package deals are employed regularly as they allow the Council and the 
Parliament to achieve their most preferred policy outcomes. While logrolls may reduce the 
ability of ordinary MEPs to participate in the decision-making process, they allow the EP 
as an institution to influence distributive policy outcomes.  
The chapter demonstrated that the legislative influence of the European Parliament 
varies across policy areas and the policy context conditions the outcomes of EU legislative 
bargaining. Overall, the European Parliament is more likely to influence legislation in 
regulatory policy areas. Nevertheless, package deals allow the EP to gain greater influence 
in some of the EU‟s most expensive policy areas. Without exaggerating the effect of 
package legislating on bicameral decision-making in the EU, the chapter identified the 
specific issue gains the EP obtains through package deals. In exchange for supporting the 
Member States‟ budgetary policy preferences, the European Parliament secures increased 
institutional and legislative powers.  
The chapter analysed the legislative influence of the European Parliament by 
measuring EP success as a dichotomous, ordinal and categorical outcome. The estimated 
models confirmed that package deals increase the probability of EP success in EU 
legislative outcomes. In addition to package deals, EP success is conditional on 
institutional impatience, different preference intensities of the EP and the Council, EP 
cohesion and Commission support.  
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CONCLUSION: THE EFFECT OF LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE DEALS ON EU 
DECISION-MAKING  
 
A. Summary of Arguments and Empirical Findings 
The main objective of the thesis was to explore why EU legislators increasingly engage in 
informal inter-chamber package deals and what the effects of these practices are for EU 
policy outcomes. Chapter I reviewed the existing literature on EU legislative politics. 
Chapter II reviewed the theoretical explanations of the use of informal institutional 
arrangements as offered by rational choice and organizational theorists. Chapter III 
presented a theory of inter-chamber logrolling in the European Union. Chapter IV outlined 
the empirical data and methodology employed throughout the thesis. Chapter V examined 
the conditions for the use of package deals in EU decision-making. Chapters VI and VII 
analyzed the effect of package deals and legislative timing on the EP‟s legislative influence 
in the consultation and co-decision procedures. Chapter VIII studied the effect of package 
deals on the EP‟s legislative influence across issues, proposals, policy areas and time.  
 
a) Package Deals in the European Union Legislature  
The main argument of the thesis is that package deals increase the legislative influence of 
the European Parliament in EU decision-making across legislative procedures and policy 
areas. Chapter V found that the likelihood of using legislative package deals increases 
when proposals are distributive and urgent, when the preference intensities of the EP and 
the Council differ, when the EP party leaders are involved in the inter-cameral negotiations 
and when the policy area is marked by multi-issue legislation. Chapter VI found that 
package deals increase the EP‟s legislative influence in the consultation procedure. Chapter 
VII found that package deals increase the EP‟s legislative influence in the co-decision 
procedure. Chapter VIII found that package deals increase the EP‟s legislative influence in 
the EU‟s distributive policy areas.   
  306 
The thesis found that the bundling of issues and proposals in packages is a regularly 
employed legislative practice in the European Union. Around 25% of all EU legislative 
proposals, completed in the period 1999 - 2007, were decided through inter-chamber 
package logrolls. On average 37% of co-decision proposals and 14% of consultation 
proposals were passed through as packages. Moreover, legislative package deals are 
relatively easy to trace empirically. The internal documents of the Council of Ministers 
specifically state whether proposals were decided in a bundle, which issues were part of the 
package deal, and why decisions on single issues would not have been possible. In 
addition, the transcripts of the EP‟s plenary sittings provide further details on whether 
proposals were part of inter-chamber logrolls and how proposals and issues were linked. 
Three types of legislative package deals were identified in the European Union 
through the examination of all completed legislation passed between 1 May 1999 and 30 
April 2007. These are package deals on a) single „omnibus‟ proposals that involve multiple 
issues; b) several proposals that are decided simultaneously within the same legislative 
procedure; and c) several proposals that are decided simultaneously across the co-decision 
and consultation procedures. Due to the lack of credible commitments over time and across 
policy areas, empirical support for logrolling was limited to simultaneous decision-making 
on bundled legislation within the same policy areas. Evidence of inter-chamber logrolling 
could not be found across policy areas or across time.  
In line with the argument proposed in Chapter III, the empirical evidence showed 
that through logrolling the European Parliament gains legislative influence in co-decision 
and consultation and that it gains institutional presence in the EU‟s distributive policy 
areas. Package deals allow the legislative chambers to trade support for their most preferred 
policy outcomes. While ordinary MEPs are unable to participate in the informal 
negotiations, package deals allow the European Parliament as an institution to gain greater 
influence in some of the EU‟s most expensive policies.  
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 Some readers may question the methodology of empirically identifying and 
quantifying informal deals and arrangements. One of the most important features of 
legislative package deals is that despite their informal character, they have to be officially 
approved through voting by each of the EU legislative chambers. These informal bargains 
need to be enforced by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Any 
agreements made between the representatives of the chambers, have to go through the 
formal legislative process in order to become law. Informal bargains made between the 
Council and the EP are therefore binding and their representatives commit to pass and 
enforce them without further amendments. 
This feature of package lawmaking requires that package deals are clearly identified 
within the legislative process, so that they can be passed as block votes without 
amendments. Each of the legislative institutions keeps records of informal inter-chamber 
negotiations and the progress on them. The Council of Ministers‟ Document Register is a 
particularly good source on legislative package deals and informal trialogues. The working 
documents of the Council clearly indicate the frequency and scope of informal inter-
chamber negotiations with the EP. Contentious issues are identified, as well as terms of 
package compromises. Both the Council‟s Register and the European Parliament‟s 
Legislative Observatory provide enough data for systematic research on package deals.   
 In addition, readers may be concerned about the originality of the argument 
presented in the thesis. While not all legislative proposals in the EU are decided in the form 
of package deals, some of the EU‟s most important legislation has been decided through 
package deals. The thesis found that package deals are not only increasingly used, but they 
are also important tools for legislative influence. Through logrolling, EU legislators trade 
support for their most preferred policy outcomes. Therefore, package deals have a clear 
effect on legislative outcomes. This is a significant contribution to the understanding of 
European Union legislative politics. 
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a) Informal Trialogue Procedures 
In addition to the effect of package deals on the legislative influence of the European 
Parliament, the thesis analysed the institution of the „informal trialogue‟. It highlighted that 
the analysis of EU decision-making cannot ignore the proliferation of trialogue procedures 
and their effect on EU lawmaking. Instead of dividing the analysis into formal vs. informal 
procedures, the thesis showed that EU legislative politics involves frequent formal and 
informal negotiations between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. 
Trialogue procedures have spread throughout the co-decision procedure and are 
increasingly employed in consultation.  
The thesis found that more than 74% of co-decision proposals and 5% of 
consultation proposals are discussed at informal inter-institutional meetings. Trialogues 
serve as institutional tools for information exchange between the Council and the EP. They 
allow members of the Parliament, the Council and the Commission to reach enforceable 
agreements through informal means. Trialogue procedures are increasingly enforced in the 
EU as Member States largely achieve their budgetary preferences, the EP secures 
additional institutional powers and the Commission regains its presence in the legislative 
process. 
Trialogue meetings do not automatically increase the European Parliament‟s 
chances of success. The thesis found that informal trialogues restrain the ability of 
individual MEPs to participate in the writing of committee reports, to deliberate and to 
propose amendments. However, to capture the gains from exchange, the legislative 
chambers commit to the institution of trialogue decision-making. Trialogue procedures help 
EU legislators to sustain the practice of package law-making. These informal inter-
institutional arrangements facilitate the exchange of information and the enforcement of 
informal commitments. 
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b) Legislative Timing  
The timing of EU decision-making has been an increasingly important factor in the study 
of EU legislative politics (Golub, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2008; Schulz and Konig, 2000; Konig, 
2007; Golub and Steunenberg, 2007; Goetz and Meyer-Sahling, 2009). Timing has also 
been considered a crucial factor in bicameral decision-making (Tsebelis and Money, 1997; 
Binder, 1999, 2003). Delay and impatience have been prominent factors in legislative 
bargaining (Cox and Kernell, 1991; Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Hiroi, 2008). The thesis 
found that urgency and the relative impatience of legislative chambers have an effect on 
their influence over policy outcomes. 
 
Delay  
In addition to the effect of package deals on the legislative influence of the European 
Parliament in the consultation procedure, Chapter VI examined the EP‟s „power of delay‟. 
It studied the EP‟s role in legislative decision-making on all consultation proposals (925) 
completed in the period 1999 - 2007. In line with the existing literature, the chapter 
confirmed that the power of the European Parliament is very limited in consultation. 
Nevertheless, the results suggest that the EP can act as an influential legislative institution 
through delay.  
 The power to delay allows the EP to enjoy important benefits in the legislative 
system. First, through delay the EP manages to obtain concessions from the Council. Delay 
allows the Parliament to see many of its preferences incorporated in the final legislative 
texts. Second, delay opens the door for informal negotiations between the Council and EP. 
When the EP delays its opinion and Member States need an urgent decision, the Council 
has an incentive to speed-up the legislative process through informal contacts. Third, delay 
gives the consultation procedure two readings. Once aware of the EP‟s preferences, the 
Council and Commission adjust their positions in order to avoid delay.  
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Impatience of Legislative Chambers 
In addition to the effect of package deals on the legislative influence of the European 
Parliament in the co-decision procedure, Chapter VII found that legislative impatience has 
an important in co-decision. Council impatience increases the probability of EP success in 
co-decision outcomes. The chapter analyzed the EP‟s legislative influence on all co-
decision proposals (54) completed in the period 1999 - 2007. It found that the European 
Parliament succeeds in 65% of its legislative demands under co-decision. In addition to 
Council impatience, EP success in co-decision is conditional on the salience of the 
proposal, EP cohesion and Commission support.   
An impatient Council is more likely to cooperate with the EP and therefore more 
likely to grant concessions to the EP in return for a fast-track decision. The results support 
the argument that the impatience of legislators undermines their bargaining power. The 
Council Impatience variable is positively correlated with EP success and statistically 
significant across procedures and policy areas. The Parliament manages to realize many of 
its legislative demands in return for not using its power to delay an opinion. In contrast, 
when the EP is relatively more impatient about the conclusion of a legislative deal, it is in a 
weaker bargaining position. Thus, the EP is likely to enjoy significant legislative influence 
in cases that require urgent decisions. 
How does the picture of EU lawmaking presented by the thesis compare to the 
„textbook diagram of EU lawmaking‟ outlined in Figure 1.2 in the Chapter I? Clearly, there 
is a lot more going on than the simple procedural legislative process outlined by the 
diagram. Informal meetings, distributive gains, preference intensities, sensitivity to time 
pressure and package deals do not feature on these diagrams. The thesis found that inter-
chamber logrolling blurs the formal procedural rules in the EU legislative system. Package 
bargains are negotiated in advance and the terms of the deals are simply approved through 
voting. The legislative activity timelines included in the case studies presented this fact.  
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Table 8.10 Comparison of Predictions and Findings  
 
Legislative Package Deals in the European Union, 1999 – 2007  
             
  Chapter V Ex Obs Chapter VI Ex Obs Chapter VII Ex Obs Chapter VIII Ex Obs 
  All legislation     Consultation     Codecision     All legislation     
Dependent Variable  Package Deal      EP Success     EP Success     EP Success     
                       
Independent Variables                         
 (Argument)      Package Deal  + +  Package Deal  + +  Package Deal  + + 
  Distributive Proposal + +  Delay +  + Trialogue -  -  Distributive Policy -  -  
  Council Impatience  +  -  Council Impatience  +   -  Council Impatience  +  +  Council Impatience  +  + 
  Urgent   + +  Urgent  +   - Urgent  +  -  Urgent  +  -  
       
Urgent for the 
Commission  +  + 
Urgent for the 
Commission +  +  
Urgent for the 
Commission +  +  
                      
Interaction effects -   
Delay * Urgent for the 
Commission + + 
Trialogue * Institutional 
Powers Issues + + 
Package Deal * 
Distributive Policy  + + 
          
Package Deal * 
Institutional Powers + + 
                          
 (Existing Literature)  Absolute Salience +  +  EP Cohesion +  -  EP Cohesion +  +  EP Cohesion +  +  
  Party Leaders Involved  +    + 
EP Committee 
Supported + -  
EP Committee 
Supported +  +  
EP Committee 
Supported +  +  
  Policy Issue Complexity  +    + Relative EP Salience  +  -  Relative EP Salience  +  -  Relative EP Salience  +  -  
  
EP - Council Salience 
Tie  -    - 
EP - Council Salience 
Tie -     -  
EP - Council Salience 
Tie -  -  
EP - Council Salience 
Tie -  -  
       Commission Support +  +  Commission Support -  +  Commission Support -  +  
       Issues Type   +    + Issues Type   +    + Issues Type   +    + 
       Council Unanimity   +    - Reading   +    + Codecision   +    + 
  Proposal Salience   +   + Proposal Salience   +   +            
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B. Contribution to the Literature on EU Legislative Politics 
Many scholars have written about legislative politics in the European Union. Their research 
has advanced our understanding about the ways in which institutional features affect EU 
legislative outcomes. This thesis adds to the existing knowledge about EU legislative 
politics in several ways.  
First, when compared with previous studies of EU legislative politics, one of the 
main contributions of the thesis is the focus on package deals and their effect on legislative 
outcomes. Previously, EU legislative research either ignored informal rules and procedures 
or simply described their existence without explaining why they are used and whether and 
how they affect legislative outcomes. By focusing on inter-chamber package deals, the 
thesis determined the extent to which legislators employ such informal tools in daily 
decision-making. Decisions on legislative packages have been increasingly occurring in the 
EU legislature. However, most of the well-known models of EU lawmaking viewed 
decision-making as a case-by-case, issue-by-issue process. The thesis filled this gap in the 
literature by studying the concept of package decision-making in the European Union.  
Second, the thesis developed a testable theory about legislative package deals in the 
EU. The argument holds that the legislative chambers often exchange support in some 
issues for loss in other issues, thus achieving mutual overall gain. The argument takes into 
account the effects of informal inter-cameral negotiations as well as formal procedural 
rules. The idea of inter-chamber logrolling in the EU departs theoretically from the 
traditional procedural literature, which has dominated EU legislative research. The 
contribution of this logrolling approach to lawmaking is the introduction of preference 
intensities. Once actors are allowed to attach different saliencies to issues, exchange of 
favours becomes an option. While the concept of „gains from exchange‟ had received little 
attention in EU legislative studies, the thesis demonstrated that the issue of package deals 
occupies a central place in EU lawmaking. 
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Third, the argument of the thesis was subjected to a series of empirical tests. EU 
decision-making was analysed across all 1465 legislative proposals completed in the period 
1 May 1999 – 30 April 2007. The results of the four empirical chapters supported the main 
argument. Legislative package deals are more likely to be used in distributive and urgent 
proposals. In turn, package deals and urgency have an effect on the European Parliament‟s 
legislative influence across procedures and policy areas. Alongside the empirical tests of 
the logrolling argument, the thesis also tested existing hypotheses from the literature on EU 
legislative politics.  
 
a) Legislative Influence in the European Union  
Who has more power over legislative outcomes in the European Union? This question 
motivated most of the earlier studies in EU legislative research. When compared with 
previous studies of legislative influence in the European Union, the thesis contributes to 
answering this question in two ways. First, it identified variation in the degree of legislative 
influence exercised by the European Parliament across proposals and issue types. Second, 
it identified variation in the EP‟s legislative influence across policy areas and it confirmed 
that the policy context conditions legislative outcomes in the EU. The following reviews 
the measurement of legislative influence adopted in the thesis, and the findings relating to 
the variation of EP influence in different contexts.  
 In this thesis, European Parliament legislative influence meant the EP‟s success rate 
in getting its policy preferences in the final legislative text. Firstly, every legislative 
proposal was broken into the controversial issues, contested by the EP. Legislative success 
was measured on each issue by comparing the EP committee reports, draft proposals and 
opinions with the final legislative texts. Of course, the EP did not influence legislative 
outcomes equally. EP success was divided into four categories with 3 = high success, 2 = 
medium success, 1 = low success and 0 = failure (see Chapter IV).  
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EP Legislative Influence Varies In Degree 
The measurement of different degrees of EP success provided a more nuanced account of 
EU decision-making. In total, 48.2% (1142 issues) fell in category 0 = failure; 3.0% (71 
issues) fell in category 1 (low success); 7.0% (990 issues) fell in category 2 (medium 
success); and 41.8% (990 issues) of the observations fell in category 3 (high success). In 
some policy areas, the EP‟s legislative influence was found predominantly in the two 
extreme categories (either 0 = failure, or 3 = high success). For example, in the policy areas 
of Development, Information Society and External Relations, the EP either succeeded in 
full, or it completely failed to influence legislative texts. Less than 5% of EP success fell in 
categories 1 and 2 in these policy areas. On the other hand, in the policy areas of the 
Budget, Internal Market and Services and Research, EP success varied considerably across 
categories. In these policy areas more than 18% of EP success fell in categories 1 and 2. 
While chapter VI and VII treated the EP success as a dichotomous variable, Chapter 
VIII treated EP success as dichotomous, ordinal and categorical. Most importantly, the 
results support the key argument of the thesis. First, package deals increase the probability 
of EP success in legislative outcomes. Second, package deals increase the EP‟s chances of 
influencing legislative outcomes in the EU‟s distributive policy areas. When EP success 
groups all three categories 1, 2, and 3 into one single Success category, package deals 
clearly predict the probability of EP influence. The effect of package deals on EP success is 
weaker if the degree of EP influence is taken into account.  
This confirms that the EP is more likely to influence legislation in the presence of a 
package deal. However, while package deals allow the EP to realize its preferred policy 
outcomes, they do not guarantee that these preferences will be accommodated in full. Thus, 
informal logrolls are important as they allow the EP to increase its influence over 
legislative texts (i.e. to achieve outcomes different from 0 = failure). However, package 
deals do not guarantee that the EP will fully realize its legislative demands.  
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While Member States are interested to engage in trade with the European 
Parliament in distributive legislation, the extent of the EP‟s legislative influence gained 
from such trade is limited. Nevertheless, given that in distributive policy areas the stakes 
are very high for Member States, an outcome in category 1 (low success) is still a 
significant achievement for the European Parliament. Therefore, package deals allow the 
European Parliament increased legislative presence in policy areas where its role has 
traditionally been consultative and limited.   
 
EP Legislative Influence Varies Across Policy Areas  
Chapter VIII found significant variation in European Parliament success across the 19 EU 
policy areas. The chapter studied the outcomes of more than 2350 issues discussed between 
the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The European Parliament was least 
successful in the policy areas of Fisheries (11.6%), Agriculture (23.5%), Economic and 
Financial Affairs (25.5%), Taxation and Customs (34.7%), External Relations (40.9%) and 
Justice, Freedom and Security (42.5%). These results are not surprising given that 
legislative proposals in these areas fall mainly under the consultation procedure. In 
contrast, the European Parliament was most successful in the policy areas of Budgets 
(71.8%), Education and Culture (68.3%), Enterprise and Industry (67.5%), Employment 
and Social Affairs (64.9%), Information Society (64.5%) and Health and Consumer 
Protection (61.6%). 
Overall, these findings confirm that the EP is more likely to influence legislation in 
regulatory policy areas. This is largely due to the presence of co-decision and the fact that 
the costs of legislation in these areas are usually borne by private actors and not the 
Member States. In distributive policy areas
145
, where the costs of legislation are usually 
covered by Member States or the EU budget, the European Parliament finds it difficult to 
                                                 
145
 The thesis defined distributive policy areas as the proportion of legislative proposals in a policy area 
that require EU funding or funding by the Member States‟ budgets (see Chapter IV).  
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realize its policy preferences. The key finding of the thesis, however, is that this rule does 
not apply when package deals are negotiated. In the absence of legislative package deals, 
European Parliament influence decreases as the distributive nature of EU policy areas 
increases. When inter-chamber package deals are negotiated, the EP‟s chances of 
influencing legislation in distributive policy areas are much higher. 
 
EP Legislative Influence Varies Across Issue Types 
In addition, the thesis found variation in EP success across different issue types. The issues 
contested by the European Parliament were divided in four categories: budgetary issues, 
policy substance issues, fundamental rights issues and institutional powers issues. The 
results indicated that the type of issues conditions the probability of EP influence. Overall, 
the European Parliament was least successful when it demanded changes on funding and 
budgetary matters. The EP enjoyed around 43% success in budgetary issues, 48% in 
institutional issues, 49% in policy substantial issues, and 80% in fundamental rights issues. 
The Parliament was most successful in its demands for human rights, transparency, 
privacy, data protection, and children‟s rights. While EP success in fundamental rights 
issues did not seem to be affected by package legislation, through package deals the 
European Parliament gained institutional powers. 
 
b) The European Commission 
One of the most interesting findings of the thesis relates to the role of the European 
Commission in legislative decision-making. The empirical tests find that support from the 
Commission significantly increases the chances of EP success in both consultation and co-
decision. The Commission‟s position on EU legislation is important and the EP benefits 
from the Commission‟s endorsement of parliamentary proposals. The Commission‟s 
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agenda-setting and implementation powers give it a strong voice in the legislative process 
and the EP benefits from having the Commission on its side.  
 While this result could have been expected under the consultation procedure, it is in 
contrast with the generally accepted argument proposed by Crombez (2000a) that the 
Commission is „irrelevant‟ under the co-decision procedure. The findings here suggest that 
in the co-decision procedure, the Commission still enjoys strong legislative presence. This 
is in line with the findings of Rasmussen (2003), Rasmussen and Shackleton (2005) and 
Konig et al. (2007). There are two reasons why the Commission‟s role is decisive for 
legislative outcomes in the EU.  
First, the institutionalization of informal trialogue procedures in co-decision allows 
the formally weak Commission to regain its seat at the legislative table alongside the EP 
and the Council. Formally, in the co-decision procedure the EP and the Council have the 
power to change legislative texts entirely regardless of the Commission‟s position. 
However, through trialogue procedures, the Commission gains presence in inter-
institutional negotiations. As the Commission ensures its participation in co-decision 
making, its position and support affect the legislative balance between the Council of 
Ministers and the European Parliament.  
Second, the Commission can influence legislative outcomes by proposing packages 
of legislative proposals. If the Commission proposes several pieces of legislation 
simultaneously and treats them as a package, it structures the negotiations between the EP 
and the Council in a logrolling framework. When the Commission proposes legislative 
packages, the EP and the Council have to engage in trade in order to secure their preferred 
policy outcomes as part of the compromise deal. Hence, the Commission enjoys significant 
agenda-setting power as it binds the legislative chambers to consider multiple issues in 
package legislation.  
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c) The European Parliament  
Cohesion 
The cohesion of the European Parliament is a significant predictor of EP success across all 
EU policy areas. This result is in line with the argument of Kreppel (2002) who finds that 
the EP is more likely to succeed in getting concessions from the Council when it is united. 
Divisions among the MEPs weaken the bargaining position of the EP vis-à-vis the Council. 
Overall, EP cohesion at the committee level seems to be slightly less important than EP 
cohesion at the plenary level. However, both EP Cohesion and EP Plenary Support are 
significant predictors of EP success.  
Nevertheless, EP cohesion in consultation does not seem to affect the likelihood of 
EP success. Most consultation cases enjoyed a very cohesive Parliament, both in committee 
and in the plenary - the mean of the EP Cohesion variable in consultation is 91.7%.  While 
EP cohesion may be an important factor for EP influence in co-decision, the presence of a 
large majority in the EP under consultation is not a clear predictor of EP success. 
Therefore, the results support Kreppel‟s hypothesis in the analysis of the co-decision 
procedure, but they contradict her predictions in the context of the consultation procedure.  
 
Role of Rapporteurs  
Benedetto (2005) and Kaeding (2004) identify the important role EP rapporteurs play in 
legislative bargaining. On the one hand, this view is supported by the results. Rapporteurs 
seem to be key figures in both legislative procedures. In the consultation procedure, 
rapporteurs have a key role to play in the exercise of the EP‟s power to delay. In the co-
decision procedure, rapporteurs usually represent the EP at informal trialogues and 
negotiate informal agreements with the Council. The rapporteur usually works with 
rapporteurs of other parliamentary committees and with political group leaders to ensure 
majority in plenary in favour of the negotiated text.  
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On the other hand, however, the role of rapporteurs is often undermined in package 
deals. When package deals are negotiated, political group leaders have the possibility to 
negotiate an informal bargain with the Council, without considering the position of the 
rapporteur. As package deals are informal agreements, their enforcement depends on „those 
with the numbers‟. Political group leaders can ensure the support of such informal deals in 
plenary through party discipline. The enforcement of logrolls is more difficult for 
rapporteurs and committee members, especially if the terms of the package deal are 
controversial for political group leaders. Therefore, in package deals party leaders can 
bypass the authority of rapporteurs and committees in general. This argument is supported 
by the results of the analysis of more than 1400 legislative proposals, which suggests that 
in 12 % of the cases party leaders were involved in proposal drafting in addition to 
committee rapporteurs. 
 
d) The Council of Ministers 
Voting Rule 
Several authors (Tsebelis, 1994; Mattila and Lane, 2001; and Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 
2006) argue that the formal voting rule requirement in the Council of Ministers is likely to 
have an effect on the EP‟s legislative influence. The results of this research do not support 
this hypothesis. The Council voting rule is not a statistically significant predictor of EP 
success. This is the case in codecision as well as in the consultation procedure. Qualified 
majority voting is used almost all the time in the codecision procedure. That is why the 
Council voting rule does not show any significant conditioning effects on the probability of 
European Parliament success. In addition, on many occasions in the consultation 
procedure, Member States could easily agree on proposals despite the unanimity 
requirement.  
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Role of the Council Presidency  
Several authors (Tallberg, 2003; Warntjen, 2008; and Thomson, 2008) have identified the 
important role of the Council Presidency in legislative bargaining. The findings of the 
thesis support this view. The Council Presidency has a central role in inter-cameral 
negotiations. The Presidency (together with past and incoming Presidencies) is the main 
negotiator in informal trialogues with the Parliament and it bargains over the terms of 
package deals with EP representatives. The Presidency is given a mandate by the Council 
to initiate informal negotiations with MEPs. The Council‟s gains from informal deals 
depend on the ability of the Presidency to negotiate with MEPs and at the same time, to 
reconcile differences within the Council. The access of the Presidency to package deal 
negotiations with EP representatives gives it an institutional advantage in the Council vis-a-
vis the other Member States. The terms of pre-negotiated package deals can rarely be 
changed in the Council, so the Presidency gains even further agenda-setting powers from 
its involvement in package deals.   
 
e) Formal Legislative Procedures 
Chapter I discussed that some of best models of EU decision-making are about the effect of 
formal procedural rules on legislative outcomes. The thesis did not neglect the importance 
of procedural factors. The analysis followed existing research by including several 
procedural variables in the empirical tests. Although the thesis‟ focus was on package deals 
and informal bargaining, the results indicate that formal procedures matter significantly.  
 
Consultation Procedure 
Many of the existing studies of the consultation procedure had overlooked the role of the 
European Parliament due to its weak formal powers (Westlake, 1994; Crombez, 1996; 
Laruelle, 2002; Jupille, 2004). The thesis found, however, that the EP is not irrelevant 
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under the consultation procedure. Although its legislative capabilities are much weaker 
under consultation than they are under co-decision, the EP still manages to achieve a 25.9 
percent success in its legislative demands. This average success rate is not uniform across 
policy areas. Interestingly, under the consultation procedure, the variation of EP success 
across policies is much larger than it is in co-decision. The EP was highly successful in 
consultation legislation in the policy areas of the Budget (69.8%) and Employment and 
Social Affairs (58.6%), whereas it was much weaker in the policy areas of Agriculture 
(21.8%), Economic and Social and Affairs (12.1%) and Fisheries (10.9%). These findings 
provide a more nuanced account of legislative politics under the consultation procedure.  
 
Codecision Procedure 
The revised by the Amsterdam treaty co-decision procedure is now generally regarded as 
making the European Parliament an equal co-legislator with the Council (Tsebelis and 
Garrett, 2000; Maurer, 2003; Crombez, 2000a). Although some authors were sceptical 
about the innovative nature of co-decision II (Kasack, 2004; Napel and Widgren, 2004), the 
results here confirmed that the chances of EP success over legislative outcomes are much 
higher in co-decision than they are in consultation. On average the EP succeeded in 65.2 
percent of the issues it contested in the codecision procedure. Of course, this average 
success rate is not uniform across policy areas.  
 The EP was more successful in the policy areas of Enterprise and Industry (69.2%) 
and Health and Consumer Protection (67%) than it was in the areas of Energy and 
Transport (60.6%) and Internal Market (57%). In the full models of EP legislative influence 
in all 2369 issues across 19 policy areas (presented in Chapter VIII), the codecision 
variable is statistically significant and positively correlated with EP success. Even when 
controlling for many other factors, its large coefficient and corresponding odds ratio 
indicate that formal procedural rules matter considerably for policy outcomes in the EU.   
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C. Contributions to the Literature on Legislative Studies  
The argument and findings of the thesis also have implications for the general literature on 
legislative studies and bicameral systems. Legislative outcomes in bicameral systems 
depend on the common actions of both chambers. Legislative chambers are interdependent 
and the way both chambers organize the legislative process has direct effects on the 
effectiveness and stability of the legislative system. According to Tsebelis and Money 
(1997: 1) approximately one third of the states in the world have bicameral legislatures. 
The role of legislative package deals in the European Union as institutional solutions to 
inter-cameral conflict, therefore, have important implications for any bicameral system.  
 
a) The Nature of Logrolling as Compared to Research on the US Congress 
 
Inter-Chamber Logrolling vs. Single Chamber Logrolling  
As Chapter II discussed, the concept of logrolling has been a dominant topic in US 
legislative research (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962, 2004; Coleman, 1966, 1990; Ferejohn, 
1986; Weingast and Marshall, 1988; Mueller, 1989; Shepsle and Weingast, 1994; 
Stratmann, 1992; 1995; 1997; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1998). Many of the existing theories 
of logrolling are about logrolling inside the US Congress. Legislative exchange is studied 
in the context of a single chamber (see Shepsle and Weingast, 1987, 1994; Marshall and 
Weingast, 1988). The argument of the thesis largely rests on these theories, but it borrows 
from organization theory the understanding that organizations can establish informal 
agreements with other organizations (see Chisholm, 1989; Doreian and Fujimoto, 2004; 
Sanders et al, 1998; Lawrence et al, 2002). Therefore, while borrowing its assumptions 
from rational choice theories of logrolling, the theory presented in this thesis extends the 
standard idea of legislative exchange from a single chamber context to a bicameral context.  
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 The concept of inter-chamber cooperation through exchange has also recently 
started to develop in the US literature. Haggard and McCubbins (2001) suggest that 
logrolling can take place across chambers and underline the importance of bicameralism in 
the US legislature. In a recent study, Gailmard and Hammond (2006: 1) link inter-cameral 
bargaining with intra-cameral organization. The authors note that single chamber  models 
„neglect a key institutional arrangement in the American policy process, and one of the few 
actually spelled out in the U.S. Constitution: Congress is bicameral, and each chamber of 
Congress has veto power over proposed legislation‟. Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1990), 
Diermeier and Myerson (1999) and Ansolabehere, Snyder and Ting (2003) also develop 
their analyses within the broader context of multi-chamber legislative politics. 
 The thesis analysed logrolling in the European Union between two legislative 
chambers: the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. These two institutions are 
the actors that organize logrolls through inter-institutional package deals. Given their 
interdependence, different preference intensities, repeated interactions in lawmaking, and 
their ability to conclude and enforce informal commitments, EU legislators find it 
profitable to cooperate through package deals. Is this macro-level logrolling between the 
two EU legislative chambers much different from the micro-level logrolling found in the 
US Congress? The argument of inter-chamber logrolling presented here differs from 
existing theories of intra-chamber logrolling in several ways.  
 First, the standard logrolling hypothesis usually concerns decision-making within a 
committee (often described as exchange between three legislators)
146
 (see Buchanan and 
Tullock, 1962; Weingast and Marshall, 1988; Stratmann, 1992). The argument presented 
here concerns only two actors – the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The 
availability of only two actors partially overcomes the problem of „cycling‟ found in 
logrolling analyses within the US Congress (Bernholz, 1973; Tullock, 1981). 
                                                 
146
 A standard logrolling situation is usually described as one where two issues with two alternatives turn 
up again and again with certainty in a group of three members (for example see Mueller, 2003).   
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Second, the committee system in the US Congress was found to provide the 
institutional mechanisms for gains from trade (Weingast and Marshall, 1988). Instead of 
the committee system, in the European Union, trialogues are institutionalized at the inter-
cameral level in order to capture the gains from trade. Trialogues provide the institutional 
structure for legislative exchange between the Parliament and the Council. Their informal 
nature allows EU legislators to exchange information and to negotiate acceptable to both 
sides deals, thus avoiding gridlock. 
Third, the specific structure of package lawmaking through representatives of each 
parent chamber makes exchange in the EU much more stable and predictable. The 
bargaining agents of the Parliament and the Council have the authority to negotiate package 
deals at the inter-cameral level and then have the ability to enforce these compromises at 
the intra-chamber level. Through informal negotiations, the organization of legislative 
exchange in the EU therefore seems well structured and simple.  
Moreover, the enforcement of package deals in the EU resembles Baron and 
Ferejohn‟s (1989) closed rules where package texts are voted for or against, without further 
amendments. As the case studies illustrated, package deals in the EU are increasingly voted 
as block votes and are not open to amendments. Compromise packages are often presented 
as a single amendment, which incorporates the complete legislative act. In plenary, MEPs 
cannot change the content of such package compromises, as a single amendment can be 
either voted up or down. Similarly, the Council Presidency offers package texts to Member 
States emphasizing the impossibility of amending pre-agreed inter-chamber agreements.  
In addition to the ability of the EP and the Council to propose package deals at the 
inter-institutional stage, in the EU the Commission can also propose package legislation 
before sending it for consideration to the legislative chambers. The Commission includes 
issues that would otherwise be unable to pass by proposing packages in the first place. This 
way the Commission structures inter-chamber negotiations in a logrolling framework.  
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b) Empirical Evidence of Package Deals  
The majority of the existing theories of logrolling in the US concern package deals on 
distributive legislation (Weingast, 1979; Shepsle and Weingast, 1984). Distributive politics, 
spending and the budget are found to be marked by logrolling and package deals (Enelow, 
1986; Haggard and McCubbins, 2001; Heller, 2001). However, Evans (2004) establishes 
empirically that logrolling occurs on several types of policies, not just on distributive 
legislation. Stratmann (1995: 453) also finds that informal agreements are widespread in 
diverse policy areas across the lawmaking process.  
The thesis found that package deals in the European Union occur in many policy 
areas (see Table 5.2). Similarly to US empirical studies of logrolling, the thesis found a 
high percentage of package deals in distributive policies such as the Budget and Research. 
In addition, the thesis found evidence of package deals in the policy areas of Energy and 
Transport, Information Society, the Environment, and Health and Consumer Protection. 
Therefore, inter-chamber logrolling in the EU occurs across different types of policy areas.  
Furthermore, when compared with existing US studies of logrolling, the thesis 
identified several types of legislative packages: a) several issues packaged in a single 
proposal (known as „omnibus‟ proposals), and b) several proposals bundled in multi-
proposal packages. Empirical studies of logrolling agreements in the US Congress identify 
two forms of packaging. First, two issues can be joined in a single proposal and be voted on 
as a package. Sinclair (1995; 2000) and Krutz (2001) find evidence of „omnibus‟ 
legislating in the US Congress in different policy areas. Second, the issue pairs can be 
voted upon separately, with the first issue‟s supporters voting for the second and the second 
issue‟s supporters voting for the first one (see Stratmann, 1992).  
 It seems that in the European Union single „omnibus‟ proposals are less popular 
than simultaneously agreed multi-proposal packages. „Omnibus‟ packaging on single 
proposals occurred only under the co-decision procedure (78 package proposals). The 
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largest number of omnibus single proposals was in the policy areas of Energy and 
Transport (16), Environment (14), Health and Consumer Protection (13) and Enterprise and 
Industry (8).  In contrast, evidence of multiple proposal bundles was found under the co-
decision and consultation procedures (166 package proposals). The largest number of 
multi-proposal package legislation was in the policy areas of Energy and Transport (26), 
Agriculture (17), Research (16), and Budget (16). Cross-procedure packaging took place in 
the policy areas of Justice, Freedom and Security, Research, Budget, Agriculture, 
Education and Culture, and Taxation. Altogether, there were 78 proposals decided as 
omnibus packages in the co-decision procedure, 98 proposals decided as part of a multi-
package deal in the co-decision procedure, and 68 multi-package proposals in the 
consultation procedure.       
 
c) Legislative Package Deals Decided Simultaneously 
The thesis found evidence of logrolling when package deals were agreed simultaneously. 
This is in line with the general consensus in the US literature that successful logrolls are 
likely to take place when agreed at the same time (Shepsle and Weingast, 1994; Weingast 
and Marshall, 1988; Mueller, 1989). It is difficult to trace successful package deals 
between the Parliament and the Council over time and across policy areas. The general 
non-enforceability of informal political bargains limits the deals that can be struck among 
MEPs and Council representatives. Thus, in the EU context evidence of legislative 
exchange was found when proposals were negotiated simultaneously, but no evidence was 
found of package deals enforced over time or policy area. These results confirm the 
established understanding in the literature that informal promises are likely to break if 
agreed sequentially.  
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D. Further Research  
Inter-Chamber Package Deals and the Legislative Influence of the Council of Ministers 
The thesis aimed to explain variations in the influence of the European Parliament in EU 
legislative politics. The European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, the two arms of 
the bicameral EU legislature were treated as unitary actors. The thesis paid some attention 
to intra-cameral behaviour within the European Parliament, but it paid little attention to 
intra-cameral behaviour within the Council of Ministers. While the analysis here 
concentrated on the European Parliament, further research can develop further analysis of 
the Council and its internal decision-making.  
To reinforce the relative influence of the European Parliament, research on the 
Council will be particularly useful. The thesis examined the effects of package deals and 
timing on EU legislative outcomes by paying attention to the role of the EP. The argument 
was presented from the viewpoint of the European Parliament. The hypotheses that 
followed were about the EP‟s legislative influence. EU legislative research may benefit 
from a replication of the study, by developing the argument from the viewpoint of the 
Council of Ministers. More specifically, the analysis should focus on the role of Coreper I  
which negotiates co-decision with the EP (Hayes – Renshaw and Wallace, 2006). Future 
research should  explore the relationship between the Council and the EP especially as 
regards whether or not differences within the Council provide opportunities for MEPs to 
exploit in achieving their proposals and preferred amendments.  
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Intra-Chamber Package Deals 
This research identified and analysed the effect of package deals in the bicameral 
legislative process of the European Union. The package deals analysed were the informal 
arrangements struck between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers in the 
making of EU laws. However, exchanges of favours within the EU institutions may also 
occur in the search of intra-institutional compromise (Crombez, 2000b, 709). Further 
research may investigate logrolling and package deals that take place inside the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Several studies have attempted to trace logrolling 
in the Council of Ministers (Tavares, 2007). Furthermore, package compromises and 
logrolls are most certainly taking place inside the Commission and between the 
Commission and interest groups (Konig, 1999). This type of logrolling is particularly 
interesting and it deserves systematic research.  
 
Lobbying the EU Institutions and Legislative Outcomes 
The thesis focused the analysis on the institutional deals between the European Parliament 
and the Council of Ministers. It examined the informal institutional arrangements and 
package deals between representatives of the legislative chambers in the EU. Nevertheless, 
decision-making in the EU is also largely affected by lobbyists (Broscheid and Coen 2003; 
2007, Bouwen 2007; Beyers and Kerremans 2007, Eising 2007; Mazey and Richardson 
1999). Lobbying strategies should be taken into account in the analysis of legislative 
outcomes. There have been several recent studies investigating the involvement of lobby 
groups in the EU legislative process (Kohler-Koch 1998, Wessels 1999, Earnshaw and 
Judge 2003; Neunreither, 2003, Bouwen 2004, Lehmann 2007). Combining interest group 
variables with institutional variables in the explanation of legislative outcomes will provide 
a richer understanding of legislative politics in the European Union.  
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Implications of Logrolling in the EU Legislative Process 
This thesis underlined the importance of package deals for legislative outcomes and it 
studied the development of logrolling practices in the EU. The research found that the 
leaders of the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers increasingly employ such 
informal mechanisms when deciding some of the EU‟s most important and most expensive 
legislation. What are the implications associated with informal negotiations and package 
deals in the EU legislative process?  
 The enforcement of informal political deals may be regarded by some as being 
detrimental to the functioning of a democratic legislature (Ferejohn, 1986, 444). On the 
other hand, case-by-case decision-making makes the legislative process sluggish and 
expensive to operate. The increasing use of informal deals between the two chambers is a 
practical way of doing legislative business. Package deals are sustained in the EU as they 
minimize the transaction costs of collective decision-making. The existence of enforcement 
mechanisms of informal inter-chamber commitments promotes stability in the EU 
legislative process. Both the EP and the Council gain utility when cooperating.  
 So long as legislative package deals facilitate the ability of the EU legislature to 
make decisions without sacrificing deliberation or restricting significantly access to the 
decision-making process, they perform a very important function. Legislative institutions, 
like any other organization, are faced with the challenge of adapting to their external 
environment. The EU institutions need to carry out their legislative functions effectively 
within set deadlines. Informal negotiations make the legislative process highly flexible. As 
a result, negotiations over legislative packages are not easy to follow, especially when 
multiple issues are involved. The move to lawmaking through package deals in the 
European Union is the result of the natural and successful adaptation of the EU bicameral 
legislature to its changing political and institutional environments. 
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Appendix: Legislative Proposals Analysed: 1 May 1999 – 30 April 2007 
    Legend: P = Package Deal; T = Trialogue; N = Number of Contested Issues  
Ref Number Dossier P T N Policy Area 
CNS/1999/0128  Hops: common organisation of the market CMO (amend. regul. 1696/71/EEC)  0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/1999/0161  Processed fruit and vegetable products: common organisation of the markets CMO (amend. regul. 2201/96/EC)  0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/1999/0182  Grain legumes for human and animal consumption: specific measure (amend. regul. 1577/96/EC)   0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/1999/0202  Cotton: production aid  0 0 5 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/1999/0207  Agriculture, Community aid: integrated administration and control system IACS (amend. regul. 3508/92/EEC)  0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/1999/0209  Common agricultural policy CAP: information measures (regul. 1258/99/EC)   0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/1999/0235  Bananas: common organisation of the market CMO, import sytem (amend. regul. 404/93/EEC)  0 0 3 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/1999/0236  Support system for producers of arable crops: including flax and hemp (amend. regul. 1251/99/EC) 0 0 2 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/1999/0237  Flax and hemp: common organisation of the markets CMO (amend. regul. 1308/70/EEC)  0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/1999/0246  Milk, milk products: common organisation of the markets CMO (amend. regul. 1255/1999/EC)   0 0 2 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2000/0181  Products of animal origin intended for human consumption: animal-health rules  0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2000/0191  Fruit and vegetables: common organisation of the market CMO (amend. Regulations (EC) Nos 2200/96, 2201/96 and 2202/96)   0 0 4 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2000/0226  Agricultural products: information provision and promotion on the internal market  0 0 2 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2000/0250  Sugar: common organisation of the markets CMO (Regulation (EC) No 2038/1999)  0 0 4 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2000/0252  Nut sector : quality and marketing improvement, extension of plans for one year (regul. 1035/72/EEC)  0 0 3 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2000/0308  Agricultural products: measures for the benefit of Azores and Madeira (amend. regul. 1600/92/EEC)  0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2000/0309  Agricultural products: measures for the benefit of Canary Islands (amend. regul. 1601/92/EEC)  0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2000/0314  Agricultural products: measures for the benefit of Azores and Madeira for milk and milk products 1 0 3 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2000/0316  Agricultural products: measures for the benefit of Canary Islands   1 0 3 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2000/0317  Beef and veal: common organisation of the market CMO, outermost regions (amend. Regulation (EC) No 1254/99)   1 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2000/0335  Common agricultural policy CAP: direct support schemes (amend. regul. 1259/1999/EC)   0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2000/0358  Olive oil: extension of the period of validity of aid scheme and quality (amend. regul. 136/66/EEC, 1638/98/EC)   0 0 3 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2001/0042  Beef and veal: common organisation of the market CMO (amend. Reguation (EC) No 1254/99)  0 0 2 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2001/0043  Arable crops: support system for producers (amend. regul. 1251/99/EC)  0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2001/0099  Seeds: common organisation of the market CMO, aid granted for 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 (amend. Regulation (EEC) No 2358/71)   0 0 2 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2001/0103  Sheepmeat and goatmeat: common organisation of the market CMO, reform  0 0 3 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2001/0159  Milk, cheese : common organisation of the market CMO (amend. Regulation (EEC) No 2204/90)   0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2001/0187  Bananas: common organisation of the market CMO (amend. Regulation (EEC) No 404/93)  0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2001/0264  EAGGF Guarantee section: scrutiny by the member States of financing transactions (amend. regul. 4045/89/EEC)   0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2001/0273  Potato starch: quota system for production (amend. regul. 1868/94/EC)  0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2001/0275  Nut sector : quality and marketing improvement plans (regul. 1035/72/EEC), specific aid for hazelnuts  0 0 2 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2001/0276  Leaf tobacco: premiums and guarantee thresholds for the 2002, 2003 and 2004 harvests (amend. regul. 2075/92/EEC)  0 0 3 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2002/0066  Agricultural products and foodstuffs: designation of origin, geographical indication (amend. regul. 2081/92/EEC)  0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2002/0227 2004 enlargement: applicant countries CEECs, support for agriculture SAPARD (amend. regul. 1268/1999/EC)  0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2002/0292  Cereals: calculation of import duties (amend. regul. 1766/92/EEC)  0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2003/0002  Organic production: traceability, indications on agricultural products and foodstuffs (amend. regul. 2092/91/EEC)  0 0 3 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2003/0006  Common agricultural policy CAP, reform: horizontal regulation, support schemes for producers (durum wheat, rice...)   1 0 7 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2003/0007  Common agricultural policy CAP, reform: EAGGF, rural dévelopment (amend. regul. 1257/1999/EC, repeal. 2826/2000/EC) 1 0 3 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2003/0008 Common agricultural policy CAP, reform: cereals, common organisation of the market COM  1 0 4 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2003/0009  Common agricultural policy CAP, reform: rice, common organisation of the market COM  1 0 5 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2003/0010  Common agricultural policy CAP, reform: dried fodder, common organisation of the market COM, 2004-2005 to 2007-2008  1 0 3 Agriculture and Rural Development 
  366 
CNS/2003/0011  Common agricultural policy CAP, reform: milk and products, common organisation of the market COM (amend. regul. 1255/1999/EC)   1 0 3 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2003/0012  Common agricultural policy CAP, reform: milk and milk products, introduction of a levy   0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2003/0231  Food and Agriculture : plant genetic resources, ratification of the FAO International Treaty, November 2001  0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2003/0275  Flax and hemp sector: common organisation of the market COM (amend. regul. 1673/2000/EC)  0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2003/0278  Common agricultural policy CAP: horizontal regulation, support schemes for farmers (modif. regul. 1782/2003/EC)   0 0 5 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2003/0279  Olive oil and table olives: common organisation of the market COM (amend. regul. 827/68/EEC, repeal. 14 regul.)   0 0 4 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2004/0003 Apiculture programme: application of measures to improve the production and marketing of honey (repeal. regul. 1221/97)  0 0 3 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2004/0052  Human consumption: fruit jams, jellies, marmalades and chestnut purée (amend. direct. 2001/113/CE)  0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2004/0161 Rural development: support by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development EAFRD 1 0 3 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2004/0164 
Common agricultural policy CAP: financing by the European agricultural guarantee Fund EAGF and the European agricultural Fund 
for rural development EAFRD (repeal. regul. 1258/1999/EC and 723/97/EC) 
1 0 2 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2004/0247 
Outermost regions: specific supply arrangements for agricultural products which are essential for human consumption, for the 
manufacture of other products or as agricultural inputs. 
0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2004/0254 
Animal products, common organisation of the market COM: financing the support measures in case of outbreaks of diseases (amend. 
regul. 2759/75/EEC, 2771/75/EEC, 2777/75/EEC, 1254/1999/EC, 1255/1999/EC, 2529/2001/EC) 
0 1 3 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2004/0269 Potatoe starch: quota system for the production, 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 marketing years (amend regul. 1868/94/EC) 0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2005/0118 Sugar: common organisation of the markets COM (repeal. regul. 1260/2001/EC) 1 0 3 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2005/0119 
Common agricultural policy CAP, reform: horizontal regulation, support schemes for producers, sugar beet and chicory payments 
(amend. regul. 1782/2003/EC) 
1 0 2 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2005/0120 Sugar industry: restructuring aid, temporary restructuring fund (amend. regul. 1290/2005/EC) 0 0 2 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2005/0129 Rural Development: Community strategic guidelines, support by the EAFRD, programming period 2007–2013 0 1 2 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2005/0270 Agricultural products and foodstuffs: traditional specialities guaranteed (repeal. regul. 2082/92/EEC) 0 0 2 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2005/0275 Agricultural products and foodstuffs: designations of origin, geographical indications (repeal. regul. 2081/92/EEC) 0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2005/0278  Organic farming: organic production and labelling of the products (repeal. regul. 2092/91/EEC on 1 January 2009)  0 0 3 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2006/0055 
Market in eggs and poultrymeat: exceptional support measures where restrictions are placed on free circulation in case of animal 
diseases and a drop in consumption (amend. regul. 2771/75/EEC, 2777/75/EEC) 
0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2006/0083 
Common agricultural policy CAP: support schemes for farmers, voluntary modulation of direct payments (regul. 1782/2003/EC, 
amend. regul. 1290/2005/EC) 
1 1 2 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2006/0162  Beef and veal: marketing of the meat of animals aged twelve months or less 0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2006/0173 Bananas: Common Market Organisation CMO (amend. regul. 404/93/EEC, 1782/2003/EC, 247/2006/EC) 0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2006/0256   Cereals: common organisation of the market CMO (amend. regul. 1784/2003/EC)  1 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2006/0261 
Accession of Romania and Bulgaria: common organisation of the markets COM in sugar, marketing years 2006/2007, 2007/2008 and 
2008/2009 (regul. 318/2006/EC, regul. 950/2006/EC) 
0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2006/0268  Potato starch: quotas for the marketing years 2007/08 and 2008/09 (amend. regul. 1868/94/EC)  0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
COD/1999/0137  Community agricultural statistics: improvement and information (amend. dec. 96/411/EC)  0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
COD/1999/0159  Forests: protection against atmospheric pollution (amend. regul. 3528/86/EEC)  1 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
COD/1999/0160  Forests: protection against fire (amend. regul. 2158/92/EEC)  1 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
COD/1999/0204  Beef: identification and registration of animals and labelling of beef (repeal. regul. 820/97/EC)  0 0 4 Agriculture and Rural Development 
COD/1999/0217  Health problems: intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine (amend. direct. 64/432/EEC)  0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
COD/2001/0267  Forests: protection against atmospheric pollution, extension to 2002 (amend. regul. 3528/86/EEC)  0 0 1 Agriculture and Rural Development 
COD/2005/0028  Spirit drinks: definition, description, presentation and labelling  1 1 5 Agriculture and Rural Development 
CNS/2000/0038  Excise duty beer imports into Finland: temporary quantitative restrictions (amend. direct. 69/169/EEC, 92/12/EEC)   0 0 1 Budget 
CNS/2000/0039  Reliefs from duty: beer imports into Finland, temporary derogation (amend. regul. 918/83/EEC)  0 0 1 Budget 
CNS/2000/0042  Peace process: financial support for interim civilian administration and for the implementation of peace agreements   1 1 1 Budget 
CNS/2000/0118  Excise duties: temporary quantitative restrictions for products brought into Sweden (amend. direct. 92/12/EEC)  0 0 1 Budget 
CNS/2000/0135  Amendment to the Financial Regulation: separation of the internal audit from the ex ante control   1 1 1 Budget 
CNS/2000/0203  General budget of the European Communities: recasting of the financial regulation  1 1 4 Budget 
CNS/2000/0901  Financial Regulation: implementation procedure (amend. regul. 3418/93 Commission)  0 0 1 Budget 
  367 
CNS/2002/0167  Translation Centre for the bodies of the Union: budget and finances, access to documents (amend. regul. 2965/94/EC)  1 0 2 Budget 
CNS/2002/0168  European Agency for reconstruction: budget and finances, access to documents (amend. regul. 2667/2000/EC)   1 0 2 Budget 
CNS/2002/0170 Agency for the evaluation of medicinal products : budget and finances, access to documents (amend. regul. 2309/93/EEC)  1 0 2 Budget 
CNS/2002/0171  European Training Foundation: budget and finances, access to documents (amend. regul. 1360/90/EEC)  1 0 2 Budget 
CNS/2002/0172  Foundation for the improvement of living and working conditions: budget, document access (amend. regul. 1365/75/EEC)  1 0 2 Budget 
CNS/2002/0173  Eurojust: budget and financial rules (amend. dec. 2002/187JHA)  1 0 2 Budget 
CNS/2002/0174  Plant Variety Office : internal audit and control, access to documents (amend. regul. 2100/94/EC)  1 0 2 Budget 
CNS/2002/0175  European Monitoring Centre for drugs and drug addiction: budget, access to documents (amend. regul. 302/93/EEC)  1 0 2 Budget 
CNS/2002/0176  European Monitoring Centre on racism and xenophobia : budget,finances, access to documents (amend. regul. 1035/97/EEC)  1 0 2 Budget 
CNS/2002/0177  Office for harmonisation in the internal market : budget and finances, access to documents (amend. regul. 40/94/EC)  1 0 2 Budget 
CNS/2002/0178  European Agency for safety and health at work: budget and finances, access to documents (amend. regul. 2062/94/EC)  1 0 2 Budget 
CNS/2002/0180  European Centre for the development of vocational training : budget, access to documents (amend. regul 337/75/EEC) 1 0 2 Budget 
CNS/2002/0901 Financial regulation applicable to the general budget: rules for the implementation of regulation 1605/2002/EC, Euratom  1 0 1 Budget 
CNS/2002/0902  Framework financial regulation: Community bodies (art. 185 regul. 1605/2002/EC, Euratom)  0 0 1 Budget 
CNS/2003/0131  Own resources: updating financial rules (amend. regul. 1150/2000/EC, Euratom implem. dec. 2000/597/EC, Euratom)  0 0 1 Budget 
CNS/2006/0039  
Union's budget: system of the European Communities' own resources, adjustment of the United Kingdom correction, financial 
framework 2007-2013  
0 0 1 Budget 
CNS/2006/0102 
Nuclear safety: 1st instalment of the 3rd Community contribution to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EBRD 
for the Chernobyl Shelter Fund 
0 0 1 Budget 
CNS/2006/0107 EIB loans: renewal of the Community guarantee for the period 2007-2013 0 0 2 Budget 
COD/1998/0101  Agenda 2000: trans-European networks, rules for granting Community financial aid (amend. regul. 2236/95/EC)  0 1 4 Budget 
COD/1999/0275  Audiovisual industry : training programme for professionals, MEDIA-Training 2001-2005  1 0 7 Budget 
COD/2002/0169  European Environment Agency : budget and finances, access to documents (amend. regul. 1210/90/EEC)  1 1 3 Budget 
COD/2002/0179  European Food Safety Agency : budget and finances, access to documents (amend. regul. 178/2002/EC)   1 1 3 Budget 
COD/2002/0181  European Aviation Safety Agency: budget and finances, access to documents (amend. regul. 1592/2002/EC)  1 1 3 Budget 
COD/2002/0182  European Maritime Safety Agency: budget and finances, access to documents (amend. regul. 1406/2002/EC)   1 1 3 Budget 
COD/2003/0076  Culture 2000: framework programme 2000-2004, extension to 2006 (amend. dec. 508/2000/EC)  0 0 1 Budget 
CNS/2000/0243  Competition: implementing articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (amend. regul. 1017/68, 2988/74, 4056/86, 3975/87/EEC)  0 0 2 Competition 
CNS/2001/0153  Shipbuilding: temporary defensive mechanism TDM, unfair Korean competition  0 0 1 Competition 
CNS/2002/0296  Concentrations between undertakings: control, EC Merger regulation (amend. regul. 4064/89/EEC)  0 0 1 Competition 
CNS/2003/0038  Air transport European Community-third countries: competition (repeal. regul. 3975/87, amend. regul. 3976/87, 1/2003)  0 0 1 Competition 
CNS/2005/0264 
Maritime transport: cabotage and international tramp services (repeal. regul. 4056/86/EEC, applic. of art. 85 and 86, amend. regul. 
1/2003/EC) 
0 0 2 Competition 
CNS/1999/0214  MEDA programme, Euro-Mediterranean partnership: economic and social structures (amend. regul. 1488/96/EC)  0 0 4 Development 
CNS/2003/0093  Public health: cancer screening  0 0 2 Development 
CNS/2005/0101 External policy: arms embargo, freezing of funds and of economic resources of Congo 0 0 2 Development 
CNS/2005/0806 Community external assistance: rules for the access to external assistance instruments, for the eligibility and the origin 0 0 1 Development 
COD/2001/0243  Development cooperation: decentralised cooperation, extension until 31.12.2003 (amend. regul. 1659/98/EC)  0 1 1 Development 
COD/2002/0051  Developing countries, poverty diseases : combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis  1 0 1 Development 
COD/2002/0052  Health in developing countries: aid for policies and actions on reproductive and sexual health and rights (repeal. regul. 1484/97/EC)   1 0 2 Development 
COD/2003/0156  Development cooperation: decentralized cooperation, 2004-2006 (exten. and amend. regul. 1659/98/EC)   0 1 2 Development 
COD/2003/0176  Development cooperation: promoting gender equality  0 1 3 Development 
COD/2003/0245  EC/South Africa relations: development cooperation (amend. regul. 1726/2000/EC)  0 1 1 Development 
COD/2004/0099   Community aid: conditions for access to the instruments financing the Community external assistance 0 1 2 Development 
COD/2004/0220  External assistance: a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation  1 1 7 Development 
COD/2005/0117  
External aid: financial and technical assistance to ACP countries that are signatories to the Sugar Protocol following the reform of the 
common organisation of the market in sugar COM 
0 1 1 Development 
CNS/1998/0206  EAGGF, agricultural levies, custom duties, VAT, excise duties: recovery of claims (amend. direct. 76/308/EEC)  0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
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CNS/1999/0080  EIB loans to PECOs, Western Balkans, Mediterranean countries, Latin America, Asia and South Africa: EC guarantee  0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/1999/0165  Bulgaria: Community supplementary macrofinancial assistance   0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/1999/0166  Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia FYROM: Community supplementary macrofinancial assistance  0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/1999/0167  Romania: Community supplementary macrofinancial assistance  0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/1999/0172  Financial aid: extension to Tajikistan of the exceptional assistance for Armenia and Georgia (amend. dec. 97/787/EC)  0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/1999/0213  Moldova: supplementary Community macro-financial assistance   0 0 2 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/1999/0240  Kosovo: exceptional Community financial assistance  0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/2000/0114  Montenegro: providing exceptional financial assistance  0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/2000/0208  Euro: protection against counterfeiting for countries that have adopted or not adopted the euro  0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/2000/0801  Environmental protection: combating serious crime. Framework decision. Initiative Denmark  0 0 2 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/2001/0045  Kosovo: further exceptional financial assistance for 2001  0 0 2 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/2001/0062  Economic Union : medium-term financial assistance for Member states' balances of payment (repeal. regul. 1969/88/EEC)  0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/2001/0112  Yugoslavia FRY: long-term macrofinancial assistance from the Community  0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/2001/0213  Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia FYROM: supplementary macro-financial assistance (amend. dec. 1999/733/EC)  0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/2001/0258  Yugoslavia FRY : Community macrofinancial assistance (amend. dec. 2001/549/EC)  0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/2002/0192  Yugoslavia FRY: provision of further macro-financial assistance  0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/2002/0193  Bosnia and Herzegovina: providing further macro-financial assistance  0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/2003/0190  Serbia and Montenegro: further macro-financial assistance (amend. dec. 2002/882/EC)  0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/2003/0232  Loans guarantied by the Union : EIB mandate for loans to new neighbour third countries (amend. dec. 2000/24/EC)  0 0 2 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/2003/0233  
Community loans to third countries: Guarantee Fund and new Member States, tranfer from the Fund to the budget (amend. regul. 
2728/94/EC)  
0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/2003/0295  Government debt: compilation and transmission of data on a quaterly basis, ESA 95 categories  0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/2004/0121 EIB loans to Russia and the Western New Independent States WNIS: EC guarantee (prolong. dec. 2001/777/EC) 0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/2005/0025 Community loans to third countries: provisioning mechanism of the Guarantee Fund for external actions (amend. regul. 2728/94/EC) 0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/2005/0061 Economic policy: implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (amend. regul. 1467/97/EC) 0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/2005/0145 Euro: introduction and use, legal framework for the enlargement of the euro area (amend. regul. 974/98/EC) 0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/2006/0068 Development cooperation: exceptional Community financial assistance to Kosovo for developing economic and fiscal framework 0 0 2 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/2006/0184 Moldova: exceptional macro-financial assistance 0 0 1 Economic and Financial Affairs 
COD/2004/0155  Credit institutions: taking up and pursuit of the business (recast direct. 2000/12/EC 1 1 7 Economic and Financial Affairs 
COD/2004/0159 Financial institutions: capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (recast direct. 93/6/EEC) 1 1 7 Economic and Financial Affairs 
CNS/1999/0276  Audiovisual industry: development, distribution and promotion of works, MEDIA-Plus 2001-2005  1 0 2 Education and Culture 
CNS/2002/0037  Tempus III: higher education, 3rd phase of the trans-European scheme, Mediterranean countries (amend. dec. 1999/311/EC)  0 0 3 Education and Culture 
CNS/2003/0116  Active European citizenship: grants to civic participation actions, 2004-2008 action programme  0 0 2 Education and Culture 
CNS/2003/0334  European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training ECDVT (amend. regul. 337/75/EEC)  0 0 1 Education and Culture 
COD/1999/0208  European year of languages 2001  0 0 2 Education and Culture 
COD/2000/0021 Free movement of persons: mobility for students, persons undergoing training, young volunteers, teachers, trainers  0 0 4 Education and Culture 
COD/2000/0022  School education: European cooperation in quality evaluation. Recommandation  0 0 3 Education and Culture 
COD/2001/0244  European Year of Education through Sport EYES 2004  0 0 4 Education and Culture 
COD/2002/0165  Higher education: co-operation with third countries, programme Erasmus Mundus 2004-2008  1 0 5 Education and Culture 
COD/2002/0303  Education and training systems: eLearning programme 2004-2006 for integration of information technologies  1 1 3 Education and Culture 
COD/2003/0064  Audiovisual industry : training programme for professionals, MEDIA-Training 2001-2005 (amend. dec. 163/2001/EC)  0 0 1 Education and Culture 
COD/2003/0067  Audiovisual industry: development, distribution, promotion of works, MEDIA Plus for 2006 (amend. dec. 2000/821/EC)  0 0 2 Education and Culture 
COD/2003/0113  European youth: grants to bodies active at European level, 2004-2006 action programme  1 1 3 Education and Culture 
COD/2003/0114  Education and training : grants to bodies active at European level, 2004-2006 action programme   1 1 2 Education and Culture 
COD/2003/0115  Culture: grants to bodies active at European level, 2004-2006 action programme  1 1 4 Education and Culture 
COD/2003/0274  European capital of culture: criteria for submitting nomination of cities, 2009-2019 (amend. direct. 1419/1999/EC)  0 0 2 Education and Culture 
COD/2003/0293  European audiovisual Observatory: Community participation till 31.12.2006 (amend. dec. 1999/784/EC)  0 0 2 Education and Culture 
COD/2003/0307  Education and training: transparency of qualifications and competences, single framework Europass  0 1 1 Education and Culture 
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COD/2004/0066   Cinematographic heritage: collection and preservation, competitiveness of related industrial activities  0 1 1 Education and Culture 
COD/2004/0150  Action in the field of culture: Culture 2007 programme (2007-2013)  0 1 4 Education and Culture 
COD/2004/0151  Audiovisual sector: implementation of a programme of support for this European sector, MEDIA 2007 0 1 4 Education and Culture 
COD/2004/0152  Youth policy: Youth in action programme for 2007-2013 0 1 6 Education and Culture 
COD/2004/0153  
Life long learning: integrated action programme comprising Comenius, Erasmus, Leonardo da Vinci and Grundtvig programmes and 
the Jean Monnet programme 
0 1 5 Education and Culture 
COD/2004/0239 Higher education: European Register of Quality Assurance and Accreditation Agencies 0 1 1 Education and Culture 
COD/2005/0041  Active European citizenship: Citizens for Europe, 2007-2013 programme  1 1 5 Education and Culture 
COD/2005/0102  Culture: Community action for the European Capital of Culture event for the years 2007 to 2019 0 1 2 Education and Culture 
COD/2005/0179 Free movement of persons: European Quality Charter for Mobility in education and training  0 1 2 Education and Culture 
COD/2005/0203  
European year of intercultural dialogue 2008: respect and promote cultural diversity in Europe and develop an active European 
citizenship  
0 1 4 Education and Culture 
COD/2005/0221  Lifelong learning: key competences and access for all citizens   0 1 2 Education and Culture 
CNS/1999/0192  Creation of the employment Committee (repeal. dec. 97/16/EC)  0 0 1 Employment and Social Affairs 
CNS/1999/0225  Employment and work conditions: fight against discrimination, equal treatment between persons   0 0 1 Employment and Social Affairs 
CNS/1999/0251  Combating discrimination: Community action programme 2001-2006  0 0 3 Employment and Social Affairs 
CNS/1999/0253  Employment and social sector: equal treatment between persons without racial and ethnic discrimination   0 0 1 Employment and Social Affairs 
CNS/2000/0143  Gender equality: Community framework strategy, programme 2001-2005  0 0 3 Employment and Social Affairs 
CNS/2000/0225  Employment: guidelines for Member states' policies for the year 2001  0 0 1 Employment and Social Affairs 
CNS/2001/0116  People with disabilities: 2003 European Year  0 0 4 Employment and Social Affairs 
CNS/2002/0039  Social protection : nationals of third countries not covered due to their nationality (ext. regul. 1408/71, 574/72/EEC)   0 0 1 Employment and Social Affairs 
CNS/2003/0068  Employment : guidelines for Member States' policies, review. Employment package  0 0 3 Employment and Social Affairs 
CNS/2003/0133  Social protection: establishing a committee with advisory status (repeal. dec. 2000/436/EC)  0 0 1 Employment and Social Affairs 
CNS/2003/0265  Equal treatment between women and men: access to and supply of goods and services  0 0 2 Employment and Social Affairs 
CNS/2004/0014  European Agency for safety and health at work (amend. regul. 2062/94/EC)  0 0 2 Employment and Social Affairs 
CNS/2004/0026  European Foundation for the improvement of living and working conditions, Dublin (amend. regul. 1365/75/EEC)  0 0 1 Employment and Social Affairs 
CNS/2004/0082  Employment policy: guidelines for strengthening the implementation of the European strategy  0 0 1 Employment and Social Affairs 
CNS/2005/0057 Employment policy: guidelines for 2005-2008 0 0 1 Employment and Social Affairs 
CNS/2006/0010 Employment policy: maintain the guidelines for 2005-2008 in 2006 (dec. 2005/600/EC) 0 0 1 Employment and Social Affairs 
CNS/2006/0103  
Maritime industry and seafarers: ratication by Member States of the 2006 Consolidated Maritime Labour Convention of the 
International Labour Organisation ILO, 23 february 2006  
0 1 1 Employment and Social Affairs 
CNS/2006/0271  Employment policy: guidelines for 2007 (dec. 2005/600/EC)  0 0 1 Employment and Social Affairs 
COD/2000/0070  Social security: employed persons, self-employed persons and their families (amend. regul. 1408/71/EEC, 574/72/EEC)   0 0 2 Employment and Social Affairs 
COD/2000/0142  Equal opportunities between women and men: employment, vocational training, working conditions   0 1 5 Employment and Social Affairs 
COD/2000/0157  Social exclusion: Community action programme 2001-2005 to encourage cooperation between Member States   0 1 5 Employment and Social Affairs 
COD/2000/0195  Employment: Community incentive measures   0 1 4 Employment and Social Affairs 
COD/2001/0006  Protection of employees: insolvency of employer, transnational situations (amend. direct. 80/987/EEC)   0 1 4 Employment and Social Affairs 
COD/2001/0165  Safety and security at work: protection from the risks related to exposure to asbestos (amend. direct. 83/477/EEC)  0 1 3 Employment and Social Affairs 
COD/2003/0109  Equality women and men: grants to organisations active at European level, 2004-2005 action programme  0 1 4 Employment and Social Affairs 
COD/2003/0138  Social security: employed persons, self-employed persons, and their families (amend. regul. 1408/71/EEC, 574/72/EEC)  1 1 1 Employment and Social Affairs 
COD/2003/0184  Social security: employed, self employed persons and families (amend. regul. 1408/71/EEC, 574/72/EEC) 1 0 1 Employment and Social Affairs 
COD/2004/0084 Equal opportunities and treatment of men and women: employment and occupation. Recast version 0 1 4 Employment and Social Affairs 
COD/2004/0158  Employment and social cohesion: programme Progress for employment and social solidarity, 2007-2013 0 0 5 Employment and Social Affairs 
COD/2004/0165 
Economic and social cohesion: European Social Fund ESF for employment, social insertion, training and education, 2007-2013 
(repeal. regul. 1784/1999/EC) 
1 1 5 Employment and Social Affairs 
COD/2004/0167 Regional policy: European Regional Development Fund ERDF (repeal. regul. 1783/1999/EC) 1 1 6 Employment and Social Affairs 
COD/2004/0168 Cross-border cooperation, economic and social cohesion: European grouping of territorial cooperation EGTC 1 1 2 Employment and Social Affairs 
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COD/2004/0284 
Social security: employed and self-employed persons, members of their families moving within the Community (amend. regul. 
1408/71/EEC, regul. 574/72/EEC), changes in national legislations since the end of accession negotiations 
0 1 1 Employment and Social Affairs 
COD/2005/0017  Gender equality: establishment of a European Institute for Gender Equality  1 1 5 Employment and Social Affairs 
COD/2005/0107 Non discrimination and gender equality: European year of equal opportunities for all 2007 0 1 5 Employment and Social Affairs 
COD/2005/0258 Social security: employed, self employed persons and families (amend. regul. 1408/71/EEC, 574/72/EEC 0 1 1 Employment and Social Affairs 
COD/2006/0033 
Employment and social solidarity: establishing the European Globalisation adjustment Fund EGF in order to facilitate re-integration 
into employment of workers affected by trade-related redundancies  
1 1 4 Employment and Social Affairs 
COD/2006/0127  
Health and safety of workers at work: simplify and rationalise the reports on practical implementation (amend. Dir. 89/391/EEC, 
83/477/EEC, 91/383/EEC, 92/29/EEC, 94/33/EC) 
0 1 1 Employment and Social Affairs 
CNS/2001/0136  GALILEO, satellite radionavigation programme: development phase, joint undertaking   0 0 5 Energy and Transport 
CNS/2002/0220  Energy: natural gas, security of supply  0 1 1 Energy and Transport 
CNS/2003/0177  GALILEO, satellite radionavigation programme: management, GNSS Supervisory Authority and Center for security and safety  0 0 1 Energy and Transport 
CNS/2004/0221 Nuclear energy: Bohunice V1 nuclear power plant in Slovakia, implementation of the Protocol n° 9 annexed to the accession Act 2004 0 0 2 Energy and Transport 
CNS/2005/0235 Air transport: Joint Undertaking to develop the new generation European air traffic management system SESAR 0 0 2 Energy and Transport 
CNS/2005/0272 Environment and health: supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel (repeal. direct. 92/3/Euratom) 0 0 1 Energy and Transport 
COD/1998/0097  Road safety and environment: roadside inspection of commercial vehicles   0 0 4 Energy and Transport 
COD/1998/0266  Railway transport: licensing of railway undertakings (amend. direct. 95/18/EC). 1st package  1 1 2 Energy and Transport 
COD/1998/0267  Railway transport: infrastructure capacity and levying for their use, safety certification. 1st package  1 1 6 Energy and Transport 
COD/1999/0083  Transport of dangerous goods by road: standards, European agreement ADR annexes (amend. direct. 94/55/EC)   0 0 1 Energy and Transport 
COD/1999/0127  Energy efficiency: requirements for ballasts for fluorescent lighting  0 0 2 Energy and Transport 
COD/1999/0252  Rail transport: interoperability of the trans-European conventional rail system  0 1 3 Energy and Transport 
COD/1999/0264  Agreements EC/Bulgaria, EC/Hungary: road and combined transport, repartition of authorizations  0 0 1 Energy and Transport 
COD/2000/0033  Energy efficiency products: office and communication technology equipment, labelling programme Energy Star  0 0 3 Energy and Transport 
COD/2000/0060  Road transport, national and international traffic : maximum dimensions and weights (amend. dir. 96/53/EC)  0 0 1 Energy and Transport 
COD/2000/0065  Maritime safety: standards in respect of shipping using Community ports, package Erika I (amend. direct. 95/21/EC)   1 1 5 Energy and Transport 
COD/2000/0066  Maritime safety: ship inspections and survey organisations, package Erika I (amend. direct. 94/57/EC)  1 1 8 Energy and Transport 
COD/2000/0067  Maritime safety: double hull or equivalent design for single hull oil tankers, package Erika I  0 0 4 Energy and Transport 
COD/2000/0069  Air transport, civil aviation: technical requirements and administrative procedures, EU-OPS regulation (amend. regul. 3922/91/EEC)   0 1 4 Energy and Transport 
COD/2000/0116  Electricity, internal market: production from renewable energy sources, RES-E  0 0 4 Energy and Transport 
COD/2000/0121  Safe seas: safe loading and unloading of bulk carriers  0 0 2 Energy and Transport 
COD/2000/0140  Summer-time arrangements: consequences and timetable for 2002 to 2006 (8th direct. 97/44/EC)  0 0 1 Energy and Transport 
COD/2000/0145  Air carriage: liability in the event of accidents (amend. regul. 2027/97/EC)  0 0 2 Energy and Transport 
COD/2000/0212  
Passenger transport by rail, road, inland waterway: competition, public service exigences and contracts (repl. regul. 1191/69/EEC, 
1893/91/EEC)  
1 1 7 Energy and Transport 
COD/2000/0236  Maritime safety and prevention of pollution from ships (amend. regul. 613/91/EEC, 2978/94/EC, 3051/95/EC)  0 0 2 Energy and Transport 
COD/2000/0237  Maritime safety, prevention of pollution from ships (amend. direct. 93/75/EEC, dec. 1999/468/EC)  0 0 2 Energy and Transport 
COD/2000/0246  Civil aviation: common rules, European Aviation Safety Agency  1 1 6 Energy and Transport 
COD/2000/0297  Access to the market in the carriage of goods by road: uniform driver attestation (amend. regul. 811/92/EEC)   0 0 1 Energy and Transport 
COD/2000/0315  Road safety: compulsory use of belts for children under 12 years of age (amend. direct. 91/671/EEC)  1 1 1 Energy and Transport 
COD/2000/0325  Maritime safety: monitoring, control and information for traffic, package Erika II (repeal. direct. 93/75/EEC)   1 1 4 Energy and Transport 
COD/2000/0327  Maritime safety: creation of a European Agency, package Erika II   1 1 6 Energy and Transport 
COD/2000/0343  Air transport safety, civil aviation: prevention of accidents, collect and dissemination of information  0 1 2 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0026  Maritime transport: formalities for ships arriving in and departing from Member States ports, IMO FAL convention   0 1 1 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0033  Road transport: training of professional drivers for the carriage of goods or passengers (regul. 3820/85/EEC)  0 0 2 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0060  Air transport: framework for the creation of a single European sky and action programme, package single European sky  1 1 7 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0077  Energy: rules for the internal market in electricity (repeal. direct. 96/92/EC)   1 1 5 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0077A  Energy: rules for the internal market in natural gas (repeal. direct. 98/30/EC)  1 1 3 Energy and Transport 
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COD/2001/0078  Energy: internal market in electricity, cross-border exchanges, access to network   1 1 3 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0098  Energy policy: energy performance of the buidings of the Union, energy saves and efficiency  1 1 6 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0135  Road safety: speed limitation devices for commercial motor vehicles (amend. direct. 92/6/EEC)   1 1 2 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0140  Air transport: slots at Community airports and competition (amend. regul. 95/93/EEC)  0 0 5 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0140A  Air transport: slots at Community airports and competition (amend. regul. 95/93/EEC, art. 10b)  0 0 1 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0226  Trans-European networks: rules for granting financial aid (amend. regul. 2236/95/EC)  0 0 3 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0229  Trans-European network of transport : Community guidelines of development (amend. dec. 1692/96/EC)  0 1 4 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0234  Air transport: common rules for civil aviation security  1 1 7 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0235  Air transport: provision of navigation services, single European sky package 1 1 9 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0236  Air transport: organisation and use of the airspace, single European sky package  1 1 6 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0237   Air transport: interoperability of the traffic management network, single European sky package  1 1 4 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0241  
Road transport: harmonisation of social legislation, driving times, breaks and rest periods for drivers (amend. regul. 3821/85/EEC, 
2135/98/EC, repeal. regul. 3820/85/EEC)  
0 1 6 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0265  Energy: use of biofuels for road transport  0 1 2 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0282  Acoustic pollution : noise-related operating restrictions at Community airports  1 1 2 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0305  Air transport: compensation and assistance to air passengers for a denied boarding (repeal. regul. 295/91/EEC)  0 1 8 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0310  Road transport: ecopoints for heavy vehicles transiting through Austria for 2004  0 1 4 Energy and Transport 
COD/2001/0311  Trans-European energy networks: guidelines (repeal. dec. 1254/96/EC)   0 1 3 Energy and Transport 
COD/2002/0013  Air transport: allocation of slots at Community airports (amend. regul. 95/93/EEC)  0 0 1 Energy and Transport 
COD/2002/0014  Air safety: third countries aircraft using Community airports  0 1 5 Energy and Transport 
COD/2002/0022  Community's railways: safety, licensing, levying of charges, certification (direct. 95/18/EC, 2001/14/EC). 2nd package   1 1 6 Energy and Transport 
COD/2002/0023 Trans-European railway transport: interoperability (amend. direct. 96/48/EC, 2001/16/EC). 2nd package  1 1 4 Energy and Transport 
COD/2002/0024  European railway area: European Railway Agency for interoperability and safety. 2nd package  1 1 8 Energy and Transport 
COD/2002/0025  Railway transport: development of the Community's railways (amend. direct. 91/440/EEC). 2nd package   1 1 4 Energy and Transport 
COD/2002/0038  Freight transport system: improving the environmental performance, programme Marco Polo PACT  0 1 5 Energy and Transport 
COD/2002/0067  Air transport: protection against unfair pricing practices from countries not members of the Community   0 1 7 Energy and Transport 
COD/2002/0074  Safe seas: ro-ro passenger ships, specific stability requirements  1 1 1 Energy and Transport 
COD/2002/0075  Safe seas: passenger ships, safety rules and standards (amend. direct. 98/18/EC)  1 1 2 Energy and Transport 
COD/2002/0082  Energy and sustainable development: multiannual programme "Intelligent Energy for Europe", 2003-2006  1 1 6 Energy and Transport 
COD/2002/0185  Energy: security of supply, providing heat and electricity by cogeneration (amend. direct. 92/42/EEC)  1 1 4 Energy and Transport 
COD/2002/0234  Air transport: insurance for air carriers and aircraft operators   0 1 5 Energy and Transport 
COD/2002/0309  Trans-European road network : minimum safety requirements for tunnels   0 1 4 Energy and Transport 
COD/2002/0310  Safety at sea: double hull or equivalent design requirements for oil tankers (regul. 417/2002, 2978/94/EC)   0 1 1 Energy and Transport 
COD/2003/0001  Shipping: seafarers, minimum level of training (amend. direct. 2001/25/EC)   0 1 1 Energy and Transport 
COD/2003/0037  Maritime safety, prevention of pollution caused by ships: penalties for infringements  1 1 6 Energy and Transport 
COD/2003/0044  Air transport between the Community and third countries: negotiation and implementation of air service agreements   0 1 5 Energy and Transport 
COD/2003/0081 Trans-European transport network: electronic road toll systems, widespread introduction and interoperability  0 1 2 Energy and Transport 
COD/2003/0089  Maritime transport: ship and port facility security   0 1 3 Energy and Transport 
COD/2003/0159  Marine pollution: European Maritime safety Agency (amend. regul. 1406/2002/EC)  0 1 1 Energy and Transport 
COD/2003/0175  Road transport: charging of heavy goods vehicles and infrastructures fees (amend. direct. 1999/62/CE Eurovignette)  0 1 6 Energy and Transport 
COD/2003/0180  Maritime tranport and safety: transfer of cargo and passenger ships between registers within the Community   0 1 2 Energy and Transport 
COD/2003/0252  Driving licences: issue, validity, renewal. Recasting (repeal direct. 91/439/EEC)  0 1 7 Energy and Transport 
COD/2003/0255  Road transport, working time: enforcing social legislation (implem. regul. 3820/85/EEC and 3821/85/EEC, repeal. direct. 88/599/EEC)) 0 1 5 Energy and Transport 
COD/2003/0297  Trans-European energy networks: guidelines for the 2004 enlargement (repeal. dec. 96/391/EC, 1229/2003/EC)  0 1 5 Energy and Transport 
COD/2003/0300  Energy policy: energy efficiency for end-users and energy saves (repeal. direct. 93/76/EEC)  1 1 6 Energy and Transport 
COD/2003/0301  Internal market for electricity: safeguard security of supplies, infrastructure investment  0 1 5 Energy and Transport 
COD/2003/0302  Energy: internal market in natural gas, cross-border exchanges, access to the transmission networks  1 1 5 Energy and Transport 
COD/2004/0031  Maritime transport: enhancing port security  0 1 4 Energy and Transport 
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COD/2004/0047  
Railway transport of passengers: opening to international competition, Rail Market Access proposal (amend. Dir. 91/440/EEC, Dir. 
2001/14/EC). 3rd package  
1 1 4 Energy and Transport 
COD/2004/0048  Railway transport: certification of train crews and drivers. 3rd package  1 1 7 Energy and Transport 
COD/2004/0049   Railway transport: international rail passengers' rights and obligations. 3rd package  1 1 10 Energy and Transport 
COD/2004/0098 Shipping: simplified procedure for the recognition of certificates of seafarers (amend. direct. 2001/25/EC) 1 1 2 Energy and Transport 
COD/2004/0123  Inland waterway transport: River Traffic Information Services RIS for safety, security and efficiency of inland navigation 1 1 2 Energy and Transport 
COD/2004/0146  Air transport: Community air trafic controller licence, single European sky package 1 1 2 Energy and Transport 
COD/2004/0154  Energy and transport: rules for the granting of financial aid for the trans-European networks (amend. regul. 2236/95/EC)  0 1 3 Energy and Transport 
COD/2004/0157  
Intermodal transport: programme Marco Polo II (2007-2013), financial assistance to improve the environmental peformance of freight 
transport 
1 1 2 Energy and Transport 
COD/2005/0007 Air transport: rights of persons with reduced mobility 1 1 4 Energy and Transport 
COD/2005/0008  
Air transport: information of passengers on the identity of the operating carrier and communication of safety information by Member 
states 
1 1 3 Energy and Transport 
COD/2005/0098  European Maritime Safety Agency: response to pollution caused by ships, multiannual funding (amend. Regul. 1406/2002/EC)  1 1 2 Energy and Transport 
COD/2006/0046 
Maritime safety: accelerated phasing-in of double-hull or equivalent design requirements for single-hull oil tankers (amend. regul. 
417/2002/EC, repeal. regul. 2978/94/EC)   
0 1 1 Energy and Transport 
COD/2006/0183  Road safety: retrofitting of mirrors to existing fleet of heavy goods vehicles  1 1 3 Energy and Transport 
COD/2006/0209 
Civil aviation: technical requirements and administrative procedures, reference to the new regulatory procedure with scrutiny in the 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission (déc. 2006/512/EC, amend. regul. 3922/2006/EC)   
0 1 1 Energy and Transport 
COD/2006/0210 
Inland waterway vessels: technical requirements, reference to the new regulatory procedure with scrutiny in the implementing powers 
conferred on the Commission (déc. 2006/512/EC, amend. direct. xxxx/2006/EC)  
0 1 1 Energy and Transport 
CNS/1999/0199  Cyprus and Malta: pre-accession strategy, implementation of operations  0 0 2 Enlargement 
CNS/2000/0205  Turkey: assistance in the pre-accession strategy , accession partnership  0 0 2 Enlargement 
CNS/2001/0097  EC/Turkey relations: pre-accession financial assistance  0 0 1 Enlargement 
COD/1998/0300  EC/Turkey relations: implementation of measures to promote economic and social development   0 0 2 Enlargement 
CNS/2004/0145 Relations EU/Cyprus, Turkish community: instrument of financial support for economic development 0 1 2 Enlargement  
CNS/2004/0222 
Community's external aid: unified Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) for the potential candidate countries to accession, 
financial perspective from 2007 to 2013 
0 1 2 Enlargement  
CNS/1999/0284  Processed agricultural products as goods: trade arrangements, Uruguay round follow-up (amend. regul. 3448/93/EEC)   0 0 2 Enterprise and Industry 
CNS/2000/0107  Enterprise policy: multiannual programme MAP 2001-2005  0 0 5 Enterprise and Industry 
CNS/2005/0023 European Medicines Agency: system of fees payable to the Agency (amend. regul. 297/95/EC) 0 0 1 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/1985/0046  Credit institutions: reorganisation and winding up  0 0 1 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/1998/0253  Credit institutions: taking up and pursuit of the business (amend. direct. 77/780/EEC)  0 0 1 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/1999/0269  Dangerous substances and preparations: azocolourants in textiles and leather (19th amend. direct. 76/769/EEC)  0 0 1 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2000/0077  Cosmetic products: animal experiments (7th amend. direct. 76/768/EEC)  0 1 5 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2000/0104  Dangerous substances and preparations: short chain chlorinated paraffins SCCP (20th amend. direct. 76/769/EEC)  0 1 2 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2000/0136  Air quality: emissions from two or three-wheeled motor vehicles, motorcycles (amend. direct. 97/24/EC)  0 1 5 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2000/0233  Measuring instruments: trading transactions and use of legally controlled instruments  0 1 4 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2000/0262  Recreational craft industry: exhaust and noise emissions from boat engines (amend. direct. 94/25/EC)  0 1 6 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2001/0004  Machinery, lifts: marketing, safety, health and consumers protection (recast direct. 98/37/EC, amend. 95/16/EC)   0 1 2 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2001/0018  Dangerous substances: marketing and use of pentaBDE in polyurethane foam (24th amend. direct. 76/769/CEE)  0 1 3 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2001/0110  Dangerous substances: carcinogens, mutagens or toxic to reproduction, c/m/r (23rd amend. direct. 76/769/EEC)   0 1 2 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2001/0210  Electronic interchange of data between administrations IDA II: guidelines (amend. dec. 1719/1999/EC)  1 1 2 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2001/0211  Electronic interchange of data between administrations IDA II: networks interoperability (amend. dec. 1720/1999/EC)  1 1 3 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2001/0211  Electronic interchange of data between administrations IDA II: networks interoperability (amend. dec. 1720/1999/EC)  1 1 1 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2001/0212  Fertilizers (recast direct. 76/116/EEC, 80/876/EEC, 87/94/EEC, 77/535/EEC)  0 0 1 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2001/0252  Medicinal products for human and veterinary use: authorisation and supervision, European Agency for evaluation   1 1 6 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2001/0253  Medicinal products for human use: Community code (amend. direct. 2001/83/EC)   1 1 5 Enterprise and Industry 
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COD/2001/0254  Veterinary medicinal products: Community code (amend. direct. 2001/82/EC)   1 1 4 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2001/0255  Air pollution: CO2 emissions, fuel consumption of N1 light commercial vehicles (amend. direct. 70/156/EEC, 80/1268/EEC)   0 0 1 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2001/0317  Road safety: mirrors, systems for indirect vision on vehicles (amend. direct. 70/156/EEC, repeal. direct. 71/127/EEC)  0 0 1 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2002/0008  Public health: traditional herbal medicinal products (amend. direct. 2001/83/EC)  0 1 3 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2002/0040  Dangerous substances: carcinogens, mutagens, toxic to reproduction c/m/r (25th amend. direct. 76/769/EEC)  0 0 2 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2002/0206  Health and environment: use of nonylphenol, nonylphenol ethoxylate and cement (26th amend. direct. 76/769/EEC)   1 1 2 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2002/0216  Environmental protection: free movement of detergents, biodegradability and labelling  1 1 3 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2002/0217  Narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances: trade in drug precursors, monitoring and surveillance  0 0 1 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2002/0306  Electrical and electronic equipment: electromagnetic compatibility (repeal. direct. 89/336/EEC) 0 1 2 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2003/0033  Road safety: protection of pedestrians, changes to the front of vehicles (amend. direct. 70/156/EEC)  0 0 1 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2003/0128  Road safety: seats, anchorages, head restraints and safety belts (amend. direct. 74/408/EEC, 96/37/EC)  1 1 2 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2003/0130  Road safety: safety belts and restraint systems (amend. direct. 77/541/EEC, 2000/3/EC)  1 1 2 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2003/0136  Road safety: anchorages of safety belts (amend. direct. 76/115/EEC, 96/38/EC)  1 1 2 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2003/0153  Car industry: harmonised approval of vehicles, trailers, systems (repeal., repl. direct. 70/156/EEC)  0 1 5 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2003/0172  Environment: setting of ecodesign requirements for energy-using products (amend. direct. 92/42/EEC, 96/57/EC and 2000/55/EC)  0 1 4 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2003/0205  Air pollution: compression-ignition or positive-ignition engines, natural or liquefied petroleum gas. Recast version  0 1 1 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2003/0226  Road safety: frontal protection systems on motor vehicles (amend. direct. 70/156/EEC)  1 1 3 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2003/0256  Chemicals: REACH system and European Agency (amend. Dir. 1999/45/EC and Reg. on persistent organic pollutants)  1 1 13 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2003/0257  Chemicals: classification, labelling, packaging, adaptation to the REACH regulation (amend. Dir. 67/548/EEC)  1 1 3 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2003/0292  Small and medium-sized enterprises SMEs: multiannual programme 2001-2005 (amend. dec. 2000/819/EC)  0 1 1 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2004/0036  Environment and health : polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in extender oils and tyres (27th amend. direct. 76/769/EEC)  0 1 1 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2004/0053  Motor vehicles : re-usability, recyclability and recovery of components (amend. direct. 70/156/CEE)  0 1 1 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2004/0111 Environment and public health: restrictions on the use of toluene and TCB (amend. direct. 76/769/EEC) 0 1 1 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2004/0217  
Medicinal products for paediatric use: implementation of good clinical practice in the conduct of clinical trials (amend. regul. 
1768/92/EEC, direct. 2001/83/EC, regul. 726/2004/EC)   
0 1 6 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2004/0248  
Free movement of goods: rules on nominal quantities for pre-packed products (repeal. direct. 75/106/EEC, 80/232/EEC, amend. 
direct. 76/211/EEC)  
0 1 2 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2004/0272 Enterprise policy, SMEs: prolongation of the multiannual programme MAP until 31 December 2006 (amend dec. 2000/819/EC) 0 0 1 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2005/0050 Competitiveness of industry and enterprises: Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme CIP, 2007-2013 0 1 5 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2005/0157 European standardisation: Community financing 1 1 2 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2005/0194 Protection of consumers: placing on the market and use of pyrotechnic articles, in particular fireworks  0 1 4 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2005/0227  Medicinal products for human use: advanced therapy medicinal products (amend. direct. 2001/83/EC, regul. 726/2004/EC)  1 1 4 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2005/0244  
Combating pollution: protection of human health and the environment, restrictions on the marketing and use of perfluorooctane 
sulfonates PFOS (amend. Direct. 76/769/EEC)  
0 1 1 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2005/0263  Medical devices and active implantable medical devices (amend. direct. 93/42/EEC and 90/385/EEC)  1 1 3 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2005/0282  
Motor vehicles: type approval with respect to emissions and on access to repair information (amend. direct. 72/306/EEC, repeal. 
direct. 70/220, 80/1268, 89/458, 91/441, 93/59/EEC, 94/12/EC, 96/69, 98/69 and 2004/3/EC)  
1 1 5 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2006/0018  
Environment and health: restrictions on the marketing of certain non-electrical measuring devices containing mercury (amend. Dir. 
76/769/EEC)  
0 1 1 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2006/0187  
Energy efficiency products: office and communication technology equipment, labelling programme Energy Star (recast Reg. 
2422/2001/EC)  
0 1 1 Enterprise and Industry 
COD/2007/0035  
Reduction of the administrative burdens on businesses: mergers of public limited liability companies (amend. Dir. 78/855/EEC) and 
division of public limited companies (amend. Dir. 82/891/EEC) as regards the requirement for an independent expert's report o 
0 1 1 Enterprise and Industry 
CNS/2000/0248  Civil protection: mechanism for the coordination of intervention in the event of emergencies   0 0 3 Environment 
CNS/2002/0030  Hazardous chemicals and pesticides, international trade: Rotterdam Convention, prior informed consent procedure  0 0 1 Environment 
CNS/2003/0005  Public health: high activity sealed radioactive sources, management and control  0 0 1 Environment 
CNS/2003/0117  Persistent organic pollutants : long range transboundary air pollution Convention, 1998 Arhus Protocol   0 0 1 Environment 
CNS/2003/0118  Environment: persistent organic pollutants, conclusion of the Stockholm convention 2001 0 0 1 Environment 
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CNS/2003/0249  Environment: access to information and justice, public participation, conclusion of the Arhus Convention  0 0 1 Environment 
CNS/2004/0181 Protection of wild fauna: conclusion of the 1995 Agreement on the conservation of African-Eurasian migratory waterbirds 0 0 1 Environment 
CNS/2005/0052 Civil protection: rapid response and preparedness instrument for major emergencies, Community financial support 0 0 2 Environment 
COD/1998/0072  Genetically modified organisms GMOs: deliberate release into the environment (repeal. Direct. 90/220/EEC)  0 1 5 Environment 
COD/1998/0249  Maritime pollution from ships: port reception facilities for ship-generated waste and cargo residues  0 1 4 Environment 
COD/1998/0289  Air pollution: incineration of waste (replacing direct. 89/369/EEC, 89/429/EEC, 94/67/EC)   0 1 4 Environment 
COD/1999/0067  Air pollution : national emission ceilings for pollutant gas (SO2, NOx, NH3, VOCs)   1 1 5 Environment 
COD/1999/0068  Air pollution: ozone in ambient air, emission ceilings  1 1 6 Environment 
COD/1999/0233  Sustainable urban development : environmental legislation at the local level, Community framework for cooperation  0 0 3 Environment 
COD/2000/0035  Water policy: list of priority substances, protection of the ecosystem and human health COMMPS  0 0 1 Environment 
COD/2000/0158  Environment and health: waste electrical and electronic equipment WEEE  1 1 7 Environment 
COD/2000/0159  Environment and health: electrical and electronic equipments WEEE, restriction of hazardous substances RoHS   1 1 6 Environment 
COD/2000/0170  Environment: substances depleting the ozone layer, allocation of hydrochlorofluorocarbons HCFCs, base year  0 0 1 Environment 
COD/2000/0194  Noise pollution : assessment and management of exposure to environmental noise  0 1 5 Environment 
COD/2000/0227  Coastal zones: integrated management ICZM, implementation of a strategy  1 1 3 Environment 
COD/2000/0331  Environment: public participation in plans and programmes (amend. direct. 85/337/EEC, 96/61/EC)  0 1 4 Environment 
COD/2000/0336  Air pollution: emissions from small park ignition engines, non-road mobile machinery (amend. direct. 97/68/EC)   0 1 1 Environment 
COD/2001/0029  Environment: 6th Community action programme 2001-2010  0 1 6 Environment 
COD/2001/0107  Quality of petrol and diesel fuels: level of sulphur (amend. direct. 98/70/EC)  0 1 3 Environment 
COD/2001/0139  Environment: promoting NGO primarily active in the environmetal protection (repeal. dec. 97/872/EC)  0 1 1 Environment 
COD/2001/0180  Genetically modified organisms GMOs: traceability and labelling (amend. direct. 2001/18/EC)  0 0 5 Environment 
COD/2001/0245  Air pollution, greenhouse gas emission: scheme for allowance trading (amend. direct. 96/61/EC)  1 1 3 Environment 
COD/2001/0257  Industrial major-accidents: hazard control, dangerous substances (amend. direct. 96/82/EC, Seveso II)   0 1 3 Environment 
COD/2001/0268  Forests : protection against fire, extension to 2002 (amend. regul. 2158/92/EEC)  0 0 1 Environment 
COD/2002/0021  Environment: liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage   1 1 4 Environment 
COD/2002/0026  Dangerous chemicals: export and import, Rotterdam Convention provisions  1 0 2 Environment 
COD/2002/0046  Biosafety: genetically modified organisms GMOs, Cartagena Protocol  1 1 5 Environment 
COD/2002/0149  Environment : anti-fouling paints used on ships, prohibition of organotin compounds  0 1 1 Environment 
COD/2002/0164  Forests : protection and monitoring of atmospheric pollution and fires, action 2003-2008 Forest Focus  1 1 5 Environment 
COD/2002/0254  Pollution, public health : quality of bathing water (repeal. direct. 76/160/EEC)  0 1 6 Environment 
COD/2002/0259  Environment : sulphur content of marine fuels and heavy fueloils (amend. direct. 1999/32/EC)   1 1 4 Environment 
COD/2002/0268  Environment, ozone layer: halons, chlorofluorocarbons CFCs and bromochloromethane (amend. regul. 2037/2000/EC)  1 1 2 Environment 
COD/2002/0301  Air pollution: volatile organic compounds due to organic solvents, programme CAFE (amend. direct. 1999/13/EC)   0 1 3 Environment 
COD/2002/0304  Air pollution: compression ignition engines by non-road mobile machinery (amend. direct. 97/68/EC)  1 1 2 Environment 
COD/2003/0029  Air pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, monitoring mechanism, Kyoto protocol (repeal. dec. 93/389/EEC)  1 1 2 Environment 
COD/2003/0107  Extractive industries: management of waste, juridical framework (amend. direct. 2004/35/EC)  0 1 6 Environment 
COD/2003/0119  Environment: persistent organic pollutants (amend. direct. 79/117/EEC and 96/59/EC), Stockholm Convention 2001   0 1 3 Environment 
COD/2003/0139  Waste: supervision and control of shipments, Basel Convention 1989 and OECD Decision 1992 (regul. 259/93/EEC)  0 1 6 Environment 
COD/2003/0164  Air quality: heavy metals, arsenic, cadmium, mercury, nickel, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (direct. 96/62/EC)  0 1 3 Environment 
COD/2003/0165  Foodstuffs: nutritrion or health claims used in labelling (amend. direct. 2000/13/EC)   0 1 8 Environment 
COD/2003/0173  Air pollution: greenhouse gas emission trading in respect of the Kyoto Protocol's project mechanisms (amend. direct. 2003/87/EC)  1 1 6 Environment 
COD/2003/0189A  Climate change: fluorinated greenhouse gases, hydrofluorocarbons HFCs, perfluorocarbons PFCs, sulphur hexafluoride  1 1 7 Environment 
COD/2003/0189B  Air pollution: emissions and fluorinated greenhouse gases from motor vehicle air-conditioning systems (amend. direct. 70/156/EEC) 1 1 6 Environment 
COD/2003/0210   Protection of groundwater: prevention and control of pollution  0 1 9 Environment 
COD/2003/0242  Environment: access to information and justice, public participation, application of the Arhus Convention  0 1 6 Environment 
COD/2003/0260  LIFE III, financial instrument for the environment: extension till 31 December 2006 (amend. regul. 1655/2000/EC)  1 1 4 Environment 
COD/2003/0282  
Environment: treating and disposing of batteries and accumulators, recycling waste equipments (repeal direct. 91/157/EEC, 
91/101/EC, 93/86/EEC)  
0 1 8 Environment 
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COD/2004/0045  2004 enlargement, environment: packaging and packaging waste (amend. direct. 94/62/EC) 0 0 1 Environment 
COD/2004/0175 
Public access to information: legal framework for an infrastructure for spatial information in Europe (INSPIRE) specially for monitoring 
environmental policy  
0 1 5 Environment 
COD/2004/0218  
LIFE +, financial instrument for the environment: multi-annual programme 2007-2013 (repl. regul. 1973/92/EC, 1404/964/EC, 
1655/2000/EC, 2152/2003/EC, dec. 1411/2001/EC, 466/2002/EC)  
0 1 8 Environment 
COD/2004/0231  
Public access to environmental information: European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (amend. direct. 91/689/EEC and 
96/61/EC) 
1 1 2 Environment 
COD/2005/0149  Noise pollution: noise emission by equipment used outdoors (amend. direct. 2000/14/EC) 0 1 1 Environment 
COD/2006/0005  Natural disasters: reduction and management of the risks of floods for human health, environment, infrastructure and property  1 1 3 Environment 
COD/2001/0251  Combating AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria: Community contribution to the Global Fund  0 1 1 EuropAid, Cooperation Office 
CNS/2005/0029 Euro: protection against counterfeiting, PERICLES action programme (amend. and extension dec. 2001/923/EC 0 0 2 European Anti-fraud Office OLAF 
COD/2003/0152  Fight against fraud: protection of the Community financial interests, Hercule action programme 2004-2006  0 1 2 European Anti-fraud Office OLAF 
COD/2006/0114  
Fight against fraud: protection of the Community financial interests, Hercule II action programme 2007-2013 (amend. dec. 
804/2004/EC)   
0 1 2 European Anti-fraud Office OLAF 
CNS/2005/0013 
Fiscal statistics: governance and quality of statistical data in the context of the excessive deficit procedure (amend. regul. 
3605/93/EC) 
0 0 2 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/1999/0200  European System of national and regional accounts ESA: recording taxes and social contributions   0 0 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2000/0019  European system of national and regional accounts ESA: swaps, forward rate (amend. regul. 2223/96/EC)  0 0 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2000/0201  Intra and extra-Community trading of goods: trans-European network for the collection of statistics, Edicom  0 0 3 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2000/0241  European system of national and regional accounts ESA 95: VAT-based own resource (amend. regul. 2223/96/EC)  0 0 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2000/0291  Agricultural statistics: production potential of plantations of fruit trees (repeal. direct. 76/625/EEC)   0 1 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2001/0023  Structural business statistics: additional sectors, credit institutions and pension funds (amend. regul. 58/97/EC)  0 0 3 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2001/0046  European statistical system: common classification of territorial units for statistics NUTS  0 0 3 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2001/0048  Transport policy: rail statistics for passengers, freight and safety  0 0 2 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2001/0197  Science and technology: production and development of Community statistics  0 0 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2001/0291  Packaging and packaging waste (amend. direct. 94/62/EC)  0 1 6 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2001/0293  Community statistics: income and living conditions in the Union EU-SILC  0 0 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2002/0251  Steel industry: annual Community statistics on steel for 2003-2009  0 0 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2003/0047  Labour force in the Community: sample survey on employment and unemployment (amend. regul. 577/98/EC)  0 1 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2003/0060  Milk and milk products : statistical surveys (amend. direct. 96/16/EC)  0 0 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2003/0095  General government: quarterly financial accounts, ESA 95 categories   0 0 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2003/0126  Statistics on the trading of goods between Member States Intrastat: common framework 2005 (repeal. regul. 3330/91/EEC)  0 0 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2003/0199  Information society, eEurope: Community statistics  0 1 2 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2003/0200  Community statistics: diffusion and creation of the Balanceof Payments Committee  0 0 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2003/0234  Agricultural surveys in 2005 and 2007: structure of holdings of the new Member States (amend. regul. 571/88/EEC)  0 0 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2003/0296  EMU statistics: quaterly non-financial accounts by institutional sector, common framework for Member States  0 0 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2003/0325 EC statistics: legislative framework for short-term statistics (amend. regul. 1165/98/EC) 0 1 2 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2004/0041  Community statistics: analysis of continuing vocational training in enterprises  0 1 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2005/0016  
Economic policy: harmonising data collection for statistics on the structure and activity of foreign affiliates in order to establish a 
common framework for the FATS production  
0 1 3 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2005/0150 Transport policy: statistics on inland waterways transport (repeal. direct. 80/1119/EEC) 0 1 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2005/0156  Asylum and migrations: common framework for the collection and compilation of Community statistics (repeal. regul. 311/76/EEC)  0 1 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2005/0253  National acounts data: revision of the transmission programme (amend. regul. 2223/96/CE)  0 1 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2006/0004  Social protection: set up the European System of integrated Social Protection Statistics ESSPROS  0 1 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2006/0011  
Community statistical system: revised common statistical classification of economic activities NACE rev. 2 (amend. regul. 
3037/90/EEC and other EC regul.)  
0 1 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2006/0042  
Price policy: common rules for the provision of basic information on Purchasing Power Parities PPPs, for their calculation and 
dissemination 
1 1 2 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
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COD/2006/0112 Agricultural surveys 2007: financial framework for 2007-2009, Community contribution for Bulgaria and Romania (amend.571/88/EEC) 0 1 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2006/0180  Labour Force Survey: introduce wages from the main job as a compulsory variable  0 1 1 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
COD/2006/0229  Community statistics: programme 2008-2012  1 1 2 Eurostat, Statistical Office 
CNS/1999/0132 
European agency for reconstruction: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FR Yugoslavia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
FYROM (amend. regul. 1628/96/EC)  
0 0 3 External Relations 
CNS/2000/0111  South-East Europe, Western Balkans: Community assistance, programme CARDS (amend. 3906/89/EEC, 1360/90/EEC, 97/256/EC) 0 0 2 External Relations 
CNS/2000/0112  European Agency for reconstruction: creation and operation (repeal. regul. 1628/96/EC)   0 0 2 External Relations 
CNS/2000/0165  Relations Union/Industrialised countries of North America, Far East and Australasia: trade relations and cooperation projects   0 0 1 External Relations 
CNS/2001/0113  Nuclear safety, Chernobyl: implementation of the Shelter Fund. 2nd report  0 0 1 External Relations 
CNS/2001/0223  
European Agency for reconstruction: extending to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia FYROM (amend. regul. 
2666/2000/EC, 2667/2000/EC)  
0 0 1 External Relations 
CNS/2002/0059  Afghanistan, sanctions: embargo, flight ban, freeze of funds of Taliban (repeal. regul. 467/2001/EC)  0 0 1 External Relations 
CNS/2002/0104  Palestine, refugees: aid to the countries in the Near East 2002-2005, 11th EC/UNRWA Convention  0 0 1 External Relations 
CNS/2003/0015  Afghanistan, sanctions: freezing of funds and economic resources, exemptions (amend. regul. 881/2002/EC)  0 0 2 External Relations 
CNS/2003/0110  Relations EU/non-industrialised regions: grants to specialised bodies, action programme 2004-2006  0 0 2 External Relations 
CNS/2003/0143  South-Eastern Europe Stability Pact: legal framework to financial assistance, UNMIK, OHR (amend. regul. 1080/2000/EC)   0 0 1 External Relations 
CNS/2003/0267 Relations EU/Western Balkan countries: partnerships in the framework of the stabilisation and the association process   0 0 1 External Relations 
CNS/2004/0133 European Agency for Reconstruction: extension of mandate and status until 31 December 2006 (amend. regul. 2667/2000/EC) 0 0 1 External Relations 
CNS/2004/0199 EC/Switzerland agreement: agreement on the Schengen acquis 0 0 1 External Relations 
CNS/2004/0200 
EC/Switzerland agreement: agreement on the criteria to determine the state responsible for the examination of an asylum application. 
Dublin Convention on Eurodac 
0 0 1 External Relations 
CNS/2004/0286 
External policy: restrictive measures directed against persons and entities constituting a threat to the peace in the Ivory Coast 
following the UN Security Council Resolution 1572 from 2004 
0 0 2 External Relations 
CNS/2004/0288 
Union/Industrialised non-member countries relations: bilateral cooperation and trade relations, extension to the 31 december 2007 
and budgetary provisions (regul. 382/2001/EC 
0 0 1 External Relations 
CNS/2005/0068 
External policy: freezing of funds and economic resources of persons designated by the United Nations as impeding the peace 
process in the Darfur region in Sudan 
0 0 2 External Relations 
CNS/2005/0133 
Technical assistance and information exchange Programme TAIEX: extension to the countries eligible for the European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument ENPI 
0 0 1 External Relations 
CNS/2006/0057 European Agency for Reconstruction: extension of mandate and status until 31 December 2008 (amend. regul. 2667/2000/EC) 0 0 1 External Relations 
CNS/2006/0807 
External assistance: a financing instrument for cooperation with industrialised countries and territories and other high-income 
countries and territories 
0 1 1 External Relations 
COD/1999/0194  Humanitarian aid: uprooted people in Asian and Latin American developing countries (exten. regul. 443/97/EC)  0 0 1 External Relations 
COD/2000/0034  EC Investment Partners financial instrument ECIP: closure and liquidation of projects (regul. 213/96/EC)  0 0 2 External Relations 
COD/2000/0062  Action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries  0 0 6 External Relations 
COD/2000/0338  Cooperation EC/Latin America and Asian countries: aid to uprooted people after 31/12/2000  0 1 1 External Relations 
COD/2003/0204  West Bank and Gaza Strip: financial and technical cooperation (amend. regul. 1734/94/EC)  0 1 1 External Relations 
COD/2003/0250  Development cooperation: democracy, rule of law, human rights (prorog. regul. 975/1999/EC)  0 0 1 External Relations 
COD/2004/0040  Cooperation EC/Asian and Latin America countries: aid to uprooted people after end 2004 (amend. regul. 2130/2001/EC)  0 1 1 External Relations 
COD/2004/0219 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument: enhanced cooperation and economic integration between the European Union 
and the partner countries (repeal. regul.1762/92/EEC, 1488/96/EC, 99/2000/EC, 1734/94/EC) 
0 1 4 External Relations 
COD/2004/0223 
Community external assistance: Stability instrument for the delivery of financial, economic and technical assistance to third countries 
and territories, EC Treaty 
1 1 5 External Relations 
COD/2006/0116 Development cooperation: European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 2007-2013  1 1 3 External Relations 
CNS/1999/0163  Common fisheries policy: closer dialogue with industry and groups concerned  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/1999/0169  EC/Angola fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 3 May 1999 to 2 May 2000  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/1999/0191  Control of certain fish diseases, especially the salmon (amend. direct. 93/53/EEC)  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/1999/0218  Common fisheries policy: collection and management of fisheries data, Community framework  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
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CNS/1999/0224  Fisheries: financial participation in the collection of data, the financing of studies and of pilot projects  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/1999/0231  Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation, NAFO: control measures of vessels of non-contracting parties  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/1999/0255  Conservation of fishery resources: protection of juveniles of marine organisms (5th amend. regul. 850/98/EC)  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2000/0071  Conservation of fishery resources : recovery of the stock of cod in the Irish Sea   0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2000/0094  EC/Mauritius fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 3 December 1999 to 2 December 2002   0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2000/0149  Fish stock conservation: technical measures for highly migratory species  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2000/0154  EC/Guinea fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 1st January 2000 to 31 December 2001  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2000/0171  Conservation of Antarctic marine living resources: catch documentation scheme for Dissostichus spp  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2000/0215  Conservation of fishery resources: protection of juveniles of marine organisms (6th amend. regul. 850/98/EC)  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2000/0253  Fish stock conservation: control measures for highly migratory species  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2000/0257  EC/Ivory Coast fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 1st July 2000 to 30th June 2003  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2000/0268  Fish stock conservation: management measures on highly migratory fish, Community financial contribution  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2000/0273  Common fisheries policy: control and inspection systems, Community financial contribution  0 0 3 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2000/0280  Fisheries resources: control in North-East Atlantic NEAFC, multilateral cooperation (amend. regul. 2791/99/EC)   0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2000/0287  EC/Equatorial Guinea fisheries agreement: protocol from 1st July 2000 to 30 June 2001   0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2000/0290  EC/Angola fisheries agreement: protocol for teh period from 3 May 2000 to 2 May 2002  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2000/0292  Conservation of fishery resources : recovery of the stock of cod in the Irish sea, measures for 2001   0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2000/0310  Fisheries sector: structural assistance, rules and arrangements (amend. regul. 2792/99/EC)   0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2001/0035  Fisheries sector: structural assistance, extension of the derogation to 30 June 2001 (regul. 2792/99/EC)  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2001/0088  EC/Comoros fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 28 February 2001 to 27 February 2004  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2001/0128  Fisheries sector and resources: fleet capacity and sustainable development, MAGP IV 12/2002 (amend. dec. 97/413/EC)  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2001/0129  Fisheries sector and resources: structural measures and sustainable development, FIFG (amend. regul. 2792/99/EC)  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2001/0161  EC/Madagascar fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 21st May 2001 to 20 May 2004  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2001/0163  EC/Morocco fisheries agreement: conversion of vessels and fishermen following the non-renewal of the agreement  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2001/0170  Conservation of fishery resources: tuna tracking and verification system, dolphin conservation 0 0 2 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2001/0200  Fisheries: extra costs due to remoteness of Azores, Madeira, Canary Is., Guyana, Réunion (amend. regul. 1587/98/CE)  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2001/0203  EC/Cape Verde fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 1st July 2001 to 30 June 2004 0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2001/0240  EC/Guinea-Bissau fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 16 June 2001 to 15 June 2006  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2001/0246  EC/Mauritania fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 1st August 2001 to 31 July 2006  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2001/0280  South-East Atlantic fisheries organisation: Convention on conservation and management of fisheries resources  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2001/0301  EC/Gabon fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 3 December 2001 to 2 December 2005  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2002/0034  EC/Guinea fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 1st January to 31st December 2002   0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2002/0036  EC/Seychelles fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 18 January 2002 to 17 January 2005  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2002/0053  Conservation of resources: specific access requirements to fishing for deep-sea stocks  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2002/0114  Common fisheries policy: conservation and sustainable exploitation (repl. regul. 9760/92/EEC)  0 0 2 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2002/0115  Fishing vessels: emergency measure for scrapping  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2002/0116  Fisheries sector: structural assistance, rules and arrangements (amend. regul. 2792/1999/EC)  0 0 5 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2002/0137  Conservation of Antartic marine living resources: fishing control (repeal. regul. 3943/90, 66/98, 1727/1999/EC)  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2002/0138  Conservation of Antarctic marine living resources: technical measures to fishing  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2002/0162  EC/Sao Tomé and Principe fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 1st June 2002 to 31 May 2005  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2002/0184  Conservation of Antarctic marine living resources: catch of Dissostichus spp (amend. regul. 1035/2001/EC)   0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2002/0186  Fish stock conservation: control measures for fishing for highly migratory species (amend. regul. 1936/2001/EC)  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2002/0189  Fish stock conservation: technical measures for highly migratory species (amend. regul. 973/2001/EC)  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2002/0198  Fish stock conservation: prohibition of removing fins of sharks on board vessels  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2002/0200  Conservation and management of fish stocks: statistical monitoring of bluefin tuna, swordfish and bigeye tuna  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2002/0237  EC/Angola fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 3 August 2002 to 2 August 2004  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2002/0238   EC/Senegal fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 1st July 2002 to 30 June 2006  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2002/0281  EC/Kiribati fisheries agreement: Western Pacific tuna fishing  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
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CNS/2002/0295  Fisheries management: areas and resources of Atlantic waters, 1986 enlargement (amend. regul. 2847/93/EEC)  0 0 2 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0049  EC/Guinea fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 1st January 2003 to 31st December 2003  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0062  Outermost regions: management of registered fishing fleets 0 0 2 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0074  EC/Mauritius fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 3 December 2002 to 2 December 2003  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0090  Conservation of fishery resources: cod, stock recovery  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0125  Fisheries: control North-East Atlantic convention area NEAFC, multilateral cooperation (amend. regul. 2791/99/EC)  0 0 2 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0137  Conservation of fish resources: recovery of the Northern hake stock  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0154 EC/Mozambique fisheries agreement: period from 1st January to 31st December 2006  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0157  EC/Morocco fisheries agreement: conversion of vessels and fishermen, extension time limits (amend. regul. 2561/2001/EC)  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0163  Conservation of fish resources: reduction of the quantity of by-catches of cetaceans (amend regul. 88/98/CE)  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0201  Conservation of marine environment: deep-water coral reefs and trawling (amend. regul. 850/98/EC)  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0202  
Fisheries: additional costs, remoteness of the Azores, Madeira, Canary Islands, Guyana, Réunion (amend. regul 1587/98 
579/2002/EC) 
0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0219  EC/Ivory Coast fisheries agreement: period from 1st July 2003 to 30th June 2004  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0227  EC/Guinea-Bissau fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 16th June 2001 to 15th June 2006  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0229  Conservation of fishery resources: exploitation in the Mediterranean Sea (amend. regul.2847/93/EC, 973/2001/EC)  0 1 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0236  EC/Denmark/Greenland fisheries agreement: period from 1st January 2004 to 31 December 2006. Modification of the 4th Protocol  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0238  Common Fisheries Policy CFP: establishment of Regional Advisory Councils  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0261  Aquaculture: sustainable development, Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance FIFG (amend. regul. 2792/99/EC)  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0281  Common fisheries policy CFP: control, Community financial contribution, 2004-2005 (repeal. dec. 2001/431/EC)  0 0 3 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0290  EC/Guinea fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 1st January 2004 to 31 December 2008   0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0318  Fisheries resources: recovery of the Southern hake and the Norway lobster stocks (amend. regul. 850/98/EC)  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2003/0327  Fisheries resources: recovery of the sole stocks in the Western Channel and the Bay of Biscay  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2004/0020  Environment: protection of deep-water coral reefs from trawling in Atlantic Ocean (amend. regul. 850/98/EC)  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2004/0058  EC/Cape Verde fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 1st July 2004 to 30 June 2005  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2004/0070  EC/Madagascar fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 1st January 2004 to 31st December 2006 0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2004/0071  EC/Mauritius fisheries agreement: protocol for the period from 3 December 2003 to 2 December 2007  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2004/0108  Fisheries: Community Fisheries Control Agency and control system (amend. regul. 2847/93/EC)  0 0 2 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2004/0169 Fisheries common policy: structural sector, European Fisheries Fund 1 1 4 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2004/0185 EC/Comoros fisheries agreement: extension of the protocol for the period from 28 February 2004 to 31st December 2004 0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2004/0211 Fisheries agreement EC/Ivory Coast: protocol for the period from 1st July 2004 to 30 June 2007 0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2004/0229 
Conservation of fishery resources: 15 years rebuilding plan for Greenland halibut in the waters of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
Organisation NAFO 
0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2004/0252 
Monitoring fisheries activities and conservation of fisheries resources: electronic recording and reporting of fishing activities, remote 
sensing 
0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2004/0268 
Protection of fauna: Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Programme AIDCP, conclusion by the European 
Community 
0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2005/0005 Fisheries sector: transfers of vessels to countries hit by the Tsunami in 2004 (amend. regul. 2792/1999/EC) 0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2005/0014 
Conservation of fishery resources: technical measures for the Baltic Sea, the Belts and the Sound (amend. regul. 1434/98/EC, repeal. 
regul. 88/98/EC) 
0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2005/0045 
Common Fisheries Policy CFP: Community financial measures for the implementation of the Fisheries Policy and of the Law of the 
Sea 
1 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2005/0092 EC/Comoros agreement: tuna fishing, protocol for the period from 1st January 2005 to 31st December 2010 0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2005/0136 
Fisheries control: Community financial contribution towards Member States programmes, inspection at sea and Information 
Technology networks, renewal for 2006 (amend. Dec. 2004/465/EC) 
0 0 2 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2005/0168 Fisheries agreement EC/Solomon Islands: Partnership Agreement initialled on the 28th january 2004 0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2005/0173 Fisheries agreement EC/Seychelles: protocol for the period from 18 January 2005 to 17 January 2011 0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2005/0201  Fisheries resources: recovery of the stock of European eel   0 0 2 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
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CNS/2005/0205 Common fisheries policy: management of fishing licences and the minimal information to be contained therein (repeal. 3090/93/EC) 0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2005/0206 Fisheries agreement EC/Micronesia: partnership agreement 0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2005/0249 Fisheries agreement EEC/Sao Tome and Príncipe: period from 1st June 2005 to 31st May 2006 0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2005/0280 EC/Morocco fisheries agreement: partnership agreement 0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2006/0002  Fisheries resources: recovery of the stocks of plaice and sole in the North Sea 0 0 2 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2006/0030 
Conservation of fisheries resources: technical measures for the conservation of stocks of highly migratory species of fish specially 
tunas and dolphins 
0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2006/0056  Aquaculture: protection of the aquatic environment from the risks associated with the use of alien and locally absent species  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2006/0122 
Fisheries EC/Cape Verde: Partnership Agreement for a sustainable fisheries policy and a responsible exploitation of fisheries 
resources 
0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2006/0156 EC/Gabon fisheries agreement: partnership agreement for the period from 3rd December 2005 to 2nd December 2011 0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2006/0190  Common fisheries policy: conservation and sustatinable exploitation, management of fishing fleet capacity (amend. 2371/202/EC)  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2006/0247 Fisheries: additional costs, remoteness of the Azores, Madeira, Canary Islands, Guyana, Réunion, compensation scheme 2007-2013 0 0 2 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2006/0262  EC/Denmark/Greenland fisheries agreement: fisheries partnership agreement 2006-2012  0 0 2 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
CNS/2007/0062 Partnership Agreement EC/Kiribati: fisheries  0 0 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
COD/2005/0223 Fishery statistics: data on landings of fishery products in Member States (repeal. regul. 1382/91/EEC)  0 1 1 Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
COD/2000/0032  Documents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission: right of public access  0 1 5 General Secretariat 
COD/2003/0039  Political parties at European level: statute and financing  0 1 4 General Secretariat 
CNS/1999/0111  Community law: application to the Canary Islands (amend. regul. 1911/91/EEC)   0 0 1 General Secretariat  
CNS/2000/0363  Expiry of the ECSC treaty: funds ECSC in liquidation and Assets of the coal and research fund  1 0 3 General Secretariat  
CNS/2000/0364  Expiry of the ECSC treaty: research programme of the coal and steel research fund, technical guidelines   1 0 3 General Secretariat  
CNS/2001/0061  Expiry of the ECSC treaty: financial consequences and research fund for coal and steel   1 0 3 General Secretariat  
CNS/2002/0203  Access to documents: opening to the public of the historical archives of the Community and the EAEC  0 0 2 General Secretariat  
CNS/2002/0298 Comitology: exercise of implementing powers conferred to the Commission (amend. dec. 1999/468/EC) 1 0 3 General Secretariat  
CNS/1998/0166  Public health: limitation of exposure of the general public to electromagnetic fields 0Hz-300GHz. Recommendation  0 0 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
CNS/1999/0092  Forest reproductive material: marketing (recasting direct. 66/404/EEC, 71/161/EEC)   0 0 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
CNS/1999/0219  Veterinary medicines: bovine somatotropine BST, placing on the market and administration (repeal. dec. 90/218/EEC)   0 0 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
CNS/2000/0036  Vine: marketing of material for the vegetative propagation (amend. direct. 68/193/EEC) 0 0 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
CNS/2000/0214  Measures for the control of classical swine fever (repl. direct. 80/217/EEC and CNS/1995/0298)  0 0 4 Health and Consumer Protection 
CNS/2001/0021  Protection of animals : welfare of intensively kept pigs and sows (amend. direct. 91/630/EEC) 0 0 2 Health and Consumer Protection 
CNS/2001/0801  Public health: drinking of alcohol by children and adolescents. Recommendation  0 0 3 Health and Consumer Protection 
CNS/2002/0079  Health and safety at work: application of legislation to self-employed workers  0 0 2 Health and Consumer Protection 
CNS/2002/0098  Public health: Union strategy on drugs 2000-2004, prevention and reduction of risks of drug dependence  0 0 2 Health and Consumer Protection 
CNS/2002/0229  Animal health requirements : bovine semen, trade and imports (amend. direct. 88/407/EEC)  0 0 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
CNS/2002/0232 Seeds, propagating and planting materials: Community comparative tests and trials (amend. 10 directives)  0 0 2 Health and Consumer Protection 
CNS/2002/0297  Ovine and caprine animals : registration and identification, traceability (amend. regul. 3508/92/EEC) 0 0 4 Health and Consumer Protection 
CNS/2002/0299  Animal diseases: foot and mouth disease (amend. direct. 92/46/EEC, repeal. direct. 85/511/EEC, dec. 84/531, 91/665/EEC)  0 0 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
CNS/2003/0171 Protection of animals during transport (amend. direct. 64/432/EC, 93/119/EEC, repeal. direct 91/628/EC)   0 0 4 Health and Consumer Protection 
CNS/2003/0224  Importation and transit of live ungulate animals: animal health rules (amend. direct. 90/426/EEC, 92/65/EEC)   0 0 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
CNS/2005/0062 Animal diseases and public health: measures for the control of avian influenza (repeal. direct. 92/40/EEC 0 0 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
CNS/2005/0063 Expenditure in the veterinary field: measures to combat avian influenza, Community financial assistance (amend. dec. 90/424/EEC) 0 0 2 Health and Consumer Protection 
CNS/2005/0099 Protection of animals: minimum rules for the protection of chickens kept for meat production  0 0 2 Health and Consumer Protection 
CNS/2005/0153 
Aquaculture, animal health: requirements for the market, the importation and the transit of animals and products, prevention and 
control of diseases (repeal. direct. 91/67/EEC, 93/53/EEC, 95/70/EEC) 
0 0 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
CNS/2005/0154 
Aquaculture, animal health: Community financial contributions in the veterinary field for fighting against animal diseases (amend. dec. 
90/424/EEC) 
0 0 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
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CNS/2006/0098 
Community policy on animal health: multi-annual eradication, control and monitoring programmes for animal diseases and zoonoses, 
integrated computerized veterinary system TRACES and ANIMO, information policy for food safety (amend. dec. 90/424/EEC) 
0 0 2 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/1992/0449  Safety and health at work: exposure of workers to mechanical vibrations  1 1 6 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/1992/0449A  Safety and health at work: exposure of workers to noise  1 1 6 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/1992/0449B  Safety and health at work: exposure of workers to optical radiations  1 1 5 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/1992/0449C  Safety and health at work: exposure of workers to electromagnetic fields  1 0 5 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/1995/0013B  Medical devices including blood and plasma derivates  0 0 4 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/1996/0112  Cocoa and chocolate products intended for human consumption 0 0 5 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/1998/0240  Pharmaceutical industry: marketing and Community procedure for designating orphan medicinal products  0 0 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/1998/0323  Animal diseases and public health: prevention and control of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies TSEs  0 0 5 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/1999/0158  Human consumption: food additives other than colours and sweeteners (amend. direct. 95/2/EC)  0 0 3 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/1999/0244  Tobacco: manufacture, presentation and sale of products (recast version direct. 89/622/EEC, 92/41/EEC, 90/239/EEC)   0 1 9 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/1999/0259  Animal nutrition: undesirable substances and products for the animal and human health (amend. direct. 1999/29/EC)  1 1 5 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2000/0068  Animal nutrition: official inspections, undesirable substances and products (amend. direct. 95/53/EC, 1999/29/EC)  0 0 3 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2000/0073  Protection of consumers: general product safety (rev. direct. 92/59/EEC)   0 1 5 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2000/0080  Food supplements: approximation of the laws of the member States  0 0 5 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2000/0119 Public health: Community action programme 2003-2008  0 1 4 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2000/0132  Stockfarming: prohibition of substances with hormonal or thyrostatic action, of beta-agonists (amend. direct. 96/22/EC)   0 1 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2000/0178  Protection of human health: hygiene of foodstuffs  1 1 5 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2000/0179  Protection of human health : food of animal origin, specific hygiene rules   1 1 6 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2000/0182  Products of animal origin, human consumption: health rules (amend. direct. 89/662/EEC, 91/67/EEC). Food hygiene package 0 0 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2000/0192  Public health : action programmes (exten. dec. 645/96/EC, 646/96/EC, 647/96/EC, 102/97/EC, 1400/97/EC, 1296/99/EC)  0 0 2 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2000/0221  Animal-health requirements: non commercial movement of pet animals (amend. direct. 92/65/EEC)  0 1 6 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2000/0230  Health police: animal wastes and by-products (amend. direct. 90/425/EEC, 92/118/EEC, dec. 94/278/CE)  0 0 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2000/0259  Health police: animal by-products not intended for human consumption, animal proteins in animal feed  0 1 4 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2000/0286  Food safety: law, European Food Authority, safety of food supply   1 1 3 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2000/0323  Public health and human blood: quality and safety of transfusion chain (amend. direct. 89/381/EEC)  0 1 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2001/0119  Tobacco products: advertising and sponsorship (repl. direct. 98/43/EC)  0 0 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2001/0173  Food safety: genetically modified food and feed  1 1 3 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2001/0176  Public health: monitoring of zoonoses and zoonotic agents (amend. dec. 90/424/EEC, repeal. direct. 92/117/EEC)  1 0 2 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2001/0177  Public health : control of salmonella and food-born zoonotic agents (amend. direct. 64/432/EEC, 72/462/EEC, 90/532/EEC)  1 0 3 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2001/0199  Health : indication of the ingredients in foodstuffs (amend. direct. 2000/13/EC)  1 1 3 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2002/0073  Food safety: additive in feedingstuffs and in drinking water for animal nutrition  1 1 5 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2002/0128 Medicine: standards of quality and safety of human tissues and cells  1 1 5 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2002/0141  Products of animal origin, human consumption: safety, controls (amend. direct. 89/662, 91/67/EEC). Hygiene package  0 1 6 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2002/0152  Human consumption: new sweeteners additives, sucralose and salt of aspartame (amend. direct. 94/35/EC)   1 1 5 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2002/0163  Food safety : smoke flavourings used on foods, authorisation procedure (direct. 88/388, regul. 178/2002/EC)  1 1 3 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2002/0201  Human health, food additives: conditions of use for E 425 konjac (amend. direct. 95/2/EC)   0 0 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2002/0274  Foodstuff: additives facilitating the storage and the use of flavourings (amend direct. 95/2/EC)  1 1 2 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2003/0020  Consumers: financing Community actions 2004-2007, general framework  1 1 4 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2003/0030  Food safety: feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules, official controls   0 1 5 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2003/0052  Pesticide: maximum levels of residue (repeal. direct. 76/895/EEC, 86/362/EEC, 86/363/EEC, 90/642/EEC, amend. 91/414/EEC)   0 1 5 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2003/0071  Animal feed: hygiene requirements and traceability of feed  0 1 3 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2003/0134  
Consumer protection : unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices (amend. direct. 84/450/EEC, 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC, 
2002/65/EC, regul. 2006/2004/EC)  
0 1 5 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2003/0162  Consumer protection: cross-border infringements, administrative and legal cooperation   0 1 4 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2003/0174  Public health: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control ECDC  1 1 5 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2003/0262  Protection of human health: addition of nutrients to food  0 1 5 Health and Consumer Protection 
  381 
COD/2004/0237 Human consumption: food additives other than colours and sweeteners and new sweeteners additives (amend95/2/EC and 94/35/EC) 0 1 3 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2004/0270 
Animal diseases and public health: prevention and control of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies TSEs, extension of the 
period for transitional measures (amend. regul. 999/2001/EC) 
0 1 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2004/0270B   Animal diseases and public health: prevention and control of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies TSEs (amend.999/2001/EC)  1 1 3 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2005/0042A  Public health: programme of Community action in the field of health, 2007-2013  1 1 7 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2005/0042B  Consumer: Programme of Community action in the field of consumer protection, 2007-2013   1 1 4 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2006/0117  
Compound feedingstuffs: trade and labelling, correction of  the legislation following the judgment of the Court of Justice of 6 
December 2005 (direct. 2002/2/EC amend. direct. 79/373/EEC)  
0 1 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2006/0193  
Protection of human health, addition of nutrients to food: reference to the new regulatory procedure with scrutiny in the implementing 
powers conferred on the Commission (dec. 2006/512/EC)  
0 1 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2006/0195  
Foodstuffs, nutrition or health claims used in labelling: reference to the new regulatory procedure with scrutiny in the implementing 
powers conferred on the Commission (dec. 2006/512/EC) 
1 1 2 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2006/0236  Internal market: ban the placing on the market and the import of or export of cat and dog fur and products containing such fur   0 1 1 Health and Consumer Protection 
COD/2003/0263  Financial services: new organisational structure of the committees (amend. 8 directives)  0 1 4 Health, Consumer Protection 
COD/2003/0272  Food safety: materials and articles intended to come into contact with food (repeal. direct. 89/109/EEC)  0 1 2 Health, Consumer Protection 
CNS/2000/0128  Information society, eContent: European digital content, linguistic diversity. 2001-2004 programme 0 0 3 Information Society 
CNS/2001/0829  Customs: information technology, files identification database. Initiative Germany, Belgium and France  0 0 2 Information Society 
COD/1996/0085  Intellectual property, original works of art: resale right for the benefit of the author  0 1 2 Information Society 
COD/1997/0337  Internet: multiannual action plan on promoting safer use   0 0 4 Information Society 
COD/2000/0183  Electronic communications: universal service, users' rights relating to networks and services  1 1 3 Information Society 
COD/2000/0184  Electronic communications: common regulatory framework for networks and services. Framework directive  1 1 3 Information Society 
COD/2000/0185  Telecommunications: unbundled access to local loops of operators having significant market power  0 0 2 Information Society 
COD/2000/0186  Electronic communications: access to networks and interconnection, new regulatory framework  1 1 3 Information Society 
COD/2000/0187  Radiocommunications, broadcasting, transport: radio spectrum, regulatory framework  1 1 3 Information Society 
COD/2000/0188  Electronic communications: authorisation of networks and services (repl. direct. 97/13/EC)  1 1 1 Information Society 
COD/2000/0189  Electronic communications: processing of personal data, protection of privacy (repl. direct. 97/66/EC)  1 1 4 Information Society 
COD/2000/0328  Internet: Top Level Domain .eu, implementation  1 1 3 Information Society 
COD/2001/0296  Telecommunications: trans-European networks, guidelines (rev. annex I dec. 1336/97/EC)  1 1 2 Information Society 
COD/2002/0071   Internet: 1999-2002 action plan on promoting a safer use (amend. dec. 276/1999/EC), extension to 2004   0 1 2 Information Society 
COD/2002/0123  Information market: re-use and commercial exploitation of public sector documents  0 1 1 Information Society 
COD/2002/0187  Information society, eEurope: good practices and network security, MODINIS programme 2003-2005   0 1 1 Information Society 
COD/2003/0032  Information society, eEurope 2005: European network and information security Agency  0 1 3 Information Society 
COD/2004/0023  Internet: 2005-2008 action programme on promoting a safer use, Safer Internet plus.  0 1 3 Information Society 
COD/2004/0025  European digital content: quality, access, use and exploitation, eContentplus. 2005-2008 programme.  0 1 3 Information Society 
COD/2004/0117  Audiovisual and information industries, competitiveness: protection of minors and human dignity and right of reply 0 1 5 Information Society 
COD/2005/0260  
Coordination of certain of the Member States' provisions concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities ("Audiovisual 
media services without frontiers") [amend. Directive 89/552/EEC and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004]  
0 1 5 Information Society 
COD/2006/0133  
Electronic communications: regulatory framework for networks and services, reductions on mobile roaming charges across the 
Community (amend. Dir. 2002/21/EC)  
1 1 4 Information Society 
CNS/2002/0308  Community trade mark (amend. regul. 40/94/EC)  0 0 2 Internal Market and Services 
COD/1997/0345  Professional qualifications, recognition: doctor, dentist, architect...(amend. direct. 89/48/EEC, 92/51/EEC)  0 1 3 Internal Market and Services 
COD/1998/0134  Community customs code (amend. regul. 2913/92/EEC)  0 0 3 Internal Market and Services 
COD/1999/0152  Money laundering: prevention of the use of the financial system (amend. direct. 91/308/EEC)   0 1 5 Internal Market and Services 
COD/1999/0153  Protection of personal data: application by the Community institutions of the directive 95/46/EC   0 1 1 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2000/0043  Companies: valuation of annual and consolidated accounts, financial information (amend. direct. 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC)   0 0 1 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2000/0115  Public procurement, service and works contracts: coordination of procedures for the award, classical directive  1 1 7 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2000/0117  Procurement water, energy, transport and postal sectors: coordination of procedures for award, utilities directive  1 1 6 Internal Market and Services 
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COD/2000/0139  Postal services: further opening to competition (amend. direct. 97/67/EC)   0 1 3 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2000/0213  Insurance: freedom of establishment and services of the intermediaries, protection of customers   0 0 7 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2000/0249  Life insurance: solvency margin for undertakings (amend. direct. 79/267/EEC)  1 1 2 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2000/0251  Non-life insurance: solvency margin for undertakings (amend. direct. 73/239/EEC)  1 1 2 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2000/0260  Institutions for occupational retirement, pension funds: laws, regulations and administrative provisions   0 1 6 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2001/0044  Capital market, financial services: application of international accounting standards  0 0 3 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2001/0086  European financial markets: financial collateral arrangements and legal certainty, consequences on the SMEs   0 0 3 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2001/0095  Financial markets and institutions: stability, prudential regulation, legal certainty (amend. directives)  0 0 4 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2001/0117  Capital market: prospectus to be published for securities (overhaul direct. 80/390/EEC, 89/298/EEC, 2001/34/EC)  0 1 4 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2001/0118  Financial markets: insider dealing and market abuse (repeal. direct. 89/592/EEC)  0 0 4 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2001/0174  Cross-border payments in euro: reducing bank charges  0 1 4 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2001/0281  Community statistics: 2003-2007 programme  0 0 4 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2002/0061  Professional qualifications: mutual recognition of the regulated professions to ensure free movement   0 1 8 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2002/0112  Insurance undertakings: annual and consolidated accounts and standards IAS (amend. direct. 78/660, 83/349, 91/674/EEC)   0 1 2 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2002/0122  Company law: access to informations, disclosure requirements (amend. direct.68/151/EEC)  0 0 1 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2002/0124  
Insurance of motor vehicles: civil liability, protection of victims of accidents, 5th car insurance directive (amend. direct. 72/166/EEC, 
84/5/EEC, 88/357/EEC, 90/232/EEC and 2000/26/EC)  
1 1 5 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2002/0240  Company law: takeover bids  0 1 1 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2002/0269  Investment services and regulated markets (amend. direct. 85/611/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 2000/12/EC)   0 1 6 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2003/0024  Intellectual property: enforcing the rights, measures and procedures  1 1 4 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2003/0045  Securities: issuers trading on a regulated market, transparency requirements (amend. direct. 2001/34/EC)  0 1 3 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2003/0277  Cross-border merges between various types of company with share capital   0 1 3 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2004/0001  
Internal market: freedom of establishment for service providers and free movement of services ("Bolkestein directive" or "Services 
Directive")  
1 1 10 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2004/0065  
Company law: statutory audit of annual and consolidated accounts (amend. direct. 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, repeal. direct. 
84/253/EEC)  
1 1 2 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2004/0097   Interior market: legal framework for reinsurance supervision (amend. direct. 73/239, 92/49/EEC, 98/787, 2002/83/EC) 0 1 3 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2004/0137  Money laundering: prevention of the use of the financial system, including terrorist financing (repeal. direct 91/308/EEC) 0 1 4 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2004/0250 
Company law: annual accounts and consolidated accounts of certain types of companies (amend. direct. 78/660/EEC, 
83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC, 91/674/EEC) 
1 1 3 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2004/0256 Company law: formation of public limited companies, maintenance and alteration of their capital (amend. direct. 77/91/EEC) 1 1 2 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2004/0258 
Pharmaceutical products: compulsory licensing of patents relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical products for export to 
countries with public health problems 
1 1 3 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2005/0111  
Markets in financial instruments: extending the transposition deadline for Member States and the compliance date for firms (amend. 
Direct. 2004/39/EC) 
0 1 2 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2005/0138  
Combating money laundering and terrorist financing: information on the payer accompanying transfers of funds, transposition of the 
Special Recommendation VII on ―wire transfers‖ (SR VII) of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) into Community legislation 
1 1 2 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2005/0245  
Community payments market: common framework for the integration and the rationalisation of national payment systems (amend. 
direct. 97/7/EC, 2000/12/EC and 2002/65/EC)  
1 1 4 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2005/0265  
Company law: exercise of voting rights by shareholders of companies having their registered office in a Member State and whose 
shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market, cross-border voting for investors (amend. direct. 2004/109/EC)  
1 1 4 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2006/0066  Public contracts: review procedures concerning the award (amend. Dir. 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC) (Remedies Directives)  1 1 4 Internal Market and Services 
COD/2006/0166  
Internal market: procedural rules and evaluation criteria for the prudential assessment of acquisitions and increase of shareholdings in 
the financial sector (amend. Dir. 92/49/EC, 2002/83/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2005/68/EC and 2006/48/EC)  
1 1 3 Internal Market and Services 
CNS/1997/0191B  Cooperation, third countries: democracy, rule of law, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms   0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/1999/0102  
Civil and commercial judicial cooperation: transmission and service of documents between the Member States, Brussels and The 
Hague conventions  
0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/1999/0110  Civil judicial cooperation: judgments in matrimonial matters and parental responsability, Brussels II Convention   0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
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CNS/1999/0116  Asylum: Eurodac system for the comparison of the fingerprints of applicants and foreigners, Dublin Convention  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/1999/0154 Civil and commercial judicial cooperation, enforcement of judgments: Brussels I, Lugano Conventions   0 0 3 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/1999/0187  European monitoring centre for drugs and addiction EMCDDA: assistance to applicant countries (amend. regul. 302/93/EEC)  0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/1999/0203  EC/Norway agreement: participation in the work of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction EMCDDA 0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/1999/0258  Immigration policy: Third-country nationals, right to family reunification  0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/1999/0274  Refugees, displaced persons, asylum-seekers: creating a European Refugee Fund  0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/1999/0804  Controls at borders: fight against counterfeit travel documents. Initiative Germany  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/1999/0806  Judicial cooperation in civil matters: undertakings, insolvency proceedings with cross-border implications  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/1999/0809  Judicial cooperation in criminal matters : mutual assistance between State members. Convention  0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/1999/0821  Euro: protection by penal sanctions against counterfeiting and falsification. Framework decision  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/1999/0822  Combat child pornography on the Internet. Initiative Austria  0 0 5 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/1999/0824  Combating crime: money laundering, financial intelligence units (direct. 91/308/EEC). Initiative Finland.  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0030  Visas: third countries whose nationals are subject to or exempt from a visa requirement (repl. regul. 574/99/EC)  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0081  Common European security and defence policy ESDP: rapid reaction facility  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0127  Displaced persons: temporary protection in the event of a mass influx, member States' admission   0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0238  Asylum: granting and withdrawing refugee status, minimum standards on procedures, Common European Asylum System  0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0240  Judicial cooperation: European network in civil and commercial matters, access to justice  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0304  Fight against organised crime: financial support, programme for the prevention, Hippocrates   0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0339  Judicial cooperation: exchange programme for legal practitioners, Grotius II general and criminal  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0340  Police cooperation: exchange programme for law enforcement athorities of the Member States, Oisin II  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0341  Combating trade in human beings and the sexual exploitation of children: 2nd phase of the programme Stop II  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0804  Data protection: establishment of a secretariat for the joint supervisory bodies   0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0809  European police Office, Europol : art. 2 and annex, Protocolon money laundering. Initiative Portugal  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0810  Free movement of persons: national long-stay visa. Initiative France  0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0811  Police cooperation: establishment of the European Police College CEPOL. Initiative Portugal  0 0 3 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0813  Freedom, security and justice: standing of victims in criminal procedures. Framework decision. Initiative Portugal  0 0 4 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0814  Combating crime: money laundering, confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds. Framework decision. Initiative France  0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0816  Judicial cooperation: creation of a provisional Unit. Initiative Portugal, France, Sweden and Belgium 0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0817  Fight against organised crime, judicial cooperation: unit Eurojust. Initiative Portugal, France, Sweden, Belgium  0 0 3 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0818  Judicial cooperation: rights of access to children, mutual enforcement of judgments. Initiative France  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0823  Judicial cooperation: taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters. Initiative Germany  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0824  Prevention of crime : European network. Initiative France and Sweden  0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0825  Police cooperation: European system of laboratories for analyses of synthetic drugs. Initiative Sweden  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2000/0826  Fight against drugs: transmission of samples of illegal narcotic substances. Initiative Sweden  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0024  Combating trafficking in human beings: offences, penalties and sanctions, liability in criminal matters. Framework decision  0 0 4 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0025 Combating the sexual exploitation of children and child pornography: criminal offences, penalties and sanctions. Framework decision  0 0 5 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0055  Ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin: common organisation of the market CMO  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0074  Immigration: third-country nationals legally residents since 5 years, long-term resident status   0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0081  Visas: uniform format for forms for affixing visa for travel documents which are not recognised  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0082  Third-country nationals: uniform format for residence permits  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0091 Asylum: reception of applicants, minimum standards  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0109  European judicial area in civil matters: implementation, general framework for activities  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0114  Combating illicit drug trafficking: criminal acts and penalties, minimum provisions. Framework decision   0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0182  Asylum: Member State responsible for examining an application lodged by a third-country national  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0207  Asylum: refugee status for third-country nationals and stateless persons, minimum standards  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0215  Judicial cooperation: European arrest warrant and surrender procedures between Member States replacing extradition.  0 0 4 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0217  Judicial and police cooperation: combating terrorism. Framework decision  0 0 5 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0230  External borders, visas, asylum and immigration: action programme 2002-2006 for administrative cooperation ARGO  0 0 3 Justice, Freedom and Security 
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CNS/2001/0232  Visas: uniform format (amend. regul. 1683/95/EC)  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0262  Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters: framework programme AGIS for 2003-2007  0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0803  Judicial cooperation: orders freezing assets or evidence. Framework decision. Initiative France, Sweden and Belgium  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0807  Europol: transmission of personal data to third States and third bodies. Initiative Sweden  0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0817  International crime : fight against serious forms, extending Europol mandate. Initiative Belgium and Sweden  0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0821  Police cooperation: joint investigation teams. Framework decision. Initiative Belgium, France, Spain and United Kingdom  0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0824  Security in connection with football matches with an international dimension. Initiative Belgium  0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0825  Judicial cooperation: financial penalties, mutual recognition. Framework decision. Initiative France, Sweden and United Kingdom   0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0826  Judicial cooperation : genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, European network. Initiative Netherlands  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2001/0828  Schengen : amending article 40 (1) and (7)of the convention. Initiative Belgium, Spain and France  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2002/0020  Access to justice, cross-border disputes: legal aid, financial aspects of civil proceedings  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2002/0043  Illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings: short term residence permit issued to victims   0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2002/0086  Criminal judicial cooperation: attacks against information systems and communication networks. Framework decision  0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2002/0110  Civil judicial cooperation: divorce and parental responsibility (repeal. regul. 1347/2000/EC, amend. regul. 44/2001/EC) 0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2002/0242  Third-country nationals: migration for the purpose of studies, vocational training or voluntary service  0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2002/0247  Area of freedom, security and justice: compensation to crime victims  0 0 4 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2002/0280  Visas: third countries whose nationals are subject to or exempt from a visa requirement (amend. regul. 539/2001/EC)  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2002/0801  Security: European network for the protection of public figures. Initiative Spain   0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2002/0808  Terrorism : police and judicial cooperation (Common position 2001/931/CFSP). Initiative Spain  0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2002/0809  Fight against terrorism: implementation of national legal provisions. Initiative Spain  0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2002/0810  Schengen: issue of visas at the border, seamen in transit. Initiative Spain  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2002/0812  Terrorism: new functions for the Schengen information System SIS II. Initiative Spain  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2002/0813  Terrorism: new functions for the Schengen information System SIS II. Initiative Spain  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2002/0815  Police cooperation: common use of liaison officers posted abroad by member States. Initiative Denmark  0 0 4 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2002/0816  Combating organized crime, judicial cooperation: execution of confiscation orders. Framework decision. Initiative Denmark  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2002/0817  Combating crime: combating corruption in the private sector. Framework decision. Initiative Denmark  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2002/0818  
Combating organized crime: confiscation of crime-related proceeds, instrumentalities and property. Framework decision. Initiative 
Denmark 
0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2002/0819  Judicial cooperation : investigation and prosecution for war crimes or crimes against humanity. Initiative Denmark  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2003/0026  Enlargement, Kaliningrad: FTD, FRTD and the common consular instructions and the common manual  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2003/0027  2004 enlargement, Kaliningrad: uniform formats for FTD and FRTD   0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2003/0061  Visas: facilitating procedures for members of the Olympic family taking part in the 2004 Games in Athens  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2003/0088  Ship-source pollution: judicial cooperation to repress offences, criminal-law framework. Framework decision   0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2003/0215 Combat against drugs: information exchange, risk assessment, control on new narcotic and synthetic drugs  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2003/0258  External borders, illegal immigration: date stamping of travel documents of third-country nationals  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2003/0273  External borders: Agency for the management of operational co-operation FRONTEX  0 0 4 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2003/0284  Illegal migrations: secure web-based information network for migration management  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2003/0801  Third-countries nationals: removal by air, assistance in cases of transit. Initiative Germany  0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2003/0805  Court of justice: transfer of direct actions to the Court of 1st instance (amend. articles 51 and 54 Statute)  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2003/0807  Schengen: Sirene Manual, regulation on procedures for amending. Initiative Greece 0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2003/0808  Schengen: Sirene manual, decision on procedures for amending. Initiative Greece   0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2003/0809  Combating illegal immigration: obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data. Initiative Spain  1 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2003/0815  Free movement of persons: signs at external border crossing points. Initiative Greece   0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2003/0817  Immigration: creation of a liaison officers network. Initiative Greece  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2004/0029  Visa information system VIS: establishment, information exchange between Member States  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2004/0032  European Refugee Fund: period 2005-2010 (dec. 2000/596/EC)  0 0 4 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2004/0069  Terrorism: exchange of information on terrorist offences while respecting the Charter of Fundamental Rights  0 0 4 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2004/0122 External borders, visas, asylum and immigration: action programme 2002-2006 ARGO (amend. dec. 2002/463/EC) 0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
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CNS/2004/0141 
Visas: nationals of a Member state, reciprocity mechanism to be used by a third country on the list in Annex II (amend. regul. 
539/2001/EC) 
0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2004/0215 
Police cooperation: establish the European Police College CEPOL as a body of the European Union, purpose, objectives and tasks 
(repeal. dec. 2000/820/JHA) 
0 0 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2004/0238 Criminal judicial cooperation: exchange of information extracted from the criminal record between the Member states 0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2004/0801 European Police College CEPOL: grant of legal personality (amend. dec. 2000/820/JHA). Initiative Ireland  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2004/0802  Police cooperation: European Police College CEPOL (amend. dec. 2000/0820/JHA). Initiative United Kingdom  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2004/0803  Fight against cross-border vehicle crime. Initiative Netherlands  0 1 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2004/0812 
Fight against criminality: exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States. 
Framework decision. Sweden initiative 
0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2004/0816 
Visas, asylum, immigration: passage to qualified majority voting and to co-decision (art. 251) for certains areas covered by title IV of 
Part three of the EC Treaty 
0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2004/0817 
Euro: designating Europol as the Central Office for combating counterfeiting. Initiative Germany, Spain, France, Italy, United Kingdom, 
Northern Ireland 
0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2005/0031 Asylum: state responsible for examining a request lodged in a Member State, Protocol to the EC/Iceland and Norway agreement 0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2005/0034 
General programme "Security and Safeguarding Liberties": specific Programme "Prevention, preparedness and consequence 
management of terrorism", 2007-2013 
1 1 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2005/0035 General programme "Security and Safeguarding Liberties": specific programme "Prevention and fight against crime, 2007-2013 1 1 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2005/0038 General Programme "Fundamental rights and justice": specific programme "Fundamental rights and citizenship", 2007-2013 1 1 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2005/0039 General Programme "Fundamental rights and justice": specific programme "Criminal Justice", 2007-2013 1 1 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2005/0048  
General programme "Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows": European Fund for the Integration of Third-country nationals, 
2007-2013  
1 1 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2005/0103  
Schengen: legal framework for governing the establishment, the operation and the use of the second generation information system, 
SIS II  
1 1 3 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2005/0124 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights: establishment, role and mandate replacing the European Monitoring Centre on 
Racism and Xenophobia EUMC (repeal. regul. 1037/97/EC) 
1 1 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2005/0125 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights: pursuing actions on police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters, Treaty TEU 
Title VI  
1 1 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2005/0202  
Fight against terrorism: processing and protection of personal data in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. Framework decision  
1 1 3 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2005/0204 Asylum and immigration policy: mutual information procedure concerning Member States measures in these areas 0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2005/0232  
Combating terrorism and internal security: access for consultation of the Visa Information System VIS by the authorities of Member 
States and by Europol  
1 1 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2005/0234 
Foreign policy: freezing of funds and economic resources, restrictive measures against persons suspected of involvement in the 
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in Lebanon 
0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2005/0808 
Police cooperation: common use of Europol liaison officers posted abroad by the law enforcement agencies of the Member States 
(amending Dec. 2003/170/JHA). Initiative United Kingdom, Northern Ireland 
0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2006/0022 
Visas: listing of the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of Member 
States and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (amend. regul. 539/2001/EC) 
0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2006/0806  Security in connection with football matches with an international dimension (amend. dec. 2002/348/JHA). Initiative Austria   0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2001/0111  Union citizenship : free movement and residence for citizens and their families within the Member States' territory  0 0 6 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2002/0090  Civil judicial cooperation: European enforcement order for uncontested claims  0 0 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2003/0025  Daphne II programme 2004-2008: combating violence against children, young people and women  0 1 4 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2003/0168  Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters: cross-border disputes, non-contractual obligations, Rome II  1 1 6 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2003/0198  Schengen Convention: access for vehicle registration authorities to the Information System SIS, amending the Convention  0 1 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2004/0055  Civil judicial cooperation : recovery of uncontested claims, European order for payment procedure 0 1 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2004/0063   Scientific research: admission of third-country national researchers to the Community, uniform visas   1 1 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2004/0127  External and internal borders: Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders 1 1 5 Justice, Freedom and Security 
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COD/2005/0006  
Free movement of persons: local border traffic at external borders of the Member States and establishment of a special "L" visa, 
amending the Schengen Conventions and the Common Consular Instructions  
0 1 4 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2005/0020  Judicial cooperation in civil matters: simplified and accelerated settlement of small claims litigation  1 1 3 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2005/0037A General programme "Fundamental Rights and Justice": specific programme "Fight against violence (Daphne III)", 2007-2013 1 1 6 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2005/0037B  General programme "Fundamental Rights and Justice": specific programme "drugs prevention and information", 2007-2013  1 1 7 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2005/0040  General Programme "Fundamental rights and justice": specific programme "Civil Justice", 2007-2013   1 1 6 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2005/0046  General programme "Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows": European refugee Fund, 2008-2013  1 1 6 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2005/0047  
General programme "Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows": External borders fund, 2007-2013, implementation of the 
common integrated border management system  
1 1 7 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2005/0049  
General programme "Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows": European Return Fund, 2007-2013, voluntary or forced return 
of illegally residing third country-nationals  
1 1 7 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2005/0104 
Schengen: access to the Second Generation Information System, SIS II, by the services in the Member States responsible for issuing 
vehicle registration certificates  
1 1 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2005/0106  
Schengen: legal framework governing in respect of matters falling with the scope of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
or EC Treaty the establishment, the operation and the use of the second generation information system, SIS II  
1 1 5 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2005/0126  
Judicial cooperation in civil or commercial matters: transmission and service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial 
documents (amend. Reg. 1348/2000/EC)  
0 1 2 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2005/0158 
External borders: simplified regime for control of persons, unilateral recognition by new Member States of documents issued by 
Schengen States as equivalent to their national visas for the purpose of transit (regul. 539/2001/EC) 
0 1 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2005/0159 
External borders: recognition by new Member States and Schengen States of residence permits issued by Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein as equivalent to their national visas for the purpose of transit (regul. 539/2001/EC) 
0 1 1 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2005/0166 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction EMCDDA (recast regul. 302/93/EEC)  0 1 4 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2005/0182  
Electronic communications: personal data protection rules and availability of traffic data for anti-terrorism purposes (amend. direct. 
2002/58/EC) 
0 1 4 Justice, Freedom and Security 
COD/2006/0140  External borders: creation of rapid border intervention teams (amend. regul. 2007/2004/EC)   0 1 3 Justice, Freedom and Security 
CNS/2003/0280  European Civil Service Tribunal: judicial panel to the Court of First Instance  0 0 2 Personel and Administration 
CNS/2002/0100  Staff Regulations of EC officials: amending the Regulations   0 0 5 Personnel and Administration 
CNS/2000/0307  Agricultural products: measures for the benefit of french overseas departments (amend. regul. 3763/91/EEC)   0 0 1 Regional Policy 
CNS/2000/0313  Agricultural products: measures for the benefit of french overseas departments  1 0 2 Regional Policy 
CNS/2001/0058  Instrument for structural policies for pre-accession ISPA (amend. regul. 1267/99/EC)  0 0 1 Regional Policy 
CNS/2002/0228 European Union Solidarity Fund: major natural disasters  0 0 1 Regional Policy 
CNS/2006/0194 International Fund for Ireland: Community financial contributions 2007-2010 1 0 1 Regional Policy 
CNS/2001/0054  European research area: research and training activities, framework programme EURATOM 2002-2006  0 0 3 Research 
CNS/2001/0122  Research RTD, 6th EC Framework-programme 2002-2006: strengthening the European Research Area  1 0 3 Research 
CNS/2001/0123  Research RTD, 6th EC Framework-programme 2002-2006: structuring the European Research Area  1 0 1 Research 
CNS/2001/0124  Research RTD, 6th framework-programme 2002-2006: Joint research Centre JRC, direct actions, EC programme  1 0 2 Research 
CNS/2001/0125  Research RTD, 6th framework- programme 2002-2006: nuclear energy, Euratom programme 1 0 1 Research 
CNS/2001/0126  Research RTD, 6th Framework-programme 2002-2006: direct actions, Joint Research Centre JRC, Euratom programme   1 0 1 Research 
CNS/2001/0327  RTD Euratom framework programme 2002-2006 : participation of undertakings, research centres and universities  0 0 3 Research 
CNS/2004/0061  Scientific research: admission to the Community by third-country national researchers, improving mobility  1 0 1 Research 
CNS/2004/0062  Scientific research: admission of third-country national researchers to the Community, application measures  1 0 1 Research 
CNS/2005/0044 Nuclear research: 7th framework programme Euratom for nuclear research and training activities, 2007-2011 1 1 2 Research 
CNS/2005/0184 Research RTD, 7th EC Framework Programme 2007-2013: specific programme through direct activities by the Joint Research Centre 1 0 1 Research 
CNS/2005/0185 Research RTD, 7th EC Framework Programme 2007-2013: trans-national Cooperation specific programme on policy-defined themes 1 0 1 Research 
CNS/2005/0186 Research RTD, 7th EC Framework Programme 2007-2013: specific programme Ideas, frontier research 1 0 2 Research 
CNS/2005/0187 
Research RTD, 7th EC Framework Programme 2007-2013: People specific programme for supporting the training and the career 
development of researchers 
1 0 3 Research 
CNS/2005/0188 Research RTD, 7th EC Framework Programme 2007-2013: Capacities specific programme for European research and innovation 1 0 2 Research 
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CNS/2005/0189 
Research RTD, 7th Euratom Framework Programme 2007-2011: specific programme through direct actions by the Joint Research 
Centre JRC 
1 0 1 Research 
CNS/2005/0190 Research RTD, 7th Euratom Framework Programme 2007-2011: fusion energy, nuclear fission and radiation protection programme 1 0 1 Research 
CNS/2006/0014 
Research RTD, 7th Euratom Framework Programme 2007-2011: participation of undertakings, research centres and universities, 
dissemination of research results 
1 0 1 Research 
CNS/2006/0802 
Nuclear safety and security: establishing an instrument for nuclear safety, radiation protection and safeguards of nuclear materials in 
third countries, EAEC Treaty 
0 1 3 Research 
COD/2001/0053  European research area: activities within the scope of the EC framework programme 2002-2006  1 1 8 Research 
COD/2001/0202  Research RTD, 6th framework programme 2002-2006: results dissemination, participation of undertakings and universities  1 1 5 Research 
COD/2002/0211  Combating AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis: research partnership Europe/developing countries  0 1 3 Research 
COD/2003/0124   Asylum and migration : programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries, 2004-2008  0 1 1 Research 
COD/2003/0147  Pan-European eGovernment services and networks: interoperable delivery, programme IDABC 2005-2009, follow-up IDA II   0 1 1 Research 
COD/2005/0043 Research RTD, 7th EC framework programme 2007-2013: research, technological development and demonstration activities  1 1 12 Research 
COD/2005/0277  Research RTD, 7th EC framework programme 2007-2013: participation of undertakings, research centres and universities  1 1 2 Research 
CNS/2000/0148 Value added tax VAT: services supplied by electronic mean (amend. direct. 77/388/EEC)   0 0 1 Taxation and Customs Union 
CNS/2000/0223  Value added tax VAT: length of application of the current minimum standard rate, 2001-2005 (amend. direct. 77/388/EEC)  0 0 1 Taxation and Customs Union 
CNS/2000/0289  Value added tax VAT: conditions laid down for invoicing (amend. direct. 77/388/EEC)  0 0 1 Taxation and Customs Union 
CNS/2000/0337  European Commission, administrative reform: management of Community programmes, statute of executive agencies  0 0 2 Taxation and Customs Union 
CNS/2001/0063  Manufactured tobacco: structure and rates of excise duty (amend. direct. 92/79/EEC, 92/80/EEC, 95/59/EC)   0 0 3 Taxation and Customs Union 
CNS/2001/0133  Value added tax VAT: administrative cooperation (repl. regul. 218/92/EEC)  0 0 1 Taxation and Customs Union 
CNS/2001/0164  Taxes: taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments. Tax package  0 0 1 Taxation and Customs Union 
CNS/2001/0284  Canary Islands: arrangements concerning the tax on imports and exchanges AIEM  0 0 1 Taxation and Customs Union 
CNS/2002/0286 Gas and electricity: VAT rules on the place of supply (amend. direct. 77/388/EEC)  0 0 1 Taxation and Customs Union 
CNS/2003/0075  Excise duty: lower rates on tobacco products for consumption in Corsica (amend. direct. 92/79/EEC, 92/80/EEC)  0 0 1 Taxation and Customs Union 
CNS/2003/0120  Value added tax VAT: measures for derogation, implementing powers (amend. direct. 77/388/EEC)  0 0 1 Taxation and Customs Union 
CNS/2003/0169  Value added tax VAT: reduced rates (amend. direct. 77/388/EEC)   0 0 1 Taxation and Customs Union 
CNS/2003/0179  Companies taxation: parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, common system (direct. 90/435/EEC)  0 0 1 Taxation and Customs Union 
CNS/2003/0239  
Companies of different Member States: taxation of mergers, divisions, transfers of assets, exchanges of shares (amend. direct. 
90/434/EC) 
0 0 1 Taxation and Customs Union 
CNS/2004/0027  EC/Switzerland agreement: taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments (direct. 2003/48/EC)  0 0 1 Taxation and Customs Union 
CNS/2005/0019 
Value added taxe VAT: simplify the procedure, assist in countering tax evasion and avoidance, repealing decisions granting 
derogations (amend. direct. 77/388/EEC) 
0 0 1 Taxation and Customs Union 
CNS/2005/0051 
Common system of value added tax VAT: length of time during which the minimum standard rate is to be applied (amend. Direct. 
77/388/EEC) 
0 0 2 Taxation and Customs Union 
CNS/2006/0245 Value added tax VAT: radio and television broadcasting services and electronically supplied services  (amend. direct. 2002/38/EC) 0 0 1 Taxation and Customs Union 
COD/2001/0185  Excisable products: computerised intra-Community movement system  0 0 4 Taxation and Customs Union 
COD/2002/0015  Indirect taxation in the internal market: Fiscalis programme 2003-2007  0 0 3 Taxation and Customs Union 
COD/2002/0029  Customs: action programme Customs 2007, 2003-2007   0 0 2 Taxation and Customs Union 
COD/2002/0132  Prevention of money laundering: controls of cash entering or leaving the Community  0 1 5 Taxation and Customs Union 
COD/2003/0167  Community customs code: treatments, controls and risk-related informations (amend. regul. 2913/92/EC) 0 0 4 Taxation and Customs Union 
COD/2006/0075  Customs 2013: action programme for customs in the Community  1 1 1 Taxation and Customs Union 
COD/2006/0076  Fiscalis 2013: Community programme to improve the operation of taxation systems in the internal market  1 1 3 Taxation and Customs Union 
CNS/2001/0131  Generalised tariff preferences: period from 1st January 2002 to 31 December 2004   0 0 1 Trade 
CNS/2003/0259  Generalised tariff preferences: extension to 31 December 2005 (amend. regul. 2501/2001/EC)  1 0 1 Trade 
CNS/2004/0242 
Scheme of generalised tariff preferences GSP: implementing guidelines for the period 2006-2015 from 1st July 2005 to 31st 
December 2008 
0 0 3 Trade 
 
